The Leviathan ebook of Thomas Hobbes from the archives Library of the Euro British Americas Coalition

 

Euro British Coalition Out-of-copyright and rare content library                             

The Leviathan
by Mr. Thomas Hobbes


In "the state of nature" (the absence of the rule of law), Mans life is "nasty, brutish and short" Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan)

We'd venture to add this also applies under the wrong regimes certainly too possibly!
www.britishcanada.org

The Project Gutenberg EBook of Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost


LEVIATHAN

By Thomas Hobbes

1651

LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER, FORME, & POWER OF A COMMON-WEALTH
ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVILL

Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury

Printed for Andrew Crooke, at the Green Dragon in St. Paul's Churchyard,
1651.


TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES ON THE E-TEXT:

This E-text was prepared from the Pelican Classics edition of Leviathan,
which in turn was prepared from the first edition. I have tried to
follow as closely as possible the original, and to give the flavour of
the text that Hobbes himself proof-read, but the following differences
were unavoidable.

Hobbes used capitals and italics very extensively, for emphasis, for
proper names, for quotations, and sometimes, it seems, just because.

The original has very extensive margin notes, which are used to show
where he introduces the definitions of words and concepts, to give in
short the subject that a paragraph or section is dealing with, and to
give references to his quotations, largely but not exclusively biblical.
To some degree, these margin notes seem to have been intended to serve
in place of an index, the original having none. They are all in italics.

He also used italics for words in other languages than English, and
there are a number of Greek words, in the Greek alphabet, in the text.

To deal with these within the limits of plain vanilla ASCII, I have done
the following in this E-text.

I have restricted my use of full capitalization to those places where
Hobbes used it, except in the chapter headings, which I have fully
capitalized, where Hobbes used a mixture of full capitalization and
italics.

Where it is clear that the italics are to indicate the text is quoting,
I have introduced quotation marks. Within quotation marks I have
retained the capitalization that Hobbes used.

Where italics seem to be used for emphasis, or for proper names, or just
because, I have capitalized the initial letter of the words. This has
the disadvantage that they are not then distinguished from those that
Hobbes capitalized in plain text, but the extent of his italics would
make the text very ugly if I was to use an underscore or slash.

Where the margin notes are either to introduce the paragraph subject,
or to show where he introduces word definitions, I have included them as
headers to the paragraph, again with all words having initial capitals,
and on a shortened line.

For margin references to quotes, I have included them in the text,
in brackets immediately next to the quotation. Where Hobbes included
references in the main text, I have left them as he put them, except to
change his square brackets to round.

For the Greek alphabet, I have simply substituted the nearest ordinary
letters that I can, and I have used initial capitals for foreign
language words.

Neither Thomas Hobbes nor his typesetters seem to have had many
inhibitions about spelling and punctuation. I have tried to reproduce
both exactly, with the exception of the introduction of quotation marks.

In preparing the text, I have found that it has much more meaning if
I read it with sub-vocalization, or aloud, rather than trying to read
silently. Hobbes' use of emphasis and his eccentric punctuation and
construction seem then to work.


TO MY MOST HONOR'D FRIEND Mr. FRANCIS GODOLPHIN of GODOLPHIN

HONOR'D SIR.

Your most worthy Brother Mr SIDNEY GODOLPHIN, when he lived, was pleas'd to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me, as you know,
with reall testimonies of his good opinion, great in themselves, and the
greater for the worthinesse of his person. For there is not any vertue
that disposeth a man, either to the service of God, or to the service
of his Country, to Civill Society, or private Friendship, that did not
manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by necessity,
or affected upon occasion, but inhaerent, and shining in a generous
constitution of his nature. Therefore in honour and gratitude to him,
and with devotion to your selfe, I humbly Dedicate unto you this my
discourse of Common-wealth. I know not how the world will receive it,
nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. For in a
way beset with those that contend on one side for too great Liberty, and
on the other side for too much Authority, 'tis hard to passe between the
points of both unwounded. But yet, me thinks, the endeavour to advance
the Civill Power, should not be by the Civill Power condemned; nor
private men, by reprehending it, declare they think that Power too
great. Besides, I speak not of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the
Seat of Power, (like to those simple and unpartiall creatures in the
Roman Capitol, that with their noyse defended those within it, not
because they were they, but there) offending none, I think, but those
without, or such within (if there be any such) as favour them. That
which perhaps may most offend, are certain Texts of Holy Scripture,
alledged by me to other purpose than ordinarily they use to be by
others. But I have done it with due submission, and also (in order to
my Subject) necessarily; for they are the Outworks of the Enemy, from
whence they impugne the Civill Power. If notwithstanding this, you find
my labour generally decryed, you may be pleased to excuse your selfe,
and say that I am a man that love my own opinions, and think all true I
say, that I honoured your Brother, and honour you, and have presum'd on
that, to assume the Title (without your knowledge) of being, as I am,

Sir,

Your most humble, and most obedient servant, Thomas Hobbes.

Paris APRILL 15/25 1651.



CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS

THE FIRST PART

OF MAN

INTRODUCTION

1. OF SENSE

2. OF IMAGINATION

3. OF THE CONSEQUENCES OR TRAIN OF IMAGINATIONS

4. OF SPEECH

5. OF REASON AND SCIENCE

6. OF THE INTERIOUR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS, COMMONLY CALLED THE
PASSIONS; AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED

7. OF THE ENDS OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE

8. OF THE VERTUES, COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUALL, AND THEIR CONTRARY
DEFECTS

9. OF THE SEVERALL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE

10. OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR, AND WORTHINESSE

11. OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS

12. OF RELIGION

13. OF THE NATURALL CONDITION OF MANKIND AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY
AND MISERY

14. OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURALL LAWES, AND OF CONTRACT

15. OF OTHER LAWES OF NATURE

16. OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS PERSONATED

THE SECOND PART

OF COMMON-WEALTH

17. OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A COMMON-WEALTH

18. OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY INSTITUTION

19. OF SEVERALL KINDS OF COMMON-WEALTH BY INSTITUTION; AND OF SUCCESION
TO THE SOVERAIGN POWER

20. OF DOMINION PATERNALL, AND DESPOTICALL

21. OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS

22. OF SYSTEMES SUBJECT, POLITICALL, AND PRIVATE

23. OF THE PUBLIQUE MINISTERS OF SOVERAIGN POWER

24. OF THE NUTRITION, AND PROCREATION OF A COMMON-WEALTH

25. OF COUNSELL

26. OF CIVILL LAWES

27. OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS

28. OF PUNISHMENTS, AND REWARDS

29. OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN, OR TEND TO THE DISSOLUTION OF A
COMMON-WEALTH

30. OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVERAIGN REPRESENTATIVE

31. OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY NATURE


THE THIRD PART

OF A CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH

32. OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN POLITIQUES

33. OF THE NUMBER, ANTIQUITY, SCOPE, AUTHORITY, AND INTERPRETERS OF THE
BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE.

34. OF THE SIGNIFICATION, OF SPIRIT, ANGELL, AND INSPIRATION IN THE
BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE

35. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD, OF HOLY,
SACRED, AND SACRAMENT

36. OF THE WORD OF GOD, AND OF PROPHETS

37. OF MIRACLES, AND THEIR USE

38. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF ETERNALL LIFE, HEL, SALVATION,
THE WORLD TO COME, AND REDEMPTION

39. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF THE WORD CHURCH

40. OF THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD, IN ABRAHAM, MOSES, THE HIGH
PRIESTS, AND THE KINGS OF JUDAH

41. OF THE OFFICE OF OUR BLESSED SAVIOUR

42. OF POWER ECCLESIASTICALL

43. OF WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR MANS RECEPTION INTO THE KINGDOME OF HEAVEN


THE FOURTH PART

OF THE KINGDOME OF DARKNESSE

44. OF SPIRITUALL DARKNESSE FROM MISINTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE

45. OF DAEMONOLOGY, AND OTHER RELIQUES OF THE RELIGION OF THE GENTILES

46. OF DARKNESSE FROM VAINE PHILOSOPHY, AND FABULOUS TRADITIONS

47. OF THE BENEFIT PROCEEDING FROM SUCH DARKNESSE; AND TO WHOM IT
ACCREWETH


48. A REVIEW AND CONCLUSION



THE INTRODUCTION

Nature (the art whereby God hath made and governes the world) is by the
art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it
can make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs,
the begining whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not
say, that all Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and
wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? For what is the
Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the
Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such as
was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that
Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, Man. For by Art is created
that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine
CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature
and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it
was intended; and in which, the Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul, as
giving life and motion to the whole body; The Magistrates, and other
Officers of Judicature and Execution, artificiall Joynts; Reward and
Punishment (by which fastned to the seat of the Soveraignty, every joynt
and member is moved to performe his duty) are the Nerves, that do the
same in the Body Naturall; The Wealth and Riches of all the particular
members, are the Strength; Salus Populi (the Peoples Safety) its
Businesse; Counsellors, by whom all things needfull for it to know,
are suggested unto it, are the Memory; Equity and Lawes, an artificiall
Reason and Will; Concord, Health; Sedition, Sicknesse; and Civill War,
Death. Lastly, the Pacts and Covenants, by which the parts of this Body
Politique were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that
Fiat, or the Let Us Make Man, pronounced by God in the Creation.

To describe the Nature of this Artificiall man, I will consider

First the Matter thereof, and the Artificer; both which is Man.

Secondly, How, and by what Covenants it is made; what are the Rights and
just Power or Authority of a Soveraigne; and what it is that Preserveth
and Dissolveth it.

Thirdly, what is a Christian Common-Wealth.

Lastly, what is the Kingdome of Darkness.

Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, That
Wisedome is acquired, not by reading of Books, but of Men. Consequently
whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other proof
of being wise, take great delight to shew what they think they have read
in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs.
But there is another saying not of late understood, by which they might
learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains; and that
is, Nosce Teipsum, Read Thy Self: which was not meant, as it is now
used, to countenance, either the barbarous state of men in power,
towards their inferiors; or to encourage men of low degree, to a
sawcie behaviour towards their betters; But to teach us, that for the
similitude of the thoughts, and Passions of one man, to the thoughts,
and Passions of another, whosoever looketh into himselfe, and
considereth what he doth, when he does Think, Opine, Reason, Hope,
Feare, &c, and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know,
what are the thoughts, and Passions of all other men, upon the like
occasions. I say the similitude of Passions, which are the same in all
men, Desire, Feare, Hope, &c; not the similitude or The Objects of the
Passions, which are the things Desired, Feared, Hoped, &c: for these the
constitution individuall, and particular education do so vary, and they
are so easie to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of mans
heart, blotted and confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying,
counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible onely to him that
searcheth hearts. And though by mens actions wee do discover their
designee sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own,
and distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to
be altered, is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part
deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that
reads, is himselfe a good or evill man.

But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it
serves him onely with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is
to govern a whole Nation, must read in himselfe, not this, or that
particular man; but Man-kind; which though it be hard to do, harder than
to learn any Language, or Science; yet, when I shall have set down my
own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be
onely to consider, if he also find not the same in himselfe. For this
kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration.



PART 1 OF MAN



CHAPTER I. OF SENSE

Concerning the Thoughts of man, I will consider them first Singly, and
afterwards in Trayne, or dependance upon one another. Singly, they
are every one a Representation or Apparence, of some quality, or other
Accident of a body without us; which is commonly called an Object. Which
Object worketh on the Eyes, Eares, and other parts of mans body; and by
diversity of working, produceth diversity of Apparences.

The Originall of them all, is that which we call Sense; (For there is
no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by
parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are derived
from that originall.

To know the naturall cause of Sense, is not very necessary to the
business now in hand; and I have els-where written of the same at large.
Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly
deliver the same in this place.

The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which presseth the
organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly, as in the Tast and Touch;
or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling: which pressure, by
the mediation of Nerves, and other strings, and membranes of the body,
continued inwards to the Brain, and Heart, causeth there a resistance,
or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart, to deliver it self:
which endeavour because Outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And
this Seeming, or Fancy, is that which men call sense; and consisteth, as
to the Eye, in a Light, or Colour Figured; To the Eare, in a Sound; To
the Nostrill, in an Odour; To the Tongue and Palat, in a Savour; and
to the rest of the body, in Heat, Cold, Hardnesse, Softnesse, and such
other qualities, as we discern by Feeling. All which qualities called
Sensible, are in the object that causeth them, but so many several
motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversly. Neither
in us that are pressed, are they anything els, but divers motions; (for
motion, produceth nothing but motion.) But their apparence to us is
Fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing,
or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the Eare,
produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the
same by their strong, though unobserved action, For if those Colours,
and Sounds, were in the Bodies, or Objects that cause them, they could
not bee severed from them, as by glasses, and in Ecchoes by reflection,
wee see they are; where we know the thing we see, is in one place; the
apparence, in another. And though at some certain distance, the reall,
and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; Yet still
the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that Sense in
all cases, is nothing els but originall fancy, caused (as I have said)
by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of externall things upon our
Eyes, Eares, and other organs thereunto ordained.

But the Philosophy-schooles, through all the Universities of
Christendome, grounded upon certain Texts of Aristotle, teach another
doctrine; and say, For the cause of Vision, that the thing seen, sendeth
forth on every side a Visible Species(in English) a Visible Shew,
Apparition, or Aspect, or a Being Seen; the receiving whereof into the
Eye, is Seeing. And for the cause of Hearing, that the thing heard,
sendeth forth an Audible Species, that is, an Audible Aspect, or Audible
Being Seen; which entring at the Eare, maketh Hearing. Nay for the
cause of Understanding also, they say the thing Understood sendeth forth
Intelligible Species, that is, an Intelligible Being Seen; which
comming into the Understanding, makes us Understand. I say not this,
as disapproving the use of Universities: but because I am to speak
hereafter of their office in a Common-wealth, I must let you see on
all occasions by the way, what things would be amended in them; amongst
which the frequency of insignificant Speech is one.


CHAPTER II. OF IMAGINATION

That when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it, it will
lye still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a
thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat els
stay it, though the reason be the same, (namely, that nothing can change
it selfe,) is not so easily assented to. For men measure, not onely
other men, but all other things, by themselves: and because they find
themselves subject after motion to pain, and lassitude, think every
thing els growes weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord;
little considering, whether it be not some other motion, wherein that
desire of rest they find in themselves, consisteth. From hence it is,
that the Schooles say, Heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite
to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper
for them; ascribing appetite, and Knowledge of what is good for their
conservation, (which is more than man has) to things inanimate absurdly.

When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els hinder
it) eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in
time, and by degrees quite extinguish it: And as wee see in the water,
though the wind cease, the waves give not over rowling for a long
time after; so also it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the
internall parts of a man, then, when he Sees, Dreams, &c. For after the
object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain an image of the
thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it,
that Latines call Imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply
the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks
call it Fancy; which signifies Apparence, and is as proper to one sense,
as to another. Imagination therefore is nothing but Decaying Sense; and
is found in men, and many other living Creatures, as well sleeping, as
waking.



Memory

The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in
sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner, as the light of the Sun
obscureth the light of the Starres; which starrs do no less exercise
their vertue by which they are visible, in the day, than in the night.
But because amongst many stroaks, which our eyes, eares, and other
organs receive from externall bodies, the predominant onely is sensible;
therefore the light of the Sun being predominant, we are not affected
with the action of the starrs. And any object being removed from our
eyes, though the impression it made in us remain; yet other objects more
present succeeding, and working on us, the Imagination of the past is
obscured, and made weak; as the voyce of a man is in the noyse of the
day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the
sight, or Sense of any object, the weaker is the Imagination. For the
continuall change of mans body, destroyes in time the parts which in
sense were moved: So that the distance of time, and of place, hath one
and the same effect in us. For as at a distance of place, that which wee
look at, appears dimme, and without distinction of the smaller parts;
and as Voyces grow weak, and inarticulate: so also after great distance
of time, our imagination of the Past is weak; and wee lose( for example)
of Cities wee have seen, many particular Streets; and of Actions, many
particular Circumstances. This Decaying Sense, when wee would express
the thing it self, (I mean Fancy it selfe,) wee call Imagination, as I
said before; But when we would express the Decay, and signifie that the
Sense is fading, old, and past, it is called Memory. So that Imagination
and Memory, are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath
divers names.

Much memory, or memory of many things, is called Experience. Againe,
Imagination being only of those things which have been formerly
perceived by Sense, either all at once, or by parts at severall
times; The former, (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was
presented to the sense) is Simple Imagination; as when one imagineth a
man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is Compounded; as
when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we
conceive in our mind a Centaure. So when a man compoundeth the image of
his own person, with the image of the actions of an other man; as when a
man imagins himselfe a Hercules, or an Alexander, (which happeneth often
to them that are much taken with reading of Romants) it is a compound
imagination, and properly but a Fiction of the mind. There be also other
Imaginations that rise in men, (though waking) from the great impression
made in sense; As from gazing upon the Sun, the impression leaves an
image of the Sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being long
and vehemently attent upon Geometricall Figures, a man shall in the
dark, (though awake) have the Images of Lines, and Angles before his
eyes: which kind of Fancy hath no particular name; as being a thing that
doth not commonly fall into mens discourse.



Dreams

The imaginations of them that sleep, are those we call Dreams. And these
also (as all other Imaginations) have been before, either totally, or
by parcells in the Sense. And because in sense, the Brain, and Nerves,
which are the necessary Organs of sense, are so benummed in sleep, as
not easily to be moved by the action of Externall Objects, there can
happen in sleep, no Imagination; and therefore no Dreame, but what
proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of mans body; which
inward parts, for the connexion they have with the Brayn, and other
Organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby
the Imaginations there formerly made, appeare as if a man were waking;
saving that the Organs of Sense being now benummed, so as there is
no new object, which can master and obscure them with a more vigorous
impression, a Dreame must needs be more cleare, in this silence of
sense, than are our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to pass, that
it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible to distinguish
exactly between Sense and Dreaming. For my part, when I consider, that
in Dreames, I do not often, nor constantly think of the same Persons,
Places, Objects, and Actions that I do waking; nor remember so long a
trayne of coherent thoughts, Dreaming, as at other times; And because
waking I often observe the absurdity of Dreames, but never dream of
the absurdities of my waking Thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being
awake, I know I dreame not; though when I dreame, I think my selfe
awake.

And seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward
parts of the Body; divers distempers must needs cause different Dreams.
And hence it is, that lying cold breedeth Dreams of Feare, and raiseth
the thought and Image of some fearfull object (the motion from the
brain to the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the Brain being
reciprocall:) and that as Anger causeth heat in some parts of the Body,
when we are awake; so when we sleep, the over heating of the same parts
causeth Anger, and raiseth up in the brain the Imagination of an Enemy.
In the same manner; as naturall kindness, when we are awake causeth
desire; and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so
also, too much heat in those parts, while wee sleep, raiseth in the
brain an imagination of some kindness shewn. In summe, our Dreams are
the reverse of our waking Imaginations; The motion when we are awake,
beginning at one end; and when we Dream, at another.



Apparitions Or Visions

The most difficult discerning of a mans Dream, from his waking thoughts,
is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept:
which is easie to happen to a man full of fearfull thoughts; and
whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth, without the
circumstances, of going to bed, or putting off his clothes, as one that
noddeth in a chayre. For he that taketh pains, and industriously layes
himselfe to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto
him, cannot easily think it other than a Dream. We read of Marcus
Brutes, (one that had his life given him by Julius Caesar, and was also
his favorite, and notwithstanding murthered him,) how at Phillipi,
the night before he gave battell to Augustus Caesar, he saw a fearfull
apparition, which is commonly related by Historians as a Vision: but
considering the circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but
a short Dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the
horrour of his rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the
cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him; which feare, as by
degrees it made him wake; so also it must needs make the Apparition by
degrees to vanish: And having no assurance that he slept, he could have
no cause to think it a Dream, or any thing but a Vision. And this is no
very rare Accident: for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be
timorous, and supperstitious, possessed with fearfull tales, and alone
in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and believe they see
spirits and dead mens Ghosts walking in Churchyards; whereas it is
either their Fancy onely, or els the knavery of such persons, as make
use of such superstitious feare, to pass disguised in the night, to
places they would not be known to haunt.

From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong
Fancies, from vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the
Religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped Satyres, Fawnes,
nymphs, and the like; and now adayes the opinion than rude people have
of Fayries, Ghosts, and Goblins; and of the power of Witches. For as for
Witches, I think not that their witch craft is any reall power; but yet
that they are justly punished, for the false beliefe they have, that
they can do such mischiefe, joyned with their purpose to do it if they
can; their trade being neerer to a new Religion, than to a Craft or
Science. And for Fayries, and walking Ghosts, the opinion of them has I
think been on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in
credit the use of Exorcisme, of Crosses, of holy Water, and other such
inventions of Ghostly men. Neverthelesse, there is no doubt, but God can
make unnaturall Apparitions. But that he does it so often, as men need
to feare such things, more than they feare the stay, or change, of the
course of Nature, which he also can stay, and change, is no point of
Christian faith. But evill men under pretext that God can do any thing,
are so bold as to say any thing when it serves their turn, though
they think it untrue; It is the part of a wise man, to believe them no
further, than right reason makes that which they say, appear credible.
If this superstitious fear of Spirits were taken away, and with it,
Prognostiques from Dreams, false Prophecies, and many other things
depending thereon, by which, crafty ambitious persons abuse the
simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civill
Obedience.

And this ought to be the work of the Schooles; but they rather nourish
such doctrine. For (not knowing what Imagination, or the Senses are),
what they receive, they teach: some saying, that Imaginations rise of
themselves, and have no cause: Others that they rise most commonly from
the Will; and that Good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man, by
God; and evill thoughts by the Divell: or that Good thoughts are powred
(infused) into a man, by God; and evill ones by the Divell. Some say
the Senses receive the Species of things, and deliver them to the
Common-sense; and the Common Sense delivers them over to the Fancy, and
the Fancy to the Memory, and the Memory to the Judgement, like
handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing
understood.



Understanding

The Imagination that is raysed in man (or any other creature indued with
the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signes, is that
we generally call Understanding; and is common to Man and Beast. For a
dogge by custome will understand the call, or the rating of his Master;
and so will many other Beasts. That Understanding which is peculiar to
man, is the Understanding not onely his will; but his conceptions and
thoughts, by the sequell and contexture of the names of things into
Affirmations, Negations, and other formes of Speech: And of this kinde
of Understanding I shall speak hereafter.


CHAPTER III. OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR TRAYNE OF IMAGINATIONS

By Consequence, or Trayne of Thoughts, I understand that succession
of one Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from
Discourse in words) Mentall Discourse.

When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, His next Thought after, is
not altogether so casuall as it seems to be. Not every Thought to every
Thought succeeds indifferently. But as wee have no Imagination, whereof
we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no
Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the
like before in our Senses. The reason whereof is this. All Fancies
are Motions within us, reliques of those made in the Sense: And those
motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense, continue
also together after Sense: In so much as the former comming again to
take place, and be praedominant, the later followeth, by coherence of
the matter moved, is such manner, as water upon a plain Table is drawn
which way any one part of it is guided by the finger. But because
in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing,
sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to passe in time, that in the
Imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what we shall Imagine
next; Onely this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the
same before, at one time or another.



Trayne Of Thoughts Unguided

This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mentall Discourse, is of two sorts. The
first is Unguided, Without Designee, and inconstant; Wherein there is no
Passionate Thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to it self,
as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion: In which case the
thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as
in a Dream. Such are Commonly the thoughts of men, that are not onely
without company, but also without care of any thing; though even then
their Thoughts are as busie as at other times, but without harmony; as
the sound which a Lute out of tune would yeeld to any man; or in tune,
to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind,
a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one
thought upon another. For in a Discourse of our present civill warre,
what could seem more impertinent, than to ask (as one did) what was the
value of a Roman Penny? Yet the Cohaerence to me was manifest enough.
For the Thought of the warre, introduced the Thought of the delivering
up the King to his Enemies; The Thought of that, brought in the Thought
of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the Thought of the 30
pence, which was the price of that treason: and thence easily followed
that malicious question; and all this in a moment of time; for Thought
is quick.



Trayne Of Thoughts Regulated

The second is more constant; as being Regulated by some desire, and
designee. For the impression made by such things as wee desire, or
feare, is strong, and permanent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of quick
return: so strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep.
From Desire, ariseth the Thought of some means we have seen produce the
like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of that, the
thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come to some
beginning within our own power. And because the End, by the greatnesse
of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to
wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way: which observed by
one of the seven wise men, made him give men this praecept, which is
now worne out, Respice Finem; that is to say, in all your actions,
look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your
thoughts in the way to attain it.



Remembrance

The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds; One, when of an effect
imagined, wee seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this
is common to Man and Beast. The other is, when imagining any thing
whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can by it be
produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when wee
have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any signe, but in man
onely; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any
living creature that has no other Passion but sensuall, such as are
hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In summe, the Discourse of the Mind,
when it is governed by designee, is nothing but Seeking, or the faculty
of Invention, which the Latines call Sagacitas, and Solertia; a hunting
out of the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects,
of some present or past cause, sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost;
and from that place, and time, wherein hee misses it, his mind runs
back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and when
he had it; that is to say, to find some certain, and limited time and
place, in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence, his
thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or
other occasion might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance,
or Calling to mind: the Latines call it Reminiscentia, as it were a
Re-Conning of our former actions.

Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse whereof
his is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof,
in the same manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a jewell; or as
a Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a sent; or as a man should run
over the alphabet, to start a rime.



Prudence

Sometime a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he
thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after
another; supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that
foresees what wil become of a Criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow
on the like Crime before; having this order of thoughts, The Crime,
the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the Gallowes. Which kind
of thoughts, is called Foresight, and Prudence, or Providence; and
sometimes Wisdome; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of
observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain; by
how much one man has more experience of things past, than another; by
so much also he is more Prudent, and his expectations the seldomer faile
him. The Present onely has a being in Nature; things Past have a being
in the Memory onely, but things To Come have no being at all; the Future
being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions Past,
to the actions that are Present; which with most certainty is done by
him that has most Experience; but not with certainty enough. And though
it be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our Expectation; yet in
its own nature, it is but Presumption. For the foresight of things to
come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him by whose will they are
to come. From him onely, and supernaturally, proceeds Prophecy. The best
Prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is
most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most
Signes to guesse by.



Signes

A Signe, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent; and contrarily,
the Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have been
observed, before: And the oftner they have been observed, the lesse
uncertain is the Signe. And therefore he that has most experience in
any kind of businesse, has most Signes, whereby to guesse at the Future
time, and consequently is the most prudent: And so much more prudent
than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by
any advantage of naturall and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young
men think the contrary.

Neverthelesse it is not Prudence that distinguisheth man from beast.
There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which
is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.



Conjecture Of The Time Past

As Prudence is a Praesumtion of the Future, contracted from the
Experience of time Past; So there is a Praesumtion of things Past taken
from other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath seen
by what courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come into
civill warre, and then to ruine; upon the sights of the ruines of any
other State, will guesse, the like warre, and the like courses have been
there also. But his conjecture, has the same incertainty almost with the
conjecture of the Future; both being grounded onely upon Experience.

There is no other act of mans mind, that I can remember, naturally
planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it,
but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five Senses. Those
other Faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper
to man onely, are acquired, and encreased by study and industry; and of
most men learned by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from
the invention of Words, and Speech. For besides Sense, and Thoughts, and
the Trayne of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by
the help of Speech, and Method, the same Facultyes may be improved to
such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living Creatures.

Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or
conception of anything we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind an
Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive the ends, and bounds of
the thing named; having no Conception of the thing, but of our own
inability. And therefore the Name of GOD is used, not to make us
conceive him; (for he is Incomprehensible; and his greatnesse, and power
are unconceivable;) but that we may honour him. Also because whatsoever
(as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived first by sense,
either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing
any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any
thing, but he must conceive it in some place; and indued with some
determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that any
thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time;
nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same place at once:
for none of these things ever have, or can be incident to Sense; but are
absurd speeches, taken upon credit (without any signification at all,)
from deceived Philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving Schoolemen.


CHAPTER IV. OF SPEECH



Originall Of Speech

The Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention
of Letters, is no great matter. But who was the first that found the use
of Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men
say was Cadmus, the sonne of Agenor, King of Phaenicia. A profitable
Invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of
mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the Earth; and
with all difficult, as proceeding from a watchfull observation of the
divers motions of the Tongue, Palat, Lips, and other organs of Speech;
whereby to make as many differences of characters, to remember them.
But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of
Speech, consisting of Names or Apellations, and their Connexion; whereby
men register their Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also
declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation;
without which, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor
Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears,
and Wolves. The first author of Speech was GOD himselfe, that instructed
Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; For the
Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient
to direct him to adde more names, as the experience and use of the
creatures should give him occasion; and to joyn them in such manner by
degrees, as to make himselfe understood; and so by succession of time,
so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so
copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of. For I do not find any
thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence can
be gathered, that Adam was taught the names of all Figures, Numbers,
Measures, Colours, Sounds, Fancies, Relations; much less the names
of Words and Speech, as Generall, Speciall, Affirmative, Negative,
Interrogative, Optative, Infinitive, all which are usefull; and least of
all, of Entity, Intentionality, Quiddity, and other significant words of
the School.

But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity,
was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man
was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language.
And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of
the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that now is,
proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need (the mother of
all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time grew every where more
copious.



The Use Of Speech

The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse, into
Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words; and that
for two commodities; whereof one is, the Registring of the Consequences
of our Thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put
us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were
marked by. So that the first use of names, is to serve for Markes,
or Notes of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words,
to signifie (by their connexion and order,) one to another, what they
conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, feare,
or have any other passion for, and for this use they are called
Signes. Speciall uses of Speech are these; First, to Register, what by
cogitation, wee find to be the cause of any thing, present or past; and
what we find things present or past may produce, or effect: which in
summe, is acquiring of Arts. Secondly, to shew to others that knowledge
which we have attained; which is, to Counsell, and Teach one another.
Thirdly, to make known to others our wills, and purposes, that we may
have the mutuall help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight
our selves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or
ornament, innocently.



Abuses Of Speech

To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent Abuses. First,
when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the
signification of their words; by which they register for their
conceptions, that which they never conceived; and so deceive themselves.
Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense
than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly,
when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not.
Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature
hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some
with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech, to grieve
him with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged to govern;
and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence
of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of Names, and the
Connexion of them.



Names Proper & Common Universall

Of Names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely thing; as Peter,
John, This Man, This Tree: and some are Common to many things; as Man,
Horse, Tree; every of which though but one Name, is nevertheless the
name of divers particular things; in respect of all which together, it
is called an Universall; there being nothing in the world Universall
but Names; for the things named, are every one of them Individual and
Singular.

One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in
some quality, or other accident: And whereas a Proper Name bringeth to
mind one thing onely; Universals recall any one of those many.

And of Names Universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent; the
larger comprehending the lesse large: and some again of equall extent,
comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the Name Body is
of larger signification than the word Man, and conprehendeth it; and the
names Man and Rationall, are of equall extent, comprehending mutually
one another. But here wee must take notice, that by a Name is not
alwayes understood, as in Grammar, one onely word; but sometimes by
circumlocution many words together. For all these words, Hee That In
His Actions Observeth The Lawes Of His Country, make but one Name,
equivalent to this one word, Just.

By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter
signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things
imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of
Appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of Speech at all,
(such, as is born and remains perfectly deafe and dumb,) if he set
before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, (such as are the
corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation compare and find, that
the three angles of that triangle, are equall to those two right angles
that stand by it. But if another triangle be shewn him different in
shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour, whether the
three angles of that also be equall to the same. But he that hath the
use of words, when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not
to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his
triangle; but onely to this, that the sides were straight, and the
angles three; and that that was all, for which he named it a Triangle;
will boldly conclude Universally, that such equality of angles is in
all triangles whatsoever; and register his invention in these generall
termes, Every Triangle Hath Its Three Angles Equall To Two Right Angles.
And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registred
and remembred, as a Universall rule; and discharges our mentall
reckoning, of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the
mind, saving the first; and makes that which was found true Here, and
Now, to be true in All Times and Places.

But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing so
evident as in Numbering. A naturall foole that could never learn by
heart the order of numerall words, as One, Two, and Three, may observe
every stroak of the Clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one; but can
never know what houre it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when
those names of number were not in use; and men were fayn to apply their
fingers of one or both hands, to those things they desired to keep
account of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numerall words
are but ten, in any Nation, and in some but five, and then they begin
again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will
lose himselfe, and not know when he has done: Much lesse will he be
able to add, and substract, and performe all other operations of
Arithmetique. So that without words, there is no possibility of
reckoning of Numbers; much lesse of Magnitudes, of Swiftnesse, of Force,
and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or
well-being of man-kind.

When two Names are joyned together into a Consequence, or Affirmation;
as thus, A Man Is A Living Creature; or thus, If He Be A Man, He Is A
Living Creature, If the later name Living Creature, signifie all that
the former name Man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence is
True; otherwise False. For True and False are attributes of Speech, not
of things. And where Speech in not, there is neither Truth nor Falshood.
Errour there may be, as when wee expect that which shall not be; or
suspect what has not been: but in neither case can a man be charged with
Untruth.

Seeing then that Truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our
affirmations, a man that seeketh precise Truth, had need to remember
what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or els
he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the
more he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which
is the onely Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on
mankind,) men begin at settling the significations of their words; which
settling of significations, they call Definitions; and place them in the
beginning of their reckoning.

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true
Knowledge, to examine the Definitions of former Authors; and either
to correct them, where they are negligently set down; or to make them
himselfe. For the errours of Definitions multiply themselves, according
as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last
they see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the beginning;
in which lyes the foundation of their errours. From whence it happens,
that they which trust to books, do as they that cast up many little
summs into a greater, without considering whether those little summes
were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the errour visible,
and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to cleere
themselves; but spend time in fluttering over their bookes; as birds
that entring by the chimney, and finding themselves inclosed in a
chamber, flitter at the false light of a glasse window, for want of wit
to consider which way they came in. So that in the right Definition
of Names, lyes the first use of Speech; which is the Acquisition of
Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions' lyes the first abuse; from
which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets; which make those men that
take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their
own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as
men endued with true Science are above it. For between true Science,
and erroneous Doctrines, Ignorance is in the middle. Naturall sense and
imagination, are not subject to absurdity. Nature it selfe cannot erre:
and as men abound in copiousnesse of language; so they become more wise,
or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without Letters for any
man to become either excellently wise, or (unless his memory be hurt by
disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words
are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the
mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a
Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.



Subject To Names

Subject To Names, is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered in an
account; and be added one to another to make a summe; or substracted one
from another, and leave a remainder. The Latines called Accounts of mony
Rationes, and accounting, Ratiocinatio: and that which we in bills or
books of account call Items, they called Nomina; that is, Names: and
thence it seems to proceed, that they extended the word Ratio, to the
faculty of Reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word
Logos, for both Speech and Reason; not that they thought there was no
Speech without Reason; but no Reasoning without Speech: And the act of
reasoning they called syllogisme; which signifieth summing up of the
consequences of one saying to another. And because the same things may
enter into account for divers accidents; their names are (to shew that
diversity) diversly wrested, and diversified. This diversity of names
may be reduced to foure generall heads.

First, a thing may enter into account for Matter, or Body; as Living,
Sensible, Rationall, Hot, Cold, Moved, Quiet; with all which names the
word Matter, or Body is understood; all such, being names of Matter.

Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident
or quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for Being Moved, for Being
So Long, for Being Hot, &c; and then, of the name of the thing it selfe,
by a little change or wresting, wee make a name for that accident, which
we consider; and for Living put into account Life; for Moved, Motion;
for Hot, Heat; for Long, Length, and the like. And all such Names, are
the names of the accidents and properties, by which one Matter, and Body
is distinguished from another. These are called Names Abstract; Because
Severed (not from Matter, but) from the account of Matter.

Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties of our own bodies,
whereby we make such distinction: as when any thing is Seen by us, we
reckon not the thing it selfe; but the Sight, the Colour, the Idea of
it in the fancy: and when any thing is Heard, wee reckon it not; but the
Hearing, or Sound onely, which is our fancy or conception of it by the
Eare: and such are names of fancies.

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to Names
themselves, and to Speeches: For, Generall, Universall, Speciall,
Oequivocall, are names of Names. And Affirmation, Interrogation,
Commandement, Narration, Syllogisme, Sermon, Oration, and many other
such, are names of Speeches.



Use Of Names Positive

And this is all the variety of Names Positive; which are put to mark
somewhat which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as
Bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the Properties
that are, or may be feigned to be; or Words and Speech.



Negative Names With Their Uses

There be also other Names, called Negative; which are notes to signifie
that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words
Nothing, No Man, Infinite, Indocible, Three Want Foure, and the
like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of
reckoning; and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not
names of any thing; because they make us refuse to admit of Names not
rightly used.



Words Insignificant

All other names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two
sorts. One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by
Definition; whereof there have been aboundance coyned by Schoole-men,
and pusled Philosophers.

Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose significations are
contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an Incorporeall Body, or
(which is all one) an Incorporeall Substance, and a great number more.
For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it
is composed, put together and made one, signifie nothing at all. For
example if it be a false affirmation to say A Quadrangle Is Round,
the word Round Quadrangle signifies nothing; but is a meere sound. So
likewise if it be false, to say that vertue can be powred, or blown up
and down; the words In-powred Vertue, In-blown Vertue, are as absurd
and insignificant, as a Round Quadrangle. And therefore you shall hardly
meet with a senselesse and insignificant word, that is not made up of
some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldome hears our Saviour called
by the name of Parole, but by the name of Verbe often; yet Verbe and
Parole differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.



Understanding

When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts which the
words of that Speech, and their connexion, were ordained and constituted
to signifie; Then he is said to understand it; Understanding being
nothing els, but conception caused by Speech. And therefore if Speech
be peculiar to man (as for ought I know it is,) then is Understanding
peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false affirmations,
in case they be universall, there can be no Understanding; though many
think they understand, then, when they do but repeat the words softly,
or con them in their mind.

What kinds of Speeches signifie the Appetites, Aversions, and Passions
of mans mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have
spoken of the Passions.



Inconstant Names

The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and
displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing,
nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men, of
Inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signifie
our conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we
conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoyd different
naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the
same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different
constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a
tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man
bust take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we
imagine of their nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such
as are the names of Vertues, and Vices; For one man calleth Wisdome,
what another calleth Feare; and one Cruelty, what another Justice;
one Prodigality, what another Magnanimity; one Gravity, what another
Stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any
ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of speech: but these
are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the
other do not.


CHAPTER V. OF REASON, AND SCIENCE.



Reason What It Is

When a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing els but conceive a summe totall,
from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from Substraction of
one summe from another: which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of
the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole;
or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other
part. And though in some things, (as in numbers,) besides Adding and
Substracting, men name other operations, as Multiplying and Dividing;
yet they are the same; for Multiplication, is but Addition together of
things equall; and Division, but Substracting of one thing, as often as
we can. These operations are not incident to Numbers onely, but to
all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of
another. For as Arithmeticians teach to adde and substract in Numbers;
so the Geometricians teach the same in Lines, Figures (solid and
superficiall,) Angles, Proportions, Times, degrees of Swiftnesse, Force,
Power, and the like; The Logicians teach the same in Consequences
Of Words; adding together Two Names, to make an Affirmation; and Two
Affirmations, to make a syllogisme; and Many syllogismes to make a
Demonstration; and from the Summe, or Conclusion of a syllogisme, they
substract one Proposition, to finde the other. Writers of Politiques,
adde together Pactions, to find mens Duties; and Lawyers, Lawes and
Facts, to find what is Right and Wrong in the actions of private men.
In summe, in what matter soever there is place for Addition and
Substraction, there also is place for Reason; and where these have no
place, there Reason has nothing at all to do.



Reason Defined

Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what that
is, which is meant by this word Reason, when wee reckon it amongst
the Faculties of the mind. For Reason, in this sense, is nothing but
Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of
generall names agreed upon, for the Marking and Signifying of our
thoughts; I say Marking them, when we reckon by our selves; and
Signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men.



Right Reason Where

And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors themselves
may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of
Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may
deceive themselves, and inferre false Conclusions; Not but that Reason
it selfe is always Right Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain
and infallible art: But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any
one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is
therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously
approved it. And therfore, as when there is a controversy in an account,
the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the
Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will
both stand, or their controversie must either come to blowes, or be
undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is
it also in all debates of what kind soever: And when men that think
themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for
judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no
other mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of
men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every
occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do
nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to
bear sway in them, to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own
controversies: bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claym they
lay to it.



The Use Of Reason

The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth
of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and
settled significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from
one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last
Conclusion, without a certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations,
on which it was grounded, and inferred. As when a master of a family,
in taking an account, casteth up the summs of all the bills of expence,
into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those
that give them in account; nor what it is he payes for; he advantages
himselfe no more, than if he allowed the account in grosse, trusting to
every of the accountants skill and honesty; so also in Reasoning of all
other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of Authors, and
doth not fetch them from the first Items in every Reckoning, (which are
the significations of names settled by definitions), loses his labour;
and does not know any thing; but onely beleeveth.



Of Error And Absurdity

When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in
particular things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing, wee
conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon
it;) if that which he thought likely to follow, followes not; or that
which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this
is called ERROR; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But
when we Reason in Words of generall signification, and fall upon a
generall inference which is false; though it be commonly called Error,
it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or senseless Speech. For Error is but a
deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which,
though it were not past, or not to come; yet there was no impossibility
discoverable. But when we make a generall assertion, unlesse it be a
true one, the possibility of it is unconceivable. And words whereby we
conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call Absurd, insignificant,
and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a Round
Quadrangle; or Accidents Of Bread In Cheese; or Immaterial Substances;
or of A Free Subject; A Free Will; or any Free, but free from being
hindred by opposition, I should not say he were in an Errour; but that
his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd.

I have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a Man did excell
all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing
whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and what
effects he could do with it. And now I adde this other degree of the
same excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he findes
to generall Rules, called Theoremes, or Aphorismes; that is, he can
Reason, or reckon, not onely in number; but in all other things, whereof
one may be added unto, or substracted from another.

But this priviledge, is allayed by another; and that is, by the
priviledge of Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man
onely. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that professe
Philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero sayth of them somewhere;
that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of
Philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them
that begins his ratiocination from the Definitions, or Explications of
the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used onely
in Geometry; whose Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.



Causes Of Absurditie

The first cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method;
in that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions; that
is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast
account, without knowing the value of the numerall words, One, Two, and
Three.

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations,
(which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) these considerations
being diversly named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and
unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore

The second cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names
of Bodies, to Accidents; or of Accidents, to Bodies; As they do, that
say, Faith Is Infused, or Inspired; when nothing can be Powred, or
Breathed into any thing, but body; and that, Extension is Body; that
Phantasmes are Spirits, &c.

The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the Accidents of
Bodies Without Us, to the Accidents of our Own Bodies; as they do that
say, the Colour Is In The Body; The Sound Is In The Ayre, &c.

The fourth, to the giving of the names of Bodies, to Names, or Speeches;
as they do that say, that There Be Things Universall; that A Living
Creature Is Genus, or A Generall Thing, &c.

The fifth, to the giving of the names of Accidents, to Names and
Speeches; as they do that say, The Nature Of A Thing Is In Its
Definition; A Mans Command Is His Will; and the like.

The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall
figures, in stead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for
example) in common speech, The Way Goeth, Or Leadeth Hither, Or Thither,
The Proverb Sayes This Or That (whereas wayes cannot go, nor Proverbs
speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to
be admitted.

The seventh, to names that signifie nothing; but are taken up, and
learned by rote from the Schooles, as Hypostatical, Transubstantiate,
Consubstantiate, Eternal-now, and the like canting of Schoole-men.

To him that can avoyd these things, it is not easie to fall into any
absurdity, unlesse it be by the length of an account; wherein he may
perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and
well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to
mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his
error to him?



Science

By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with
us; nor gotten by Experience onely; as Prudence is; but attayned by
Industry; first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good
and orderly Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names,
to Assertions made by Connexion of one of them to another; and so to
syllogismes, which are the Connexions of one Assertion to another, till
we come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to
the subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas
Sense and Memory are but knowledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and
irrevocable; Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance
of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we
know how to do something els when we will, or the like, another time;
Because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by
what manner; when the like causes come into our power, wee see how to
make it produce the like effects.

Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have
attained the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the
possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come. And
the most part of men, though they have the use of Reasoning a little
way, as in numbring to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in
common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse,
according to their differences of experience, quicknesse of memory, and
inclinations to severall ends; but specially according to good or evill
fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for Science, or certain
rules of their actions, they are so farre from it, that they know
not what it is. Geometry they have thought Conjuring: but for other
Sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings, and some
progresse in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated,
are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation,
are made believe by the women, that their brothers and sisters are not
born, but found in the garden.

But yet they that have no Science, are in better, and nobler condition
with their naturall Prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by
trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd generall
rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so farre
out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of
what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the
contrary.

To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by
exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; Reason is
the Pace; Encrease of Science, the Way; and the Benefit of man-kind, the
End. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words,
are like Ignes Fatui; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst
innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or
contempt.



Prudence & Sapience, With Their Difference

As, much Experience, is Prudence; so, is much Science, Sapience. For
though wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both; yet
the Latines did always distinguish between Prudentia and Sapientia,
ascribing the former to Experience, the later to Science. But to make
their difference appeare more cleerly, let us suppose one man endued
with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity in handling his armes; and
another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired Science, of where
he can offend, or be offended by his adversarie, in every possible
posture, or guard: The ability of the former, would be to the ability
of the later, as Prudence to Sapience; both usefull; but the later
infallible. But they that trusting onely to the authority of books,
follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to the false rules
of the master of fence, ventures praesumptuously upon an adversary, that
either kills, or disgraces him.



Signes Of Science

The signes of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some,
uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing,
can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof
perspicuously to another: Uncertain, when onely some particular events
answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he sayes
they must. Signes of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by
experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the successe,
is impossible. But in any businesse, whereof a man has not infallible
Science to proceed by; to forsake his own natural judgement, and be
guided by generall sentences read in Authors, and subject to many
exceptions, is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of
Pedantry. And even of those men themselves, that in Councells of the
Common-wealth, love to shew their reading of Politiques and History,
very few do it in their domestique affaires, where their particular
interest is concerned; having Prudence enough for their private
affaires: but in publique they study more the reputation of their owne
wit, than the successe of anothers businesse.


CHAPTER VI. OF THE INTERIOUR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS

COMMONLY CALLED THE PASSIONS. AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH
THEY ARE EXPRESSED.




Motion Vitall And Animal

There be in Animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to them: One called
Vitall; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through
their whole life; such as are the Course of the Bloud, the Pulse, the
Breathing, the Concoctions, Nutrition, Excretion, &c; to which Motions
there needs no help of Imagination: The other in Animal Motion,
otherwise called Voluntary Motion; as to Go, to Speak, to Move any of
our limbes, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That Sense,
is Motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by
the action of the things we See, Heare, &c.; And that Fancy is but the
Reliques of the same Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already
sayd in the first and second Chapters. And because Going, Speaking, and
the like Voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of
Whither, Which Way, and What; it is evident, that the Imagination is
the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion. And although
unstudied men, doe not conceive any motion at all to be there, where
the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in, is (for the
shortnesse of it) insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such
Motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is moved
over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be
moved over that. These small beginnings of Motion, within the body
of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other
visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.



Endeavour; Appetite; Desire; Hunger; Thirst; Aversion

This Endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called
APPETITE, or DESIRE; the later, being the generall name; and the other,
oftentimes restrayned to signifie the Desire of Food, namely Hunger and
Thirst. And when the Endeavour is fromward something, it is generally
called AVERSION. These words Appetite, and Aversion we have from the
Latines; and they both of them signifie the motions, one of approaching,
the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which
are orme and aphorme. For nature it selfe does often presse upon men
those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond
Nature, they stumble at. For the Schooles find in meere Appetite to go,
or move, no actuall Motion at all: but because some Motion they must
acknowledge, they call it Metaphoricall Motion; which is but an absurd
speech; for though Words may be called metaphoricall; Bodies, and
Motions cannot.

That which men Desire, they are also sayd to LOVE; and to HATE those
things, for which they have Aversion. So that Desire, and Love, are the
same thing; save that by Desire, we alwayes signifie the Absence of
the object; by Love, most commonly the Presence of the same. So also
by Aversion, we signifie the Absence; and by Hate, the Presence of the
Object.

Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men; as Appetite of
food, Appetite of excretion, and exoneration, (which may also and more
properly be called Aversions, from somewhat they feele in their Bodies;)
and some other Appetites, not many. The rest, which are Appetites of
particular things, proceed from Experience, and triall of their effects
upon themselves, or other men. For of things wee know not at all, or
believe not to be, we can have no further Desire, than to tast and try.
But Aversion wee have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us;
but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.



Contempt

Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said to Contemne:
CONTEMPT being nothing els but an immobility, or contumacy of the Heart,
in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the
Heart is already moved otherwise, by either more potent objects; or from
want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mutation;
it is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him
the same Appetites, and aversions: much lesse can all men consent, in
the Desire of almost any one and the same Object.



Good Evill

But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is
it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate,
and Aversion, evill; And of his contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable.
For these words of Good, evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with
relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and
absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and evill, to be taken from
the nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the man
(where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) From the
Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men
disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule
thereof.



Pulchrum Turpe; Delightfull Profitable; Unpleasant Unprofitable

The Latine Tongue has two words, whose significations approach to
those of Good and Evill; but are not precisely the same; And those are
Pulchrum and Turpe. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some
apparent signes promiseth Good; and the later, that, which promiseth
evill. But in our Tongue we have not so generall names to expresse them
by. But for Pulchrum, we say in some things, Fayre; in other Beautifull,
or Handsome, or Gallant, or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable; and
for Turpe, Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like, as the
subject shall require; All which words, in their proper places signifie
nothing els, but the Mine, or Countenance, that promiseth Good and
evill. So that of Good there be three kinds; Good in the Promise,
that is Pulchrum; Good in Effect, as the end desired, which is called
Jucundum, Delightfull; and Good as the Means, which is called Utile,
Profitable; and as many of evill: For evill, in Promise, is that
they call Turpe; evill in Effect, and End, is Molestum, Unpleasant,
Troublesome; and evill in the Means, Inutile, Unprofitable, Hurtfull.



Delight Displeasure

As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (As I have sayd
before) onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in
apparence; to the Sight, Light and Colour; to the Eare, Sound; to the
Nostrill, Odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued
from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the real effect
there is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite,
or Aversion, to, or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense
of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.



Pleasure Offence

This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it
Delight, and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vitall motion,
and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused Delight, were
not improperly called Jucunda, (A Juvando,) from helping or fortifying;
and the contrary, Molesta, Offensive, from hindering, and troubling the
motion vitall.

Pleasure therefore, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of Good;
and Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evill. And
consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied with some
Delight more or lesse; and all Hatred, and Aversion, with more or lesse
Displeasure and Offence.



Pleasures Of Sense; Pleasures Of The Mind; Joy Paine Griefe

Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object
Present; And those may be called Pleasures Of Sense, (The word Sensuall,
as it is used by those onely that condemn them, having no place till
there be Lawes.) Of this kind are all Onerations and Exonerations of the
body; as also all that is pleasant, in the Sight, Hearing, Smell,
Tast, Or Touch; Others arise from the Expectation, that proceeds from
foresight of the End, or Consequence of things; whether those things in
the Sense Please or Displease: And these are Pleasures Of The Mind of
him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called JOY. In
the like manner, Displeasures, are some in the Sense, and called PAYNE;
others, in the Expectation of consequences, and are called GRIEFE.

These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate,
Joy, and griefe, have their names for divers considerations diversified.
As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversly called from
the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they
desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the
consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the Alteration or
succession it selfe.

Hope-- For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.

Despaire-- The same, without such opinion, DESPAIRE.

Feare-- Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEARE.

Courage-- The same, with hope of avoyding that Hurt by resistance,
COURAGE.

Anger-- Sudden Courage, ANGER.

Confidence-- Constant Hope, CONFIDENCE of our selves.

Diffidence-- Constant Despayre, DIFFIDENCE of our selves.

Indignation-- Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the
same to be done by Injury, INDIGNATION.

Benevolence-- Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL,
CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.

Covetousnesse-- Desire of Riches, COVETOUSNESSE: a name used alwayes in
signification of blame; because men contending for them, are displeased
with one anothers attaining them; though the desire in it selfe, be to
be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which those Riches are
sought.

Ambition-- Desire of Office, or precedence, AMBITION: a name used also
in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.

Pusillanimity-- Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends;
And fear of things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.

Magnanimity-- Contempt of little helps, and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.

Valour-- Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.

Liberality-- Magnanimity in the use of Riches, LIBERALITY

Miserablenesse-- Pusillanimity, in the same WRETCHEDNESSE,
MISERABLENESSE; or PARSIMONY; as it is liked or disliked.

Kindnesse-- Love of Persons for society, KINDNESSE.

Naturall Lust-- Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely, NATURAL
LUST.

Luxury-- Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is Imagination
of Pleasure past, LUXURY.

The Passion Of Love; Jealousie-- Love of one singularly, with desire to
be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the
love is not mutuall, JEALOUSIE.

Revengefulnesse-- Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn
some fact of his own, REVENGEFULNESSE.

Curiosity-- Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no
living creature but Man; so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his
Reason; but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom
the appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by praedominance,
take away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind,
that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable
generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall
Pleasure.

Religion Superstition; True Religion-- Feare of power invisible, feigned
by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not
allowed, superstition. And when the power imagined is truly such as we
imagine, TRUE RELIGION.

Panique Terrour-- Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what,
PANIQUE TERROR; called so from the fables that make Pan the author of
them; whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first,
some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example;
every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion
happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.

Admiration-- Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to
man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.

Glory Vaine-glory-- Joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power
and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING:
which, if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is
the same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others, or
onely supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it,
is called VAINE-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a
well-grounded Confidence begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of
power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vaine.

Dejection-- Griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called dejection
of mind.

The Vaine-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of
abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident to young
men, and nourished by the Histories or Fictions of Gallant Persons; and
is corrected often times by Age, and Employment.

Sudden Glory Laughter-- Sudden glory, is the passion which maketh those
Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of
their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some
deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud
themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the
fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in
their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men.
And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others is a signe of
Pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper workes is, to help
and free others from scorn; and compare themselves onely with the most
able.

Sudden Dejection Weeping-- On the contrary, Sudden Dejection is the
passion that causeth WEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as
suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: and
they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall,
such as are Women, and Children. Therefore, some Weep for the loss of
Friends; Others for their unkindnesse; others for the sudden stop made
to their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation. But in all cases, both
Laughter and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking them both away.
For no man Laughs at old jests; or Weeps for an old calamity.

Shame Blushing-- Griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability
is SHAME, or the passion that discovereth itself in BLUSHING; and
consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young
men, is a signe of the love of good reputation; and commendable: in
old men it is a signe of the same; but because it comes too late, not
commendable.

Impudence-- The Contempt of good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.

Pitty-- Griefe, for the calamity of another is PITTY; and ariseth
from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and
therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present
time a FELLOW-FEELING: and therefore for Calamity arriving from
great wickedness, the best men have the least Pitty; and for the same
Calamity, those have least Pitty, that think themselves least obnoxious
to the same.

Cruelty-- Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that
which men call CRUELTY; proceeding from Security of their own fortune.
For, that any man should take pleasure in other mens' great harmes,
without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.

Emulation Envy-- Griefe, for the success of a Competitor in wealth,
honour, or other good, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own
abilities to equal or exceed him, is called EMULATION: but joyned with
Endeavour to supplant or hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.

Deliberation-- When in the mind of man, Appetites and Aversions, Hopes
and Feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and
divers good and evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing
propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we
have an Appetite to it, sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to
be able to do it; sometimes Despaire, or Feare to attempt it; the whole
sum of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Feares, continued till the thing be
either done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.

Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because manifestly
impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or
thought so; because men know, or think such Deliberation vaine. But
of things impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate; not
knowing it is in vain. And it is called DELIBERATION; because it is a
putting an end to the Liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to
our own Appetite, or Aversion.

This alternate succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Feares is
no less in other living Creatures than in Man; and therefore Beasts also
Deliberate.

Every Deliberation is then sayd to End when that whereof they
Deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then wee
retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our Appetite, or
Aversion.



The Will

In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering
to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the
WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing. And Beasts that have
Deliberation must necessarily also have Will. The Definition of the
Will, given commonly by the Schooles, that it is a Rationall Appetite,
is not good. For if it were, then could there be no Voluntary Act
against Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that, which proceedeth from the
Will, and no other. But if in stead of a Rationall Appetite, we shall
say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then the
Definition is the same that I have given here. Will, therefore, Is The
Last Appetite In Deliberating. And though we say in common Discourse, a
man had a Will once to do a thing, that neverthelesse he forbore to
do; yet that is properly but an Inclination, which makes no Action
Voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last
Inclination, or Appetite. For if the intervenient Appetites make any
action Voluntary, then by the same reason all intervenient Aversions
should make the same action Involuntary; and so one and the same action
should be both Voluntary & Involuntary.

By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their beginning
from Covetousness, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing
propounded; but also those that have their beginning from Aversion,
or Feare of those consequences that follow the omission, are Voluntary
Actions.



Formes Of Speech, In Passion

The formes of Speech by which the Passions are expressed, are partly the
same, and partly different from those, by which we express our Thoughts.
And first generally all Passions may be expressed Indicatively; as, I
Love, I Feare, I Joy, I Deliberate, I Will, I Command: but some of them
have particular expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are not
affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make other inferences,
besides that of the Passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed
Subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with
their consequences; as, If This Be Done, Then This Will Follow; and
differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in
generall words, but Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars.
The language of Desire, and Aversion, is Imperative; as, Do This,
Forbear That; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbear, is
Command; otherwise Prayer; or els Counsell. The language of Vaine-Glory,
of Indignation, Pitty and Revengefulness, Optative: but of the Desire to
know, there is a peculiar expression called Interrogative; as, What Is
It, When Shall It, How Is It Done, and Why So? Other language of the
Passions I find none: for Cursing, Swearing, Reviling, and the like, do
not signifie as Speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.

These forms of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary
significations of our Passions: but certain signes they be not; because
they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such
Passions or not. The best signes of Passions present, are either in the
countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we
otherwise know the man to have.



Good And Evill Apparent

And because in Deliberation the Appetites and Aversions are raised by
foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action
whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the
foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man
is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the Good
in those consequences be greater than the evill, the whole chain is that
which Writers call Apparent or Seeming Good. And contrarily, when the
evill exceedeth the good, the whole is Apparent or Seeming Evill: so
that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest
prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himself; and is able, when he
will, to give the best counsel unto others.



Felicity

Continual Successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to
time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call
FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing
as perpetual Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life
itself is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without
Feare, no more than without Sense. What kind of Felicity God hath
ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know,
than enjoy; being joys, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of
School-men, Beatifical Vision, is unintelligible.



Praise Magnification

The form of speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse
of anything is PRAISE. That whereby they signifie the power and
greatness of anything is MAGNIFYING. And that whereby they signifie
the opinion they have of a man's felicity is by the Greeks called
Makarismos, for which we have no name in our tongue. And thus much is
sufficient for the present purpose to have been said of the passions.


CHAPTER VII. OF THE ENDS OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE

Of all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last
an End, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of
Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.



Judgement, or Sentence Final; Doubt

If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the
thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been,
alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans
Discourse, you leave him in a Praesumption of It Will Be, or, It Will
Not Be; or it Has Been, or, Has Not Been. All which is Opinion. And that
which is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil,
the same is alternate Opinion in the Enquiry of the truth of Past, and
Future. And as the last Appetite in Deliberation is called the Will, so
the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future, is called
the JUDGEMENT, or Resolute and Final Sentence of him that Discourseth.
And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the question of Good
or Bad is called Deliberation; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate,
in the question of True, or False is called DOUBT.

No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or
to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and
ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have
said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No
man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will
be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if
This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which
is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to
another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.



Science Opinion Conscience

And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with
the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into
general Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes, the end or
last sum is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it
signified is that conditional Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence
of words, which is commonly called Science. But if the first ground of
such Discourse be not Definitions, or if the Definitions be not rightly
joyned together into Syllogismes, then the End or Conclusion is again
OPINION, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in
absurd and senslesse words, without possibility of being understood.
When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said
to be CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is as much as to know it
together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one
another, or of a third, it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill
act, for any man to speak against his Conscience; or to corrupt or force
another so to do: Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been always
hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use
of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret
facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically said that
the Conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently
in love with their own new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and
obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that
reverenced name of Conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful,
to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true,
when they know at most but that they think so.



Beliefe Faith

When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either
at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called
Opinion; Or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to
know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth
not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the
Person; And the Resolution is called BELEEFE, and FAITH: Faith, In the
man; Beleefe, both Of the man, and Of the truth of what he sayes. So
then in Beleefe are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the
other of his vertue. To Have Faith In, or Trust To, or Beleeve A Man,
signifie the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man:
But to Beleeve What Is Said, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth
of the saying. But wee are to observe that this Phrase, I Beleeve In;
as also the Latine, Credo In; and the Greek, Pisteno Eis, are never used
but in the writings of Divines. In stead of them, in other writings are
put, I Beleeve Him; I Have Faith In Him; I Rely On Him: and in Latin,
Credo Illi; Fido Illi: and in Greek, Pisteno Anto: and that this
singularity of the Ecclesiastical use of the word hath raised many
disputes about the right object of the Christian Faith.

But by Beleeving In, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the
Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine. For not
onely Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold
all for truth they heare him say, whether they understand it, or not;
which is all the Faith and trust can possibly be had in any person
whatsoever: But they do not all believe the Doctrine of the Creed.

From whence we may inferre, that when wee believe any saying whatsoever
it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing it selfe, or
from the principles of naturall Reason, but from the Authority, and
good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it; then is the speaker, or
person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of
our Faith; and the Honour done in Believing, is done to him onely. And
consequently, when wee Believe that the Scriptures are the word of God,
having no immediate revelation from God himselfe, our Beleefe, Faith,
and Trust is in the Church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein.
And they that believe that which a Prophet relates unto them in the
name of God, take the word of the Prophet, do honour to him, and in him
trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he
be a true, or a false Prophet. And so it is also with all other History.
For if I should not believe all that is written By Historians, of the
glorious acts of Alexander, or Caesar; I do not think the Ghost of
Alexander, or Caesar, had any just cause to be offended; or any body
else, but the Historian. If Livy say the Gods made once a Cow speak, and
we believe it not; wee distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that it is
evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, than what is
drawn from authority of men onely, and their writings; whether they be
sent from God or not, is Faith in men onely.


CHAPTER VIII. OF THE VERTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL;

AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS



Intellectuall Vertue Defined

Vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued
for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things
were equally in all men, nothing would be prized. And by Vertues
INTELLECTUALL, are always understood such abilityes of the mind, as men
praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under
the name of a Good Witte; though the same word Witte, be used also, to
distinguish one certain ability from the rest.



Wit, Naturall, Or Acquired

These Vertues are of two sorts; Naturall, and Acquired. By Naturall, I
mean not, that which a man hath from his Birth: for that is nothing else
but Sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute
Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst Vertues. But I mean, that
Witte, which is gotten by Use onely, and Experience; without Method,
Culture, or Instruction. This NATURALL WITTE, consisteth principally
in two things; Celerity Of Imagining, (that is, swift succession of one
thought to another;) and Steddy Direction to some approved end. On the
Contrary a slow Imagination, maketh that Defect, or fault of the mind,
which is commonly called DULNESSE, Stupidity, and sometimes by other
names that signifie slownesse of motion, or difficulty to be moved.



Good Wit, Or Fancy; Good Judgement; Discretion

And this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the difference of mens
passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and
therefore some mens thoughts run one way, some another: and are held to,
and observe differently the things that passe through their imagination.
And whereas in his succession of mens thoughts, there is nothing to
observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be Like One
Another, or in what they be Unlike, or What They Serve For, or How They
Serve To Such A Purpose; Those that observe their similitudes, in case
they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are sayd to have a
Good Wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a Good Fancy. But they
that observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called
Distinguishing, and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing; in
case, such discerning be not easie, are said to have a Good Judgement:
and particularly in matter of conversation and businesse; wherein,
times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this Vertue is called
DISCRETION. The former, that is, Fancy, without the help of Judgement,
is not commended as a Vertue: but the later which is Judgement, and
Discretion, is commended for it selfe, without the help of Fancy.
Besides the Discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a
good Fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts
to their End; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done;
he that hath this Vertue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that
will please, not onely by illustration of his discourse, and adorning it
with new and apt metaphors; but also, by the rarity or their invention.
But without Steddinesse, and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one
kind of Madnesse; such as they have, that entring into any discourse,
are snatched from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their
thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and parentheses, that
they utterly lose themselves: Which kind of folly, I know no particular
name for: but the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience; whereby
that seemeth to a man new and rare, which doth not so to others:
sometimes Pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other
men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore
thought fit to be told, withdrawes a man by degrees from the intended
way of his discourse.

In a good Poem, whether it be Epique, or Dramatique; as also in Sonnets,
Epigrams, and other Pieces, both Judgement and Fancy are required:
But the Fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the
Extravagancy; but ought not to displease by Indiscretion.

In a good History, the Judgement must be eminent; because the goodnesse
consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse of the
actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but
onely in adorning the stile.

In Orations of Prayse, and in Invectives, the Fancy is praedominant;
because the designe is not truth, but to Honour or Dishonour; which is
done by noble, or by vile comparisons. The Judgement does but suggest
what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.

In Hortatives, and Pleadings, as Truth, or Disguise serveth best to the
Designe in hand; so is the Judgement, or the Fancy most required.

In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigourous search of Truth,
Judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding have need to be
opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of Fancy.
But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing
they openly professe deceipt; to admit them into Councell, or Reasoning,
were manifest folly.

And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be
apparent, how extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse
will be taken for a signe of want of wit; and so will it never when the
Discretion is manifest, though the Fancy be never so ordinary.

The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane,
clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verball
discourse cannot do, farther than the Judgement shall approve of the
Time, Place, and Persons. An Anatomist, or a Physitian may speak, or
write his judgement of unclean things; because it is not to please,
but profit: but for another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant
fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt,
should come and present himselfe before good company. And 'tis the want
of Discretion that makes the difference. Again, in profest remissnesse
of mind, and familiar company, a man may play with the sounds, and
aequivocal significations of words; and that many times with encounters
of extraordinary Fancy: but in a Sermon, or in publique, or before
persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no Gingling of
words that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is onely in
the want of Discretion. So that where Wit is wanting, it is not Fancy
that is wanting, but Discretion. Judgement therefore without Fancy is
Wit, but Fancy without Judgement not.



Prudence

When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over a
multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe; or what
designe they may conduce into; if his observations be such as are not
easie, or usuall, This wit of his is called PRUDENCE; and dependeth on
much Experience, and Memory of the like things, and their consequences
heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of Men, as there is
in their Fancies and Judgements; Because the Experience of men equall
in age, is not much unequall, as to the quantity; but lyes in different
occasions; every one having his private designes. To govern well a
family, and a kingdome, are not different degrees of Prudence; but
different sorts of businesse; no more then to draw a picture in little,
or as great, or greater then the life, are different degrees of Art. A
plain husband-man is more Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a
Privy Counseller in the affaires of another man.



Craft

To Prudence, if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such
as usually are prompted to men by Feare, or Want; you have that Crooked
Wisdome, which is called CRAFT; which is a signe of Pusillanimity. For
Magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which
the Latines Call Versutia, (translated into English, Shifting,) and is
a putting off of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into
a greater, as when a man robbs one to pay another, is but a shorter
sighted Craft, called Versutia, from Versura, which signifies taking
mony at usurie, for the present payment of interest.



Acquired Wit

As for Acquired Wit, (I mean acquired by method and instruction,) there
is none but Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech; and
produceth the Sciences. But of Reason and Science, I have already spoken
in the fifth and sixth Chapters.

The causes of this difference of Witts, are in the Passions: and
the difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different
Constitution of the body, and partly from different Education. For if
the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of
Sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no lesse difference
of men in their Sight, Hearing, or other Senses, than in their Fancies,
and Discretions. It proceeds therefore from the Passions; which are
different, not onely from the difference of mens complexions; but also
from their difference of customes, and education.

The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are
principally, the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge,
and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of
Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but severall sorts of Power.



Giddinesse Madnesse

And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things;
but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good
man, as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have
either a great Fancy, or much Judgement. For the Thoughts, are to the
Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the
things Desired: All Stedinesse of the minds motion, and all quicknesse
of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have no Desire, is to
be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dulnesse; and to have Passions
indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESSE, and Distraction; and to have
stronger, and more vehement Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily
seen in others, is that which men call MADNESSE.

Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves.
Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from the
evill constitution of the organs of the Body, or harme done them; and
sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the Organs, is caused by the
vehemence, or long continuance of the Passion. But in both cases the
Madnesse is of one and the same nature.

The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse, is either
great Vaine-Glory; which is commonly called Pride, and Selfe-Conceipt;
or great Dejection of mind.



Rage

Pride, subjecteth a man to Anger, the excesse whereof, is the Madnesse
called RAGE, and FURY. And thus it comes to passe that excessive desire
of Revenge, when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs, and becomes
Rage: That excessive love, with jealousie, becomes also Rage: Excessive
opinion of a mans own selfe, for divine inspiration, for wisdome,
learning, forme, and the like, becomes Distraction, and Giddinesse:
the same, joyned with Envy, Rage: Vehement opinion of the truth of any
thing, contradicted by others, Rage.



Melancholy

Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears; which is a Madnesse
commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners; as in
haunting of solitudes, and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in
fearing some one, some another particular thing. In summe, all Passions
that produce strange and unusuall behaviour, are called by the generall
name of Madnesse. But of the severall kinds of Madnesse, he that
would take the paines, might enrowle a legion. And if the Excesses be
madnesse, there is no doubt but the Passions themselves, when they tend
to Evill, are degrees of the same.

(For example,) Though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of
an opinion of being inspired, be not visible alwayes in one man, by any
very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such Passion; yet when
many of them conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude is
visible enough. For what argument of Madnesse can there be greater, than
to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is
somewhat lesse than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour,
fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their lifetime before,
they have been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be
Madnesse in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For
as in the middest of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of
that part of the water next him; yet he is well assured, that part
contributes as much, to the Roaring of the Sea, as any other part, of
the same quantity: so also, thought wee perceive no great unquietnesse,
in one, or two men; yet we may be well assured, that their singular
Passions, are parts of the Seditious roaring of a troubled Nation. And
if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madnesse; yet that very
arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough. If some
man in Bedlam should entertaine you with sober discourse; and you desire
in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time
requite his civility; and he should tell you, he were God the Father;
I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his
Madnesse.

This opinion of Inspiration, called commonly, Private Spirit, begins
very often, from some lucky finding of an Errour generally held by
others; and not knowing, or not remembring, by what conduct of reason,
they came to so singular a truth, (as they think it, though it be many
times an untruth they light on,) they presently admire themselves; as
being in the speciall grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same
to them supernaturally, by his Spirit.

Again, that Madnesse is nothing else, but too much appearing Passion,
may be gathered out of the effects of Wine, which are the same with
those of the evill disposition of the organs. For the variety of
behaviour in men that have drunk too much, is the same with that of
Mad-men: some of them Raging, others Loving, others laughing, all
extravagantly, but according to their severall domineering Passions:
For the effect of the wine, does but remove Dissimulation; and take from
them the sight of the deformity of their Passions. For, (I believe) the
most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the
mind, would be unwilling the vanity and Extravagance of their thoughts
at that time should be publiquely seen: which is a confession, that
Passions unguided, are for the most part meere Madnesse.

The opinions of the world, both in antient and later ages, concerning
the cause of madnesse, have been two. Some, deriving them from the
Passions; some, from Daemons, or Spirits, either good, or bad, which
they thought might enter into a man, possesse him, and move his organs
is such strange, and uncouth manner, as mad-men use to do. The former
sort therefore, called such men, Mad-men: but the Later, called them
sometimes Daemoniacks, (that is, possessed with spirits;) sometimes
Energumeni, (that is agitated, or moved with spirits;) and now in
Italy they are called not onely Pazzi, Mad-men; but also Spiritati, men
possest.

There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a City of the
Greeks, at the acting of the Tragedy of Andromeda, upon an extream hot
day: whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into Fevers, had
this accident from the heat, and from The Tragedy together, that they
did nothing but pronounce Iambiques, with the names of Perseus and
Andromeda; which together with the Fever, was cured, by the comming on
of Winter: And this madnesse was thought to proceed from the Passion
imprinted by the Tragedy. Likewise there raigned a fit of madnesse in
another Graecian city, which seized onely the young Maidens; and caused
many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of
the Divel. But one that suspected, that contempt of life in them,
might proceed from some Passion of the mind, and supposing they did not
contemne also their honour, gave counsell to the Magistrates, to strip
such as so hang'd themselves, and let them hang out naked. This the
story sayes cured that madnesse. But on the other side, the same
Graecians, did often ascribe madnesse, to the operation of the
Eumenides, or Furyes; and sometimes of Ceres, Phoebus, and other Gods:
so much did men attribute to Phantasmes, as to think them aereal living
bodies; and generally to call them Spirits. And as the Romans in this,
held the same opinion with the Greeks: so also did the Jewes; For they
calle mad-men Prophets, or (according as they thought the spirits
good or bad) Daemoniacks; and some of them called both Prophets, and
Daemoniacks, mad-men; and some called the same man both Daemoniack, and
mad-man. But for the Gentiles, 'tis no wonder; because Diseases, and
Health; Vices, and Vertues; and many naturall accidents, were with them
termed, and worshipped as Daemons. So that a man was to understand by
Daemon, as well (sometimes) an Ague, as a Divell. But for the Jewes to
have such opinion, is somewhat strange. For neither Moses, nor Abraham
pretended to Prophecy by possession of a Spirit; but from the voyce of
God; or by a Vision or Dream: Nor is there any thing in his Law,
Morall, or Ceremoniall, by which they were taught, there was any such
Enthusiasme; or any Possession. When God is sayd, (Numb. 11. 25.) to
take from the Spirit that was in Moses, and give it to the 70. Elders,
the Spirit of God (taking it for the substance of God) is not divided.
The Scriptures by the Spirit of God in man, mean a mans spirit, enclined
to Godlinesse. And where it is said (Exod. 28. 3.) "Whom I have filled
with the Spirit of wisdome to make garments for Aaron," is not meant a
spirit put into them, that can make garments; but the wisdome of their
own spirits in that kind of work. In the like sense, the spirit of
man, when it produceth unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean
spirit; and so other spirits, though not alwayes, yet as often as the
vertue or vice so stiled, is extraordinary, and Eminent. Neither did the
other Prophets of the old Testament pretend Enthusiasme; or, that God
spake in them; but to them by Voyce, Vision, or Dream; and the Burthen
Of The Lord was not Possession, but Command. How then could the Jewes
fall into this opinion of possession? I can imagine no reason, but that
which is common to all men; namely, the want of curiosity to search
naturall causes; and their placing Felicity, in the acquisition of the
grosse pleasures of the Senses, and the things that most immediately
conduce thereto. For they that see any strange, and unusuall ability, or
defect in a mans mind; unlesse they see withall, from what cause it may
probably proceed, can hardly think it naturall; and if not naturall,
they must needs thinke it supernaturall; and then what can it be, but
that either God, or the Divell is in him? And hence it came to passe,
when our Saviour (Mark 3.21.) was compassed about with the multitude,
those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him: but
the Scribes said he had Belzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out
divels; as if the greater mad-man had awed the lesser. And that (John
10. 20.) some said, "He hath a Divell, and is mad;" whereas others
holding him for a Prophet, sayd, "These are not the words of one that
hath a Divell." So in the old Testament he that came to anoynt Jehu, (2
Kings 9.11.) was a Prophet; but some of the company asked Jehu, "What
came that mad-man for?" So that in summe, it is manifest, that whosoever
behaved himselfe in extraordinary manner, was thought by the Jewes to be
possessed either with a good, or evill spirit; except by the Sadduces,
who erred so farre on the other hand, as not to believe there were at
all any spirits, (which is very neere to direct Atheisme;) and thereby
perhaps the more provoked others, to terme such men Daemoniacks, rather
than mad-men.

But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they
were possest; and not as if they were mad. To which I can give no other
kind of answer, but that which is given to those that urge the Scripture
in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the Earth. The
Scripture was written to shew unto men the kingdome of God; and to
prepare their mindes to become his obedient subjects; leaving the
world, and the Philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men, for the
exercising of their naturall Reason. Whether the Earths, or Suns motion
make the day, and night; or whether the Exorbitant actions of men,
proceed from Passion, or from the Divell, (so we worship him not) it is
all one, as to our obedience, and subjection to God Almighty; which is
the thing for which the Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour
speaketh to the disease, as to a person; it is the usuall phrase of all
that cure by words onely, as Christ did, (and Inchanters pretend to
do, whether they speak to a Divel or not.) For is not Christ also said
(Math. 8.26.) to have rebuked the winds? Is not he said also (Luk. 4.
39.) to rebuke a Fever? Yet this does not argue that a Fever is a Divel.
And whereas many of these Divels are said to confesse Christ; it is not
necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that those mad-men
confessed him. And whereas our Saviour (Math. 12. 43.) speaketh of an
unclean Spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandreth through dry
places, seeking rest, and finding none; and returning into the same
man, with seven other spirits worse than himselfe; It is manifestly a
Parable, alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his
lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven times
worse than he was. So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that
requireth a beliefe, that Daemoniacks were any other thing but Mad-men.



Insignificant Speech

There is yet another fault in the Discourses of some men; which may also
be numbred amongst the sorts of Madnesse; namely, that abuse of words,
whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the Name of
Absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have
in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through
misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by
others, from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to
none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible,
as the Schoole-men; or in questions of abstruse Philosophy. The common
sort of men seldome speak Insignificantly, and are therefore, by those
other Egregious persons counted Idiots. But to be assured their words
are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would
need some Examples; which if any man require, let him take a Schoole-man
into his hands, and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning
any difficult point; as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ;
Transubstantiation; Free-will. &c. into any of the moderne tongues, so
as to make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latine, such
as they were acquainted withall, that lived when the Latine tongue was
Vulgar. What is the meaning of these words. "The first cause does not
necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the Essential
subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to worke?"
They are the Translation of the Title of the sixth chapter of Suarez
first Booke, Of The Concourse, Motion, And Help Of God. When men write
whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not Mad, or intend to make others
so? And particularly, in the question of Transubstantiation; where
after certain words spoken, they that say, the White-nesse, Round-nesse,
Magni-tude, Quali-ty, Corruptibili-ty, all which are incorporeall, &c.
go out of the Wafer, into the Body of our blessed Saviour, do they not
make those Nesses, Tudes and Ties, to be so many spirits possessing his
body? For by Spirits, they mean alwayes things, that being incorporeall,
are neverthelesse moveable from one place to another. So that this kind
of Absurdity, may rightly be numbred amongst the many sorts of Madnesse;
and all the time that guided by clear Thoughts of their worldly lust,
they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but Lucide Intervals. And thus
much of the Vertues and Defects Intellectuall.


CHAPTER IX. OF THE SEVERALL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE

There are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is Knowledge Of Fact: the
other Knowledge Of The Consequence Of One Affirmation To Another. The
former is nothing else, but Sense and Memory, and is Absolute Knowledge;
as when we see a Fact doing, or remember it done: And this is the
Knowledge required in a Witnesse. The later is called Science; and is
Conditionall; as when we know, that, If The Figure Showne Be A Circle,
Then Any Straight Line Through The Centre Shall Divide It Into Two
Equall Parts. And this is the Knowledge required in a Philosopher; that
is to say, of him that pretends to Reasoning.

The Register of Knowledge Of Fact is called History. Whereof there be
two sorts: one called Naturall History; which is the History of such
Facts, or Effects of Nature, as have no Dependance on Mans Will; Such as
are the Histories of Metals, Plants, Animals, Regions, and the like. The
other, is Civill History; which is the History of the Voluntary Actions
of men in Common-wealths.

The Registers of Science, are such Books as contain the Demonstrations
of Consequences of one Affirmation, to another; and are commonly called
Books of Philosophy; whereof the sorts are many, according to the
diversity of the Matter; And may be divided in such manner as I have
divided them in the following Table.

I. Science, that is, Knowledge of Consequences; which is called
also PHILOSOPHY

A. Consequences from Accidents of Bodies Naturall; which is
called
NATURALL PHILOSOPHY

1. Consequences from the Accidents common to all Bodies Naturall;
which are Quantity, and Motion.

a. Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Indeterminate;
which, being the Principles or first foundation of
Philosophy, is called Philosophia Prima

PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA

b. Consequences from Motion, and Quantity Determined

1) Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Determined

a) By Figure, By Number

1] Mathematiques,

GEOMETRY
ARITHMETIQUE

2) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of Bodies in
Speciall

a) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of the
great parts of the World, as the Earth and Stars,

1] Cosmography

ASTRONOMY
GEOGRAPHY

b) Consequences from the Motion of Speciall kinds, and
Figures of Body,

1] Mechaniques, Doctrine of Weight

Science of
ENGINEERS
ARCHITECTURE
NAVIGATION

2. PHYSIQUES, or Consequences from Qualities

a. Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Transient, such
as sometimes appear, sometimes vanish

METEOROLOGY

b. Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Permanent

1) Consequences from the Qualities of the Starres

a) Consequences from the Light of the Starres. Out of
this, and the Motion of the Sunne, is made the
Science of

SCIOGRAPHY

b) Consequences from the Influence of the Starres,

ASTROLOGY

2) Consequences of the Qualities from Liquid Bodies that
fill the space between the Starres; such as are the
Ayre, or substance aetherial.

3) Consequences from Qualities of Bodies Terrestrial

a) Consequences from parts of the Earth that are
without Sense,

1] Consequences from Qualities of Minerals, as
Stones, Metals, &c
. 2] Consequences from the Qualities of Vegetables

b) Consequences from Qualities of Animals

1] Consequences from Qualities of Animals in
Generall

a] Consequences from Vision,

OPTIQUES

b] Consequences from Sounds,

MUSIQUE

c] Consequences from the rest of the senses

2] Consequences from Qualities of Men in Speciall

a] Consequences from Passions of Men,

ETHIQUES

b] Consequences from Speech,

i) In Magnifying, Vilifying, etc.

POETRY

ii) In Persuading,

RHETORIQUE

iii) In Reasoning,

LOGIQUE

iv) In Contracting,

The Science of
JUST and UNJUST

B. Consequences from the Accidents of Politique Bodies; which is
called
POLITIQUES, and CIVILL PHILOSOPHY

1. Of Consequences from the Institution of COMMON-WEALTHS, to
the Rights, and Duties of the Body Politique, or Soveraign.

2. Of Consequences from the same, to the Duty and Right of
the Subjects.


CHAPTER X. OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR AND WORTHINESS



Power

The POWER of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means,
to obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Originall, or
Instrumentall.

Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body, or Mind: as
extraordinary Strength, Forme, Prudence, Arts, Eloquence, Liberality,
Nobility. Instrumentall are those Powers, which acquired by these, or
by fortune, are means and Instruments to acquire more: as Riches,
Reputation, Friends, and the Secret working of God, which men call
Good Luck. For the nature of Power, is in this point, like to Fame,
increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the
further they go, make still the more hast.

The Greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the Powers
of most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall, or civill, that
has the use of all their Powers depending on his will; such as is the
Power of a Common-wealth: or depending on the wills of each particular;
such as is the Power of a Faction, or of divers factions leagued.
Therefore to have servants, is Power; To have Friends, is Power: for
they are strengths united.

Also Riches joyned with liberality, is Power; because it procureth
friends, and servants: Without liberality, not so; because in this case
they defend not; but expose men to Envy, as a Prey.

Reputation of power, is Power; because it draweth with it the adhaerance
of those that need protection.

So is Reputation of love of a mans Country, (called Popularity,) for the
same Reason.

Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or
the reputation of such quality, is Power; because it is a means to have
the assistance, and service of many.

Good successe is Power; because it maketh reputation of Wisdome, or good
fortune; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him.

Affability of men already in power, is encrease of Power; because it
gaineth love.

Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Power; because
to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves, more willingly
than to others.

Nobility is Power, not in all places, but onely in those Common-wealths,
where it has Priviledges: for in such priviledges consisteth their
Power.

Eloquence is Power; because it is seeming Prudence.

Forme is Power; because being a promise of Good, it recommendeth men to
the favour of women and strangers.

The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and therefore, not
acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them, but
of a few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand
it to be, but such as in a good measure have attayned it.

Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other
Instruments of War; because they conferre to Defence, and Victory,
are Power; And though the true Mother of them, be Science, namely the
Mathematiques; yet, because they are brought into the Light, by the hand
of the Artificer, they be esteemed (the Midwife passing with the vulgar
for the Mother,) as his issue.



Worth

The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price;
that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power:
and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and
judgement of another. An able conductor of Souldiers, is of great Price
in time of War present, or imminent; but in Peace not so. A learned and
uncorrupt Judge, is much Worth in time of Peace; but not so much in
War. And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer
determines the Price. For let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves as
the highest Value they can; yet their true Value is no more than it is
esteemed by others.

The manifestation of the Value we set on one another, is that which is
commonly called Honouring, and Dishonouring. To Value a man at a high
rate, is to Honour him; at a low rate, is to Dishonour him. But high,
and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate
that each man setteth on himselfe.



Dignity

The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the
Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. And this Value
of him by the Common-wealth, is understood, by offices of Command,
Judicature, publike Employment; or by Names and Titles, introduced for
distinction of such Value.



To Honour and Dishonour

To pray to another, for ayde of any kind, is to HONOUR; because a signe
we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the ayde
is, the more is the Honour.

To obey, is to Honour; because no man obeyes them, whom they think
have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to
Dishonour.

To give great gifts to a man, is to Honour him; because 'tis buying
of Protection, and acknowledging of Power. To give little gifts, is to
Dishonour; because it is but Almes, and signifies an opinion of the
need of small helps. To be sedulous in promoting anothers good; also
to flatter, is to Honour; as a signe we seek his protection or ayde. To
neglect, is to Dishonour.

To give way, or place to another, in any Commodity, is to Honour; being
a confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to Dishonour.

To shew any signe of love, or feare of another, is to Honour; for both
to love, and to feare, is to value. To contemne, or lesse to love or
feare then he expects, is to Dishonour; for 'tis undervaluing.

To praise, magnifie, or call happy, is to Honour; because nothing but
goodnesse, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pitty, is
to Dishonour.

To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with
decency, and humility, is to Honour him; as signes of fear to offend.
To speak to him rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly,
impudently, is to Dishonour.

To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him; signe of
opinion of his vertue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to
Dishonour.

To hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever, is to
Honour; as a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep,
or go forth, or talk the while, is to Dishonour.

To do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Honour, or
which the Law or Custome makes so, is to Honour; because in approving
the Honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others
acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to Dishonour.

To agree with in opinion, is to Honour; as being a signe of approving
his judgement, and wisdome. To dissent, is Dishonour; and an upbraiding
of errour; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.

To imitate, is to Honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate
ones Enemy, is to Dishonour.

To honour those another honours, is to Honour him; as a signe of
approbation of his judgement. To honour his Enemies, is to Dishonour
him.

To employ in counsell, or in actions of difficulty, is to Honour; as a
signe of opinion of his wisdome, or other power. To deny employment in
the same cases, to those that seek it, is to Dishonour.

All these wayes of Honouring, are naturall; and as well within, as
without Common-wealths. But in Common-wealths, where he, or they that
have the supreme Authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand
for signes of Honour, there be other Honours.

A Soveraigne doth Honour a Subject, with whatsoever Title, or Office, or
Employment, or Action, that he himselfe will have taken for a signe of
his will to Honour him.

The King of Persia, Honoured Mordecay, when he appointed he should be
conducted through the streets in the Kings Garment, upon one of the
Kings Horses, with a Crown on his head, and a Prince before him,
proclayming, "Thus shall it be done to him that the King will honour."
And yet another King of Persia, or the same another time, to one that
demanded for some great service, to weare one of the Kings robes, gave
him leave so to do; but with his addition, that he should weare it as
the Kings foole; and then it was Dishonour. So that of Civill Honour;
such as are Magistracy, Offices, Titles; and in some places Coats, and
Scutchions painted: and men Honour such as have them, as having so many
signes of favour in the Common-wealth; which favour is Power.

Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument
and signe of Power.

And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable;
as arguments of Power. To be Honoured of few or none, Dishonourable.

Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable; as a signe of the favour of God.
Ill fortune, and losses, Dishonourable. Riches, are Honourable; for
they are Power. Poverty, Dishonourable. Magnanimity, Liberality,
Hope, Courage, Confidence, are Honourable; for they proceed from the
conscience of Power. Pusillanimity, Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence, are
Dishonourable.

Timely Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is
Honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers.
And Irresolution, Dishonourable; as a signe of too much valuing of
little impediments, and little advantages: For when a man has weighed
things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference
of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues
little things, which is Pusillanimity.

All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much
Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable; For all these
are Powers. Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour, Ignorance, or
Folly, Dishonourable.

Gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on
some thing else, is Honourable; because employment is a signe of
Power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is
Dishonourable. For the gravity of the Former, is like the steddinesse of
a Ship laden with Merchandise; but of the later, like the steddinesse of
a Ship ballasted with Sand, and other trash.

To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office,
great Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable; as a signe of the
power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, Obscurity, is
Dishonourable.

To be descended from conspicuous Parents, is Honourable; because they
the more easily attain the aydes, and friends of their Ancestors. On the
contrary, to be descended from obscure Parentage, is Dishonourable.

Actions proceeding from Equity, joyned with losse, are Honourable;
as signes of Magnanimity: for Magnanimity is a signe of Power. On the
contrary, Craft, Shifting, neglect of Equity, is Dishonourable.

Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be great
and difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,) be just or
unjust: for Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power. Therefore
the ancient Heathen did not thinke they Dishonoured, but greatly
Honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their Poems, committing
Rapes, Thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: In so much
as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his Adulteries; nor
in Mercury, as his Frauds, and Thefts: of whose praises, in a hymne
of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had
invented Musique at noon, and before night, stolen away the Cattell of
Appollo, from his Herdsmen.

Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Common-wealths,
it was thought no dishonour to be a Pyrate, or a High-way Theefe; but
rather a lawfull Trade, not onely amongst the Greeks, but also amongst
all other Nations; as is manifest by the Histories of antient time. And
at this day, in this part of the world, private Duels are, and alwayes
will be Honourable, though unlawfull, till such time as there shall be
Honour ordained for them that refuse, and Ignominy for them that make
the Challenge. For Duels also are many times effects of Courage; and the
ground of Courage is alwayes Strength or Skill, which are Power; though
for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of
Dishonour, in one, or both the Combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are
driven into the Lists to avoyd disgrace.

Scutchions, and coats of Armes haereditary, where they have any eminent
Priviledges, are Honourable; otherwise not: for their Power consisteth
either in such Priviledges, or in Riches, or some such thing as is
equally honoured in other men. This kind of Honour, commonly called
Gentry, has been derived from the Antient Germans. For there never was
any such thing known, where the German Customes were unknown. Nor is it
now any where in use, where the Germans have not inhabited. The antient
Greek Commanders, when they went to war, had their Shields painted with
such Devises as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted Buckler was a
signe of Poverty, and of a common Souldier: but they transmitted not the
Inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the Marks of their Families:
but they were the Images, not the Devises of their Ancestors. Amongst
the people of Asia, Afrique, and America, there is not, nor was ever,
any such thing. The Germans onely had that custome; from whom it has
been derived into England, France, Spain, and Italy, when in great
numbers they either ayded the Romans, or made their own Conquests in
these Westerne parts of the world.

For Germany, being antiently, as all other Countries, in their
beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords, or
Masters of Families, that continually had wars one with another; those
Masters, or Lords, principally to the end they might, when they were
Covered with Arms, be known by their followers; and partly for ornament,
both painted their Armor, or their Scutchion, or Coat, with the picture
of some Beast, or other thing; and also put some eminent and visible
mark upon the Crest of their Helmets. And his ornament both of the
Armes, and Crest, descended by inheritance to their Children; to the
eldest pure, and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the
Old master, that is to say in Dutch, the Here-alt thought fit. But when
many such Families, joyned together, made a greater Monarchy, this duty
of the Herealt, to distinguish Scutchions, was made a private Office
a part. And the issue of these Lords, is the great and antient Gentry;
which for the most part bear living creatures, noted for courage, and
rapine; or Castles, Battlements, Belts, Weapons, Bars, Palisadoes, and
other notes of War; nothing being then in honour, but vertue military.
Afterwards, not onely Kings, but popular Common-wealths, gave divers
manners of Scutchions, to such as went forth to the War, or returned
from it, for encouragement, or recompence to their service. All which,
by an observing Reader, may be found in such ancient Histories, Greek
and Latine, as make mention of the German Nation, and Manners, in their
times.



Titles of Honour

Titles of Honour, such as are Duke, Count, Marquis, and Baron, are
Honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the Soveraigne
Power of the Common-wealth: Which Titles, were in old time titles
of Office, and Command, derived some from the Romans, some from the
Germans, and French. Dukes, in Latine Duces, being Generalls in War:
Counts, Comites, such as bare the Generall company out of friendship;
and were left to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified:
Marquises, Marchiones, were Counts that governed the Marches, or bounds
of the Empire. Which titles of Duke, Count, and Marquis, came into the
Empire, about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customes of
the German Militia. But Baron, seems to have been a Title of the Gaules,
and signifies a Great man; such as were the Kings, or Princes men, whom
they employed in war about their persons; and seems to be derived from
Vir, to Ber, and Bar, that signified the same in the Language of the
Gaules, that Vir in Latine; and thence to Bero, and Baro: so that such
men were called Berones, and after Barones; and (in Spanish) Varones.
But he that would know more particularly the originall of Titles of
Honour, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr. Seldens most excellent
Treatise of that subject. In processe of time these offices of Honour,
by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peacable government,
were turned into meer Titles; serving for the most part, to distinguish
the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the Common-wealth: and
men were made Dukes, Counts, Marquises, and Barons of Places, wherein
they had neither possession, nor command: and other Titles also, were
devised to the same end.



Worthinesse Fitnesse

WORTHINESSE, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man; and
also from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a particular power,
or ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular
ability, is usually named FITNESSE, or Aptitude.

For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a Judge, or to have any
other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the
well discharging of it; and Worthiest of Riches, that has the qualities
most requisite for the well using of them: any of which qualities being
absent, one may neverthelesse be a Worthy man, and valuable for
some thing else. Again, a man may be Worthy of Riches, Office, and
Employment, that neverthelesse, can plead no right to have it before
another; and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For Merit,
praesupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise: Of
which I shall say more hereafter, when I shall speak of Contracts.



CHAPTER XI. OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS



What Is Here Meant By Manners

By MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour; as how one man should
salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth
before company, and such other points of the Small Morals; But those
qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together in Peace, and
Unity. To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life,
consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such
Finis Ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest good,) as is
spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man
any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and
Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progresse of the
desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being
still but the way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the object
of mans desire, is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time;
but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the
voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the
procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ
onely in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions,
in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or
opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.



A Restlesse Desire Of Power, In All Men

So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all
mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that
ceaseth onely in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man
hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or
that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot
assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without
the acquisition of more. And from hence it is, that Kings, whose power
is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it a home by Lawes,
or abroad by Wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire;
in some, of Fame from new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensuall
pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in
some art, or other ability of the mind.



Love Of Contention From Competition

Competition of Riches, Honour, command, or other power, enclineth to
Contention, Enmity, and War: because the way of one Competitor, to the
attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the
other. Particularly, competition of praise, enclineth to a reverence of
Antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these
ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.



Civil Obedience From Love Of Ease

Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men to obey a common
Power: because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the protection might
be hoped for from his own Industry, and labour.



From Feare Of Death Or Wounds

Fear of Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same
reason. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their
present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of Military
command, are enclined to continue the causes of warre; and to stirre up
trouble and sedition: for there is no honour Military but by warre; nor
any such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.



And From Love Of Arts

Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, enclineth men to obey a common
Power: For such Desire, containeth a desire of leasure; and consequently
protection from some other Power than their own.



Love Of Vertue, From Love Of Praise

Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them
whose judgement they value; for of these men whom we contemn, we contemn
also the Praises. Desire of Fame after death does the same. And though
after death, there be no sense of the praise given us on Earth, as being
joyes, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joyes of Heaven,
or extinguished in the extreme torments of Hell: yet is not such Fame
vain; because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight
of it, and of the benefit that may rebound thereby to their posterity:
which though they now see not, yet they imagine; and any thing that is
pleasure in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.



Hate, From Difficulty Of Requiting Great Benefits

To have received from one, to whom we think our selves equall, greater
benefits than there is hope to Requite, disposeth to counterfiet love;
but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate
debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitely wishes
him there, where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige; and
obligation is thraldome; which is to ones equall, hateful. But to have
received benefits from one, whom we acknowledge our superiour, enclines
to love; because the obligation is no new depession: and cheerfull
acceptation, (which men call Gratitude,) is such an honour done to
the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution. Also to receive
benefits, though from an equall, or inferiour, as long as there is hope
of requitall, disposeth to love: for in the intention of the receiver,
the obligation is of ayd, and service mutuall; from whence proceedeth
an Emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most noble and
profitable contention possible; wherein the victor is pleased with his
victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.



And From Conscience Of Deserving To Be Hated

To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate,
enclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge, or
forgivenesse; both which are hatefull.



Promptnesse To Hurt, From Fear

Feare of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek ayd by
society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life
and liberty.



And From Distrust Of Their Own Wit

Men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, and sedition,
better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise,
or crafty. For these love to consult, the other (fearing to be
circumvented,) to strike first. And in sedition, men being alwayes in
the procincts of Battell, to hold together, and use all advantages of
force, is a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from subtilty of
Wit.



Vain Undertaking From Vain-glory

Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of
great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are
enclined onely to ostentation; but not to attempt: Because when
danger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have their
insufficiency discovered.

Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery
of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured
ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are enclined to
rash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire
if they can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather
hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse; than their
lives, for which no salve is sufficient.



Ambition, From Opinion Of Sufficiency

Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of
government, are disposed to Ambition. Because without publique
Employment in counsell or magistracy, the honour of their wisdome is
lost. And therefore Eloquent speakers are enclined to Ambition; for
Eloquence seemeth wisdome, both to themselves and others



Irresolution, From Too Great Valuing Of Small Matters

Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and consequently to lose
the occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have
been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not
then manifest what is best to be done, tis a signe, the difference of
Motives, the one way and the other, are not great: Therefore not to
resolve then, is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles; which is
pusillanimity.

Frugality,(though in poor men a Vertue,) maketh a man unapt to atchieve
such actions, as require the strength of many men at once: For it
weakeneth their Endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by
Reward.

Confidence In Others From Ignorance Of The Marks Of Wisdome and
Kindnesse Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them
that have it; because the former is seeming Wisdome, the later seeming
Kindnesse. Adde to them Military reputation, and it disposeth men to
adhaere, and subject themselves to those men that have them. The two
former, having given them caution against danger from him; the later
gives them caution against danger from others.



And From The Ignorance Of Naturall Causes

Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather
constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others. For
all men whom the truth concernes, if they rely not on their own,
must rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than
themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.



And From Want Of Understanding

Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of
understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not onely the truth they
know not; but also the errors; and which is more, the non-sense of them
they trust: For neither Error, nor non-sense, can without a perfect
understanding of words, be detected.

From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and
the same thing, from the difference of their own passions: As they that
approve a private opinion, call it Opinion; but they that mislike it,
Haeresie: and yet haeresie signifies no more than private opinion; but
has onely a greater tincture of choler.

From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without
study and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many
actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one action of
all the Senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many actions of a
number of Senators in killing Caesar; and therefore are disposed to take
for the action of the people, that which is a multitude of actions done
by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the perswasion of one.

Adhaerence To Custome, From Ignorance Of The Nature Of Right And Wrong
Ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution of Right, Equity,
Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to make Custome and Example the rule
of his actions; in such manner, as to think that Unjust which it
hath been the custome to punish; and that Just, of the impunity and
approbation whereof they can produce an Example, or (as the Lawyers
which onely use the false measure of Justice barbarously call it) a
Precedent; like little children, that have no other rule of good and
evill manners, but the correction they receive from their Parents, and
Masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are
not so; because grown strong, and stubborn, they appeale from custome
to reason, and from reason to custome, as it serves their turn; receding
from custome when their interest requires it, and setting themselves
against reason, as oft as reason is against them: Which is the cause,
that the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by
the Pen and the Sword: whereas the doctrine of Lines, and Figures, is
not so; because men care not, in that subject what be truth, as a thing
that crosses no mans ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if
it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of dominion, or to the
interest of men that have dominion, That The Three Angles Of A Triangle
Should Be Equall To Two Angles Of A Square; that doctrine should have
been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry,
suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able.

Adhaerence To Private Men, From Ignorance Of The Causes Of Peace
Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events, to
the causes immediate, and Instrumentall: For these are all the causes
they perceive. And hence it comes to passe, that in all places, men that
are grieved with payments to the Publique, discharge their anger upon
the Publicans, that is to say, Farmers, Collectors, and other Officers
of the publique Revenue; and adhaere to such as find fault with the
publike Government; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves
beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the Supreme Authority, for
feare of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.



Credulity From Ignorance Of Nature

Ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to Credulity, so as
to believe many times impossibilities: for such know nothing to
the contrary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the
Impossibility. And Credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in
company, disposeth them to lying: so that Ignorance it selfe without
Malice, is able to make a man bothe to believe lyes, and tell them; and
sometimes also to invent them.



Curiosity To Know, From Care Of Future Time

Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the causes
of things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to
order the present to their best advantage.



Naturall Religion, From The Same

Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from
consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of
that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that
there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternall;
which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound
enquiry into naturall causes, without being enclined thereby to believe
there is one God Eternall; though they cannot have any Idea of him in
their mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind,
hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought
to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himselfe,
there is somewhat there, which men call Fire, and is the cause of the
heat he feeles; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an Idea of
it in his mind, such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible
things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive
there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an Idea,
or Image of him in his mind.

And they that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes of
things, yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe,
of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are
enclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, severall kinds of Powers
Invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time
of distresse to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good
successe, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own
fancy, their Gods. By which means it hath come to passe, that from the
innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created in the world innumerable
sorts of Gods. And this Feare of things invisible, is the naturall Seed
of that, which every one in himself calleth Religion; and in them that
worship, or feare that Power otherwise than they do, Superstition.

And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some of those
that have observed it, have been enclined thereby to nourish, dresse,
and forme it into Lawes; and to adde to it of their own invention,
any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they
should best be able to govern others, and make unto themselves the
greatest use of their Powers.


CHAPTER XII. OF RELIGION



Religion, In Man Onely

Seeing there are no signes, nor fruit of Religion, but in Man onely;
there is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of Religion, is also onely
in Man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some
eminent degree thereof, not to be found in other Living creatures.



First, From His Desire Of Knowing Causes

And first, it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive into
the Causes of the Events they see, some more, some lesse; but all men so
much, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and
evill fortune.



From The Consideration Of The Beginning Of Things

Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a Beginning, to think
also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it
did, rather than sooner or later.



From His Observation Of The Sequell Of Things

Thirdly, whereas there is no other Felicity of Beasts, but the enjoying
of their quotidian Food, Ease, and Lusts; as having little, or no
foresight of the time to come, for want of observation, and memory
of the order, consequence, and dependance of the things they see; Man
observeth how one Event hath been produced by another; and remembreth in
them Antecedence and Consequence; And when he cannot assure himselfe of
the true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evill fortune for
the most part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either such
as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth to the Authority of other men,
such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himselfe.

The Naturall Cause Of Religion, The Anxiety Of The Time To Come The
two first, make Anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of all
things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is
impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himselfe
against the evill he feares, and procure the good he desireth, not to
be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come; So that every man,
especially those that are over provident, are in an estate like to that
of Prometheus. For as Prometheus, (which interpreted, is, The Prudent
Man,) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where,
an Eagle feeding on his liver, devoured in the day, as much as was
repayred in the night: So that man, which looks too far before him, in
the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by
feare of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause
of his anxiety, but in sleep.



Which Makes Them Fear The Power Of Invisible Things

This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance of
causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something.
And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to
accuse, either of their good, or evill fortune, but some Power, or Agent
Invisible: In which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old Poets
said, that the Gods were at first created by humane Feare: which spoken
of the Gods, (that is to say, of the many Gods of the Gentiles) is
very true. But the acknowledging of one God Eternall, Infinite, and
Omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to
know the causes of naturall bodies, and their severall vertues, and
operations; than from the feare of what was to befall them in time to
come. For he that from any effect hee seeth come to passe, should reason
to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause
of that cause, and plonge himselfe profoundly in the pursuit of causes;
shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the Heathen
Philosophers confessed) one First Mover; that is, a First, and an
Eternall cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name
of God: And all this without thought of their fortune; the solicitude
whereof, both enclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the
causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as
many Gods, as there be men that feigne them.



And Suppose Them Incorporeall

And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fancyed;
they could not by naturall cogitation, fall upon any other conceipt, but
that it was the same with that of the Soule of man; and that the Soule
of man, was of the same substance, with that which appeareth in a Dream,
to one that sleepeth; or in a Looking-glasse, to one that is awake;
which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but
creatures of the Fancy, think to be reall, and externall Substances;
and therefore call them Ghosts; as the Latines called them Imagines,
and Umbrae; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aereall bodies; and
those Invisible Agents, which they feared, to bee like them; save that
they appear, and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such
Spirits were Incorporeall, or Immateriall, could never enter into the
mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of
contradictory signification, as Spirit, and Incorporeall; yet they
can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them:
And therefore, men that by their own meditation, arrive to the
acknowledgement of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and Eternall God,
choose rather to confesse he is Incomprehensible, and above their
understanding; than to define his Nature By Spirit Incorporeall, and
then Confesse their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him
such a title, it is not Dogmatically, with intention to make the Divine
Nature understood; but Piously, to honour him with attributes, of
significations, as remote as they can from the grossenesse of Bodies
Visible.



But Know Not The Way How They Effect Anything

Then, for the way by which they think these Invisible Agents wrought
their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in
bringing things to passe, men that know not what it is that we call
Causing, (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to guesse by, but
by observing, and remembring what they have seen to precede the like
effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the
antecedent and subsequent Event, any dependance or connexion at all:
And therefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to
come; and hope for good or evill luck, superstitiously, from things that
have no part at all in the causing of it: As the Athenians did for their
war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; the Pompeian faction for their
warre in Afrique, another Scipio; and others have done in divers other
occasions since. In like manner they attribute their fortune to a
stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially
if the name of God be amongst them; as Charming, and Conjuring (the
Leiturgy of Witches;) insomuch as to believe, they have power to turn a
stone into bread, bread into a man, or any thing, into any thing.



But Honour Them As They Honour Men

Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibite to Powers
invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence,
as they would use towards men; Gifts, Petitions, Thanks, Submission
of Body, Considerate Addresses, sober Behaviour, premeditated Words,
Swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises,) by invoking
them. Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing; but leaves them either to
rest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to
be wiser than themselves.



And Attribute To Them All Extraordinary Events

Lastly, concerning how these Invisible Powers declare to men the things
which shall hereafter come to passe, especially concerning their good
or evill fortune in generall, or good or ill successe in any particular
undertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture
of the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not onely to
take casuall things, after one or two encounters, for Prognostiques
of the like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like
Prognostiques from other men, of whom they have once conceived a good
opinion.



Foure Things, Naturall Seeds Of Religion

And in these foure things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second
causes, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casuall for
Prognostiques, consisteth the Naturall seed of Religion; which by reason
of the different Fancies, Judgements, and Passions of severall men, hath
grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one
man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.



Made Different By Culture

For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort
have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to
their own invention. The other, have done it, by Gods commandement, and
direction: but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men
that relyed on them, the more apt to Obedience, Lawes, Peace, Charity,
and civill Society. So that the Religion of the former sort, is a part
of humane Politiques; and teacheth part of the duty which Earthly Kings
require of their Subjects. And the Religion of the later sort is
Divine Politiques; and containeth Precepts to those that have yeelded
themselves subjects in the Kingdome of God. Of the former sort, were all
the Founders of Common-wealths, and the Law-givers of the Gentiles: Of
the later sort, were Abraham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour; by whom
have been derived unto us the Lawes of the Kingdome of God.



The Absurd Opinion Of Gentilisme

And for that part of Religion, which consisteth in opinions concerning
the nature of Powers Invisible, there is almost nothing that has a
name, that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or
another, a God, or Divell; or by their Poets feigned to be inanimated,
inhabited, or possessed by some Spirit or other.

The unformed matter of the World, was a God, by the name of Chaos.

The Heaven, the Ocean, the Planets, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds, were
so many Gods.

Men, Women, a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dogge, a Snake, an Onion,
a Leeke, Deified. Besides, that they filled almost all places, with
spirits called Daemons; the plains, with Pan, and Panises, or Satyres;
the Woods, with Fawnes, and Nymphs; the Sea, with Tritons, and other
Nymphs; every River, and Fountayn, with a Ghost of his name, and with
Nymphs; every house, with it Lares, or Familiars; every man, with his
Genius; Hell, with Ghosts, and spirituall Officers, as Charon, Cerberus,
and the Furies; and in the night time, all places with Larvae, Lemures,
Ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdome of Fayries, and Bugbears.
They have also ascribed Divinity, and built Temples to meer Accidents,
and Qualities; such as are Time, Night, Day, Peace, Concord, Love,
Contention, Vertue, Honour, Health, Rust, Fever, and the like; which
when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to, as if there were
Ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or
withholding that Good, or Evill, for, or against which they prayed. They
invoked also their own Wit, by the name of Muses; their own Ignorance,
by the name of Fortune; their own Lust, by the name of Cupid; their
own Rage, by the name Furies; their own privy members by the name of
Priapus; and attributed their pollutions, to Incubi, and Succubae:
insomuch as there was nothing, which a Poet could introduce as a person
in his Poem, which they did not make either a God, or a Divel.

The same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, observing the second
ground for Religion, which is mens Ignorance of causes; and thereby
their aptnesse to attribute their fortune to causes, on which there
was no dependence at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their
ignorance, in stead of second causes, a kind of second and ministeriall
Gods; ascribing the cause of Foecundity, to Venus; the cause of Arts, to
Apollo; of Subtilty and Craft, to Mercury; of Tempests and stormes,
to Aeolus; and of other effects, to other Gods: insomuch as there was
amongst the Heathen almost as great variety of Gods, as of businesse.

And to the Worship, which naturally men conceived fit to bee used
towards their Gods, namely Oblations, Prayers, Thanks, and the rest
formerly named; the same Legislators of the Gentiles have added their
Images, both in Picture, and Sculpture; that the more ignorant sort,
(that is to say, the most part, or generality of the people,) thinking
the Gods for whose representation they were made, were really included,
and as it were housed within them, might so much the more stand in feare
of them: And endowed them with lands, and houses, and officers, and
revenues, set apart from all other humane uses; that is, consecrated,
and made holy to those their Idols; as Caverns, Groves, Woods,
Mountains, and whole Ilands; and have attributed to them, not onely
the shapes, some of Men, some of Beasts, some of Monsters; but also the
Faculties, and Passions of men and beasts; as Sense, Speech, Sex, Lust,
Generation, (and this not onely by mixing one with another, to propagate
the kind of Gods; but also by mixing with men, and women, to beget
mongrill Gods, and but inmates of Heaven, as Bacchus, Hercules,
and others;) besides, Anger, Revenge, and other passions of living
creatures, and the actions proceeding from them, as Fraud, Theft,
Adultery, Sodomie, and any vice that may be taken for an effect of
Power, or a cause of Pleasure; and all such Vices, as amongst men are
taken to be against Law, rather than against Honour.

Lastly, to the Prognostiques of time to come; which are naturally, but
Conjectures upon the Experience of time past; and supernaturall, divine
Revelation; the same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, partly
upon pretended Experience, partly upon pretended Revelation, have
added innumerable other superstitious wayes of Divination; and made men
believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous
or senslesse answers of the priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other
famous Oracles; which answers, were made ambiguous by designe, to own
the event both wayes; or absurd by the intoxicating vapour of the place,
which is very frequent in sulphurous Cavernes: Sometimes in the leaves
of the Sibills; of whose Prophecyes (like those perhaps of Nostradamus;
for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times)
there were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman Republique:
Sometimes in the insignificant Speeches of Mad-men, supposed to
be possessed with a divine Spirit; which Possession they called
Enthusiasme; and these kinds of foretelling events, were accounted
Theomancy, or Prophecy; Sometimes in the aspect of the Starres at their
Nativity; which was called Horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary
Astrology: Sometimes in their own hopes and feares, called Thumomancy,
or Presage: Sometimes in the Prediction of Witches, that pretended
conference with the dead; which is called Necromancy, Conjuring, and
Witchcraft; and is but juggling and confederate knavery: Sometimes in
the Casuall flight, or feeding of birds; called Augury: Sometimes in
the Entrayles of a sacrificed beast; which was Aruspicina: Sometimes
in Dreams: Sometimes in Croaking of Ravens, or chattering of Birds:
Sometimes in the Lineaments of the face; which was called Metoposcopy;
or by Palmistry in the lines of the hand; in casuall words, called
Omina: Sometimes in Monsters, or unusuall accidents; as Ecclipses,
Comets, rare Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, uncouth Births, and the
like, which they called Portenta and Ostenta, because they thought them
to portend, or foreshew some great Calamity to come; Sometimes, in meer
Lottery, as Crosse and Pile; counting holes in a sive; dipping of Verses
in Homer, and Virgil; and innumerable other such vaine conceipts. So
easie are men to be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have
gotten credit with them; and can with gentlenesse, and dexterity, take
hold of their fear, and ignorance.

The Designes Of The Authors Of The Religion Of The Heathen And therefore
the first Founders, and Legislators of Common-wealths amongst the
Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and
peace, have in all places taken care; First, to imprint in their minds a
beliefe, that those precepts which they gave concerning Religion, might
not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates
of some God, or other Spirit; or else that they themselves were of a
higher nature than mere mortalls, that their Lawes might the more easily
be received: So Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the Ceremonies he
instituted amongst the Romans, from the Nymph Egeria: and the first King
and founder of the Kingdome of Peru, pretended himselfe and his wife to
be the children of the Sunne: and Mahomet, to set up his new Religion,
pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in forme of a Dove.
Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same
things were displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the
Lawes. Thirdly, to prescribe Ceremonies, Supplications, Sacrifices, and
Festivalls, by which they were to believe, the anger of the Gods might
be appeased; and that ill success in War, great contagions of Sicknesse,
Earthquakes, and each mans private Misery, came from the Anger of
the Gods; and their Anger from the Neglect of their Worship, or the
forgetting, or mistaking some point of the Ceremonies required. And
though amongst the antient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that
which in the Poets is written of the paines, and pleasures after this
life; which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have
in their Harangues openly derided; yet that beliefe was alwaies more
cherished, than the contrary.

And by these, and such other Institutions, they obtayned in order to
their end, (which was the peace of the Commonwealth,) that the common
people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or errour in
their Ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the lawes, were the
lesse apt to mutiny against their Governors. And being entertained with
the pomp, and pastime of Festivalls, and publike Gomes, made in
honour of the Gods, needed nothing else but bread, to keep them from
discontent, murmuring, and commotion against the State. And therefore
the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known
World, made no scruple of tollerating any Religion whatsoever in the
City of Rome it selfe; unlesse it had somthing in it, that could not
consist with their Civill Government; nor do we read, that any Religion
was there forbidden, but that of the Jewes; who (being the peculiar
Kingdome of God) thought it unlawfull to acknowledge subjection to any
mortall King or State whatsoever. And thus you see how the Religion of
the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.

The True Religion, And The Lawes Of Gods Kingdome The Same But where God
himselfe, by supernaturall Revelation, planted Religion; there he
also made to himselfe a peculiar Kingdome; and gave Lawes, not only of
behaviour towards himselfe; but also towards one another; and thereby
in the Kingdome of God, the Policy, and lawes Civill, are a part of
Religion; and therefore the distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall
Domination, hath there no place. It is true, that God is King of all the
Earth: Yet may he be King of a peculiar, and chosen Nation. For there is
no more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the generall command
of the whole Army, should have withall a peculiar Regiment, or Company
of his own. God is King of all the Earth by his Power: but of his
chosen people, he is King by Covenant. But to speake more largly of the
Kingdome of God, both by Nature, and Covenant, I have in the following
discourse assigned an other place.



The Causes Of Change In Religion

From the propagation of Religion, it is not hard to understand
the causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or
principles; which are only an opinion of a Deity, and Powers invisible,
and supernaturall; that can never be so abolished out of humane nature,
but that new Religions may againe be made to spring out of them, by the
culture of such men, as for such purpose are in reputation.

For seeing all formed Religion, is founded at first, upon the faith
which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to
be a wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to
be a holy man, to whom God himselfe vouchsafeth to declare his will
supernaturally; It followeth necessarily, when they that have the
Goverment of Religion, shall come to have either the wisedome of those
men, their sincerity, or their love suspected; or that they shall
be unable to shew any probable token of divine Revelation; that the
Religion which they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise; and
(without the feare of the Civill Sword) contradicted and rejected.



Injoyning Beleefe Of Impossibilities

That which taketh away the reputation of Wisedome, in him that formeth
a Religion, or addeth to it when it is allready formed, is the enjoyning
of a beliefe of contradictories: For both parts of a contradiction
cannot possibly be true: and therefore to enjoyne the beliefe of them,
is an argument of ignorance; which detects the Author in that; and
discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation
supernaturall: which revelation a man may indeed have of many things
above, but of nothing against naturall reason.



Doing Contrary To The Religion They Establish

That which taketh away the reputation of Sincerity, is the doing, or
saying of such things, as appeare to be signes, that what they require
other men to believe, is not believed by themselves; all which doings,
or sayings are therefore called Scandalous, because they be stumbling
blocks, that make men to fall in the way of Religion: as Injustice,
Cruelty, Prophanesse, Avarice, and Luxury. For who can believe, that he
that doth ordinarily such actions, as proceed from any of these
rootes, believeth there is any such Invisible Power to be feared, as he
affrighteth other men withall, for lesser faults?

That which taketh away the reputation of Love, is the being detected of
private ends: as when the beliefe they require of others, conduceth or
seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of Dominion, Riches, Dignity, or
secure Pleasure, to themselves onely, or specially. For that which men
reap benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own
sakes, and not for love of others



Want Of The Testimony Of Miracles

Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine Calling, can be no
other, than the operation of Miracles; or true Prophecy, (which also is
a Miracle;) or extraordinary Felicity. And therefore, to those points
of Religion, which have been received from them that did such Miracles;
those that are added by such, as approve not their Calling by some
Miracle, obtain no greater beliefe, than what the Custome, and Lawes of
the places, in which they be educated, have wrought into them. For as
in naturall things, men of judgement require naturall signes,
and arguments; so in supernaturall things, they require signes
supernaturall, (which are Miracles,) before they consent inwardly, and
from their hearts.

All which causes of the weakening of mens faith, do manifestly appear
in the Examples following. First, we have the Example of the children
of Israel; who when Moses, that had approved his Calling to them by
Miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but
40 dayes, revolted from the worship of the true God, recommended to
them by him; and setting up (Exod.32 1,2) a Golden Calfe for their God,
relapsed into the Idolatry of the Egyptians; from whom they had been
so lately delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and that
generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel, (Judges
2 11) were dead; another generation arose, and served Baal. So that
Miracles fayling, Faith also failed.

Again, when the sons of Samuel, (1 Sam.8.3) being constituted by their
father Judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly, the
people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their King, in other
manner than he was King of other people; and therefore cryed out to
Samuel, to choose them a King after the manner of the Nations. So that
Justice Fayling, Faith also fayled: Insomuch, as they deposed their God,
from reigning over them.

And whereas in the planting of Christian Religion, the Oracles ceased
in all parts of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians encreased
wonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching of the
Apostles, and Evangelists; a great part of that successe, may reasonably
be attributed, to the contempt, into which the Priests of the Gentiles
of that time, had brought themselves, by their uncleannesse, avarice,
and jugling between Princes. Also the Religion of the Church of Rome,
was partly, for the same cause abolished in England, and many other
parts of Christendome; insomuch, as the fayling of Vertue in the
Pastors, maketh Faith faile in the People: and partly from bringing
of the Philosophy, and doctrine of Aristotle into Religion, by the
Schoole-men; from whence there arose so many contradictions, and
absurdities, as brought the Clergy into a reputation both of Ignorance,
and of Fraudulent intention; and enclined people to revolt from them,
either against the will of their own Princes, as in France, and Holland;
or with their will, as in England.

Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary for
Salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the Pope,
and of his spirituall subjects, residing in the territories of other
Christian Princes, that were it not for the mutuall emulation of those
Princes, they might without warre, or trouble, exclude all forraign
Authority, as easily as it has been excluded in England. For who is
there that does not see, to whose benefit it conduceth, to have it
believed, that a King hath not his Authority from Christ, unlesse a
Bishop crown him? That a King, if he be a Priest, cannot Marry? That
whether a Prince be born in lawfull Marriage, or not, must be judged by
Authority from Rome? That Subjects may be freed from their Alleageance,
if by the Court of Rome, the King be judged an Heretique? That a King
(as Chilperique of France) may be deposed by a Pope (as Pope Zachary,)
for no cause; and his Kingdome given to one of his Subjects? That the
Clergy, and Regulars, in what Country soever, shall be exempt from the
Jurisdiction of their King, in cases criminall? Or who does not see, to
whose profit redound the Fees of private Masses, and Vales of Purgatory;
with other signes of private interest, enough to mortifie the most
lively Faith, if (as I sayd) the civill Magistrate, and Custome did not
more sustain it, than any opinion they have of the Sanctity, Wisdome,
or Probity of their Teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes
of Religion in the world, to one and the some cause; and that is,
unpleasing Priests; and those not onely amongst Catholiques, but even in
that Church that hath presumed most of Reformation.


CHAPTER XIII. OF THE NATURALL CONDITION OF MANKIND,

AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY

Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as
that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger
in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned
together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable,
as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which
another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body,
the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger
with himselfe.

And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded
upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and
infallible rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few
things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained,
(as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,) I find yet a greater
equality amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but
Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes on all men, in those
things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make
such equality incredible, is but a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome,
which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the
Vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by
Fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the
nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be
more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly
believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they see their own wit
at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this proveth rather that men
are in that point equall, than unequall. For there is not ordinarily a
greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing, than that every
man is contented with his share.



From Equality Proceeds Diffidence

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining
of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which
neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the
way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and
sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one
an other. And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath
no more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow,
build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to
come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not
only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And
the Invader again is in the like danger of another.



From Diffidence Warre

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to
secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or
wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no
other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his
own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there
be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in
the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security
requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within
modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would
not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist.
And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being
necessary to a mans conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of
griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe
them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at
the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt,
or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst
them that have no common power, to keep them in quiet, is far enough
to make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his
contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the example.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of
quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.

The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and
the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves
Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second,
to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different
opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their
Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation,
their Profession, or their Name.



Out Of Civil States,

There Is Alwayes Warre Of Every One Against Every One Hereby it is
manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep
them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre;
and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARRE,
consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract
of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known:
and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of
Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule
weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination
thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in
actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the
time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.



The Incommodites Of Such A War

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man
is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men
live without other security, than what their own strength, and their
own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is
no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and
consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the
commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no
Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force;
no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no
Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and
danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty,
brutish, and short.

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things;
that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade,
and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this
Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same
confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himselfe, when
taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied;
when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he
locks his chests; and this when he knows there bee Lawes, and publike
Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him; what
opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his
fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children, and
servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse
mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse
mans nature in it. The Desires, and other Passions of man, are in
themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that proceed from those
Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them; which till Lawes be
made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made, till they have agreed
upon the Person that shall make it.

It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor
condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so,
over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now.
For the savage people in many places of America, except the government
of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have
no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as
I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there
would be, where there were no common Power to feare; by the manner of
life, which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull government,
use to degenerate into, in a civill Warre.

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in
a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and
persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are
in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators;
having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another;
that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their
Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a
posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their
Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies
the Liberty of particular men.



In Such A Warre, Nothing Is Unjust

To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent;
that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and
Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is
no Law: where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the
two Cardinall vertues. Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties
neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that
were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They
are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is
consequent also to the same condition, that there be no Propriety, no
Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans
that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much
for the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in;
though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the
Passions, partly in his Reason.



The Passions That Incline Men To Peace

The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of
such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their
Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of
Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are
they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature: whereof I shall
speak more particularly, in the two following Chapters.


CHAPTER XIV. OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURALL LAWES, AND OF CONTRACTS



Right Of Nature What

The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the
Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for
the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life;
and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and
Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.



Liberty What

By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the
word, the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft
take away part of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder
him from using the power left him, according as his judgement, and
reason shall dictate to him.



A Law Of Nature What

A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule,
found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which
is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the
same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.
For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and
Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT,
consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, determineth,
and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much,
as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are
inconsistent.



Naturally Every Man Has Right To Everything

And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the
precedent Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every
one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there
is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in
preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a
condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers
body. And therefore, as long as this naturall Right of every man to
every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong
or wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily
alloweth men to live.



The Fundamental Law Of Nature

And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, "That
every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of
obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use,
all helps, and advantages of Warre." The first branch, of which Rule,
containeth the first, and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, "To seek
Peace, and follow it." The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature;
which is, "By all means we can, to defend our selves."



The Second Law Of Nature

From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded to
endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; "That a man be willing,
when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of
himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all
things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as
he would allow other men against himselfe." For as long as every man
holdeth this Right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in
the condition of Warre. But if other men will not lay down their Right,
as well as he; then there is no Reason for any one, to devest himselfe
of his: For that were to expose himselfe to Prey, (which no man is bound
to) rather than to dispose himselfe to Peace. This is that Law of the
Gospell; "Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do
ye to them." And that Law of all men, "Quod tibi feiri non vis, alteri
ne feceris."



What it is to lay down a Right

To Lay Downe a mans Right to any thing, is to Devest himselfe of the
Liberty, of hindring another of the benefit of his own Right to the
same. For he that renounceth, or passeth away his Right, giveth not to
any other man a Right which he had not before; because there is nothing
to which every man had not Right by Nature: but onely standeth out of
his way, that he may enjoy his own originall Right, without hindrance
from him; not without hindrance from another. So that the effect which
redoundeth to one man, by another mans defect of Right, is but so much
diminution of impediments to the use of his own Right originall.



Renouncing (or) Transferring Right What; Obligation Duty Justice

Right is layd aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by Transferring
it to another. By Simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the
benefit thereof redoundeth. By TRANSFERRING; when he intendeth the
benefit thereof to some certain person, or persons. And when a man hath
in either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; then is he said
to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is
granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he Ought, and it
his DUTY, not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such
hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being Sine Jure; the Right being
before renounced, or transferred. So that Injury, or Injustice, in
the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the
disputations of Scholers is called Absurdity. For as it is there called
an Absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the Beginning: so in
the world, it is called Injustice, and Injury, voluntarily to undo that,
which from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man
either simply Renounceth, or Transferreth his Right, is a Declaration,
or Signification, by some voluntary and sufficient signe, or signes,
that he doth so Renounce, or Transferre; or hath so Renounced, or
Transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these Signes are
either Words onely, or Actions onely; or (as it happeneth most often)
both Words and Actions. And the same are the BONDS, by which men are
bound, and obliged: Bonds, that have their strength, not from their own
Nature, (for nothing is more easily broken then a mans word,) but from
Feare of some evill consequence upon the rupture.



Not All Rights Are Alienable

Whensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it; it is either
in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to himselfe; or
for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act:
and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good To
Himselfe. And therefore there be some Rights, which no man can be
understood by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned, or
transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them,
that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be
understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to himselfe. The same may be
sayd of Wounds, and Chayns, and Imprisonment; both because there is
no benefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the patience of
suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man
cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether
they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive, and end for which
this renouncing, and transferring or Right is introduced, is nothing
else but the security of a mans person, in his life, and in the means of
so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by
words, or other signes, seem to despoyle himselfe of the End, for which
those signes were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant
it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words
and actions were to be interpreted.



Contract What

The mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call CONTRACT.

There is difference, between transferring of Right to the Thing; and
transferring, or tradition, that is, delivery of the Thing it selfe. For
the Thing may be delivered together with the Translation of the Right;
as in buying and selling with ready mony; or exchange of goods, or
lands: and it may be delivered some time after.



Covenant What

Again, one of the Contractors, may deliver the Thing contracted for on
his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate
time after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the Contract on
his part, is called PACT, or COVENANT: Or both parts may contract now,
to performe hereafter: in which cases, he that is to performe in time
to come, being trusted, his performance is called Keeping Of Promise, or
Faith; and the fayling of performance (if it be voluntary) Violation Of
Faith.



Free-gift

When the transferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties
transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from
another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of
Charity, or Magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of
compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; This is not Contract, but
GIFT, FREEGIFT, GRACE: which words signifie one and the same thing.



Signes Of Contract Expresse

Signes of Contract, are either Expresse, or By Inference. Expresse, are
words spoken with understanding of what they signifie; And such words
are either of the time Present, or Past; as, I Give, I Grant, I Have
Given, I Have Granted, I Will That This Be Yours: Or of the future;
as, I Will Give, I Will Grant; which words of the future, are called
Promise.



Signes Of Contract By Inference

Signes by Inference, are sometimes the consequence of Words; sometimes
the consequence of Silence; sometimes the consequence of Actions;
sometimes the consequence of Forbearing an Action: and generally a signe
by Inference, of any Contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the
will of the Contractor.



Free Gift Passeth By Words Of The Present Or Past

Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise,
are an insufficient signe of a Free-gift and therefore not obligatory.
For if they be of the time to Come, as, To Morrow I Will Give, they
are a signe I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not
transferred, but remaineth till I transferre it by some other Act. But
if the words be of the time Present, or Past, as, "I have given, or do
give to be delivered to morrow," then is my to morrows Right given away
to day; and that by the vertue of the words, though there were no
other argument of my will. And there is a great difference in the
signification of these words, Volos Hoc Tuum Esse Cras, and Cros Dabo;
that is between "I will that this be thine to morrow," and, "I will
give it to thee to morrow:" For the word I Will, in the former manner
of speech, signifies an act of the will Present; but in the later, it
signifies a promise of an act of the will to Come: and therefore the
former words, being of the Present, transferre a future right; the
later, that be of the Future, transferre nothing. But if there be other
signes of the Will to transferre a Right, besides Words; then, though
the gift be Free, yet may the Right be understood to passe by words of
the future: as if a man propound a Prize to him that comes first to the
end of a race, The gift is Free; and though the words be of the
Future, yet the Right passeth: for if he would not have his words so be
understood, he should not have let them runne.

Signes Of Contract Are Words Both Of The Past, Present, and Future In
Contracts, the right passeth, not onely where the words are of the time
Present, or Past; but also where they are of the Future; because all
Contract is mutuall translation, or change of Right; and therefore he
that promiseth onely, because he hath already received the benefit for
which he promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the Right
should passe: for unlesse he had been content to have his words so
understood, the other would not have performed his part first. And
for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of Contract, A
Promise is equivalent to a Covenant; and therefore obligatory.



Merit What

He that performeth first in the case of a Contract, is said to MERIT
that which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath
it as Due. Also when a Prize is propounded to many, which is to be given
to him onely that winneth; or mony is thrown amongst many, to be enjoyed
by them that catch it; though this be a Free Gift; yet so to Win, or
so to Catch, is to Merit, and to have it as DUE. For the Right is
transferred in the Propounding of the Prize, and in throwing down the
mony; though it be not determined to whom, but by the Event of the
contention. But there is between these two sorts of Merit, this
difference, that In Contract, I Merit by vertue of my own power, and the
Contractors need; but in this case of Free Gift, I am enabled to
Merit onely by the benignity of the Giver; In Contract, I merit at The
Contractors hand that hee should depart with his right; In this case of
gift, I Merit not that the giver should part with his right; but that
when he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than anothers.
And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the Schooles,
between Meritum Congrui, and Meritum Condigni. For God Almighty, having
promised Paradise to those men (hoodwinkt with carnall desires,) that
can walk through this world according to the Precepts, and Limits
prescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall Merit Paradise
Ex Congruo. But because no man can demand a right to it, by his own
Righteousnesse, or any other power in himselfe, but by the Free Grace of
God onely; they say, no man can Merit Paradise Ex Condigno. This I say,
I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because Disputers do not
agree upon the signification of their own termes of Art, longer than it
serves their turn; I will not affirme any thing of their meaning:
onely this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be
contended for, he that winneth Meriteth, and may claime the Prize as
Due.



Covenants Of Mutuall Trust, When Invalid

If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe
presently, but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature,
(which is a condition of Warre of every man against every man,) upon
any reasonable suspition, it is Voyd; But if there be a common Power set
over them bothe, with right and force sufficient to compell performance;
it is not Voyd. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other
will performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle
mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the feare of
some coerceive Power; which in the condition of meer Nature, where all
men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of their own fears cannot
possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does
but betray himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the Right (he can never
abandon) of defending his life, and means of living.

But in a civill estate, where there is a Power set up to constrain
those that would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more
reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the Covenant is to perform
first, is obliged so to do.

The cause of Feare, which maketh such a Covenant invalid, must be
alwayes something arising after the Covenant made; as some new fact,
or other signe of the Will not to performe; else it cannot make the
Covenant Voyd. For that which could not hinder a man from promising,
ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.



Right To The End, Containeth Right To The Means

He that transferreth any Right, transferreth the Means of enjoying it,
as farre as lyeth in his power. As he that selleth Land, is understood
to transferre the Herbage, and whatsoever growes upon it; Nor can he
that sells a Mill turn away the Stream that drives it. And they that
give to a man The Right of government in Soveraignty, are understood
to give him the right of levying mony to maintain Souldiers; and of
appointing Magistrates for the administration of Justice.



No Covenant With Beasts

To make Covenant with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because not
understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any
translation of Right; nor can translate any Right to another; and
without mutuall acceptation, there is no Covenant.



Nor With God Without Speciall Revelation

To make Covenant with God, is impossible, but by Mediation of such
as God speaketh to, either by Revelation supernaturall, or by his
Lieutenants that govern under him, and in his Name; For otherwise we
know not whether our Covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they
that Vow any thing contrary to any law of Nature, Vow in vain; as being
a thing unjust to pay such Vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the
Law of Nature, it is not the Vow, but the Law that binds them.



No Covenant, But Of Possible And Future

The matter, or subject of a Covenant, is alwayes something that falleth
under deliberation; (For to Covenant, is an act of the Will; that is to
say an act, and the last act, of deliberation;) and is therefore alwayes
understood to be something to come; and which is judged Possible for him
that Covenanteth, to performe.

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be Impossible, is no
Covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was
thought possible, the Covenant is valid, and bindeth, (though not to the
thing it selfe,) yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to
the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible; for to
more no man can be obliged.



Covenants How Made Voyd

Men are freed of their Covenants two wayes; by Performing; or by being
Forgiven. For Performance, is the naturall end of obligation; and
Forgivenesse, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of
that Right, in which the obligation consisted.



Covenants Extorted By Feare Are Valide

Covenants entred into by fear, in the condition of meer Nature, are
obligatory. For example, if I Covenant to pay a ransome, or service for
my life, to an enemy; I am bound by it. For it is a Contract, wherein
one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive mony,
or service for it; and consequently, where no other Law (as in the
condition, of meer Nature) forbiddeth the performance, the Covenant
is valid. Therefore Prisoners of warre, if trusted with the payment of
their Ransome, are obliged to pay it; And if a weaker Prince, make a
disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for feare; he is bound to keep
it; unlesse (as hath been sayd before) there ariseth some new, and just
cause of feare, to renew the war. And even in Common-wealths, if I be
forced to redeem my selfe from a Theefe by promising him mony, I am
bound to pay it, till the Civill Law discharge me. For whatsoever I may
lawfully do without Obligation, the same I may lawfully Covenant to do
through feare: and what I lawfully Covenant, I cannot lawfully break.



The Former Covenant To One, Makes Voyd The Later To Another

A former Covenant, makes voyd a later. For a man that hath passed away
his Right to one man to day, hath it not to passe to morrow to another:
and therefore the later promise passeth no Right, but is null.



A Mans Covenant Not To Defend Himselfe, Is Voyd

A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd.
For (as I have shewed before) no man can transferre, or lay down his
Right to save himselfe from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment, (the
avoyding whereof is the onely End of laying down any Right,)
and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no Covenant
transferreth any right; nor is obliging. For though a man may Covenant
thus, "Unlesse I do so, or so, kill me;" he cannot Covenant thus "Unless
I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me." For
man by nature chooseth the lesser evill, which is danger of death in
resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death
in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in
that they lead Criminals to Execution, and Prison, with armed men,
notwithstanding that such Criminals have consented to the Law, by which
they are condemned.



No Man Obliged To Accuse Himselfe

A Covenant to accuse ones Selfe, without assurance of pardon, is
likewise invalide. For in the condition of Nature, where every man is
Judge, there is no place for Accusation: and in the Civill State, the
Accusation is followed with Punishment; which being Force, a man is
not obliged not to resist. The same is also true, of the Accusation of
those, by whose Condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a Father,
Wife, or Benefactor. For the Testimony of such an Accuser, if it be not
willingly given, is praesumed to be corrupted by Nature; and therefore
not to be received: and where a mans Testimony is not to be credited,
his not bound to give it. Also Accusations upon Torture, are not to
be reputed as Testimonies. For Torture is to be used but as means of
conjecture, and light, in the further examination, and search of truth;
and what is in that case confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is
Tortured; not to the informing of the Torturers: and therefore ought
not to have the credit of a sufficient Testimony: for whether he deliver
himselfe by true, or false Accusation, he does it by the Right of
preserving his own life.



The End Of An Oath; The Forme Of As Oath

The force of Words, being (as I have formerly noted) too weak to hold
men to the performance of their Covenants; there are in mans nature, but
two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a Feare
of the consequence of breaking their word; or a Glory, or Pride in
appearing not to need to breake it. This later is a Generosity too
rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of Wealth,
Command, or sensuall Pleasure; which are the greatest part of Mankind.
The Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear; whereof there be two very
generall Objects: one, the Power of Spirits Invisible; the other, the
Power of those men they shall therein Offend. Of these two, though the
former be the greater Power, yet the feare of the later is commonly
the greater Feare. The Feare of the former is in every man, his own
Religion: which hath place in the nature of man before Civill Society.
The later hath not so; at least not place enough, to keep men to their
promises; because in the condition of meer Nature, the inequality of
Power is not discerned, but by the event of Battell. So that before the
time of Civill Society, or in the interruption thereof by Warre, there
is nothing can strengthen a Covenant of Peace agreed on, against the
temptations of Avarice, Ambition, Lust, or other strong desire, but the
feare of that Invisible Power, which they every one Worship as God; and
Feare as a Revenger of their perfidy. All therefore that can be done
between two men not subject to Civill Power, is to put one another
to swear by the God he feareth: Which Swearing or OATH, is a Forme Of
Speech, Added To A Promise; By Which He That Promiseth, Signifieth, That
Unlesse He Performe, He Renounceth The Mercy Of His God, Or Calleth To
Him For Vengeance On Himselfe. Such was the Heathen Forme, "Let Jupiter
kill me else, as I kill this Beast." So is our Forme, "I shall do thus,
and thus, so help me God." And this, with the Rites and Ceremonies,
which every one useth in his own Religion, that the feare of breaking
faith might be the greater.



No Oath, But By God

By this it appears, that an Oath taken according to any other Forme, or
Rite, then his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no Oath: And there is no
Swearing by any thing which the Swearer thinks not God. For though men
have sometimes used to swear by their Kings, for feare, or flattery; yet
they would have it thereby understood, they attributed to them Divine
honour. And that Swearing unnecessarily by God, is but prophaning of his
name: and Swearing by other things, as men do in common discourse, is
not Swearing, but an impious Custome, gotten by too much vehemence of
talking.



An Oath Addes Nothing To The Obligation

It appears also, that the Oath addes nothing to the Obligation. For a
Covenant, if lawfull, binds in the sight of God, without the Oath,
as much as with it; if unlawfull, bindeth not at all; though it be
confirmed with an Oath.


CHAPTER XV. OF OTHER LAWES OF NATURE



The Third Law Of Nature, Justice

From that law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transferre to
another, such Rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of Mankind,
there followeth a Third; which is this, That Men Performe Their
Covenants Made: without which, Covenants are in vain, and but Empty
words; and the Right of all men to all things remaining, wee are still
in the condition of Warre.



Justice And Injustice What

And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of
JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been
transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently,
no action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it
is Unjust: And the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than The Not
Performance Of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just.

Justice And Propriety Begin With The Constitution of Common-wealth
But because Covenants of mutuall trust, where there is a feare of not
performance on either part, (as hath been said in the former Chapter,)
are invalid; though the Originall of Justice be the making of Covenants;
yet Injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such feare
be taken away; which while men are in the naturall condition of Warre,
cannot be done. Therefore before the names of Just, and Unjust can have
place, there must be some coercive Power, to compell men equally to
the performance of their Covenants, by the terrour of some punishment,
greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant;
and to make good that Propriety, which by mutuall Contract men acquire,
in recompence of the universall Right they abandon: and such power there
is none before the erection of a Common-wealth. And this is also to be
gathered out of the ordinary definition of Justice in the Schooles: For
they say, that "Justice is the constant Will of giving to every man his
own." And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there
is no Injustice; and where there is no coerceive Power erected, that is,
where there is no Common-wealth, there is no Propriety; all men having
Right to all things: Therefore where there is no Common-wealth, there
nothing is Unjust. So that the nature of Justice, consisteth in keeping
of valid Covenants: but the Validity of Covenants begins not but with
the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to compell men to keep
them: And then it is also that Propriety begins.



Justice Not Contrary To Reason

The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice;
and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans
conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there
could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced
thereunto; and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep
Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit.
He does not therein deny, that there be Covenants; and that they are
sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may
be called Injustice, and the observance of them Justice: but he
questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the feare of God, (for the
same Foole hath said in his heart there is no God,) may not sometimes
stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; and
particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a
man in a condition, to neglect not onely the dispraise, and revilings,
but also the power of other men. The Kingdome of God is gotten by
violence; but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? were it
against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by
it? and if it be not against Reason, it is not against Justice; or else
Justice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as this,
Succesfull wickednesse hath obtained the Name of Vertue; and some that
in all other things have disallowed the violation of Faith; yet have
allowed it, when it is for the getting of a Kingdome. And the Heathen
that believed, that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, believed
neverthelesse the same Jupiter to be the avenger of Injustice: Somewhat
like to a piece of Law in Cokes Commentaries on Litleton; where he
sayes, If the right Heire of the Crown be attainted of Treason; yet the
Crown shall descend to him, and Eo Instante the Atteynder be voyd; From
which instances a man will be very prone to inferre; that when the Heire
apparent of a Kingdome, shall kill him that is in possession, though his
father; you may call it Injustice, or by what other name you will; yet
it can never be against Reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of
men tend to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most
Reasonable, that conduce most to their ends. This specious reasoning is
nevertheless false.

For the question is not of promises mutuall, where there is no security
of performance on either side; as when there is no Civill Power erected
over the parties promising; for such promises are no Covenants: But
either where one of the parties has performed already; or where there
is a Power to make him performe; there is the question whether it be
against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to performe,
or not. And I say it is not against reason. For the manifestation
whereof, we are to consider; First, that when a man doth a thing, which
notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to
his own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could not expect,
arriving may turne it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it
reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a condition of Warre,
wherein every man to every man, for want of a common Power to keep them
all in awe, is an Enemy, there is no man can hope by his own strength,
or wit, to defend himselfe from destruction, without the help
of Confederates; where every one expects the same defence by the
Confederation, that any one else does: and therefore he which declares
he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect
no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single
Power. He therefore that breaketh his Covenant, and consequently
declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received
into any Society, that unite themselves for Peace and defence, but
by the errour of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be
retayned in it, without seeing the danger of their errour; which errours
a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security; and
therefore if he be left, or cast out of Society, he perisheth; and if he
live in Society, it is by the errours of other men, which he could not
foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his
preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction,
forbear him onely out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.

As for the Instance of gaining the secure and perpetuall felicity of
Heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable;
and that is not breaking, but keeping of Covenant.

And for the other Instance of attaining Soveraignty by Rebellion; it is
manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably
be expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so,
others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof
is against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, Keeping of
Covenant, is a Rule of Reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing
destructive to our life; and consequently a Law of Nature.

There be some that proceed further; and will not have the Law of Nature,
to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life on
earth; but to the attaining of an eternall felicity after death; to
which they think the breach of Covenant may conduce; and consequently
be just and reasonable; (such are they that think it a work of merit
to kill, or depose, or rebell against, the Soveraigne Power constituted
over them by their own consent.) But because there is no naturall
knowledge of mans estate after death; much lesse of the reward that is
then to be given to breach of Faith; but onely a beliefe grounded upon
other mens saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know
those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally;
Breach of Faith cannot be called a Precept of Reason, or Nature.



Covenants Not Discharged By The Vice Of The Person To Whom Made

Others, that allow for a Law of Nature, the keeping of Faith, do
neverthelesse make exception of certain persons; as Heretiques, and
such as use not to performe their Covenant to others: And this also is
against reason. For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge
our Covenant made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to
have hindred the making of it.



Justice Of Men, And Justice Of Actions What

The names of Just, and Unjust, when they are attributed to Men, signifie
one thing; and when they are attributed to Actions, another. When they
are attributed to Men, they signifie Conformity, or Inconformity of
Manners, to Reason. But when they are attributed to Actions, they
signifie the Conformity, or Inconformity to Reason, not of Manners, or
manner of life, but of particular Actions. A Just man therefore, is he
that taketh all the care he can, that his Actions may be all Just: and
an Unjust man, is he that neglecteth it. And such men are more often
in our Language stiled by the names of Righteous, and Unrighteous; then
Just, and Unjust; though the meaning be the same. Therefore a Righteous
man, does not lose that Title, by one, or a few unjust Actions, that
proceed from sudden Passion, or mistake of Things, or Persons: nor does
an Unrighteous man, lose his character, for such Actions, as he does,
of forbeares to do, for feare: because his Will is not framed by the
Justice, but by the apparant benefit of what he is to do. That which
gives to humane Actions the relish of Justice, is a certain Noblenesse
or Gallantnesse of courage, (rarely found,) by which a man scorns to
be beholding for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of
promise. This Justice of the Manners, is that which is meant, where
Justice is called a Vertue; and Injustice a Vice.

But the Justice of Actions denominates men, not Just, but Guiltlesse;
and the Injustice of the same, (which is also called Injury,) gives them
but the name of Guilty.



Justice Of Manners, And Justice Of Actions

Again, the Injustice of Manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to
do Injurie; and is Injustice before it proceed to Act; and without
supposing any individuall person injured. But the Injustice of an
Action, (that is to say Injury,) supposeth an individuall person
Injured; namely him, to whom the Covenant was made: And therefore many
times the injury is received by one man, when the dammage redoundeth
to another. As when The Master commandeth his servant to give mony to a
stranger; if it be not done, the Injury is done to the Master, whom
he had before Covenanted to obey; but the dammage redoundeth to the
stranger, to whom he had no Obligation; and therefore could not Injure
him. And so also in Common-wealths, private men may remit to one another
their debts; but not robberies or other violences, whereby they are
endammaged; because the detaining of Debt, is an Injury to themselves;
but Robbery and Violence, are Injuries to the Person of the
Common-wealth.



Nothing Done To A Man, By His Own Consent Can Be Injury

Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own Will signified to
the doer, is no Injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed
away his originall right to do what he please, by some Antecedent
Covenant, there is no breach of Covenant; and therefore no Injury done
him. And if he have; then his Will to have it done being signified, is a
release of that Covenant; and so again there is no Injury done him.



Justice Commutative, And Distributive

Justice of Actions, is by Writers divided into Commutative, and
Distributive; and the former they say consisteth in proportion
Arithmeticall; the later in proportion Geometricall. Commutative
therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted
for; And Distributive, in the distribution of equall benefit, to men of
equall merit. As if it were Injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to
give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted
for, is measured by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the
just value, is that which they be contented to give. And Merit (besides
that which is by Covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth
the performance of the other part, and falls under Justice Commutative,
not Distributive,) is not due by Justice; but is rewarded of Grace
onely. And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to
be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, Commutative Justice,
is the Justice of a Contractor; that is, a Performance of Covenant,
in Buying, and Selling; Hiring, and Letting to Hire; Lending, and
Borrowing; Exchanging, Bartering, and other acts of Contract.

And Distributive Justice, the Justice of an Arbitrator; that is to say,
the act of defining what is Just. Wherein, (being trusted by them that
make him Arbitrator,) if he performe his Trust, he is said to distribute
to every man his own: and his is indeed Just Distribution, and may
be called (though improperly) Distributive Justice; but more properly
Equity; which also is a Law of Nature, as shall be shewn in due place.



The Fourth Law Of Nature, Gratitude

As Justice dependeth on Antecedent Covenant; so does Gratitude depend
on Antecedent Grace; that is to say, Antecedent Free-gift: and is the
fourth Law of Nature; which may be conceived in this Forme, "That a man
which receiveth Benefit from another of meer Grace, Endeavour that he
which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good
will." For no man giveth, but with intention of Good to himselfe;
because Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts, the Object is to
every man his own Good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated,
there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of
mutuall help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore
they are to remain still in the condition of War; which is contrary to
the first and Fundamentall Law of Nature, which commandeth men to Seek
Peace. The breach of this Law, is called Ingratitude; and hath the same
relation to Grace, that Injustice hath to Obligation by Covenant.



The Fifth, Mutuall accommodation, or Compleasance

A fifth Law of Nature, is COMPLEASANCE; that is to say, "That every
man strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest." For the understanding
whereof, we may consider, that there is in mens aptnesse to Society;
a diversity of Nature, rising from their diversity of Affections; not
unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an
Aedifice. For as that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of
Figure, takes more room from others, than it selfe fills; and for
the hardnesse, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the
building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome:
so also, a man that by asperity of Nature, will strive to retain those
things which to himselfe are superfluous, and to others necessary; and
for the stubbornness of his Passions, cannot be corrected, is to be
left, or cast out of Society, as combersome thereunto. For seeing every
man, not onely by Right, but also by necessity of Nature, is supposed
to endeavour all he can, to obtain that which is necessary for his
conservation; He that shall oppose himselfe against it, for things
superfluous, is guilty of the warre that thereupon is to follow; and
therefore doth that, which is contrary to the fundamentall Law of
Nature, which commandeth To Seek Peace. The observers of this Law,
may be called SOCIABLE, (the Latines call them Commodi;) The contrary,
Stubborn, Insociable, Froward, Intractable.



The Sixth, Facility To Pardon

A sixth Law of Nature is this, "That upon caution of the Future time,
a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire
it." For PARDON, is nothing but granting of Peace; which though granted
to them that persevere in their hostility, be not Peace, but Feare; yet
not granted to them that give caution of the Future time, is signe of an
aversion to Peace; and therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.



The Seventh, That In Revenges, Men Respect Onely The Future Good

A seventh is, " That in Revenges, (that is, retribution of evil for
evil,) Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the
greatnesse of the good to follow." Whereby we are forbidden to inflict
punishment with any other designe, than for correction of the offender,
or direction of others. For this Law is consequent to the next before
it, that commandeth Pardon, upon security of the Future Time. Besides,
Revenge without respect to the Example, and profit to come, is a
triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end; (for the
End is alwayes somewhat to Come;) and glorying to no end, is vain-glory,
and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the
introduction of Warre; which is against the Law of Nature; and is
commonly stiled by the name of Cruelty.



The Eighth, Against Contumely

And because all signes of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight;
insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be
revenged; we may in the eighth place, for a Law of Nature set down this
Precept, "That no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare
Hatred, or Contempt of another." The breach of which Law, is commonly
called Contumely.



The Ninth, Against Pride

The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of
meer Nature; where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall. The
inequallity that now is, has been introduced by the Lawes civill. I know
that Aristotle in the first booke of his Politiques, for a foundation of
his doctrine, maketh men by Nature, some more worthy to Command, meaning
the wiser sort (such as he thought himselfe to be for his Philosophy;)
others to Serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not
Philosophers as he;) as if Master and Servant were not introduced by
consent of men, but by difference of Wit; which is not only against
reason; but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish,
that had not rather governe themselves, than be governed by others:
Nor when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force, with them who
distrust their owne wisdome, do they alwaies, or often, or almost at any
time, get the Victory. If Nature therefore have made men equall, that
equalitie is to be acknowledged; or if Nature have made men unequall;
yet because men that think themselves equall, will not enter into
conditions of Peace, but upon Equall termes, such equalitie must be
admitted. And therefore for the ninth Law of Nature, I put this, "That
every man acknowledge other for his Equall by Nature." The breach of
this Precept is Pride.



The Tenth Against Arrogance

On this law, dependeth another, "That at the entrance into conditions of
Peace, no man require to reserve to himselfe any Right, which he is not
content should be reserved to every one of the rest." As it is necessary
for all men that seek peace, to lay down certaine Rights of Nature; that
is to say, not to have libertie to do all they list: so is it necessarie
for mans life, to retaine some; as right to governe their owne bodies;
enjoy aire, water, motion, waies to go from place to place; and all
things else without which a man cannot live, or not live well. If in
this case, at the making of Peace, men require for themselves, that
which they would not have to be granted to others, they do contrary
to the precedent law, that commandeth the acknowledgement of naturall
equalitie, and therefore also against the law of Nature. The observers
of this law, are those we call Modest, and the breakers Arrogant Men.
The Greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia; that is, a desire
of more than their share.



The Eleventh Equity

Also "If a man be trusted to judge between man and man," it is a precept
of the Law of Nature, "that he deale Equally between them." For without
that, the Controversies of men cannot be determined but by Warre.
He therefore that is partiall in judgment, doth what in him lies, to
deterre men from the use of Judges, and Arbitrators; and consequently,
(against the fundamentall Lawe of Nature) is the cause of Warre.

The observance of this law, from the equall distribution to each man, of
that which in reason belongeth to him, is called EQUITY, and (as I have
sayd before) distributive justice: the violation, Acception Of Persons,
Prosopolepsia.



The Twelfth, Equall Use Of Things Common

And from this followeth another law, "That such things as cannot be
divided, be enjoyed in Common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the
thing permit, without Stint; otherwise Proportionably to the number of
them that have Right." For otherwise the distribution is Unequall, and
contrary to Equitie.



The Thirteenth, Of Lot

But some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed in
common. Then, The Law of Nature, which prescribeth Equity, requireth,
"That the Entire Right; or else, (making the use alternate,) the First
Possession, be determined by Lot." For equall distribution, is of
the Law of Nature; and other means of equall distribution cannot be
imagined.



The Fourteenth, Of Primogeniture, And First Seising

Of Lots there be two sorts, Arbitrary, and Naturall. Arbitrary, is
that which is agreed on by the Competitors; Naturall, is either
Primogeniture, (which the Greek calls Kleronomia, which signifies, Given
by Lot;) or First Seisure.

And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor
divided, ought to be adjudged to the First Possessor; and is some cases
to the First-Borne, as acquired by Lot.



The Fifteenth, Of Mediators

It is also a Law of Nature, "That all men that mediate Peace, be allowed
safe Conduct." For the Law that commandeth Peace, as the End, commandeth
Intercession, as the Means; and to Intercession the Means is safe
Conduct.



The Sixteenth, Of Submission To Arbitrement

And because, though men be never so willing to observe these Lawes,
there may neverthelesse arise questions concerning a mans action; First,
whether it were done, or not done; Secondly (if done) whether against
the Law, or not against the Law; the former whereof, is called a
question Of Fact; the later a question Of Right; therefore unlesse the
parties to the question, Covenant mutually to stand to the sentence
of another, they are as farre from Peace as ever. This other, to whose
Sentence they submit, is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of
the Law of Nature, "That they that are at controversie, submit their
Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator."



The Seventeenth, No Man Is His Own Judge

And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own
benefit, no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause: and if he were
never so fit; yet Equity allowing to each party equall benefit, if one
be admitted to be Judge, the other is to be admitted also; & so the
controversie, that is, the cause of War, remains, against the Law of
Nature.



The Eighteenth, No Man To Be Judge, That Has In Him Cause Of Partiality

For the same reason no man in any Cause ought to be received for
Arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently
ariseth out of the victory of one party, than of the other: for he hath
taken (though an unavoydable bribe, yet) a bribe; and no man can be
obliged to trust him. And thus also the controversie, and the condition
of War remaineth, contrary to the Law of Nature.



The Nineteenth, Of Witnesse

And in a controversie of Fact, the Judge being to give no more credit
to one, than to the other, (if there be no other Arguments) must give
credit to a third; or to a third and fourth; or more: For else the
question is undecided, and left to force, contrary to the Law of Nature.

These are the Lawes of Nature, dictating Peace, for a means of the
conservation of men in multitudes; and which onely concern the doctrine
of Civill Society. There be other things tending to the destruction of
particular men; as Drunkenness, and all other parts of Intemperance;
which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the Law
of Nature hath forbidden; but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are
pertinent enough to this place.



A Rule, By Which The Laws Of Nature May Easily Be Examined

And though this may seem too subtile a deduction of the Lawes of Nature,
to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busie in
getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave
all men unexcusable, they have been contracted into one easie sum,
intelligible even to the meanest capacity; and that is, "Do not that to
another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe;" which sheweth
him, that he has no more to do in learning the Lawes of Nature, but,
when weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too
heavy, to put them into the other part of the ballance, and his own into
their place, that his own passions, and selfe-love, may adde nothing to
the weight; and then there is none of these Lawes of Nature that will
not appear unto him very reasonable.



The Lawes Of Nature Oblige In Conscience Alwayes,

But In Effect Then Onely When There Is Security The Lawes of Nature
oblige In Foro Interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they
should take place: but In Foro Externo; that is, to the putting them
in act, not alwayes. For he that should be modest, and tractable, and
performe all he promises, in such time, and place, where no man els
should do so, should but make himselfe a prey to others, and procure his
own certain ruine, contrary to the ground of all Lawes of Nature, which
tend to Natures preservation. And again, he that shall observe the same
Lawes towards him, observes them not himselfe, seeketh not Peace, but
War; & consequently the destruction of his Nature by Violence.

And whatsoever Lawes bind In Foro Interno, may be broken, not onely by
a fact contrary to the Law but also by a fact according to it, in case a
man think it contrary. For though his Action in this case, be according
to the Law; which where the Obligation is In Foro Interno, is a breach.



The Laws Of Nature Are Eternal;

The Lawes of Nature are Immutable and Eternall, For Injustice,
Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the
rest, can never be made lawfull. For it can never be that Warre shall
preserve life, and Peace destroy it.



And Yet Easie

The same Lawes, because they oblige onely to a desire, and endeavour, I
mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed. For
in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their
performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just.



The Science Of These Lawes, Is The True Morall Philosophy

And the Science of them, is the true and onely Moral Philosophy. For
Morall Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is Good, and
Evill, in the conversation, and Society of mankind. Good, and Evill,
are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different
tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different: And divers men,
differ not onely in their Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant,
and unpleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also
of what is conformable, or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of
common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe;
and one time praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what another time
he dispraiseth, and calleth Evil: From whence arise Disputes,
Controversies, and at last War. And therefore so long as man is in the
condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of War,) as private
Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill: and consequently all men
agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way, or
means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are Justice, Gratitude,
Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of Nature, are good; that
is to say, Morall Vertues; and their contrarie Vices, Evill. Now the
science of Vertue and Vice, is Morall Philosophie; and therfore the true
Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the true Morall Philosophie. But the
Writers of Morall Philosophie, though they acknowledge the same Vertues
and Vices; Yet not seeing wherein consisted their Goodnesse; nor that
they come to be praised, as the meanes of peaceable, sociable, and
comfortable living; place them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not
the Cause, but the Degree of daring, made Fortitude; or not the Cause,
but the Quantity of a gift, made Liberality.

These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes; but
improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what
conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas Law,
properly is the word of him, that by right hath command over others. But
yet if we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of
God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called
Lawes.


CHAPTER XVI. OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS PERSONATED


A Person What

A PERSON, is he "whose words or actions are considered, either as his
own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any
other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction."



Person Naturall, And Artificiall

When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall
Person: And when they are considered as representing the words and
actions of an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificiall person.



The Word Person, Whence

The word Person is latine: instead whereof the Greeks have Prosopon,
which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the Disguise,
or Outward Appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and somtimes
more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask
or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any Representer
of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a
Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common
Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an
other; and he that acteth another, is said to beare his Person, or
act in his name; (in which sence Cicero useth it where he saies, "Unus
Sustineo Tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I beare three
Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and the Judges;") and is called in
diverse occasions, diversly; as a Representer, or Representative, a
Lieutenant, a Vicar, an Attorney, a Deputy, a Procurator, an Actor, and
the like.



Actor, Author; Authority

Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned by
those whom they represent. And then the Person is the Actor; and he that
owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In which case the
Actor acteth by Authority. For that which in speaking of goods and
possessions, is called an Owner, and in latine Dominus, in Greeke
Kurios; speaking of Actions, is called Author. And as the Right of
possession, is called Dominion; so the Right of doing any Action, is
called AUTHORITY. So that by Authority, is alwayes understood a Right
of doing any act: and Done By Authority, done by Commission, or Licence
from him whose right it is.



Covenants By Authority, Bind The Author

From hence it followeth, that when the Actor maketh a Covenant by
Authority, he bindeth thereby the Author, no lesse than if he had made
it himselfe; and no lesse subjecteth him to all the consequences of the
same. And therfore all that hath been said formerly, (Chap. 14) of the
nature of Covenants between man and man in their naturall capacity,
is true also when they are made by their Actors, Representers, or
Procurators, that have authority from them, so far-forth as is in their
Commission, but no farther.

And therefore he that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, or Representer,
not knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own perill. For no man
is obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by
a Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave.



But Not The Actor

When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by command of
the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him, not he, but
the Author breaketh the Law of Nature: for though the Action be against
the Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily; to refuse to do
it, is against the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth breach of Covenant.



The Authority Is To Be Shewne

And he that maketh a Covenant with the Author, by mediation of the
Actor, not knowing what Authority he hath, but onely takes his word;
in case such Authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is
no longer obliged: For the Covenant made with the Author, is not valid,
without his Counter-assurance. But if he that so Covenanteth, knew
before hand he was to expect no other assurance, than the Actors word;
then is the Covenant valid; because the Actor in this case maketh
himselfe the Author. And therefore, as when the Authority is evident,
the Covenant obligeth the Author, not the Actor; so when the Authority
is feigned, it obligeth the Actor onely; there being no Author but
himselfe.



Things Personated, Inanimate

There are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by
Fiction. Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may
be Personated by a Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things Inanimate,
cannot be Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their Actors: Yet the
Actors may have Authority to procure their maintenance, given them by
those that are Owners, or Governours of those things. And therefore,
such things cannot be Personated, before there be some state of Civill
Government.



Irrational

Likewise Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason, may
be Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors (during
that time) of any action done by them, longer then (when they shall
recover the use of Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable.
Yet during the Folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give
Authority to the Guardian. But this again has no place but in a State
Civill, because before such estate, there is no Dominion of Persons.



False Gods

An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, my be Personated; as were the
Gods of the Heathen; which by such Officers as the State appointed, were
Personated, and held Possessions, and other Goods, and Rights, which men
from time to time dedicated, and consecrated unto them. But idols cannot
be Authors: for a Idol is nothing. The Authority proceeded from the
State: and therefore before introduction of Civill Government, the Gods
of the Heathen could not be Personated.



The True God

The true God may be Personated. As he was; first, by Moses; who governed
the Israelites, (that were not his, but Gods people,) not in his own
name, with Hoc Dicit Moses; but in Gods Name, with Hoc Dicit Dominus.
Secondly, by the son of man, his own Son our Blessed Saviour Jesus
Christ, that came to reduce the Jewes, and induce all Nations into the
Kingdome of his Father; not as of himselfe, but as sent from his Father.
And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and working
in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost, was a Comforter that came not of
himselfe; but was sent, and proceeded from them both.



A Multitude Of Men, How One Person

A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or
one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of
every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the
Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person
One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one
Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude.



Every One Is Author

And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot
be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their
Representative faith, or doth in their name; Every man giving their
common Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular; and owning
all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority
without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how farre
he shall represent them, none of them owneth more, than they gave him
commission to Act.



An Actor May Be Many Men Made One By Plurality Of Voyces

And if the Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the greater
number, must be considered as the voyce of them all. For if the lesser
number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in
the Negative, there will be Negatives more than enough to destroy
the Affirmatives; and thereby the excesse of Negatives, standing
uncontradicted, are the onely voyce the Representative hath.



Representatives, When The Number Is Even, Unprofitable

And a Representative of even number, especially when the number is
not great, whereby the contradictory voyces are oftentimes equall, is
therefore oftentimes mute, and uncapable of Action. Yet in some cases
contradictory voyces equall in number, may determine a question; as in
condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemne
not, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemne, in that they absolve
not. For when a Cause is heard; not to condemne, is to absolve; but on
the contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The
like it is in a deliberation of executing presently, or deferring
till another time; For when the voyces are equall, the not decreeing
Execution, is a decree of Dilation.



Negative Voyce

Or if the number be odde, as three, or more, (men, or assemblies;)
whereof every one has by a Negative Voice, authority to take away the
effect of all the Affirmative Voices of the rest, This number is no
Representative; because by the diversity of Opinions, and Interests of
men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a
mute Person, and unapt, as for may things else, so for the government of
a Multitude, especially in time of Warre.

Of Authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have
before defined to be him, that owneth the Action of another simply.
The second is he, that owneth an Action, or Covenant of another
conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the
other doth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these Authors
conditionall, are generally called SURETYES, in Latine Fidejussores, and
Sponsores; and particularly for Debt, Praedes; and for Appearance before
a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.




PART II. OF COMMON-WEALTH


CHAPTER XVII. OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A
COMMON-WEALTH



The End Of Common-wealth, Particular Security

The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty,
and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon
themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the
foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life
thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable
condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn)
to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep
them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of
their Covenants, and observation of these Lawes of Nature set down in
the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.



Which Is Not To Be Had From The Law Of Nature:

For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in
summe) Doing To Others, As Wee Would Be Done To,) if themselves, without
the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to
our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and
the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no
strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of
Nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep
them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no Power erected, or not
great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on
his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in all
places, where men have lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one
another, has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the
Law of Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was
their honour; and men observed no other Lawes therein, but the Lawes of
Honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives,
and instruments of husbandry. And as small Familyes did then; so now
do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their own
security) enlarge their Dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and
fear of Invasion, or assistance that may be given to Invaders, endeavour
as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open
force, and secret arts, for want of other Caution, justly; and are
rememdbred for it in after ages with honour.



Nor From The Conjunction Of A Few Men Or Familyes

Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them
this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side
or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient
to carry the Victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an Invasion.
The Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security, is not
determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the Enemy we
feare; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the Enemy is not of so
visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of warre, as to
move him to attempt.



Nor From A Great Multitude, Unlesse Directed By One Judgement

And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions be
directed according to their particular judgements, and particular
appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither
against a Common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For
being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application
of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another; and reduce
their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing: whereby they are
easily, not onely subdued by a very few that agree together; but also
when there is no common enemy, they make warre upon each other, for
their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great Multitude of
men to consent in the observation of Justice, and other Lawes of Nature,
without a common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose
all Man-kind to do the same; and then there neither would be nor need to
be any Civill Government, or Common-wealth at all; because there would
be Peace without subjection.



And That Continually

Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all
the time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one
judgement, for a limited time; as in one Battell, or one Warre. For
though they obtain a Victory by their unanimous endeavour against a
forraign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy,
or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for
a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve,
and fall again into a Warre amongst themselves.



Why Certain Creatures Without Reason, Or Speech,



Do Neverthelesse Live In Society, Without Any Coercive Power

It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live
sociably one with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle numbred
amongst Politicall creatures;) and yet have no other direction, than
their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of
them can signifie to another, what he thinks expedient for the common
benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind
cannot do the same. To which I answer,

First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity,
which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there
ariseth on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre; but amongst
these not so.

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not
from the Private; and being by nature enclined to their private, they
procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose Joy consisteth
in comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing but what is
eminent.

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason,
do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their
common businesse: whereas amongst men, there are very many, that thinke
themselves wiser, and abler to govern the Publique, better than the
rest; and these strive to reforme and innovate, one this way, another
that way; and thereby bring it into Distraction and Civill warre.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in
making knowne to one another their desires, and other affections; yet
they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others,
that which is Good, in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill, in the
likenesse of Good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatnesse of
Good and Evill; discontenting men, and troubling their Peace at their
pleasure.

Fiftly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene Injury, and
Dammage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended
with their fellowes: whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he is
most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdome, and
controule the Actions of them that governe the Common-wealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men, is
by Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder
if there be somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their
Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in
awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.



The Generation Of A Common-wealth

The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them
from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and
thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie,
and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live
contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one
Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills,
by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to
appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every
one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he
that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those
things which concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to
submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his
Judgment. This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of
them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with
every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, "I
Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to
this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right
to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner." This done, the
Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine
CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to
speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the
Immortall God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him
by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so
much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is
inabled to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall
ayd against their enemies abroad.



The Definition Of A Common-wealth

And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to
define it,) is "One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall
Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author,
to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall
think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence."



Soveraigne, And Subject, What

And he that carryeth this Person, as called SOVERAIGNE, and said to have
Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.

The attaining to this Soveraigne Power, is by two wayes. One, by
Naturall force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves,
and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if
they refuse, or by Warre subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them
their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst
themselves, to submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on
confidence to be protected by him against all others. This later, may be
called a Politicall Common-wealth, or Common-wealth by Institution; and
the former, a Common-wealth by Acquisition. And first, I shall speak of
a Common-wealth by Institution.


CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY INSTITUTION



The Act Of Instituting A Common-wealth, What

A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do
Agree, and Covenant, Every One With Every One, that to whatsoever Man,
or Assembly Of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right
to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their
Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted For It, as he that
Voted Against It, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of
that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his
own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected
against other men.



The Consequences To Such Institution, Are



I. The Subjects Cannot Change The Forme Of Government



From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the Rights, and
Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by
the consent of the People assembled.

First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not
obliged by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And
Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being
thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of one,
cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient
to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And
therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave
cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude;
nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it, to another Man,
or other Assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man,
to Own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their
Soveraigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man
dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man,
which is injustice: and they have also every man given the Soveraignty
to him that beareth their Person; and therefore if they depose him,
they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice.
Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or
punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment,
as being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do: And
because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be
punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust.
And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their
Soveraign, a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also
is unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some
body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant,
who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with
God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences, that
it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly
disposition.



2. Soveraigne Power Cannot Be Forfeited

Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given
to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and
not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the
part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any
pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he which
is made Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects beforehand, is
manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as
one party to the Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with
every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as
yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many severall Covenants
as there be men, those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd,
because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach
thereof, is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest, because done
in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular.
Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant
made by the Soveraigne at his Institution; and others, or one other of
his Subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach,
there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversie: it returns
therefore to the Sword again; and every man recovereth the right of
Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to the designe they
had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain to grant Soveraignty by
way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his
Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth from want
of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants being but words, and
breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man,
but what it has from the publique Sword; that is, from the untyed hands
of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty, and whose
actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them
all, in him united. But when an Assembly of men is made Soveraigne; then
no man imagineth any such Covenant to have past in the Institution; for
no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made
a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such
conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the
Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and
in a Popular Government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that
are kinder to the government of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to
participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.



3. No Man Can Without Injustice Protest Against The

Institution Of The Soveraigne Declared By The Major Part. Thirdly,
because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Soveraigne;
he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented
to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the
rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the Congregation of them that
were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore
tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne: and
therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation against
any of their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therfore
unjustly. And whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether his
consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or
be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might
without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.



4. The Soveraigns Actions Cannot Be Justly Accused By The Subject

Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the
Actions, and Judgements of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that
whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor
ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any
thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose
authority he acteth: But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every
particular man is Author of all the Soveraigne doth; and consequently
he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that
whereof he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man
but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to do injury to ones
selfe, is impossible. It is true that they that have Soveraigne
power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper
signification.



5. What Soever The Soveraigne Doth, Is Unpunishable By The Subject

Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath
Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner
by his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is author of the
actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions
committed by himselfe.



6. The Soveraigne Is Judge Of What Is Necessary For The Peace

And Defence Of His Subjects

And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of
them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means;
it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the
Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence;
and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do
whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the
preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of discord at home and
Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the
recovery of the same. And therefore,



And Judge Of What Doctrines Are Fit To Be Taught Them

Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions
and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently,
on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall,
in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines
of all bookes before they be published. For the Actions of men proceed
from their Opinions; and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth
the well governing of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and
Concord. And though in matter of Doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded
but the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by
Peace. For Doctrine Repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace
and Concord can be against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in
a Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of
Governours, and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally
received; the contrary Truths may be generally offensive; Yet the most
sudden, and rough busling in of a new Truth, that can be, does never
breake the Peace, but onely somtimes awake the Warre. For those men that
are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or
introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their condition not Peace,
but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another; and they live
as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually. It belongeth
therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be Judge, or
constitute all Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to
Peace, thereby to prevent Discord and Civill Warre.



7. The Right Of Making Rules, Whereby The Subject May

Every Man Know What Is So His Owne, As No Other Subject

Can Without Injustice Take It From Him

Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of
prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may
enjoy and what Actions he may doe, without being molested by any of
his fellow Subjects: And this is it men Call Propriety. For before
constitution of Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn) all men had
right to all things; which necessarily causeth Warre: and therefore this
Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and depending on Soveraign Power,
is the Act of the Power, in order to the publique peace. These Rules of
Propriety (or Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull and Unlawfull
in the actions of subjects, are the Civill Lawes, that is to say, the
lawes of each Commonwealth in particular; though the name of Civill Law
be now restrained to the antient Civill Lawes of the City of Rome; which
being the head of a great part of the World, her Lawes at that time were
in these parts the Civill Law.



8. To Him Also Belongeth The Right Of All Judicature

And Decision Of Controversies:

Eightly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature; that
is to say, of hearing and deciding all Controversies, which may arise
concerning Law, either Civill, or naturall, or concerning Fact. For
without the decision of Controversies, there is no protection of one
Subject, against the injuries of another; the Lawes concerning Meum and
Tuum are in vaine; and to every man remaineth, from the naturall and
necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting
himselfe by his private strength, which is the condition of Warre; and
contrary to the end for which every Common-wealth is instituted.



9. And Of Making War, And Peace, As He Shall Think Best:

Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making Warre, and
Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say, of
Judging when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to
be assembled, armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the
Subjects, to defray the expenses thereof. For the Power by which the
people are to be defended, consisteth in their Armies; and the strength
of an Army, in the union of their strength under one Command; which
Command the Soveraign Instituted, therefore hath; because the command
of the Militia, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it
Soveraign. And therefore whosoever is made Generall of an Army, he that
hath the Soveraign Power is alwayes Generallissimo.



10. And Of Choosing All Counsellours, And Ministers,

Both Of Peace, And Warre:

Tenthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the choosing of all
Councellours, Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in peace, and
War. For seeing the Soveraign is charged with the End, which is the
common Peace and Defence; he is understood to have Power to use such
Means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge.



11. And Of Rewarding, And Punishing, And That (Where No

Former Law hath Determined The Measure Of It) Arbitrary:

Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding
with riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary
punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Lawe he hath
formerly made; or if there be no Law made, according as he shall judge
most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the Common-wealth, or
deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.



12. And Of Honour And Order

Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon
themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they
value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, Emulation,
Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre, to the destroying of one
another, and diminution of their strength against a Common Enemy; It
is necessary that there be Lawes of Honour, and a publique rate of the
worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the
Common-wealth; and that there be force in the hands of some or other, to
put those Lawes in execution. But it hath already been shown, that not
onely the whole Militia, or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the
Judicature of all Controversies, is annexed to the Soveraignty. To the
Soveraign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to
appoint what Order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what
signes of respect, in publique or private meetings, they shall give to
one another.



These Rights Are Indivisible

These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty; and which
are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man, or Assembly
of men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth. For these are
incommunicable, and inseparable. The Power to coyn Mony; to dispose of
the estate and persons of Infant heires; to have praeemption in
Markets; and all other Statute Praerogatives, may be transferred by the
Soveraign; and yet the Power to protect his Subject be retained. But if
he transferre the Militia, he retains the Judicature in vain, for want
of execution of the Lawes; Or if he grant away the Power of raising
Mony; the Militia is in vain: or if he give away the government of
doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the feare of
Spirits. And so if we consider any one of the said Rights, we shall
presently see, that the holding of all the rest, will produce no
effect, in the conservation of Peace and Justice, the end for which all
Common-wealths are Instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is
said, "A kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand:" For unlesse this
division precede, division into opposite Armies can never happen. If
there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of
England, that these Powers were divided between the King, and the Lords,
and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided, and
fallen into this Civill Warre; first between those that disagreed
in Politiques; and after between the Dissenters about the liberty of
Religion; which have so instructed men in this point of Soveraign Right,
that there be few now (in England,) that do not see, that these Rights
are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged, at the next
return of Peace; and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten; and
no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hetherto
been.



And Can By No Grant Passe Away Without Direct

Renouncing Of The Soveraign Power

And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows
necessarily, that in whatsoever, words any of them seem to be granted
away, yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct termes
renounced, and the name of Soveraign no more given by the Grantees to
him that Grants them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has granted all he
can, if we grant back the Soveraignty, all is restored, as inseparably
annexed thereunto.



The Power And Honour Of Subjects Vanisheth In The Presence

Of The Power Soveraign

This great Authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the
Soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of
Soveraign Kings, though they be Singulis Majores, of greater Power than
every one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis Minores, of lesse
power than them all together. For if by All Together, they mean not
the collective body as one person, then All Together, and Every One,
signifie the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by All Together,
they understand them as one Person (which person the Soveraign bears,)
then the power of all together, is the same with the Soveraigns power;
and so again the speech is absurd; which absurdity they see well enough,
when the Soveraignty is in an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch
they see it not; and yet the power of Soveraignty is the same in
whomsoever it be placed.

And as the Power, so also the Honour of the Soveraign, ought to be
greater, than that of any, or all the Subjects. For in the Soveraignty
is the fountain of Honour. The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke, and
Prince are his Creatures. As in the presence of the Master, the Servants
are equall, and without any honour at all; So are the Subjects, in the
presence of the Soveraign. And though they shine some more, some lesse,
when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more
than the Starres in presence of the Sun.



Soveraigne Power Not Hurtfull As The Want Of It,

And The Hurt Proceeds For The Greatest Part From Not

Submitting Readily, To A Lesse

But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is very
miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions
of him, or them that have so unlimited a Power in their hands. And
commonly they that live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy;
and they that live under the government of Democracy, or other
Soveraign Assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that forme of
Common-wealth; whereas the Power in all formes, if they be perfect
enough to protect them, is the same; not considering that the estate
of Man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the
greatest, that in any forme of Government can possibly happen to the
people in generall, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and
horrible calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre; or that dissolute
condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a
coercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge: nor
considering that the greatest pressure of Soveraign Governours,
proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the
dammage, or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth
their own selves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence,
make it necessary for their Governours to draw from them what they can
in time of Peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or
sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their Enemies. For all men
are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, (that is their
Passions and Self-love,) through which, every little payment appeareth a
great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely
Morall and Civill Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang
over them, and cannot without such payments be avoyded.


CHAPTER XIX. OF THE SEVERALL KINDS OF COMMON-WEALTH BY INSTITUTION,

AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE SOVERAIGNE POWER



The Different Formes Of Common-wealths But Three

The difference of Common-wealths, consisteth in the difference of the
Soveraign, or the Person representative of all and every one of the
Multitude. And because the Soveraignty is either in one Man, or in an
Assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either Every man hath
right to enter, or not every one, but Certain men distinguished from the
rest; it is manifest, there can be but Three kinds of Common-wealth. For
the Representative must needs be One man, or More: and if more, then it
is the Assembly of All, or but of a Part. When the Representative is One
man, then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY: when an Assembly of All that
will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or Popular Common-wealth:
when an Assembly of a Part onely, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY.
Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none: for either One, or
More, or All must have the Soveraign Power (which I have shewn to be
indivisible) entire.



Tyranny And Oligarchy, But Different Names Of Monarchy, And Aristocracy

There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of
Policy; as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other
Formes of Government, but of the same Formes misliked. For they that
are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are
displeased with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: so also, they which
find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy, (which
signifies want of Government;) and yet I think no man believes, that
want of Government, is any new kind of Government: nor by the same
reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind, when
they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the
Governours.



Subordinate Representatives Dangerous

It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they
please, give Authority to One Man, to represent them every one; as
well as give such Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever; and
consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a Monarch,
as absolutely, as to any other Representative. Therefore, where there is
already erected a Soveraign Power, there can be no other Representative
of the same people, but onely to certain particular ends, by the
Soveraign limited. For that were to erect two Soveraigns; and every
man to have his person represented by two Actors, that by opposing one
another, must needs divide that Power, which (if men will live in Peace)
is indivisible, and thereby reduce the Multitude into the condition of
Warre, contrary to the end for which all Soveraignty is instituted. And
therefore as it is absurd, to think that a Soveraign Assembly, inviting
the People of their Dominion, to send up their Deputies, with power
to make known their Advise, or Desires, should therefore hold such
Deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute Representative of
the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a Monarchy. And
I know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little
observed; that in a Monarchy, he that had the Soveraignty from a descent
of 600 years, was alone called Soveraign, had the title of Majesty from
every one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them
for their King; was notwithstanding never considered as their
Representative; that name without contradiction passing for the title
of those men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry
their Petitions, and give him (if he permitted it) their advise. Which
may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute
Representative of a People, to instruct men in the nature of that
Office, and to take heed how they admit of any other generall
Representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge
the truth committed to them.



Comparison Of Monarchy, With Soveraign Assemblyes

The difference between these three kindes of Common-wealth, consisteth
not in the difference of Power; but in the difference of Convenience, or
Aptitude to produce the Peace, and Security of the people; for which end
they were instituted. And to compare Monarchy with the other two, we may
observe; First, that whosoever beareth the Person of the people, or
is one of that Assembly that bears it, beareth also his own naturall
Person. And though he be carefull in his politique Person to procure
the common interest; yet he is more, or no lesse carefull to procure the
private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the
most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he
preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent
than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the publique and
private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most
advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the
publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from
the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can
be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or
contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a
war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the
publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private fortune of one
that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a
treacherous action, or a Civill warre.

Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counsell of whom, when, and where he
pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men versed in the
matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and
as long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will.
But when a Soveraigne Assembly has need of Counsell, none are admitted
but such as have a Right thereto from the beginning; which for the
most part are of those who have beene versed more in the acquisition
of Wealth than of Knowledge; and are to give their advice in long
discourses, which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but
not governe them in it. For the Understanding is by the flame of the
Passions, never enlightned, but dazled: Nor is there any place, or time,
wherein an Assemblie can receive Counsell with secrecie, because of
their owne Multitude.

Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch, are subject to no other
Inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies, besides that
of Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number. For the absence
of a few, that would have the Resolution once taken, continue firme,
(which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments,) or
the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to day,
all that was concluded yesterday.

Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy, or
interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce
a Civill Warre.

Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Subject,
by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer,
may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confesse is a great and
inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the
Soveraigne Power is in an Assembly: for their power is the same; and
they are as subject to evill Counsell, and to be seduced by Orators, as
a Monarch by Flatterers; and becoming one an others Flatterers, serve
one anothers Covetousnesse and Ambition by turnes. And whereas the
Favorites of an Assembly, are many; and the Kindred much more numerous,
than of any Monarch. Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch, which
cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: But Orators,
that is to say, Favourites of Soveraigne Assemblies, though they have
great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires lesse
Eloquence (such is mans Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than
absolution more resembles Justice.

Sixtly, that it is an inconvenience in Monarchie, that the Soveraigntie
may descend upon an Infant, or one that cannot discerne between Good and
Evill: and consisteth in this, that the use of his Power, must be in the
hand of another Man, or of some Assembly of men, which are to governe by
his right, and in his name; as Curators, and Protectors of his Person,
and Authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of
the Soveraign Power, into the hand of a Man, or an Assembly of men; is
to say that all Government is more Inconvenient, than Confusion, and
Civill Warre. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must
arise from the Contention of those, that for an office of so great
honour, and profit, may become Competitors. To make it appear, that
this inconvenience, proceedeth not from that forme of Government we call
Monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent Monarch, hath appointed
who shall have the Tuition of his Infant Successor, either expressely
by Testament, or tacitly, by not controlling the Custome in that
case received: And then such inconvenience (if it happen) is to be
attributed, not to the Monarchy, but to the Ambition, and Injustice of
the Subjects; which in all kinds of Government, where the people are
not well instructed in their Duty, and the Rights of Soveraignty, is
the same. Or else the precedent Monarch, hath not at all taken order for
such Tuition; And then the Law of Nature hath provided this sufficient
rule, That the Tuition shall be in him, that hath by Nature most
interest in the preservation of the Authority of the Infant, and to whom
least benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. For seeing every
man by nature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to put an Infant
into the power of those, that can promote themselves by his destruction,
or dammage, is not Tuition, but Trechery. So that sufficient provision
being taken, against all just quarrell, about the Government under a
Child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique Peace,
it is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, but to the ambition
of Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty. On the other side, there is
no great Common-wealth, the Soveraignty whereof is in a great Assembly,
which is not, as to consultations of Peace, and Warre, and making of
Lawes, in the same condition, as if the Government were in a Child. For
as a Child wants the judgement to dissent from counsell given him, and
is thereby necessitated to take the advise of them, or him, to whom he
is committed: So an Assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the
counsell of the major part, be it good, or bad. And as a Child has need
of a Tutor, or Protector, to preserve his Person, and Authority: So also
(in great Common-wealths,) the Soveraign Assembly, in all great dangers
and troubles, have need of Custodes Libertatis; that is of Dictators, or
Protectors of their Authoritie; which are as much as Temporary Monarchs;
to whom for a time, they may commit the entire exercise of their Power;
and have (at the end of that time) been oftner deprived thereof, than
Infant Kings, by their Protectors, Regents, or any other Tutors.

Though the Kinds of Soveraigntie be, as I have now shewn, but three;
that is to say, Monarchie, where one Man has it; or Democracie, where
the generall Assembly of Subjects hath it; or Aristocracie, where it is
in an Assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished
from the rest: Yet he that shall consider the particular Common-wealthes
that have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce
them to three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other
Formes, arising from these mingled together. As for example, Elective
Kingdomes; where Kings have the Soveraigne Power put into their hands
for a time; of Kingdomes, wherein the King hath a power limited: which
Governments, are nevertheless by most Writers called Monarchie. Likewise
if a Popular, or Aristocraticall Common-wealth, subdue an Enemies
Countrie, and govern the same, by a President, Procurator, or
other Magistrate; this may seeme perhaps at first sight, to be a
Democraticall, or Aristocraticall Government. But it is not so. For
Elective Kings, are not Soveraignes, but Ministers of the Soveraigne;
nor limited Kings Soveraignes, but Ministers of them that have the
Soveraigne Power: nor are those Provinces which are in subjection to a
Democracie, or Aristocracie of another Common-wealth, Democratically, or
Aristocratically governed, but Monarchically.

And first, concerning an Elective King, whose power is limited to
his life, as it is in many places of Christendome at this day; or to
certaine Yeares or Moneths, as the Dictators power amongst the Romans;
If he have Right to appoint his Successor, he is no more Elective but
Hereditary. But if he have no Power to elect his Successor, then there
is some other Man, or Assembly known, which after his decease may elect
a new, or else the Common-wealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and
returneth to the condition of Warre. If it be known who have the power
to give the Soveraigntie after his death, it is known also that the
Soveraigntie was in them before: For none have right to give that which
they have not right to possesse, and keep to themselves, if they think
good. But if there be none that can give the Soveraigntie, after the
decease of him that was first elected; then has he power, nay he is
obliged by the Law of Nature, to provide, by establishing his Successor,
to keep those that had trusted him with the Government, from relapsing
into the miserable condition of Civill warre. And consequently he was,
when elected, a Soveraign absolute.

Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or
them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is
not supreme; that is to say not Soveraign. The Soveraignty therefore
was alwaies in that Assembly which had the Right to Limit him; and
by consequence the government not Monarchy, but either Democracy, or
Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the Kings had a priviledge
to lead their Armies; but the Soveraignty was in the Ephori.

Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman People, governed the land of Judea
(for example) by a President; yet was not Judea therefore a Democracy;
because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any of
them, had right to enter; nor by an Aristocracy; because they were
not governed by any Assembly, into which, any man could enter by their
Election: but they were governed by one Person, which though as to the
people of Rome was an Assembly of the people, or Democracy; yet as to
the people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the
government, was a Monarch. For though where the people are governed
by an Assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the
government is called a Democracy, or Aristocracy; yet when they are
governed by an Assembly, not of their own choosing, 'tis a Monarchy; not
of One man, over another man; but of one people, over another people.



Of The Right Of Succession

Of all these Formes of Government, the matter being mortall, so that not
onely Monarchs, but also whole Assemblies dy, it is necessary for the
conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for
an Artificiall Man, so there be order also taken, for an Artificiall
Eternity of life; without which, men that are governed by an Assembly,
should return into the condition of Warre in every age; and they
that are governed by One man, as soon as their Governour dyeth. This
Artificiall Eternity, is that which men call the Right of Succession.

There is no perfect forme of Government, where the disposing of the
Succession is not in the present Soveraign. For if it be in any other
particular Man, or private Assembly, it is in a person subject, and may
be assumed by the Soveraign at his pleasure; and consequently the Right
is in himselfe. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new
choyce; then is the Common-wealth dissolved; and the Right is in him
that can get it; contrary to the intention of them that did institute
the Common-wealth, for their perpetuall, and not temporary security.

In a Democracy, the whole Assembly cannot faile, unlesse the Multitude
that are to be governed faile. And therefore questions of the right of
Succession, have in that forme of Government no place at all.

In an Aristocracy, when any of the Assembly dyeth, the election of
another into his room belongeth to the Assembly, as the Soveraign, to
whom belongeth the choosing of all Counsellours, and Officers. For that
which the Representative doth, as Actor, every one of the Subjects doth,
as Author. And though the Soveraign assembly, may give Power to others,
to elect new men, for supply of their Court; yet it is still by their
Authority, that the Election is made; and by the same it may (when the
publique shall require it) be recalled.

The Present Monarch Hath Right To Dispose Of The Succession The greatest
difficultie about the right of Succession, is in Monarchy: And the
difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest
who is to appoint the Successor; nor many times, who it is whom he
hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more exact
ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use. As to the question,
who shall appoint the Successor, of a Monarch that hath the Soveraign
Authority; that is to say, (for Elective Kings and Princes have not the
Soveraign Power in propriety, but in use only,) we are to consider, that
either he that is in possession, has right to dispose of the Succession,
or else that right is again in the dissolved Multitude. For the death
of him that hath the Soveraign power in propriety, leaves the Multitude
without any Soveraign at all; that is, without any Representative in
whom they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at
all: And therefore they are incapable of Election of any new Monarch;
every man having equall right to submit himselfe to such as he thinks
best able to protect him, or if he can, protect himselfe by his owne
sword; which is a returne to Confusion, and to the condition of a War of
every man against every man, contrary to the end for which Monarchy had
its first Institution. Therfore it is manifest, that by the Institution
of Monarchy, the disposing of the Successor, is alwaies left to the
Judgment and Will of the present Possessor.

And for the question (which may arise sometimes) who it is that the
Monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance
of his power; it is determined by his expresse Words, and Testament; or
by other tacite signes sufficient.



Succession Passeth By Expresse Words;

By expresse Words, or Testament, when it is declared by him in his life
time, viva voce, or by Writing; as the first Emperours of Rome declared
who should be their Heires. For the word Heire does not of it selfe
imply the Children, or nearest Kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man
shall any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his Estate.
If therefore a Monarch declare expresly, that such a man shall be his
Heire, either by Word or Writing, then is that man immediately after the
decease of his Predecessor, Invested in the right of being Monarch.



Or, By Not Controlling A Custome;

But where Testament, and expresse Words are wanting, other naturall
signes of the Will are to be followed: whereof the one is Custome. And
therefore where the Custome is, that the next of Kindred absolutely
succeedeth, there also the next of Kindred hath right to the Succession;
for that, if the will of him that was in posession had been otherwise,
he might easily have declared the same in his life time. And likewise
where the Custome is, that the next of the Male Kindred succeedeth,
there also the right of Succession is in the next of the Kindred Male,
for the same reason. And so it is if the Custome were to advance the
Female. For whatsoever Custome a man may by a word controule, and does
not, it is a naturall signe he would have that Custome stand.



Or, By Presumption Of Naturall Affection

But where neither Custome, nor Testament hath preceded, there it is
to be understood, First, that a Monarchs will is, that the government
remain Monarchicall; because he hath approved that government in
himselfe. Secondly, that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be
preferred before any other; because men are presumed to be more enclined
by nature, to advance their own children, than the children of other
men; and of their own, rather a Male than a Female; because men, are
naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger. Thirdly,
where his own Issue faileth, rather a Brother than a stranger; and so
still the neerer in bloud, rather than the more remote, because it is
alwayes presumed that the neerer of kin, is the neerer in affection; and
'tis evident that a man receives alwayes, by reflexion, the most honour
from the greatnesse of his neerest kindred.



To Dispose Of The Succession, Though To A King Of Another Nation,

Not Unlawfull

But if it be lawfull for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by words
of Contract, or Testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience:
for he may sell, or give his Right of governing to a stranger; which,
because strangers (that is, men not used to live under the same
government, not speaking the same language) do commonly undervalue one
another, may turn to the oppression of his Subjects; which is indeed
a great inconvenience; but it proceedeth not necessarily from the
subjection to a strangers government, but from the unskilfulnesse of the
Governours, ignorant of the true rules of Politiques. And therefore
the Romans when they had subdued many Nations, to make their Government
digestible, were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they
thought necessary, by giving sometimes to whole Nations, and sometimes
to Principall men of every Nation they conquered, not onely the
Privileges, but also the Name of Romans; and took many of them into the
Senate, and Offices of charge, even in the Roman City. And this was it
our most wise King, King James, aymed at, in endeavouring the Union of
his two Realms of England and Scotland. Which if he could have obtained,
had in all likelihood prevented the Civill warres, which make both those
Kingdomes at this present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to
the people, for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by Will; though
by the fault of many Princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient.
Of the lawfulnesse of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever
inconvenience can arrive by giving a Kingdome to a stranger, may arrive
also by so marrying with strangers, as the Right of Succession may
descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawfull.


CHAPTER XX. OF DOMINION PATERNALL AND DESPOTICALL

A Common-wealth by Acquisition, is that, where the Soveraign Power is
acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or
many together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do
authorise all the actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their
lives and liberty in his Power.



Wherein Different From A Common-wealth By Institution

And this kind of Dominion, or Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty by
Institution, onely in this, That men who choose their Soveraign, do it
for fear of one another, and not of him whom they Institute: But in this
case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases
they do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such
Covenants, as proceed from fear of death, or violence, voyd: which if
it were true, no man, in any kind of Common-wealth, could be obliged
to Obedience. It is true, that in a Common-wealth once Instituted, or
acquired, Promises proceeding from fear of death, or violence, are no
Covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the
Lawes; But the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because
he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he
may lawfully performe, and doth not, it is not the Invalidity of
the Covenant, that absolveth him, but the Sentence of the Soveraign.
Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh:
But when the Soveraign, who is the Actor, acquitteth him, then he is
acquitted by him that exorted the promise, as by the Author of such
absolution.



The Rights Of Soveraignty The Same In Both

But the Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty, are the same in both.
His Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another: He
cannot Forfeit it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects, of
Injury: He cannot be Punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary
for Peace; and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme
Judge of Controversies; and of the Times, and Occasions of Warre,
and Peace: to him it belongeth to choose Magistrates, Counsellours,
Commanders, and all other Officers, and Ministers; and to determine of
Rewards, and punishments, Honour, and Order. The reasons whereof, are
the same which are alledged in the precedent Chapter, for the same
Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty by Institution.



Dominion Paternall How Attained Not By Generation, But By Contract

Dominion is acquired two wayes; By Generation, and by Conquest. The
right of Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent hath over
his Children; and is called PATERNALL. And is not so derived from the
Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his Child
because he begat him; but from the Childs Consent, either expresse, or
by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to the Generation, God
hath ordained to man a helper; and there be alwayes two that are equally
Parents: the Dominion therefore over the Child, should belong equally to
both; and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man
can obey two Masters. And whereas some have attributed the Dominion to
the Man onely, as being of the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it.
For there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between
the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without War.
In Common-wealths, this controversie is decided by the Civill Law: and
for the most part, (but not alwayes) the sentence is in favour of the
Father; because for the most part Common-wealths have been erected by
the Fathers, not by the Mothers of families. But the question lyeth
now in the state of meer Nature; where there are supposed no lawes
of Matrimony; no lawes for the Education of Children; but the Law of
Nature, and the naturall inclination of the Sexes, one to another, and
to their children. In this condition of meer Nature, either the Parents
between themselves dispose of the dominion over the Child by Contract;
or do not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right
passeth according to the Contract. We find in History that the Amazons
Contracted with the Men of the neighbouring Countries, to whom they had
recourse for issue, that the issue Male should be sent back, but the
Female remain with themselves: so that the dominion of the Females was
in the Mother.



Or Education;

If there be no Contract, the Dominion is in the Mother. For in the
condition of Meer Nature, where there are no Matrimoniall lawes, it
cannot be known who is the Father, unlesse it be declared by the Mother:
and therefore the right of Dominion over the Child dependeth on her
will, and is consequently hers. Again, seeing the Infant is first in the
power of the Mother; so as she may either nourish, or expose it, if she
nourish it, it oweth its life to the Mother; and is therefore obliged to
obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the Dominion over
it is hers. But if she expose it, and another find, and nourish it, the
Dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom
it is preserved; because preservation of life being the end, for which
one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise
obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him.



Or Precedent Subjection Of One Of The Parents To The Other

If the Mother be the Fathers subject, the Child, is in the Fathers
power: and if the Father be the Mothers subject, (as when a Soveraign
Queen marrieth one of her subjects,) the Child is subject to the Mother;
because the Father also is her subject.

If a man and a woman, Monarches of two severall Kingdomes, have a Child,
and contract concerning who shall have the Dominion of him, the Right of
the Dominion passeth by the Contract. If they contract not, the Dominion
followeth the Dominion of the place of his residence. For the Soveraign
of each Country hath Dominion over all that reside therein.

He that hath the Dominion over the Child, hath Dominion also over their
Childrens Children. For he that hath Dominion over the person of a man,
hath Dominion over all that is his; without which, Dominion were but a
Title, without the effect.



The Right Of Succession Followeth The Rules Of The Rights Of Possession

The Right of Succession to Paternall dominion, proceedeth in the same
manner, as doth the Right of Succession to Monarchy; of which I have
already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.



Despoticall Dominion, How Attained

Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war, is that which some
Writers call DESPOTICALL, from Despotes, which signifieth a Lord, or
Master; and is the Dominion of the Master over his Servant. And this
Dominion is then acquired to the Victor, when the Vanquished, to avoyd
the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in expresse words, or by
other sufficient signes of the Will, that so long as his life, and
the liberty of his body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use
thereof, at his pleasure. And after such Covenant made, the Vanquished
is a SERVANT, and not before: for by the word Servant (whether it be
derived from Servire, to Serve, or from Servare, to Save, which I leave
to Grammarians to dispute) is not meant a Captive, which is kept in
prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him
of one that did, shall consider what to do with him: (for such men,
(commonly called Slaves,) have no obligation at all; but may break their
bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their Master,
justly:) but one, that being taken, hath corporall liberty allowed him;
and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his Master, is
trusted by him.



Not By The Victory, But By The Consent Of The Vanquished

It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominion over
the Vanquished, but his own Covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is
Conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but
because he commeth in, and submitteth to the Victor; Nor is the Victor
obliged by an enemies rendring himselfe, (without promise of life,) to
spare him for this his yeelding to discretion; which obliges not the
Victor longer, than in his own discretion hee shall think fit.

And that men do, when they demand (as it is now called) Quarter, (which
the Greeks called Zogria, taking alive,) is to evade the present fury of
the Victor, by Submission, and to compound for their life, with Ransome,
or Service: and therefore he that hath Quarter, hath not his life given,
but deferred till farther deliberation; For it is not an yeelding on
condition of life, but to discretion. And then onely is his life in
security, and his service due, when the Victor hath trusted him with his
corporall liberty. For Slaves that work in Prisons, or Fetters, do it
not of duty, but to avoyd the cruelty of their task-masters.

The Master of the Servant, is Master also of all he hath; and may exact
the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his
servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he
holdeth his life of his Master, by the covenant of obedience; that is,
of owning, and authorising whatsoever the Master shall do. And in case
the Master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise
punish him for his disobedience, he is himselfe the author of the same;
and cannot accuse him of injury.

In summe the Rights and Consequences of both Paternall and Despoticall
Dominion, are the very same with those of a Soveraign by Institution;
and for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent
chapter. So that for a man that is Monarch of divers Nations, whereof he
hath, in one the Soveraignty by Institution of the people assembled, and
in another by Conquest, that is by the Submission of each particular,
to avoyd death or bonds; to demand of one Nation more than of the other,
from the title of Conquest, as being a Conquered Nation, is an act of
ignorance of the Rights of Soveraignty. For the Soveraign is absolute
over both alike; or else there is no Soveraignty at all; and so every
man may Lawfully protect himselfe, if he can, with his own sword, which
is the condition of war.



Difference Between A Family And A Kingdom

By this it appears, that a great Family if it be not part of some
Common-wealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Soveraignty, a little
Monarchy; whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of
a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants
together: wherein the Father of Master is the Soveraign. But yet a
Family is not properly a Common-wealth; unlesse it be of that power by
its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without
the hazard of war. For where a number of men are manifestly too weak to
defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of
danger, to save his own life, either by flight, or by submission to
the enemy, as hee shall think best; in the same manner as a very small
company of souldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their armes,
and demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And
thus much shall suffice; concerning what I find by speculation, and
deduction, of Soveraign Rights, from the nature, need, and designes
of men, in erecting of Commonwealths, and putting themselves under
Monarchs, or Assemblies, entrusted with power enough for their
protection.



The Right Of Monarchy From Scripture

Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point. To
Moses, the children of Israel say thus. (Exod. 20. 19) "Speak thou to
us, and we will heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye."
This is absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the Right of Kings, God
himself by the mouth of Samuel, saith, (1 Sam. 8. 11, 12, &c.) "This
shall be the Right of the King you will have to reigne over you. He
shall take your sons, and set them to drive his Chariots, and to be his
horsemen, and to run before his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and
to make his engines of War, and Instruments of his chariots; and shall
take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his Cookes, and Bakers. He
shall take your fields, your vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and give
them to his servants. He shall take the tyth of your corne and wine, and
give it to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants. He shall
take your man-servants, and your maid-servants, and the choice of your
youth, and employ them in his businesse. He shall take the tyth of your
flocks; and you shall be his servants." This is absolute power, and
summed up in the last words, "you shall be his servants." Againe, when
the people heard what power their King was to have, yet they consented
thereto, and say thus, (Verse. 19 &c.) "We will be as all other nations,
and our King shall judge our causes, and goe before us, to conduct our
wars." Here is confirmed the Right that Soveraigns have, both to the
Militia, and to all Judicature; in which is conteined as absolute power,
as one man can possibly transferre to another. Again, the prayer of
King Salomon to God, was this. (1 Kings 3. 9) "Give to thy servant
understanding, to judge thy people, and to discerne between Good and
Evill." It belongeth therefore to the Soveraigne to bee Judge, and
to praescribe the Rules of Discerning Good and Evill; which Rules are
Lawes; and therefore in him is the Legislative Power. Saul sought
the life of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his
Servants would have done it, David forbad them, saying (1 Sam. 24. 9)
"God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anoynted of
God." For obedience of servants St. Paul saith, (Coll. 3. 20) "Servants
obey your masters in All things," and, (Verse. 22) "Children obey your
Parents in All things." There is simple obedience in those that are
subject to Paternall, or Despoticall Dominion. Again, (Math. 23. 2,3)
"The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses chayre and therefore All that
they shall bid you observe, that observe and do." There again is simple
obedience. And St. Paul, (Tit. 3. 2) "Warn them that they subject
themselves to Princes, and to those that are in Authority, & obey
them." This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour himselfe
acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by Kings imposed,
where he sayes, "Give to Caesar that which is Caesars;" and payed such
taxes himselfe. And that the Kings word, is sufficient to take any thing
from any subject, when there is need; and that the King is Judge of that
need: For he himselfe, as King of the Jewes, commanded his Disciples to
take the Asse, and Asses Colt to carry him into Jerusalem, saying, (Mat.
21. 2,3) "Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find a
shee Asse tyed, and her Colt with her, unty them, and bring them to me.
And if any man ask you, what you mean by it, Say the Lord hath need
of them: And they will let them go." They will not ask whether his
necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of that
necessity; but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.

To these places may be added also that of Genesis, (Gen. 3. 5) "You
shall be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill." and verse 11. "Who told thee
that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded
thee thou shouldest not eat?" For the Cognisance of Judicature of Good
and Evill, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of
Knowledge, as a triall of Adams obedience; The Divell to enflame the
Ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautifull,
told her that by tasting it, they should be as Gods, knowing Good and
Evill. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them
Gods office, which is Judicature of Good and Evill; but acquired no new
ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is sayd, that
having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that
place, as if they had formerly blind, as saw not their own skins: the
meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakednesse
(wherein it was Gods will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being
ashamed, did tacitely censure God himselfe. And thereupon God saith,
"Hast thou eaten, &c." as if he should say, doest thou that owest me
obedience, take upon thee to judge of my Commandements? Whereby it is
cleerly, (though Allegorically,) signified, that the Commands of
them that have the right to command, are not by their Subjects to be
censured, nor disputed.



Soveraign Power Ought In All Common-wealths To Be Absolute

So it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and
Scripture, that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in
Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocraticall
Common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make
it. And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill
consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is
perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The
condition of man in this life shall never be without Inconveniences; but
there happeneth in no Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but what
proceeds from the Subjects disobedience, and breach of those Covenants,
from which the Common-wealth had its being. And whosoever thinking
Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse; must subject
himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.

The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask, where,
and when, such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged. But one may
ask them again, when, or where has there been a Kingdome long free from
Sedition and Civill Warre. In those Nations, whose Common-wealths have
been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by forraign warre, the
Subjects never did dispute of the Soveraign Power. But howsoever, an
argument for the Practise of men, that have not sifted to the bottom,
and with exact reason weighed the causes, and nature of Common-wealths,
and suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance
thereof, is invalid. For though in all places of the world, men should
lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be
inferred, that so it ought to be. The skill of making, and maintaining
Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and
Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise onely: which Rules, neither
poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have
hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.


CHAPTER XXI. OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS



Liberty What

Liberty, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition;
(by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may
be applyed no lesse to Irrational, and Inanimate creatures, than to
Rationall. For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move,
but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition
of some externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And
so of all living creatures, whilest they are imprisoned, or restrained,
with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilest it is kept in by banks,
or vessels, that otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger space, we
use to say, they are not at Liberty, to move in such manner, as without
those externall impediments they would. But when the impediment of
motion, is in the constitution of the thing it selfe, we use not to
say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power to move; as when a stone lyeth
still, or a man is fastned to his bed by sicknesse.



What It Is To Be Free

And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the
word, A FREE-MAN, is "he, that in those things, which by his strength
and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will
to." But when the words Free, and Liberty, are applyed to any thing but
Bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to Motion, is not
subject to Impediment: And therefore, when 'tis said (for example) The
way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk
in it without stop. And when we say a Guift is free, there is not meant
any liberty of the Guift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any
law, or Covenant to give it. So when we Speak Freely, it is not the
liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath
obliged to speak otherwise then he did. Lastly, from the use of the
word Freewill, no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or
inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that
he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination
to doe.



Feare And Liberty Consistent

Feare and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into
the Sea for Feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very
willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore the
action, of one that was Free; so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for
Feare of Imprisonment, which because no body hindred him from detaining,
was the action of a man at Liberty. And generally all actions which men
doe in Common-wealths, for Feare of the law, or actions, which the doers
had Liberty to omit.



Liberty And Necessity Consistent

Liberty and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hath not
only Liberty, but a Necessity of descending by the Channel: so likewise
in the Actions which men voluntarily doe; which (because they proceed
from their will) proceed from Liberty; and yet because every act of
mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause,
which causes in a continuall chaine (whose first link in the hand of
God the first of all causes) proceed from Necessity. So that to him
that could see the connexion of those causes, the Necessity of all
mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest. And therefore God, that
seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the Liberty of man
in doing what he will, is accompanied with the Necessity of doing that
which God will, & no more, nor lesse. For though men may do many things,
which God does not command, nor is therefore Author of them; yet they
can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods
will is not the cause. And did not his will assure the Necessity of mans
will, and consequently of all that on mans will dependeth, the Liberty
of men would be a contradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and
Liberty of God. And this shall suffice, (as to the matter in hand) of
that naturall Liberty, which only is properly called Liberty.



Artificiall Bonds, Or Covenants

But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves
thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so
also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes, which they
themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips
of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power;
and at the other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature
but weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not
by the difficulty of breaking them.



Liberty Of Subjects Consisteth In Liberty From Covenants

In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the
Liberty of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world,
for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being
a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of
actions, by the laws praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what
their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves.
For if wee take Liberty in the proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that
is to say, freedome from chains, and prison, it were very absurd for men
to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Againe,
if we take Liberty, for an exemption from Lawes, it is no lesse absurd,
for men to demand as they doe, that Liberty, by which all other men may
be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they
demand; not knowing that the Lawes are of no power to protect them,
without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to
be put in execution. The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only
in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath
praetermitted; such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise
contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet,
their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves
think fit; & the like.



Liberty Of The Subject Consistent With Unlimited Power Of The Soveraign

Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the
Soveraign Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited. For
it has been already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative
can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called
Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the
Soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise,
than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe
the laws of Nature. And therefore it may, and doth often happen in
Common-wealths, that a Subject may be put to death, by the command of
the Soveraign Power; and yet neither doe the other wrong: as when Jeptha
caused his daughter to be sacrificed: In which, and the like cases,
he that so dieth, had Liberty to doe the action, for which he is
neverthelesse, without Injury put to death. And the same holdeth also
in a Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death an Innocent Subject. For
though the action be against the law of Nature, as being contrary to
Equitie, (as was the killing of Uriah, by David;) yet it was not an
Injurie to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to doe
what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself; And yet to God, because
David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all Iniquitie by the law of
Nature. Which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact,
evidently confirmed, saying, "To thee only have I sinned." In the same
manner, the people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of
their Common-wealth for ten years, thought they committed no Injustice;
and yet they never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he
would doe: Nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and
every Citizen bringing his Oystershell into the market place, written
with the name of him he desired should be banished, without actuall
accusing him, sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of
Justice; And sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a
Jest of it. And yet a man cannot say, the Soveraign People of Athens
wanted right to banish them; or an Athenian the Libertie to Jest, or to
be Just.



The Liberty Which Writers Praise, Is The Liberty Of Soveraigns;

Not Of Private Men

The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention, in
the Histories, and Philosophy of the Antient Greeks, and Romans, and in
the writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all
their learning in the Politiques, is not the Libertie of Particular
men; but the Libertie of the Common-wealth: which is the same with
that, which every man then should have, if there were no Civil Laws,
nor Common-wealth at all. And the effects of it also be the same. For as
amongst masterlesse men, there is perpetuall war, of every man against
his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to expect
from the Father; no propriety of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a
full and absolute Libertie in every Particular man: So in States, and
Common-wealths not dependent on one another, every Common-wealth, (not
every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is
to say, what that Man, or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge)
most conducing to their benefit. But withall, they live in the condition
of a perpetuall war, and upon the confines of battel, with their
frontiers armed, and canons planted against their neighbours
round about. The Athenians, and Romanes, were free; that is, free
Common-wealths: not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist
their own Representative; but that their Representative had the Libertie
to resist, or invade other people. There is written on the Turrets of
the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet
no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie,
or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in
Constantinople. Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the
Freedome is still the same.

But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name
of Libertie; and for want of Judgement to distinguish, mistake that for
their Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is the right of the
Publique only. And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of
men in reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if
it produce sedition, and change of Government. In these westerne
parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the
Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and
other men, Greeks and Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived
those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them
into their books, out of the Practice of their own Common-wealths, which
were Popular; as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language, out of
the Practise of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of
Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught, (to keep them
from desire of changing their Government,) that they were Freemen, and
all that lived under Monarchy were slaves; therefore Aristotle puts it
down in his Politiques,(lib.6.cap.2) "In democracy, Liberty is to be
supposed: for 'tis commonly held, that no man is Free in any other
Government." And as Aristotle; so Cicero, and other Writers have
grounded their Civill doctrine, on the opinions of the Romans, who were
taught to hate Monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed their
Soveraign, shared amongst them the Soveraignty of Rome; and afterwards
by their Successors. And by reading of these Greek, and Latine Authors,
men from their childhood have gotten a habit (under a false shew of
Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the
actions of their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers,
with the effusion of so much blood; as I think I may truly say, there
was never any thing so deerly bought, as these Western parts have bought
the learning of the Greek and Latine tongues.



Liberty Of The Subject How To Be Measured

To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject; that is
to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he
may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider,
what Rights we passe away, when we make a Common-wealth; or (which is
all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves, by owning all the Actions
(without exception) of the Man, or Assembly we make our Soveraign. For
in the act of our Submission, consisteth both our Obligation, and
our Liberty; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from
thence; there being no Obligation on any man, which ariseth not from
some Act of his own; for all men equally, are by Nature Free. And
because such arguments, must either be drawn from the expresse words, "I
Authorise all his Actions," or from the Intention of him that submitteth
himselfe to his Power, (which Intention is to be understood by the End
for which he so submitteth;) The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject,
is to be derived, either from those Words, (or others equivalent;) or
else from the End of the Institution of Soveraignty; namely, the Peace
of the Subjects within themselves, and their Defence against a common
Enemy.



Subjects Have Liberty To Defend Their Own Bodies,

Even Against Them That Lawfully Invade Them

First therefore, seeing Soveraignty by Institution, is by Covenant of
every one to every one; and Soveraignty by Acquisition, by Covenants of
the Vanquished to the Victor, or Child to the Parent; It is manifest,
that every Subject has Liberty in all those things, the right whereof
cannot by Covenant be transferred. I have shewn before in the 14.
Chapter, that Covenants, not to defend a mans own body, are voyd.
Therefore,



Are Not Bound To Hurt Themselves;

If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill,
wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or
to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing,
without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.

If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority, concerning
a crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon)
to confesse it; because no man (as I have shewn in the same Chapter) can
be obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe.

Again, the Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power, is contained in
these words, "I Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions;" in which
there is no restriction at all, of his own former naturall Liberty:
For by allowing him to Kill Me, I am not bound to Kill my selfe when
he commands me. "'Tis one thing to say 'Kill me, or my fellow, if you
please;' another thing to say, 'I will kill my selfe, or my fellow.'" It
followeth therefore, that

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or
any other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes
have, upon the Command of the Soveraign to execute any dangerous, or
dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the Words of our Submission; but
on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End thereof. When
therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which the
Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise
there is.



Nor To Warfare, Unless They Voluntarily Undertake It

Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight against
the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall
with death, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without Injustice;
as when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place: for in this
case he deserteth not the service of the Common-wealth. And there is
allowance to be made for naturall timorousnesse, not onely to women, (of
whom no such dangerous duty is expected,) but also to men of feminine
courage. When Armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running
away; yet when they do it not out of trechery, but fear, they are not
esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to
avoyd battell, is not Injustice, but Cowardise. But he that inrowleth
himselfe a Souldier, or taketh imprest mony, taketh away the excuse of
a timorous nature; and is obliged, not onely to go to the battell,
but also not to run from it, without his Captaines leave. And when the
Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth at once the help of all that
are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the
Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the purpose, or
courage to preserve, was in vain.

To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man,
guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Liberty, takes
away from the Soveraign, the means of Protecting us; and is therefore
destructive of the very essence of Government. But in case a great many
men together, have already resisted the Soveraign Power Unjustly, or
committed some Capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth
death, whether have they not the Liberty then to joyn together, and
assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: For they but defend
their lives, which the guilty man may as well do, as the Innocent. There
was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of
Arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is
no new unjust act. And if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not
unjust at all. But the offer of Pardon taketh from them, to whom it
is offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in
assisting, or defending the rest, unlawfull.



The Greatest Liberty Of Subjects, Dependeth On The Silence Of The Law

As for other Lyberties, they depend on the silence of the Law. In cases
where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath
the liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion. And
therefore such Liberty is in some places more, and in some lesse; and in
some times more, in other times lesse, according as they that have the
Soveraignty shall think most convenient. As for Example, there was
a time, when in England a man might enter in to his own Land,
(and dispossesse such as wrongfully possessed it) by force. But in
after-times, that Liberty of Forcible entry, was taken away by a Statute
made (by the King) in Parliament. And is some places of the world, men
have the Liberty of many wives: in other places, such Liberty is not
allowed.

If a Subject have a controversie with his Soveraigne, of Debt, or
of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service
required at his hands, or concerning any penalty corporall, or
pecuniary, grounded on a precedent Law; He hath the same Liberty to sue
for his right, as if it were against a Subject; and before such Judges,
as are appointed by the Soveraign. For seeing the Soveraign demandeth
by force of a former Law, and not by vertue of his Power; he declareth
thereby, that he requireth no more, than shall appear to be due by that
Law. The sute therefore is not contrary to the will of the Soveraign;
and consequently the Subject hath the Liberty to demand the hearing of
his Cause; and sentence, according to that Law. But if he demand, or
take any thing by pretence of his Power; there lyeth, in that case, no
action of Law: for all that is done by him in Vertue of his Power, is
done by the Authority of every subject, and consequently, he that brings
an action against the Soveraign, brings it against himselfe.

If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all, or any of
his Subjects; which Grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their
safety, the Grant is voyd; unlesse he directly renounce, or transferre
the Soveraignty to another. For in that he might openly, (if it had been
his will,) and in plain termes, have renounced, or transferred it, and
did not; it is to be understood it was not his will; but that the Grant
proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a Liberty and
the Soveraign Power; and therefore the Soveraignty is still retayned;
and consequently all those Powers, which are necessary to the exercising
thereof; such as are the Power of Warre, and Peace, of Judicature, of
appointing Officers, and Councellours, of levying Mony, and the rest
named in the 18th Chapter.



In What Cases Subjects Absolved Of Their Obedience To Their Soveraign

The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign is understood to last as
long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to
protect them. For the right men have by Nature to protect themselves,
when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished. The
Soveraignty is the Soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed from
the Body, the members doe no more receive their motion from it. The end
of Obedience is Protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in
his own, or in anothers sword, Nature applyeth his obedience to it, and
his endeavour to maintaine it. And though Soveraignty, in the intention
of them that make it, be immortall; yet is it in its own nature, not
only subject to violent death, by forreign war; but also through
the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very
institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality, by Intestine Discord.



In Case Of Captivity

If a Subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of
life be within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporall
Libertie given him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor, he hath
Libertie to accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject
of him that took him; because he had no other way to preserve himselfe.
The case is the same, if he be deteined on the same termes, in a
forreign country. But if a man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not
trusted with the libertie of his bodie; he cannot be understood to be
bound by Covenant to subjection; and therefore may, if he can, make his
escape by any means whatsoever.



In Case The Soveraign Cast Off The Government From Himself And Heyrs

If a Monarch shall relinquish the Soveraignty, both for himself, and
his heires; His Subjects returne to the absolute Libertie of Nature;
because, though Nature may declare who are his Sons, and who are the
nerest of his Kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, (as hath been said
in the precedent chapter,) who shall be his Heyr. If therefore he will
have no Heyre, there is no Soveraignty, nor Subjection. The case is the
same, if he dye without known Kindred, and without declaration of
his Heyre. For then there can no Heire be known, and consequently no
Subjection be due.



In Case Of Banishment

If the Soveraign Banish his Subject; during the Banishment, he is not
Subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travell, is
still Subject; but it is, by Contract between Soveraigns, not by vertue
of the covenant of Subjection. For whosoever entreth into anothers
dominion, is Subject to all the Lawes thereof; unless he have a
privilege by the amity of the Soveraigns, or by speciall licence.



In Case The Soveraign Render Himself Subject To Another

If a Monarch subdued by war, render himself Subject to the Victor; his
Subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged
to the Victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty
of his own Body; he is not understood to have given away the Right of
Soveraigntie; and therefore his Subjects are obliged to yield obedience
to the Magistrates formerly placed, governing not in their own name,
but in his. For, his Right remaining, the question is only of the
Administration; that is to say, of the Magistrates and Officers; which,
if he have not means to name, he is supposed to approve those, which he
himself had formerly appointed.


CHAPTER XXII. OF SYSTEMES SUBJECT, POLITICALL, AND PRIVATE



The Divers Sorts Of Systemes Of People

Having spoken of the Generation, Forme, and Power of a Common-wealth, I
am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of Systemes,
which resemble the similar parts, or Muscles of a Body naturall. By
SYSTEMES; I understand any numbers of men joyned in one Interest, or one
Businesse. Of which, some are Regular, and some Irregular. Regular are
those, where one Man, or Assembly of men, is constituted Representative
of the whole number. All other are Irregular.

Of Regular, some are Absolute, and Independent, subject to none but
their own Representative: such are only Common-wealths; Of which I have
spoken already in the 5. last preceding chapters. Others are Dependent;
that is to say, Subordinate to some Soveraign Power, to which every one,
as also their Representative is Subject.

Of Systemes subordinate, some are Politicall, and some Private.
Politicall (otherwise Called Bodies Politique, and Persons In Law,)
are those, which are made by authority from the Soveraign Power of the
Common-wealth. Private, are those, which are constituted by Subjects
amongst themselves, or by authoritie from a stranger. For no authority
derived from forraign power, within the Dominion of another, is Publique
there, but Private.

And of Private Systemes, some are Lawfull; some Unlawfull: Lawfull, are
those which are allowed by the Common-wealth: all other are Unlawfull.
Irregular Systemes, are those which having no Representative,
consist only in concourse of People; which if not forbidden by the
Common-wealth, nor made on evill designe, (such as are conflux of People
to markets, or shews, or any other harmelesse end,) are Lawfull. But
when the Intention is evill, or (if the number be considerable) unknown,
they are Unlawfull.



In All Bodies Politique The Power Of The Representative Is Limited

In Bodies Politique, the power of the Representative is alwaies Limited:
And that which prescribeth the limits thereof, is the Power Soveraign.
For Power Unlimited, is absolute Soveraignty. And the Soveraign, in
every Commonwealth, is the absolute Representative of all the Subjects;
and therefore no other, can be Representative of any part of them,
but so far forth, as he shall give leave; And to give leave to a Body
Politique of Subjects, to have an absolute Representative to all
intents and purposes, were to abandon the Government of so much of the
Commonwealth, and to divide the Dominion, contrary to their Peace and
Defence, which the Soveraign cannot be understood to doe, by any Grant,
that does not plainly, and directly discharge them of their subjection.
For consequences of words, are not the signes of his will, when other
consequences are signes of the contrary; but rather signes of errour,
and misreckoning; to which all mankind is too prone.

The bounds of that Power, which is given to the Representative of a
Bodie Politique, are to be taken notice of, from two things. One is
their Writt, or Letters from the Soveraign: the other is the Law of the
Common-wealth.



By Letters Patents

For though in the Institution or Acquisition of a Common-wealth,
which is independent, there needs no Writing, because the Power of the
Representative has there no other bounds, but such as are set out by
the unwritten Law of Nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such
diversities of Limitation necessary, concerning their businesses, times,
and places, as can neither be remembred without Letters, nor taken
notice of, unlesse such Letters be Patent, that they may be read to
them, and withall sealed, or testified, with the Seales, or other
permanent signes of the Authority Soveraign.



And The Lawes

And because such Limitation is not alwaies easie, or perhaps possible
to be described in writing; the ordinary Lawes, common to all Subjects,
must determine, that the Representative may lawfully do, in all Cases,
where the Letters themselves are silent. And therefore



When The Representative Is One Man, His Unwarranted Acts His Own Onely

In a Body Politique, if the Representative be one man, whatsoever he
does in the Person of the Body, which is not warranted in his Letters,
nor by the Lawes, is his own act, and not the act of the Body, nor of
any other Member thereof besides himselfe: Because further than his
Letters, or the Lawes limit, he representeth no mans person, but his
own. But what he does according to these, is the act of every one: For
of the Act of the Soveraign every one is Author, because he is their
Representative unlimited; and the act of him that recedes not from the
Letters of the Soveraign, is the act of the Soveraign, and therefore
every member of the Body is Author of it.



When It Is An Assembly, It Is The Act Of Them That Assented Onely

But if the Representative be an Assembly, whatsoever that Assembly shall
Decree, not warranted by their Letters, or the Lawes, is the act of the
Assembly, or Body Politique, and the act of every one by whose Vote the
Decree was made; but not the act of any man that being present Voted to
the contrary; nor of any man absent, unlesse he Voted it by procuration.
It is the act of the Assembly, because Voted by the major part; and if
it be a crime, the Assembly may be punished, as farre-forth as it is
capable, as by dissolution, or forfeiture of their Letters (which is to
such artificiall, and fictitious Bodies, capitall,) or (if the
Assembly have a Common stock, wherein none of the Innocent Members have
propriety,) by pecuniary Mulct. For from corporall penalties Nature hath
exempted all Bodies Politique. But they that gave not their Vote, are
therefore Innocent, because the Assembly cannot Represent any man in
things unwarranted by their Letters, and consequently are not involved
in their Votes.

When The Representative Is One Man, If He Borrow Mony, Or Owe It, By
Contract; He Is Lyable Onely, The Members Not If the person of the Body
Politique being in one man, borrow mony of a stranger, that is, of one
that is not of the same Body, (for no Letters need limit borrowing,
seeing it is left to mens own inclinations to limit lending) the debt is
the Representatives. For if he should have Authority from his Letters,
to make the members pay what he borroweth, he should have by consequence
the Soveraignty of them; and therefore the grant were either voyd,
as proceeding from Errour, commonly incident to humane Nature, and an
unsufficient signe of the will of the Granter; or if it be avowed
by him, then is the Representer Soveraign, and falleth not under the
present question, which is onely of Bodies subordinate. No member
therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the Representative
himselfe: because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to the Letters,
and to the qualification of the Body, understandeth those onely for
his debtors, that are engaged; and seeing the Representer can ingage
himselfe, and none else, has him onely for Debtor; who must therefore
pay him, out of the common stock (if there be any), or (if there be
none) out of his own estate.

If he come into debt by Contract, or Mulct, the case is the same.



When It Is An Assembly, They Onely Are Liable That Have Assented

But when the Representative is an Assembly, and the debt to a stranger;
all they, and onely they are responsible for the debt, that gave their
votes to the borrowing of it, or to the Contract that made it due, or to
the fact for which the Mulct was imposed; because every one of those in
voting did engage himselfe for the payment: For he that is author of
the borrowing, is obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt, though
when payd by any one, he be discharged.



If The Debt Be To One Of The Assembly, The Body Onely Is Obliged

But if the debt be to one of the Assembly, the Assembly onely is obliged
to the payment, out of their common stock (if they have any:) For having
liberty of Vote, if he Vote the Mony, shall be borrowed, he Votes it
shall be payd; If he Vote it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet
because in lending, he voteth the borrowing, he contradicteth his former
Vote, and is obliged by the later, and becomes both borrower and lender,
and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but
from the common Treasure onely; which fayling he hath no remedy, nor
complaint, but against himselfe, that being privy to the acts of
the Assembly, and their means to pay, and not being enforced, did
neverthelesse through his own folly lend his mony.



Protestation Against The Decrees Of Bodies Politique

Sometimes Lawful; But Against Soveraign Power Never It is manifest by
this, that in Bodies Politique subordinate, and subject to a Soveraign
Power, it is sometimes not onely lawfull, but expedient, for a
particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of the
Representative Assembly, and cause their dissent to be Registred, or to
take witnesse of it; because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts
contracted, and be responsible for crimes committed by other men: But in
a Soveraign Assembly, that liberty is taken away, both because he that
protesteth there, denies their Soveraignty; and also because whatsoever
is commanded by the Soveraign Power, is as to the Subject (though not
so alwayes in the sight of God) justified by the Command; for of such
command every Subject is the Author.



Bodies Politique For Government Of A Province, Colony, Or Town

The variety of Bodies Politique, is almost infinite; for they are
not onely distinguished by the severall affaires, for which they are
constituted, wherein there is an unspeakable diversitie; but also by the
times, places, and numbers, subject to many limitations. And as to their
affaires, some are ordained for Government; As first, the Government
of a Province may be committed to an Assembly of men, wherein all
resolutions shall depend on the Votes of the major part; and then this
Assembly is a Body Politique, and their power limited by Commission.
This word Province signifies a charge, or care of businesse, which he
whose businesse it is, committeth to another man, to be administred for,
and under him; and therefore when in one Common-wealth there be divers
Countries, that have their Lawes distinct one from another, or are farre
distant in place, the Administration of the Government being committed
to divers persons, those Countries where the Soveraign is not resident,
but governs by Commission, are called Provinces. But of the government
of a Province, by an Assembly residing in the Province it selfe, there
be few examples. The Romans who had the Soveraignty of many Provinces;
yet governed them alwaies by Presidents, and Praetors; and not by
Assemblies, as they governed the City of Rome, and Territories adjacent.
In like manner, when there were Colonies sent from England, to Plant
Virginia, and Sommer-Ilands; though the government of them here, were
committed to Assemblies in London, yet did those Assemblies never
commit the Government under them to any Assembly there; but did to each
Plantation send one Governour; For though every man, where he can be
present by Nature, desires to participate of government; yet where
they cannot be present, they are by Nature also enclined, to commit the
Government of their common Interest rather to a Monarchicall, then a
Popular form of Government: which is also evident in those men that have
great private estates; who when they are unwilling to take the paines of
administring the businesse that belongs to them, choose rather to trust
one Servant, than a Assembly either of their friends or servants.
But howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose the Government of a
Province, or Colony committed to an Assembly: and when it is, that which
in this place I have to say, is this; that whatsoever debt is by that
Assembly contracted; or whatsoever unlawfull Act is decreed, is the Act
onely of those that assented, and not of any that dissented, or were
absent, for the reasons before alledged. Also that an Assembly residing
out of the bounds of that Colony whereof they have the government,
cannot execute any power over the persons, or goods of any of the
Colonie, to seize on them for debt, or other duty, in any place
without the Colony it selfe, as having no Jurisdiction, nor Authoritie
elsewhere, but are left to the remedie, which the Law of the place
alloweth them. And though the Assembly have right, to impose a Mulct
upon any of their members, that shall break the Lawes they make; yet
out of the Colonie it selfe, they have no right to execute the same.
And that which is said here, of the Rights of an Assembly, for the
government of a Province, or a Colony, is appliable also to an Assembly
for the Government of a Town, or University, or a College, or a Church,
or for any other Government over the persons of men.

And generally, in all Bodies Politique, if any particular member
conceive himself Injured by the Body it self, the Cognisance of his
cause belongeth to the Soveraign, and those the Soveraign hath ordained
for Judges in such causes, or shall ordaine for that particular cause;
and not to the Body it self. For the whole Body is in this case his
fellow subject, which in a Soveraign Assembly, is otherwise: for there,
if the Soveraign be not Judge, though in his own cause, there can be no
Judge at all.



Bodies Politique For Ordering Of Trade

In a Bodie Politique, for the well ordering of forraigne Traffique, the
most commodious Representative is an Assembly of all the members; that
is to say, such a one, as every one that adventureth his mony, may be
present at all the Deliberations, and Resolutions of the Body, if they
will themselves. For proof whereof, we are to consider the end, for
which men that are Merchants, and may buy and sell, export, and import
their Merchandise, according to their own discretions, doe neverthelesse
bind themselves up in one Corporation. It is true, there be few
Merchants, that with the Merchandise they buy at home, can fraight a
Ship, to export it; or with that they buy abroad, to bring it home; and
have therefore need to joyn together in one Society; where every man
may either participate of the gaine, according to the proportion of his
adventure; or take his own; and sell what he transports, or imports, at
such prices as he thinks fit. But this is no Body Politique, there being
no Common Representative to oblige them to any other Law, than that
which is common to all other subjects. The End of their Incorporating,
is to make their gaine the greater; which is done two wayes; by sole
buying, and sole selling, both at home, and abroad. So that to grant
to a Company of Merchants to be a Corporation, or Body Politique, is to
grant them a double Monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers; another
to be sole sellers. For when there is a Company incorporate for any
particular forraign Country, they only export the Commodities vendible
in that Country; which is sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad.
For at home there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth:
both which is gainfull to the Merchant, because thereby they buy at home
at lower, and sell abroad at higher rates: And abroad there is but one
buyer of forraign Merchandise, and but one that sels them at home; both
which againe are gainfull to the adventurers.

Of this double Monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at
home, the other to forraigners. For at home by their sole exportation
they set what price they please on the husbandry and handy-works of
the people; and by the sole importation, what price they please on all
forraign commodities the people have need of; both which are ill for the
people. On the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities
abroad, and sole buying the forraign commodities upon the place,
they raise the price of those, and abate the price of these, to
the disadvantage of the forraigner: For where but one selleth, the
Merchandise is the dearer; and where but one buyeth the cheaper: Such
Corporations therefore are no other then Monopolies; though they would
be very profitable for a Common-wealth, if being bound up into one body
in forraigne Markets they were at liberty at home, every man to buy, and
sell at what price he could.

The end then of these Bodies of Merchants, being not a Common benefit
to the whole Body, (which have in this case no common stock, but what
is deducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying,
victualling and manning of Ships,) but the particular gaine of
every adventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted with the
employment of his own; that is, that every one be of the Assembly, that
shall have the power to order the same; and be acquainted with their
accounts. And therefore the Representative of such a Body must be
an Assembly, where every member of the Body may be present at the
consultations, if he will.

If a Body Politique of Merchants, contract a debt to a stranger by the
act of their Representative Assembly, every Member is lyable by himself
for the whole. For a stranger can take no notice of their private Lawes,
but considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the
whole payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest: But if
the debt be to one of the Company, the creditor is debter for the whole
to himself, and cannot therefore demand his debt, but only from the
common stock, if there be any.

If the Common-wealth impose a Tax upon the Body, it is understood to be
layd upon every member proportionably to his particular adventure in the
Company. For there is in this case no other common stock, but what is
made of their particular adventures.

If a Mulct be layd upon the Body for some unlawfull act, they only are
lyable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was
executed; for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being
of the Body; which if a crime, (because the Body was ordeyned by the
authority of the Common-wealth,) is not his.

If one of the Members be indebted to the Body, he may be sued by the
Body; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the
authority of the Body; but only by Authority of the Common-wealth:
for if they can doe it by their own Authority, they can by their own
Authority give judgement that the debt is due, which is as much as to be
Judge in their own Cause.



A Bodie Politique For Counsel To Be Give To The Soveraign

These Bodies made for the government of Men, or of Traffique, be either
perpetuall, or for a time prescribed by writing. But there be Bodies
also whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their
businesse. For example, if a Soveraign Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly,
shall think fit to give command to the towns, and other severall parts
of their territory, to send to him their Deputies, to enforme him of the
condition, and necessities of the Subjects, or to advise with him for
the making of good Lawes, or for any other cause, as with one Person
representing the whole Country, such Deputies, having a place and time
of meeting assigned them, are there, and at that time, a Body Politique,
representing every Subject of that Dominion; but it is onely for such
matters as shall be propounded unto them by that Man, or Assembly, that
by the Soveraign Authority sent for them; and when it shall be declared
that nothing more shall be propounded, nor debated by them, the Body is
dissolved. For if they were the absolute Representative of the people,
then were it the Soveraign Assembly; and so there would be two Soveraign
Assemblies, or two Soveraigns, over the same people; which cannot
consist with their Peace. And therefore where there is once a
Soveraignty, there can be no absolute Representation of the people, but
by it. And for the limits of how farre such a Body shall represent the
whole People, they are set forth in the Writing by which they were sent
for. For the People cannot choose their Deputies to other intent, than
is in the Writing directed to them from their Soveraign expressed.



A Regular Private Body, Lawfull, As A Family

Private Bodies Regular, and Lawfull, are those that are constituted
without Letters, or other written Authority, saving the Lawes common
to all other Subjects. And because they be united in one Person
Representative, they are held for Regular; such as are all Families, in
which the Father, or Master ordereth the whole Family. For he obligeth
his Children, and Servants, as farre as the Law permitteth, though not
further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions,
which the Law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during
the time they are under domestique government, they are subject to their
Fathers, and Masters, as to their immediate Soveraigns. For the Father,
and Master being before the Institution of Common-wealth, absolute
Soveraigns in their own Families, they lose afterward no more of their
Authority, than the Law of the Common-wealth taketh from them.



Private Bodies Regular, But Unlawfull

Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull, are those that unite themselves
into one person Representative, without any publique Authority at all;
such as are the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies, the better
to order their trade of begging, and stealing; and the Corporations of
men, that by Authority from any forraign Person, unite themselves in
anothers Dominion, for easier propagation of Doctrines, and for making a
party, against the Power of the Common-wealth.



Systemes Irregular, Such As Are Private Leagues

Irregular Systemes, in their nature, but Leagues, or sometimes meer
concourse of people, without union to any particular designe, not by
obligation of one to another, but proceeding onely from a similitude of
wills and inclinations, become Lawfull, or Unlawfull, according to the
lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse of every particular mans design therein:
And his designe is to be understood by the occasion.

The Leagues of Subjects, (because Leagues are commonly made for mutuall
defence,) are in a Common-wealth (which is no more than a League of
all the Subjects together) for the most part unnecessary, and savour of
unlawfull designe; and are for that cause Unlawfull, and go commonly by
the name of factions, or Conspiracies. For a League being a connexion of
men by Covenants, if there be no power given to any one Man or Assembly,
(as in the condition of meer Nature) to compell them to performance,
is so long onely valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and
therefore Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom there is no humane
Power established, to keep them all in awe, are not onely lawfull, but
also profitable for the time they last. But Leagues of the Subjects of
one and the same Common-wealth, where every one may obtain his right
by means of the Soveraign Power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of
Peace and Justice, and (in case the designe of them be evill, or Unknown
to the Common-wealth) unlawfull. For all uniting of strength by private
men, is, if for evill intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous
to the Publique, and unjustly concealed.



Secret Cabals

If the Soveraign Power be in a great Assembly, and a number of men,
part of the Assembly, without authority, consult a part, to contrive
the guidance of the rest; This is a Faction, or Conspiracy unlawfull,
as being a fraudulent seducing of the Assembly for their particular
interest. But if he, whose private interest is to be debated, and
judged in the Assembly, make as many friends as he can; in him it is
no Injustice; because in this case he is no part of the Assembly. And
though he hire such friends with mony, (unlesse there be an expresse Law
against it,) yet it is not Injustice. For sometimes, (as mens manners
are,) Justice cannot be had without mony; and every man may think his
own cause just, till it be heard, and judged.



Feuds Of Private Families

In all Common-wealths, if a private man entertain more servants, than
the government of his estate, and lawfull employment he has for them
requires, it is Faction, and unlawfull. For having the protection of the
Common-wealth, he needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas
in Nations not throughly civilized, severall numerous Families have
lived in continuall hostility, and invaded one another with private
force; yet it is evident enough, that they have done unjustly; or else
that they had no Common-wealth.



Factions For Government

And as Factions for Kindred, so also Factions for Government of
Religion, as of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of State, as Patricians,
and Plebeians of old time in Rome, and of Aristocraticalls and
Democraticalls of old time in Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to
the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the Sword out of the
hand of the Soveraign.

Concourse of people, is an Irregular Systeme, the lawfulnesse, or
unlawfulnesse, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of
them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawfull, and manifest, the
Concourse is lawfull; as the usuall meeting of men at Church, or at a
publique Shew, in usuall numbers: for if the numbers be extraordinarily
great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot
render a particular and good account of his being amongst them, is to
be judged conscious of an unlawfull, and tumultuous designe. It may be
lawfull for a thousand men, to joyn in a Petition to be delivered to a
Judge, or Magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is
a tumultuous Assembly; because there needs but one or two for that
purpose. But in such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes
the Assembly Unlawfull, but such a number, as the present Officers are
not able to suppresse, and bring to Justice.

When an unusuall number of men, assemble against a man whom they accuse;
the Assembly is an Unlawfull tumult; because they may deliver their
accusation to the Magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the case
of St. Paul at Ephesus; where Demetrius, and a great number of other
men, brought two of Pauls companions before the Magistrate, saying with
one Voyce, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians;" which was their way of
demanding Justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine,
as was against their Religion, and Trade. The occasion here, considering
the Lawes of that People, was just; yet was their Assembly Judged
Unlawfull, and the Magistrate reprehended them for it, in these
words,(Acts 19. 40) "If Demetrius and the other work-men can accuse any
man, of any thing, there be Pleas, and Deputies, let them accuse one
another. And if you have any other thing to demand, your case may
be judged in an Assembly Lawfully called. For we are in danger to be
accused for this dayes sedition, because, there is no cause by which any
man can render any reason of this Concourse of People." Where he calleth
an Assembly, whereof men can give no just account, a Sedition, and such
as they could not answer for. And this is all I shall say concerning
Systemes, and Assemblyes of People, which may be compared (as I said,)
to the Similar parts of mans Body; such as be Lawfull, to the Muscles;
such as are Unlawfull, to Wens, Biles, and Apostemes, engendred by the
unnaturall conflux of evill humours.


CHAPTER XXIII. OF THE PUBLIQUE MINISTERS OF SOVERAIGN POWER

In the last Chapter I have spoken of the Similar parts of a
Common-wealth; In this I shall speak of the parts Organicall, which are
Publique Ministers.



Publique Minister Who

A PUBLIQUE MINISTER, is he, that by the Soveraign, (whether a Monarch,
or an Assembly,) is employed in any affaires, with Authority to
represent in that employment, the Person of the Common-wealth. And
whereas every man, or assembly that hath Soveraignty, representeth
two Persons, or (as the more common phrase is) has two Capacities, one
Naturall, and another Politique, (as a Monarch, hath the person not
onely of the Common-wealth, but also of a man; and a Soveraign Assembly
hath the Person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of the
Assembly); they that be servants to them in their naturall Capacity,
are not Publique Ministers; but those onely that serve them in the
Administration of the Publique businesse. And therefore neither Ushers,
nor Sergeants, nor other Officers that waite on the Assembly, for
no other purpose, but for the commodity of the men assembled, in an
Aristocracy, or Democracy; nor Stewards, Chamberlains, Cofferers, or any
other Officers of the houshold of a Monarch, are Publique Ministers in a
Monarchy.



Ministers For The Generall Administration

Of Publique Ministers, some have charge committed to them of a general
Administration, either of the whole Dominion, or of a part thereof.
Of the whole, as to a Protector, or Regent, may bee committed by
the Predecessor of an Infant King, during his minority, the whole
Administration of his Kingdome. In which case, every Subject is so far
obliged to obedience, as the Ordinances he shall make, and the commands
he shall give be in the Kings name, and not inconsistent with his
Soveraigne Power. Of a Part, or Province; as when either a Monarch, or
a Soveraign Assembly, shall give the generall charge thereof to a
Governour, Lieutenant, Praefect, or Vice-Roy: And in this case also,
every one of that Province, is obliged to all he shall doe in the name
of the Soveraign, and that not incompatible with the Soveraigns Right.
For such Protectors, Vice-Roys, and Governours, have no other right, but
what depends on the Soveraigns Will; and no Commission that can be given
them, can be interpreted for a Declaration of the will to transferre the
Soveraignty, without expresse and perspicuous words to that purpose. And
this kind of Publique Ministers resembleth the Nerves, and Tendons that
move the severall limbs of a body naturall.



For Speciall Administration, As For Oeconomy

Others have speciall Administration; that is to say, charges of some
speciall businesse, either at home, or abroad: As at home, First, for
the Oeconomy of a Common-wealth, They that have Authority concerning the
Treasure, as Tributes, Impositions, Rents, Fines, or whatsoever publique
revenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the Accounts thereof,
are Publique Ministers: Ministers, because they serve the Person
Representative, and can doe nothing against his Command, nor without his
Authority: Publique, because they serve him in his Politicall Capacity.

Secondly, they that have Authority concerning the Militia; to have the
custody of Armes, Forts, Ports; to Levy, Pay, or Conduct Souldiers; or
to provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by Land or
Sea, are publique Ministers. But a Souldier without Command, though he
fight for the Common-wealth, does not therefore represent the Person of
it; because there is none to represent it to. For every one that hath
command, represents it to them only whom he commandeth.



For Instruction Of The People

They also that have authority to teach, or to enable others to teach
the people their duty to the Soveraign Power, and instruct them in the
knowledge of what is just, and unjust, thereby to render them more apt
to live in godlinesse, and in peace among themselves, and resist the
publique enemy, are Publique Ministers: Ministers, in that they doe it
not by their own Authority, but by anothers; and Publique, because they
doe it (or should doe it) by no Authority, but that of the Soveraign.
The Monarch, or the Soveraign Assembly only hath immediate Authority
from God, to teach and instruct the people; and no man but the
Soveraign, receiveth his power Dei Gratia simply; that is to say, from
the favour of none but God: All other, receive theirs from the favour
and providence of God, and their Soveraigns; as in a Monarchy Dei Gratia
& Regis; or Dei Providentia & Voluntate Regis.



For Judicature

They also to whom Jurisdiction is given, are Publique Ministers. For in
their Seats of Justice they represent the person of the Soveraign; and
their Sentence, is his Sentence; For (as hath been before declared) all
Judicature is essentially annexed to the Soveraignty; and therefore all
other Judges are but Ministers of him, or them that have the Soveraign
Power. And as Controversies are of two sorts, namely of Fact, and of
Law; so are judgements, some of Fact, some of Law: And consequently in
the same controversie, there may be two Judges, one of Fact, another of
Law.

And in both these controversies, there may arise a controversie between
the party Judged, and the Judge; which because they be both Subjects to
the Soveraign, ought in Equity to be Judged by men agreed on by consent
of both; for no man can be Judge in his own cause. But the Soveraign
is already agreed on for Judge by them both, and is therefore either to
heare the Cause, and determine it himself, or appoint for Judge such as
they shall both agree on. And this agreement is then understood to be
made between them divers wayes; as first, if the Defendant be allowed
to except against such of his Judges, whose interest maketh him suspect
them, (for as to the Complaynant he hath already chosen his own Judge,)
those which he excepteth not against, are Judges he himself agrees on.
Secondly, if he appeale to any other Judge, he can appeale no further;
for his appeale is his choice. Thirdly, if he appeale to the Soveraign
himself, and he by himself, or by Delegates which the parties shall
agree on, give Sentence; that Sentence is finall: for the Defendant is
Judged by his own Judges, that is to say, by himself.

These properties of just and rationall Judicature considered, I cannot
forbeare to observe the excellent constitution of the Courts of Justice,
established both for Common, and also for Publique Pleas in England. By
Common Pleas, I meane those, where both the Complaynant and Defendant
are Subjects: and by Publique, (which are also called Pleas of the
Crown) those, where the Complaynant is the Soveraign. For whereas there
were two orders of men, whereof one was Lords, the other Commons; The
Lords had this Priviledge, to have for Judges in all Capitall crimes,
none but Lords; and of them, as many as would be present; which being
ever acknowledged as a Priviledge of favour, their Judges were none but
such as they had themselves desired. And in all controversies, every
Subject (as also in civill controversies the Lords) had for Judges, men
of the Country where the matter in controversie lay; against which he
might make his exceptions, till at last Twelve men without exception
being agreed on, they were Judged by those twelve. So that having
his own Judges, there could be nothing alledged by the party, why the
sentence should not be finall, These publique persons, with Authority
from the Soveraign Power, either to Instruct, or Judge the people,
are such members of the Common-wealth, as may fitly be compared to the
organs of Voice in a Body naturall.



For Execution

Publique Ministers are also all those, that have Authority from the
Soveraign, to procure the Execution of Judgements given; to publish the
Soveraigns Commands; to suppresse Tumults; to apprehend, and imprison
Malefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation of the
Peace. For every act they doe by such Authority, is the act of the
Common-wealth; and their service, answerable to that of the Hands, in a
Bodie naturall.

Publique Ministers abroad, are those that represent the Person of their
own Soveraign, to forraign States. Such are Ambassadors, Messengers,
Agents, and Heralds, sent by publique Authoritie, and on publique
Businesse.

But such as are sent by Authoritie only of some private partie of a
troubled State, though they be received, are neither Publique, nor
Private Ministers of the Common-wealth; because none of their actions
have the Common-wealth for Author. Likewise, an Ambassador sent from a
Prince, to congratulate, condole, or to assist at a solemnity, though
Authority be Publique; yet because the businesse is Private, and
belonging to him in his naturall capacity; is a Private person. Also if
a man be sent into another Country, secretly to explore their counsels,
and strength; though both the Authority, and the Businesse be Publique;
yet because there is none to take notice of any Person in him, but
his own; he is but a Private Minister; but yet a Minister of the
Common-wealth; and may be compared to an Eye in the Body naturall. And
those that are appointed to receive the Petitions or other informations
of the People, and are as it were the publique Eare, are Publique
Ministers, and represent their Soveraign in that office.



Counsellers Without Other Employment Then To Advise

Are Not Publique Ministers

Neither a Counsellor, nor a Councell of State, if we consider it with
no Authority of Judicature or Command, but only of giving Advice to
the Soveraign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not
required, is a Publique Person. For the Advice is addressed to the
Soveraign only, whose person cannot in his own presence, be represented
to him, by another. But a Body of Counsellors, are never without some
other Authority, either of Judicature, or of immediate Administration:
As in a Monarchy, they represent the Monarch, in delivering his Commands
to the Publique Ministers: In a Democracy, the Councell, or Senate
propounds the Result of their deliberations to the people, as a
Councell; but when they appoint Judges, or heare Causes, or give
Audience to Ambassadors, it is in the quality of a Minister of the
People: And in an Aristocracy the Councell of State is the Soveraign
Assembly it self; and gives counsell to none but themselves.


CHAPTER XXIV. OF THE NUTRITION, AND PROCREATION OF A COMMON-WEALTH


The Nourishment Of A Common-wealth Consisteth In The Commodities

Of Sea And Land

The NUTRITION of a Common-wealth consisteth, in the Plenty, and
Distribution of Materials conducing to Life: In Concoction, or
Preparation; and (when concocted) in the Conveyance of it, by convenient
conduits, to the Publique use.

As for the Plenty of Matter, it is a thing limited by Nature, to those
commodities, which from (the two breasts of our common Mother) Land,
and Sea, God usually either freely giveth, or for labour selleth to
man-kind.

For the Matter of this Nutriment, consisting in Animals, Vegetals, and
Minerals, God hath freely layd them before us, in or neer to the face of
the Earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry
of receiving them. Insomuch as Plenty dependeth (next to Gods favour)
meerly on the labour and industry of men.

This Matter, commonly called Commodities, is partly Native, and partly
Forraign: Native, that which is to be had within the Territory of
the Common-wealth; Forraign, that which is imported from without. And
because there is no Territory under the Dominion of one Common-wealth,
(except it be of very vast extent,) that produceth all things needfull
for the maintenance, and motion of the whole Body; and few that produce
not something more than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had
within, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by
importation of that which may be had abroad, either by Exchange, or
by just Warre, or by Labour: for a mans Labour also, is a commodity
exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing: And there have
been Common-wealths that having no more Territory, than hath served
them for habitation, have neverthelesse, not onely maintained, but also
encreased their Power, partly by the labour of trading from one place to
another, and partly by selling the Manifactures, whereof the Materials
were brought in from other places.



And The Right Of Distribution Of Them

The Distribution of the Materials of this Nourishment, is the
constitution of Mine, and Thine, and His, that is to say, in one word
Propriety; and belongeth in all kinds of Common-wealth to the Soveraign
Power. For where there is no Common-wealth, there is, (as hath been
already shewn) a perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour;
And therefore every thing is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by
force; which is neither Propriety nor Community; but Uncertainty. Which
is so evident, that even Cicero, (a passionate defender of Liberty,) in
a publique pleading, attributeth all Propriety to the Law Civil, "Let
the Civill Law," saith he, "be once abandoned, or but negligently
guarded, (not to say oppressed,) and there is nothing, that any man can
be sure to receive from his Ancestor, or leave to his Children." And
again; "Take away the Civill Law, and no man knows what is his own, and
what another mans." Seeing therefore the Introduction of Propriety is
an effect of Common-wealth; which can do nothing but by the Person that
Represents it, it is the act onely of the Soveraign; and consisteth in
the Lawes, which none can make that have not the Soveraign Power. And
this they well knew of old, who called that Nomos, (that is to say,
Distribution,) which we call Law; and defined Justice, by distributing
to every man his own.



All Private Estates Of Land Proceed Originally

From The Arbitrary Distribution Of The Soveraign

In this Distribution, the First Law, is for Division of the Land it
selfe: wherein the Soveraign assigneth to every man a portion, according
as he, and not according as any Subject, or any number of them, shall
judge agreeable to Equity, and the Common Good. The Children of Israel,
were a Common-wealth in the Wildernesse; but wanted the commodities
of the Earth, till they were masters of the Land of Promise; which
afterward was divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but
by the discretion of Eleazar the Priest, and Joshua their Generall: who
when there were twelve Tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision of
the Tribe of Joseph; made neverthelesse but twelve portions of the Land;
and ordained for the Tribe of Levi no land; but assigned them the Tenth
part of the whole fruits; which division was therefore Arbitrary. And
though a People comming into possession of a land by warre, do not
alwaies exterminate the antient Inhabitants, (as did the Jewes,) but
leave to many, or most, or all of them their Estates; yet it is manifest
they hold them afterwards, as of the Victors distribution; as the people
of England held all theirs of William the Conquerour.



Propriety Of A Subject Excludes Not The Dominion Of The Soveraign,

But Onely Of Another Subject

From whence we may collect, that the Propriety which a subject hath in
his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the
use of them; and not to exclude their Soveraign, be it an Assembly, or
a Monarch. For seeing the Soveraign, that is to say, the Common-wealth
(whose Person he representeth,) is understood to do nothing but in order
to the common Peace and Security, this Distribution of lands, is to be
understood as done in order to the same: And consequently, whatsoever
Distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the
will of every subject, that committed his Peace, and safety to his
discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of
them, is to be reputed voyd. It is true, that a Soveraign Monarch, or
the greater part of a Soveraign Assembly, may ordain the doing of many
things in pursuit of their Passions, contrary to their own consciences,
which is a breach of trust, and of the Law of Nature; but this is not
enough to authorise any subject, either to make warre upon, or so much
as to accuse of Injustice, or any way to speak evill of their Soveraign;
because they have authorised all his actions, and in bestowing the
Soveraign Power, made them their own. But in what cases the Commands
of Soveraigns are contrary to Equity, and the Law of Nature, is to be
considered hereafter in another place.



The Publique Is Not To Be Dieted

In the Distribution of land, the Common-wealth it selfe, may be
conceived to have a portion, and possesse, and improve the same by
their Representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to
susteine the whole expence to the common Peace, and defence necessarily
required: Which were very true, if there could be any Representative
conceived free from humane passions, and infirmities. But the nature
of men being as it is, the setting forth of Publique Land, or of any
certaine Revenue for the Common-wealth, is in vaine; and tendeth to the
dissolution of Government, and to the condition of meere Nature, and
War, assoon as ever the Soveraign Power falleth into the hands of a
Monarch, or of an Assembly, that are either too negligent of mony, or
too hazardous in engaging the publique stock, into a long, or costly
war. Common-wealths can endure no Diet: For seeing their expence is
not limited by their own appetite, but by externall Accidents, and the
appetites of their neighbours, the Publique Riches cannot be limited by
other limits, than those which the emergent occasions shall require. And
whereas in England, there were by the Conquerour, divers Lands
reserved to his own use, (besides Forrests, and Chases, either for his
recreation, or for preservation of Woods,) and divers services reserved
on the Land he gave his Subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved
for his Maintenance in his Publique, but in his Naturall capacity: For
he, and his Successors did for all that, lay Arbitrary Taxes on all
Subjects land, when they judged it necessary. Or if those publique
Lands, and Services, were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the
Common-wealth, it was contrary to the scope of the Institution; being
(as it appeared by those ensuing Taxes) insufficient, and (as it
appeares by the late Revenue of the Crown) Subject to Alienation,
and Diminution. It is therefore in vaine, to assign a portion to the
Common-wealth; which may sell, or give it away; and does sell, and give
it away when tis done by their Representative.



The Places And Matter Of Traffique Depend, As Their Distribution,

On The Soveraign

As the Distribution of Lands at home; so also to assigne in what places,
and for what commodities, the Subject shall traffique abroad, belongeth
to the Soveraign. For if it did belong to private persons to use their
own discretion therein, some of them would bee drawn for gaine, both
to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the Common-wealth, and hurt it
themselves, by importing such things, as pleasing mens appetites, be
neverthelesse noxious, or at least unprofitable to them. And therefore
it belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is, to the Soveraign only,)
to approve, or disapprove both of the places, and matter of forraign
Traffique.



The Laws Of Transferring Property Belong Also To The Soveraign

Further, seeing it is not enough to the Sustentation of a Common-wealth,
that every man have a propriety in a portion of Land, or in some few
commodities, or a naturall property in some usefull art, and there is no
art in the world, but is necessary either for the being, or well being
almost of every particular man; it is necessary, that men distribute
that which they can spare, and transferre their propriety therein,
mutually one to another, by exchange, and mutuall contract. And
therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is to say, to the
Soveraign,) to appoint in what manner, all kinds of contract between
Subjects, (as buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting,
and taking to hire,) are to bee made; and by what words, and signes they
shall be understood for valid. And for the Matter, and Distribution of
the Nourishment, to the severall Members of the Common-wealth, thus much
(considering the modell of the whole worke) is sufficient.



Mony The Bloud Of A Common-wealth

By Concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodities, which are
not presently consumed, but reserved for Nourishment in time to come, to
some thing of equal value, and withall so portably, as not to hinder
the motion of men from place to place; to the end a man may have in
what place soever, such Nourishment as the place affordeth. And this is
nothing else but Gold, and Silver, and Mony. For Gold and Silver, being
(as it happens) almost in all Countries of the world highly valued, is a
commodious measure for the value of all things else between Nations; and
Mony (of what matter soever coyned by the Soveraign of a Common-wealth,)
is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, between the
Subjects of that Common-wealth. By the means of which measures, all
commodities, Moveable, and Immoveable, are made to accompany a man, to
all places of his resort, within and without the place of his
ordinary residence; and the same passeth from Man to Man, within the
Common-wealth; and goes round about, Nourishing (as it passeth)
every part thereof; In so much as this Concoction, is as it were the
Sanguification of the Common-wealth: For naturall Bloud is in like
manner made of the fruits of the Earth; and circulating, nourisheth by
the way, every Member of the Body of Man.

And because Silver and Gold, have their value from the matter it self;
they have first this priviledge, that the value of them cannot be
altered by the power of one, nor of a few Common-wealths; as being a
common measure of the commodities of all places. But base Mony, may
easily be enhanced, or abased. Secondly, they have the priviledge to
make Common-wealths, move, and stretch out their armes, when need is,
into forraign Countries; and supply, not only private Subjects that
travell, but also whole Armies with provision. But that Coyne, which is
not considerable for the Matter, but for the Stamp of the place, being
unable to endure change of ayr, hath its effect at home only; where
also it is subject to the change of Laws, and thereby to have the value
diminished, to the prejudice many times of those that have it.



The Conduits And Way Of Mony To The Publique Use

The Conduits, and Wayes by which it is conveyed to the Publique use, are
of two sorts; One, that Conveyeth it to the Publique Coffers; The other,
that Issueth the same out againe for publique payments. Of the first
sort, are Collectors, Receivers, and Treasurers; of the second are the
Treasurers againe, and the Officers appointed for payment of severall
publique or private Ministers. And in this also, the Artificiall Man
maintains his resemblance with the Naturall; whose Veins receiving the
Bloud from the severall Parts of the Body, carry it to the Heart; where
being made Vitall, the Heart by the Arteries sends it out again, to
enliven, and enable for motion all the Members of the same.



The Children Of A Common-wealth Colonies

The Procreation, or Children of a Common-wealth, are those we call
Plantations, or Colonies; which are numbers of men sent out from the
Common-wealth, under a Conductor, or Governour, to inhabit a Forraign
Country, either formerly voyd of Inhabitants, or made voyd then, by
warre. And when a Colony is setled, they are either a Common-wealth of
themselves, discharged of their subjection to their Soveraign that sent
them, (as hath been done by many Common-wealths of antient time,) in
which case the Common-wealth from which they went was called their
Metropolis, or Mother, and requires no more of them, then Fathers
require of the Children, whom they emancipate, and make free from their
domestique government, which is Honour, and Friendship; or else they
remain united to their Metropolis, as were the Colonies of the people of
Rome; and then they are no Common-wealths themselves, but Provinces, and
parts of the Common-wealth that sent them. So that the Right of Colonies
(saving Honour, and League with their Metropolis,) dependeth wholly on
their Licence, or Letters, by which their Soveraign authorised them to
Plant.


CHAPTER XXV. OF COUNSELL



Counsell What

How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary
and inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the
confusion of Counsels, and Commands, arising from the Imperative manner
of speaking in them both, and in may other occasions besides. For the
words "Doe this," are the words not onely of him that Commandeth; but
also of him that giveth Counsell; and of him that Exhorteth; and yet
there are but few, that see not, that these are very different things;
or that cannot distinguish between them, when they perceive who it
is that speaketh, and to whom the Speech is directed, and upon what
occasion. But finding those phrases in mens writings, and being not
able, or not willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances,
they mistake sometimes the Precepts of Counsellours, for the Precepts
of them that command; and sometimes the contrary; according as it best
agreeth with the conclusions they would inferre, or the actions
they approve. To avoyd which mistakes, and render to those termes
of Commanding, Counselling, and Exhorting, their proper and distinct
significations, I define them thus.



Differences Between Command And Counsell

COMMAND is, where a man saith, "Doe this," or "Doe this not," without
expecting other reason than the Will of him that sayes it. From this it
followeth manifestly, that he that Commandeth, pretendeth thereby his
own Benefit: For the reason of his Command is his own Will onely, and
the proper object of every mans Will, is some Good to himselfe.

COUNSELL, is where a man saith, "Doe" or "Doe not this," and deduceth
his own reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he
saith it. And from this it is evident, that he that giveth Counsell,
pretendeth onely (whatsoever he intendeth) the good of him, to whom he
giveth it.

Therefore between Counsell and Command, one great difference is, that
Command is directed to a mans own benefit; and Counsell to the benefit
of another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man
may be obliged to do what he is Commanded; as when he hath covenanted
to obey: But he cannot be obliged to do as he is Counselled, because the
hurt of not following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow
it, then is the Counsell turned into the nature of a Command. A third
difference between them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of
another mans Counsell; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to
himselfe; but to demand right to Counsell another, argues a will to know
his designes, or to gain some other Good to himselfe; which (as I said
before) is of every mans will the proper object.

This also is incident to the nature of Counsell; that whatsoever it be,
he that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: For to ask
Counsell of another, is to permit him to give such Counsell as he shall
think best; And consequently, he that giveth counsell to his Soveraign,
(whether a Monarch, or an Assembly) when he asketh it, cannot in equity
be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of
the most, or not, so it be to the Proposition in debate. For if the
sense of the Assembly can be taken notice of, before the Debate be
ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further Counsell; For the
Sense of the Assembly, is the Resolution of the Debate, and End of all
Deliberation. And generally he that demandeth Counsell, is Author of it;
and therefore cannot punish it; and what the Soveraign cannot, no man
else can. But if one Subject giveth Counsell to another, to do any
thing contrary to the Lawes, whether that Counsell proceed from
evill intention, or from ignorance onely, it is punishable by the
Common-wealth; because ignorance of the Law, is no good excuse, where
every man is bound to take notice of the Lawes to which he is subject.



Exhortation And Dehortation What

EXHORTATION, and DEHORTATION, is Counsell, accompanied with signes in
him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed; or to say it
more briefly, Counsell Vehemently Pressed. For he that Exhorteth, doth
not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tye
himselfe therein to the rigour of true reasoning; but encourages him he
Counselleth, to Action: As he that Dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And
therefore they have in their speeches, a regard to the common Passions,
and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of
Similitudes, Metaphors, Examples, and other tooles of Oratory, to
perswade their Hearers of the Utility, Honour, or Justice of following
their advise.

From whence may be inferred, First, that Exhortation and Dehortation,
is directed to the Good of him that giveth the Counsell, not of him that
asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a Counsellour; who (by the
definition of Counsell) ought to regard, not his own benefits, but his
whom he adviseth. And that he directeth his Counsell to his own
benefit, is manifest enough, by the long and vehement urging, or by
the artificial giving thereof; which being not required of him, and
consequently proceeding from his own occasions, is directed principally
to his own benefit, and but accidentarily to the good of him that is
Counselled, or not at all.

Secondly, that the use of Exhortation and Dehortation lyeth onely, where
a man is to speak to a Multitude; because when the Speech is addressed
to one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously,
than can be done in a Multitude; which are too many to enter into
Dispute, and Dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them
all at once. Thirdly, that they that Exhort and Dehort, where they are
required to give Counsell, are corrupt Counsellours, and as it were
bribed by their own interest. For though the Counsell they give be never
so good; yet he that gives it, is no more a good Counsellour, than he
that giveth a Just Sentence for a reward, is a just Judge. But where a
man may lawfully Command, as a Father in his Family, or a Leader in an
Army, his Exhortations and Dehortations, are not onely lawfull, but
also necessary, and laudable: But then they are no more Counsells, but
Commands; which when they are for Execution of soure labour; sometimes
necessity, and alwayes humanity requireth to be sweetned in the
delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of Counsell,
rather then in harsher language of Command.

Examples of the difference between Command and Counsell, we may take
from the formes of Speech that expresse them in Holy Scripture. "Have no
other Gods but me; Make to thy selfe no graven Image; Take not Gods name
in vain; Sanctifie the Sabbath; Honour thy Parents; Kill not; Steale
not," &c. are Commands; because the reason for which we are to obey
them, is drawn from the will of God our King, whom we are obliged to
obey. But these words, "Sell all thou hast; give it to the poore; and
follow me," are Counsell; because the reason for which we are to do
so, is drawn from our own benefit; which is this, that we shall have
"Treasure in Heaven." These words, "Go into the village over against
you, and you shall find an Asse tyed, and her Colt; loose her, and bring
her to me," are a Command: for the reason of their fact is drawn from
the will of their Master: but these words, "Repent, and be Baptized in
the Name of Jesus," are Counsell; because the reason why we should so
do, tendeth not to any benefit of God Almighty, who shall still be King
in what manner soever we rebell; but of our selves, who have no other
means of avoyding the punishment hanging over us for our sins.



Differences Of Fit And Unfit Counsellours

As the difference of Counsell from Command, hath been now deduced from
the nature of Counsell, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or
hurt that may arise to him that is to be Counselled, by the necessary
or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the
differences between apt, and inept counsellours be derived from the
same. For Experience, being but Memory of the consequences of like
actions formerly observed, and Counsell but the Speech whereby that
experience is made known to another; the Vertues, and Defects of
Counsell, are the same with the Vertues, and Defects Intellectuall:
And to the Person of a Common-wealth, his Counsellours serve him in the
place of Memory, and Mentall Discourse. But with this resemblance of the
Common-wealth, to a naturall man, there is one dissimilitude joyned,
of great importance; which is, that a naturall man receiveth his
experience, from the naturall objects of sense, which work upon him
without passion, or interest of their own; whereas they that give
Counsell to the Representative person of a Common-wealth, may have,
and have often their particular ends, and passions, that render their
Counsells alwayes suspected, and many times unfaithfull. And therefore
we may set down for the first condition of a good Counsellour, That His
Ends, And Interest, Be Not Inconsistent With The Ends And Interest Of
Him He Counselleth.

Secondly, Because the office of a Counsellour, when an action comes
into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such
manner, as he that is Counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he
ought to propound his advise, in such forme of speech, as may make
the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firme
ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as
the evidence will permit. And therefore Rash, And Unevident Inferences;
(such as are fetched onely from Examples, or authority of Books, and are
not arguments of what is good, or evill, but witnesses of fact, or
of opinion,) Obscure, Confused, And Ambiguous Expressions, Also All
Metaphoricall Speeches, Tending To The Stirring Up Of Passion, (because
such reasoning, and such expressions, are usefull onely to deceive, or
to lead him we Counsell towards other ends than his own) Are Repugnant
To The Office Of A Counsellour.

Thirdly, Because the Ability of Counselling proceedeth from Experience,
and long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all those
things that to the Administration of a great Common-wealth are necessary
to be known, No Man Is Presumed To Be A Good Counsellour, But In Such
Businesse, As He Hath Not Onely Been Much Versed In, But Hath Also
Much Meditated On, And Considered. For seeing the businesse of a
Common-wealth is this, to preserve the people at home, and defend them
against forraign Invasion, we shall find, it requires great knowledge
of the disposition of Man-kind, of the Rights of Government, and of the
nature of Equity, Law, Justice, and Honour, not to be attained without
study; And of the Strength, Commodities, Places, both of their own
Country, and their Neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designes
of all Nations that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to,
without much experience. Of which things, not onely the whole summe, but
every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation of a man
in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for Counsel,
as I have said before is Judgement. And the differences of men in that
point come from different education, of some to one kind of study, or
businesse, and of others to another. When for the doing of any thing,
there be Infallible rules, (as in Engines, and Edifices, the rules of
Geometry,) all the experience of the world cannot equall his Counsell,
that has learnt, or found out the Rule. And when there is no such Rule,
he that hath most experience in that particular kind of businesse, has
therein the best Judgement, and is the best Counsellour.

Fourthly, to be able to give Counsell to a Common-wealth, in a businesse
that hath reference to another Common-wealth, It Is Necessary To Be
Acquainted With The Intelligences, And Letters That Come From Thence,
And With All The Records Of Treaties, And Other Transactions Of State
Between Them; which none can doe, but such as the Representative
shall think fit. By which we may see, that they who are not called to
Counsell, can have no good Counsell in such cases to obtrude.

Fifthly, Supposing the number of Counsellors equall, a man is better
Counselled by hearing them apart, then in an Assembly; and that for many
causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man;
but in an Assembly may of them deliver their advise with I, or No, or
with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the
eloquence of another, or for feare of displeasing some that have spoken,
or the whole Assembly, by contradiction; or for feare of appearing
duller in apprehension, than those that have applauded the contrary
opinion. Secondly, in an Assembly of many, there cannot choose but be
some whose interests are contrary to that of the Publique; and these
their Interests make passionate, and Passion eloquent, and Eloquence
drawes others into the same advice. For the Passions of men, which
asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in Assembly are like
many brands, that enflame one another, (especially when they blow one
another with Orations) to the setting of the Common-wealth on fire,
under pretence of Counselling it. Thirdly, in hearing every man apart,
one may examine (when there is need) the truth, or probability of
his reasons, and of the grounds of the advise he gives, by frequent
interruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in an Assembly,
where (in every difficult question) a man is rather astonied, and dazled
with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he
ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an Assembly of many, called
together for advice, wherein there be not some, that have the ambition
to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the Politiques; and give not
their advice with care of the businesse propounded, but of the applause
of their motly orations, made of the divers colored threds, or shreds of
Authors; which is an Impertinence at least, that takes away the time
of serious Consultation, and in the secret way of Counselling apart, is
easily avoided. Fourthly, in Deliberations that ought to be kept secret,
(whereof there be many occasions in Publique Businesse,) the Counsells
of many, and especially in Assemblies, are dangerous; And therefore
great Assemblies are necessitated to commit such affaires to lesser
numbers, and of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity
they have most confidence.

To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of Counsell
from a great Assembly of Counsellours, that wisheth for, or would accept
of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his Children,
disposing of his Lands, governing his Household, or managing his
private Estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not
his prosperity? A man that doth his businesse by the help of many and
prudent Counsellours, with every one consulting apart in his proper
element, does it best, as he that useth able Seconds at Tennis play,
placed in their proper stations. He does next best, that useth his own
Judgement only; as he that has no Second at all. But he that is carried
up and down to his businesse in a framed Counsell, which cannot move
but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is
commonly (out of envy, or interest) retarded by the part dissenting,
does it worst of all, and like one that is carried to the ball, though
by good Players, yet in a Wheele-barrough, or other frame, heavy of it
self, and retarded also by the inconcurrent judgements, and endeavours
of them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set
their hands to it; and most of all, when there is one, or more amongst
them, that desire to have him lose. And though it be true, that many eys
see more then one; yet it is not to be understood of many Counsellours;
but then only, when the finall Resolution is in one man. Otherwise,
because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to
look asquint towards their private benefit; they that desire not to
misse their marke, though they look about with two eyes, yet they never
ayme but with one; And therefore no great Popular Common-wealth was
ever kept up; but either by a forraign Enemy that united them; or by
the reputation of some one eminent Man amongst them; or by the secret
Counsell of a few; or by the mutuall feare of equall factions; and
not by the open Consultations of the Assembly. And as for very little
Common-wealths, be they Popular, or Monarchicall, there is no humane
wisdome can uphold them, longer then the Jealousy lasteth of their
potent Neighbours.


CHAPTER XXVI. OF CIVILL LAWES



Civill Law what

By CIVILL LAWES, I understand the Lawes, that men are therefore bound to
observe, because they are Members, not of this, or that Common-wealth
in particular, but of a Common-wealth. For the knowledge of particular
Lawes belongeth to them, that professe the study of the Lawes of their
severall Countries; but the knowledge of Civill Law in generall, to any
man. The antient Law of Rome was called their Civil Law, from the word
Civitas, which signifies a Common-wealth; And those Countries, which
having been under the Roman Empire, and governed by that Law, retaine
still such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the Civill
Law, to distinguish it from the rest of their own Civill Lawes. But that
is not it I intend to speak of here; my designe being not to shew what
is Law here, and there; but what is Law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero,
and divers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of
the study of the Law.

And first it manifest, that Law in generall, is not Counsell, but
Command; nor a Command of any man to any man; but only of him, whose
Command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him. And as for
Civill Law, it addeth only the name of the person Commanding, which is
Persona Civitatis, the Person of the Common-wealth.

Which considered, I define Civill Law in this Manner. "CIVILL LAW, Is to
every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath Commanded him,
by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make use
of, for the Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say, of what is
contrary, and what is not contrary to the Rule."

In which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight
evident. For every man seeth, that some Lawes are addressed to all the
Subjects in generall; some to particular Provinces; some to particular
Vocations; and some to particular Men; and are therefore Lawes, to every
of those to whom the Command is directed; and to none else. As also,
that Lawes are the Rules of Just, and Unjust; nothing being reputed
Unjust, that is not contrary to some Law. Likewise, that none can
make Lawes but the Common-wealth; because our Subjection is to the
Common-wealth only: and that Commands, are to be signified by sufficient
Signs; because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them. And
therefore, whatsoever can from this definition by necessary consequence
be deduced, ought to be acknowledged for truth. Now I deduce from it
this that followeth.



The Soveraign Is Legislator

1. The Legislator in all Common-wealths, is only the Soveraign, be he
one Man, as in a Monarchy, or one Assembly of men, as in a Democracy,
or Aristocracy. For the Legislator, is he that maketh the Law. And the
Common-wealth only, praescribes, and commandeth the observation of those
rules, which we call Law: Therefore the Common-wealth is the Legislator.
But the Common-wealth is no Person, nor has capacity to doe any thing,
but by the Representative, (that is, the Soveraign;) and therefore the
Soveraign is the sole Legislator. For the same reason, none can abrogate
a Law made, but the Soveraign; because a Law is not abrogated, but by
another Law, that forbiddeth it to be put in execution.



And Not Subject To Civill Law

2. The Soveraign of a Common-wealth, be it an Assembly, or one Man, is
not subject to the Civill Lawes. For having power to make, and repeale
Lawes, he may when he pleaseth, free himselfe from that subjection,
by repealing those Lawes that trouble him, and making of new; and
consequently he was free before. For he is free, that can be free when
he will: Nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himselfe;
because he that can bind, can release; and therefore he that is bound to
himselfe onely, is not bound.



Use, A Law Not By Vertue Of Time, But Of The Soveraigns Consent

3. When long Use obtaineth the authority of a Law, it is not the
Length of Time that maketh the Authority, but the Will of the Soveraign
signified by his silence, (for Silence is sometimes an argument of
Consent;) and it is no longer Law, then the Soveraign shall be silent
therein. And therefore if the Soveraign shall have a question of Right
grounded, not upon his present Will, but upon the Lawes formerly
made; the Length of Time shal bring no prejudice to his Right; but the
question shal be judged by Equity. For many unjust Actions, and unjust
Sentences, go uncontrolled a longer time, than any man can remember.
And our Lawyers account no Customes Law, but such as are reasonable, and
that evill Customes are to be abolished; But the Judgement of what is
reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh
the Law, which is the Soveraign Assembly, or Monarch.



The Law Of Nature, And The Civill Law Contain Each Other

4. The Law of Nature, and the Civill Law, contain each other, and are
of equall extent. For the Lawes of Nature, which consist in Equity,
Justice, Gratitude, and other morall Vertues on these depending, in the
condition of meer Nature (as I have said before in the end of the 15th
Chapter,) are not properly Lawes, but qualities that dispose men to
peace, and to obedience. When a Common-wealth is once settled, then are
they actually Lawes, and not before; as being then the commands of the
Common-wealth; and therefore also Civill Lawes: for it is the Soveraign
Power that obliges men to obey them. For in the differences of private
men, to declare, what is Equity, what is Justice, and what is morall
Vertue, and to make them binding, there is need of the Ordinances of
Soveraign Power, and Punishments to be ordained for such as shall break
them; which Ordinances are therefore part of the Civill Law. The Law of
Nature therefore is a part of the Civill Law in all Common-wealths of
the world. Reciprocally also, the Civill Law is a part of the Dictates
of Nature. For Justice, that is to say, Performance of Covenant, and
giving to every man his own, is a Dictate of the Law of Nature. But
every subject in a Common-wealth, hath covenanted to obey the Civill
Law, (either one with another, as when they assemble to make a common
Representative, or with the Representative it selfe one by one, when
subdued by the Sword they promise obedience, that they may receive
life;) And therefore Obedience to the Civill Law is part also of the
Law of Nature. Civill, and Naturall Law are not different kinds, but
different parts of Law; whereof one part being written, is called
Civill, the other unwritten, Naturall. But the Right of Nature, that
is, the naturall Liberty of man, may by the Civill Law be abridged,
and restrained: nay, the end of making Lawes, is no other, but such
Restraint; without the which there cannot possibly be any Peace. And Law
was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit the naturall
liberty of particular men, in such manner, as they might not hurt, but
assist one another, and joyn together against a common Enemy.



Provinciall Lawes Are Not Made By Custome, But By The Soveraign Power

5. If the Soveraign of one Common-wealth, subdue a people that have
lived under other written Lawes, and afterwards govern them by the
same Lawes, by which they were governed before; yet those Lawes are the
Civill Lawes of the Victor, and not of the Vanquished Common-wealth, For
the Legislator is he, not by whose authority the Lawes were first made,
but by whose authority they now continue to be Lawes. And therefore
where there be divers Provinces, within the Dominion of a Common-wealth,
and in those Provinces diversity of Lawes, which commonly are called the
Customes of each severall Province, we are not to understand that such
Customes have their Force, onely from Length of Time; but that they were
antiently Lawes written, or otherwise made known, for the Constitutions,
and Statutes of their Soveraigns; and are now Lawes, not by vertue of
the Praescription of time, but by the Constitutions of their present
Soveraigns. But if an unwritten Law, in all the Provinces of a Dominion,
shall be generally observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof;
that law can be no other but a Law of Nature, equally obliging all
man-kind.



Some Foolish Opinions Of Lawyers Concerning The Making Of Lawes

6. Seeing then all Lawes, written, and unwritten, have their Authority,
and force, from the Will of the Common-wealth; that is to say, from the
Will of the Representative; which in a Monarchy is the Monarch, and
in other Common-wealths the Soveraign Assembly; a man may wonder from
whence proceed such opinions, as are found in the Books of Lawyers of
eminence in severall Common-wealths, directly, or by consequence making
the Legislative Power depend on private men, or subordinate Judges.
As for example, "That the Common Law, hath no Controuler but the
Parlament;" which is true onely where a Parlament has the Soveraign
Power, and cannot be assembled, nor dissolved, but by their own
discretion. For if there be a right in any else to dissolve them, there
is a right also to controule them, and consequently to controule their
controulings. And if there be no such right, then the Controuler of
Lawes is not Parlamentum, but Rex In Parlamento. And where a Parlament
is Soveraign, if it should assemble never so many, or so wise men, from
the Countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause; yet there is no man
will believe, that such an Assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves
a Legislative Power. Item, that the two arms of a Common-wealth,
are Force, and Justice; The First Whereof Is In The King; The Other
Deposited In The Hands Of The Parlament. As if a Common-wealth could
consist, where the Force were in any hand, which Justice had not the
Authority to command and govern.

7. That Law can never be against Reason, our Lawyers are agreed; and
that not the Letter,(that is, every construction of it,) but that which
is according to the Intention of the Legislator, is the Law. And it is
true: but the doubt is, of whose Reason it is, that shall be received
for Law. It is not meant of any private Reason; for then there would be
as much contradiction in the Lawes, as there is in the Schooles; nor yet
(as Sr. Ed, Coke makes it (Sir Edward Coke, upon Littleton Lib.2. Ch.6
fol 97.b),) an Artificiall Perfection of Reason, Gotten By Long Study,
Observation, And Experience, (as his was.) For it is possible long study
may encrease, and confirm erroneous Sentences: and where men build on
false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruine; and of
those that study, and observe with equall time, and diligence, the
reasons and resolutions are, and must remain discordant: and therefore
it is not that Juris Prudentia, or wisedome of subordinate Judges;
but the Reason of this our Artificiall Man the Common-wealth, and
his Command, that maketh Law: And the Common-wealth being in
their Representative but one Person, there cannot easily arise any
contradiction in the Lawes; and when there doth, the same Reason is
able, by interpretation, or alteration, to take it away. In all Courts
of Justice, the Soveraign (which is the Person of the Common-wealth,)
is he that Judgeth: The subordinate Judge, ought to have regard to the
reason, which moved his Soveraign to make such Law, that his Sentence
may be according thereunto; which then is his Soveraigns Sentence;
otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one.



Law Made, If Not Also Made Known, Is No Law

8. From this, that the Law is a Command, and a Command consisteth in
declaration, or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth, by
voyce, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may
understand, that the Command of the Common-wealth, is Law onely to
those, that have means to take notice of it. Over naturall fooles,
children, or mad-men there is no Law, no more than over brute beasts;
nor are they capable of the title of just, or unjust; because they had
never power to make any covenant, or to understand the consequences
thereof; and consequently never took upon them to authorise the
actions of any Soveraign, as they must do that make to themselves a
Common-wealth. And as those from whom Nature, or Accident hath taken
away the notice of all Lawes in generall; so also every man, from whom
any accident, not proceeding from his own default, hath taken away the
means to take notice of any particular Law, is excused, if he observe it
not; And to speak properly, that Law is no Law to him. It is therefore
necessary, to consider in this place, what arguments, and signes be
sufficient for the knowledge of what is the Law; that is to say, what is
the will of the Soveraign, as well in Monarchies, as in other formes of
government.



Unwritten Lawes Are All Of Them Lawes Of Nature

And first, if it be a Law that obliges all the Subjects without
exception, and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as
they may take notice thereof, it is a Law of Nature. For whatsoever men
are to take knowledge of for Law, not upon other mens words, but every
one from his own reason, must be such as is agreeable to the reason of
all men; which no Law can be, but the Law of Nature. The Lawes of Nature
therefore need not any publishing, nor Proclamation; as being contained
in this one Sentence, approved by all the world, "Do not that to
another, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to thy
selfe."

Secondly, if it be a Law that obliges only some condition of men, or one
particular man and be not written, nor published by word, then also it
is a Law of Nature; and known by the same arguments, and signs,
that distinguish those in such a condition, from other Subjects. For
whatsoever Law is not written, or some way published by him that makes
it Law, can be known no way, but by the reason of him that is to obey
it; and is therefore also a Law not only Civill, but Naturall. For
example, if the Soveraign employ a Publique Minister, without written
Instructions what to doe; he is obliged to take for Instructions the
Dictates of Reason; As if he make a Judge, The Judge is to take notice,
that his Sentence ought to be according to the reason of his Soveraign,
which being alwaies understood to be Equity, he is bound to it by the
Law of Nature: Or if an Ambassador, he is (in al things not conteined
in his written Instructions) to take for Instruction that which Reason
dictates to be most conducing to his Soveraigns interest; and so of
all other Ministers of the Soveraignty, publique and private. All which
Instructions of naturall Reason may be comprehended under one name of
Fidelity; which is a branch of naturall Justice.

The Law of Nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence of all other
Lawes, to be made known, to every man that shall be obliged to obey
them, either by word, or writing, or some other act, known to proceed
from the Soveraign Authority. For the will of another, cannot be
understood, but by his own word, or act, or by conjecture taken from his
scope and purpose; which in the person of the Common-wealth, is to be
supposed alwaies consonant to Equity and Reason. And in antient time,
before letters were in common use, the Lawes were many times put into
verse; that the rude people taking pleasure in singing, or reciting
them, might the more easily reteine them in memory. And for the same
reason Solomon adviseth a man, to bind the ten Commandements (Prov. 7.
3) upon his ten fingers. And for the Law which Moses gave to the people
of Israel at the renewing of the Covenant, (Deut. 11. 19) he biddeth
them to teach it their Children, by discoursing of it both at home, and
upon the way; at going to bed, and at rising from bed; and to write
it upon the posts, and dores of their houses; and (Deut. 31. 12) to
assemble the people, man, woman, and child, to heare it read.



Nothing Is Law Where The Legislator Cannot Be Known

Nor is it enough the Law be written, and published; but also that there
be manifest signs, that it proceedeth from the will of the Soveraign.
For private men, when they have, or think they have force enough to
secure their unjust designes, and convoy them safely to their ambitious
ends, may publish for Lawes what they please, without, or against
the Legislative Authority. There is therefore requisite, not only a
Declaration of the Law, but also sufficient signes of the Author, and
Authority. The Author, or Legislator is supposed in every Common-wealth
to be evident, because he is the Soveraign, who having been Constituted
by the consent of every one, is supposed by every one to be sufficiently
known. And though the ignorance, and security of men be such, for the
most part, as that when the memory of the first Constitution of their
Common-wealth is worn out, they doe not consider, by whose power they
use to be defended against their enemies, and to have their industry
protected, and to be righted when injury is done them; yet because no
man that considers, can make question of it, no excuse can be derived
from the ignorance of where the Soveraignty is placed. And it is a
Dictate of Naturall Reason, and consequently an evident Law of Nature,
that no man ought to weaken that power, the protection whereof he hath
himself demanded, or wittingly received against others. Therefore of
who is Soveraign, no man, but by his own fault, (whatsoever evill men
suggest,) can make any doubt. The difficulty consisteth in the evidence
of the Authority derived from him; The removing whereof, dependeth on
the knowledge of the publique Registers, publique Counsels, publique
Ministers, and publique Seales; by which all Lawes are sufficiently
verified.



Difference Between Verifying And Authorising

Verifyed, I say, not Authorised: for the Verification, is but the
Testimony and Record; not the Authority of the law; which consisteth in
the Command of the Soveraign only.



The Law Verifyed By The Subordinate Judge

If therefore a man have a question of Injury, depending on the Law of
Nature; that is to say, on common Equity; the Sentence of the Judge,
that by Commission hath Authority to take cognisance of such causes, is
a sufficient Verification of the Law of Nature in that individuall case.
For though the advice of one that professeth the study of the Law, be
usefull for the avoyding of contention; yet it is but advice; tis the
Judge must tell men what is Law, upon the hearing of the Controversy.



By The Publique Registers

But when the question is of injury, or crime, upon a written Law; every
man by recourse to the Registers, by himself, or others, may (if he
will) be sufficiently enformed, before he doe such injury, or commit the
crime, whither it be an injury, or not: Nay he ought to doe so: for when
a man doubts whether the act he goeth about, be just, or injust; and may
informe himself, if he will; the doing is unlawfull. In like manner, he
that supposeth himself injured, in a case determined by the written Law,
which he may by himself, or others see and consider; if he complaine
before he consults with the Law, he does unjustly, and bewrayeth a
disposition rather to vex other men, than to demand his own right.



By Letters Patent, And Publique Seale

If the question be of Obedience to a publique Officer; To have seen his
Commission, with the Publique Seale, and heard it read; or to have
had the means to be informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient
Verification of his Authority. For every man is obliged to doe his best
endeavour, to informe himself of all written Lawes, that may concerne
his own future actions.



The Interpretation Of The Law Dependeth On The Soveraign Power

The Legislator known; and the Lawes, either by writing, or by the
light of Nature, sufficiently published; there wanteth yet another
very materiall circumstance to make them obligatory. For it is not the
Letter, but the Intendment, or Meaning; that is to say, the authentique
Interpretation of the Law (which is the sense of the Legislator,) in
which the nature of the Law consisteth; And therefore the Interpretation
of all Lawes dependeth on the Authority Soveraign; and the Interpreters
can be none but those, which the Soveraign, (to whom only the
Subject oweth obedience) shall appoint. For else, by the craft of an
Interpreter, the Law my be made to beare a sense, contrary to that of
the Soveraign; by which means the Interpreter becomes the Legislator.



All Lawes Need Interpretation

All Laws, written, and unwritten, have need of Interpretation.
The unwritten Law of Nature, though it be easy to such, as without
partiality, and passion, make use of their naturall reason, and
therefore leaves the violators thereof without excuse; yet considering
there be very few, perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by
self love, or some other passion, it is now become of all Laws the most
obscure; and has consequently the greatest need of able Interpreters.
The written Laws, if they be short, are easily mis-interpreted, from the
divers significations of a word, or two; if long, they be more obscure
by the diverse significations of many words: in so much as no written
Law, delivered in few, or many words, can be well understood, without a
perfect understanding of the finall causes, for which the Law was
made; the knowledge of which finall causes is in the Legislator. To him
therefore there can not be any knot in the Law, insoluble; either by
finding out the ends, to undoe it by; or else by making what ends he
will, (as Alexander did with his sword in the Gordian knot,) by the
Legislative power; which no other Interpreter can doe.



The Authenticall Interpretation Of Law Is Not That Of Writers

The Interpretation of the Lawes of Nature, in a Common-wealth, dependeth
not on the books of Morall Philosophy. The Authority of writers, without
the Authority of the Common-wealth, maketh not their opinions Law,
be they never so true. That which I have written in this Treatise,
concerning the Morall Vertues, and of their necessity, for the
procuring, and maintaining peace, though it bee evident Truth, is not
therefore presently Law; but because in all Common-wealths in the world,
it is part of the Civill Law: For though it be naturally reasonable; yet
it is by the Soveraigne Power that it is Law: Otherwise, it were a great
errour, to call the Lawes of Nature unwritten Law; whereof wee see
so many volumes published, and in them so many contradictions of one
another, and of themselves.



The Interpreter Of The Law Is The Judge Giving Sentence Viva Voce

In Every Particular Case

The Interpretation of the Law of Nature, is the Sentence of the Judge
constituted by the Soveraign Authority, to heare and determine such
controversies, as depend thereon; and consisteth in the application of
the Law to the present case. For in the act of Judicature, the Judge
doth no more but consider, whither the demand of the party, be consonant
to naturall reason, and Equity; and the Sentence he giveth, is therefore
the Interpretation of the Law of Nature; which Interpretation is
Authentique; not because it is his private Sentence; but because
he giveth it by Authority of the Soveraign, whereby it becomes the
Soveraigns Sentence; which is Law for that time, to the parties
pleading.



The Sentence Of A Judge, Does Not Bind Him, Or Another Judge

To Give Like Sentence In Like Cases Ever After

But because there is no Judge Subordinate, nor Soveraign, but may erre
in a Judgement of Equity; if afterward in another like case he find it
more consonant to Equity to give a contrary Sentence, he is obliged to
doe it. No mans error becomes his own Law; nor obliges him to persist
in it. Neither (for the same reason) becomes it a Law to other Judges,
though sworn to follow it. For though a wrong Sentence given by
authority of the Soveraign, if he know and allow it, in such Lawes as
are mutable, be a constitution of a new Law, in cases, in which every
little circumstance is the same; yet in Lawes immutable, such as are the
Lawes of Nature, they are no Lawes to the same, or other Judges, in the
like cases for ever after. Princes succeed one another; and one Judge
passeth, another commeth; nay, Heaven and Earth shall passe; but not one
title of the Law of Nature shall passe; for it is the Eternall Law of
God. Therefore all the Sentences of precedent Judges that have ever
been, cannot all together make a Law contrary to naturall Equity: Nor
any Examples of former Judges, can warrant an unreasonable Sentence, or
discharge the present Judge of the trouble of studying what is Equity
(in the case he is to Judge,) from the principles of his own naturall
reason. For example sake, 'Tis against the Law of Nature, To Punish The
Innocent; and Innocent is he that acquitteth himselfe Judicially, and is
acknowledged for Innocent by the Judge. Put the case now, that a man is
accused of a capitall crime, and seeing the powers and malice of some
enemy, and the frequent corruption and partiality of Judges, runneth
away for feare of the event, and afterwards is taken, and brought to a
legall triall, and maketh it sufficiently appear, he was not guilty of
the crime, and being thereof acquitted, is neverthelesse condemned to
lose his goods; this is a manifest condemnation of the Innocent. I say
therefore, that there is no place in the world, where this can be an
interpretation of a Law of Nature, or be made a Law by the Sentences of
precedent Judges, that had done the same. For he that judged it first,
judged unjustly; and no Injustice can be a pattern of Judgement to
succeeding Judges. A written Law may forbid innocent men to fly, and
they may be punished for flying: But that flying for feare of injury,
should be taken for presumption of guilt, after a man is already
absolved of the crime Judicially, is contrary to the nature of a
Presumption, which hath no place after Judgement given. Yet this is set
down by a great Lawyer for the common Law of England. "If a man," saith
he, "that is Innocent, be accused of Felony, and for feare flyeth for
the same; albeit he judicially acquitteth himselfe of the Felony; yet
if it be found that he fled for the Felony, he shall notwithstanding his
Innocency, Forfeit all his goods, chattels, debts, and duties. For as
to the Forfeiture of them, the Law will admit no proofe against the
Presumption in Law, grounded upon his flight." Here you see, An Innocent
Man, Judicially Acquitted, Notwithstanding His Innocency, (when no
written Law forbad him to fly) after his acquitall, Upon A Presumption
In Law, condemned to lose all the goods he hath. If the Law ground upon
his flight a Presumption of the fact, (which was Capitall,) the Sentence
ought to have been Capitall: if the presumption were not of the Fact,
for what then ought he to lose his goods? This therefore is no Law of
England; nor is the condemnation grounded upon a Presumption of Law, but
upon the Presumption of the Judges. It is also against Law, to say
that no Proofe shall be admitted against a Presumption of Law. For
all Judges, Soveraign and subordinate, if they refuse to heare Proofe,
refuse to do Justice: for though the Sentence be Just, yet the Judges
that condemn without hearing the Proofes offered, are Unjust Judges; and
their Presumption is but Prejudice; which no man ought to bring with him
to the Seat of Justice, whatsoever precedent judgements, or examples he
shall pretend to follow. There be other things of this nature, wherein
mens Judgements have been perverted, by trusting to Precedents: but this
is enough to shew, that though the Sentence of the Judge, be a Law to
the party pleading, yet it is no Law to any Judge, that shall succeed
him in that Office.

In like manner, when question is of the Meaning of written Lawes, he is
not the Interpreter of them, that writeth a Commentary upon them. For
Commentaries are commonly more subject to cavill, than the Text; and
therefore need other Commentaries; and so there will be no end of such
Interpretation. And therefore unlesse there be an Interpreter authorised
by the Soveraign, from which the subordinate Judges are not to recede,
the Interpreter can be no other than the ordinary Judges, in the some
manner, as they are in cases of the unwritten Law; and their Sentences
are to be taken by them that plead, for Lawes in that particular case;
but not to bind other Judges, in like cases to give like judgements.
For a Judge may erre in the Interpretation even of written Lawes; but no
errour of a subordinate Judge, can change the Law, which is the generall
Sentence of the Soveraigne.



The Difference Between The Letter And Sentence Of The Law

In written Lawes, men use to make a difference between the Letter, and
the Sentence of the Law: And when by the Letter, is meant whatsoever
can be gathered from the bare words, 'tis well distinguished. For the
significations of almost all words, are either in themselves, or in the
metaphoricall use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in argument, to
make many senses; but there is onely one sense of the Law. But if by the
Letter, be meant the Literall sense, then the Letter, and the Sentence
or intention of the Law, is all one. For the literall sense is that,
which the Legislator is alwayes supposed to be Equity: For it were a
great contumely for a Judge to think otherwise of the Soveraigne.
He ought therefore, if the Word of the Law doe not fully authorise a
reasonable Sentence, to supply it with the Law of Nature; or if the
case be difficult, to respit Judgement till he have received more ample
authority. For Example, a written Law ordaineth, that he which is thrust
out of his house by force, shall be restored by force: It happens that
a man by negligence leaves his house empty, and returning is kept out by
force, in which case there is no speciall Law ordained. It is evident,
that this case is contained in the same Law: for else there is no remedy
for him at all; which is to be supposed against the Intention of the
Legislator. Again, the word of the Law, commandeth to Judge according
to the Evidence: A man is accused falsly of a fact, which the Judge saw
himself done by another; and not by him that is accused. In this case
neither shall the Letter of the Law be followed to the condemnation of
the Innocent, nor shall the Judge give Sentence against the evidence
of the Witnesses; because the Letter of the Law is to the contrary:
but procure of the Soveraign that another be made Judge, and himselfe
Witnesse. So that the incommodity that follows the bare words of a
written Law, may lead him to the Intention of the Law, whereby to
interpret the same the better; though no Incommodity can warrant a
Sentence against the Law. For every Judge of Right, and Wrong, is not
Judge of what is Commodious, or Incommodious to the Common-wealth.



The Abilities Required In A Judge

The abilities required in a good Interpreter of the Law, that is to say,
in a good Judge, are not the same with those of an Advocate; namely the
study of the Lawes. For a Judge, as he ought to take notice of the Fact,
from none but the Witnesses; so also he ought to take notice of the
Law, from nothing but the Statutes, and Constitutions of the Soveraign,
alledged in the pleading, or declared to him by some that have authority
from the Soveraign Power to declare them; and need not take care
before-hand, what hee shall Judge; for it shall bee given him what hee
shall say concerning the Fact, by Witnesses; and what hee shall say in
point of Law, from those that shall in their pleadings shew it, and by
authority interpret it upon the place. The Lords of Parlament in England
were Judges, and most difficult causes have been heard and determined
by them; yet few of them were much versed in the study of the Lawes,
and fewer had made profession of them: and though they consulted with
Lawyers, that were appointed to be present there for that purpose; yet
they alone had the authority of giving Sentence. In like manner, in
the ordinary trialls of Right, Twelve men of the common People, are the
Judges, and give Sentence, not onely of the Fact, but of the Right; and
pronounce simply for the Complaynant, or for the Defendant; that is to
say, are Judges not onely of the Fact, but also of the Right: and in a
question of crime, not onely determine whether done, or not done; but
also whether it be Murder, Homicide, Felony, Assault, and the like,
which are determinations of Law: but because they are not supposed to
know the Law of themselves, there is one that hath Authority to enforme
them of it, in the particular case they are to Judge of. But yet if they
judge not according to that he tells them, they are not subject thereby
to any penalty; unlesse it be made appear, they did it against their
consciences, or had been corrupted by reward. The things that make
a good Judge, or good Interpreter of the Lawes, are, first A Right
Understanding of that principall Law of Nature called Equity; which
depending not on the reading of other mens Writings, but on the
goodnesse of a mans own naturall Reason, and Meditation, is presumed
to be in those most, that have had most leisure, and had the most
inclination to meditate thereon. Secondly, Contempt Of Unnecessary
Riches, and Preferments. Thirdly, To Be Able In Judgement To Devest
Himselfe Of All Feare, Anger, Hatred, Love, And Compassion. Fourthly,
and lastly, Patience To Heare; Diligent Attention In Hearing; And Memory
To Retain, Digest And Apply What He Hath Heard.



Divisions Of Law

The difference and division of the Lawes, has been made in divers
manners, according to the different methods, of those men that have
written of them. For it is a thing that dependeth not on Nature, but on
the scope of the Writer; and is subservient to every mans proper method.
In the Institutions of Justinian, we find seven sorts of Civill Lawes.

1. The Edicts, Constitutions, and Epistles Of The Prince, that is, of
the Emperour; because the whole power of the people was in him. Like
these, are the Proclamations of the Kings of England.

2. The Decrees Of The Whole People Of Rome (comprehending the Senate,)
when they were put to the Question by the Senate. These were Lawes, at
first, by the vertue of the Soveraign Power residing in the people; and
such of them as by the Emperours were not abrogated, remained Lawes by
the Authority Imperiall. For all Lawes that bind, are understood to be
Lawes by his authority that has power to repeale them. Somewhat like to
these Lawes, are the Acts of Parliament in England.

3. The Decrees Of The Common People (excluding the Senate,) when they
were put to the question by the Tribune of the people. For such of them
as were not abrogated by the Emperours, remained Lawes by the Authority
Imperiall. Like to these, were the Orders of the House of Commons in
England.

4. Senatus Consulta, the Orders Of The Senate; because when the people
of Rome grew so numerous, as it was inconvenient to assemble them; it
was thought fit by the Emperour, that men should Consult the Senate in
stead of the people: And these have some resemblance with the Acts of
Counsell.

5. The Edicts Of Praetors, and (in some Cases) of the Aediles: such as
are the Chiefe Justices in the Courts of England.

6. Responsa Prudentum; which were the Sentences, and Opinions of those
Lawyers, to whom the Emperour gave Authority to interpret the Law, and
to give answer to such as in matter of Law demanded their advice;
which Answers, the Judges in giving Judgement were obliged by the
Constitutions of the Emperour to observe; And should be like the Reports
of Cases Judged, if other Judges be by the Law of England bound to
observe them. For the Judges of the Common Law of England, are not
properly Judges, but Juris Consulti; of whom the Judges, who are either
the Lords, or Twelve men of the Country, are in point of Law to ask
advice.

7. Also, Unwritten Customes, (which in their own nature are an imitation
of Law,) by the tacite consent of the Emperour, in case they be not
contrary to the Law of Nature, are very Lawes.

Another division of Lawes, is into Naturall and Positive. Naturall are
those which have been Lawes from all Eternity; and are called not onely
Naturall, but also Morall Lawes; consisting in the Morall Vertues, as
Justice, Equity, and all habits of the mind that conduce to Peace, and
Charity; of which I have already spoken in the fourteenth and fifteenth
Chapters.

Positive, are those which have not been for Eternity; but have been
made Lawes by the Will of those that have had the Soveraign Power over
others; and are either written, or made known to men, by some other
argument of the Will of their Legislator.



Another Division Of Law

Again, of Positive Lawes some are Humane, some Divine; And of Humane
positive lawes, some are Distributive, some Penal. Distributive are
those that determine the Rights of the Subjects, declaring to every man
what it is, by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands,
or goods, and a right or liberty of action; and these speak to all
the Subjects. Penal are those, which declare, what Penalty shall be
inflicted on those that violate the Law; and speak to the Ministers
and Officers ordained for execution. For though every one ought to be
informed of the Punishments ordained beforehand for their transgression;
neverthelesse the Command is not addressed to the Delinquent, (who
cannot be supposed will faithfully punish himselfe,) but to publique
Ministers appointed to see the Penalty executed. And these Penal Lawes
are for the most part written together with the Lawes Distributive; and
are sometimes called Judgements. For all Lawes are generall judgements,
or Sentences of the Legislator; as also every particular Judgement, is a
Law to him, whose case is Judged.



Divine Positive Law How Made Known To Be Law

Divine Positive Lawes (for Naturall Lawes being Eternall, and
Universall, are all Divine,) are those, which being the Commandements of
God, (not from all Eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but
onely to a certain people, or to certain persons,) are declared for
such, by those whom God hath authorised to declare them. But this
Authority of man to declare what be these Positive Lawes of God, how can
it be known? God may command a man by a supernaturall way, to deliver
Lawes to other men. But because it is of the essence of Law, that he who
is to be obliged, be assured of the Authority of him that declareth
it, which we cannot naturally take notice to be from God, How Can A Man
Without Supernaturall Revelation Be Assured Of The Revelation Received
By The Declarer? and How Can He Be Bound To Obey Them? For the first
question, how a man can be assured of the Revelation of another, without
a Revelation particularly to himselfe, it is evidently impossible:
for though a man may be induced to believe such Revelation, from the
Miracles they see him doe, or from seeing the Extraordinary sanctity of
his life, or from seeing the Extraordinary wisedome, or Extraordinary
felicity of his Actions, all which are marks of Gods extraordinary
favour; yet they are not assured evidence of speciall Revelation.
Miracles are Marvellous workes: but that which is marvellous to one,
may not be so to another. Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible
felicities of this world, are most often the work of God by Naturall,
and ordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by
naturall reason, that another has had a supernaturall revelation of Gods
will; but only a beliefe; every one (as the signs thereof shall appear
greater, or lesser) a firmer, or a weaker belief.

But for the second, how he can be bound to obey them; it is not so hard.
For if the Law declared, be not against the Law of Nature (which is
undoubtedly Gods Law) and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his
own act; bound I say to obey it, but not bound to believe it: for mens
beliefe, and interiour cogitations, are not subject to the commands,
but only to the operation of God, ordinary, or extraordinary. Faith of
Supernaturall Law, is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting to the
same; and not a duty that we exhibite to God, but a gift which God
freely giveth to whom he pleaseth; as also Unbelief is not a breach
of any of his Lawes; but a rejection of them all, except the Lawes
Naturall. But this that I say, will be made yet cleerer, by the
Examples, and Testimonies concerning this point in holy Scripture. The
Covenant God made with Abraham (in a Supernaturall Manner) was thus,
(Gen. 17. 10) "This is the Covenant which thou shalt observe between
Me and Thee and thy Seed after thee." Abrahams Seed had not this
revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the Covenant,
and bound to obey what Abraham should declare to them for Gods Law;
which they could not be, but in vertue of the obedience they owed to
their Parents; who (if they be Subject to no other earthly power, as
here in the case of Abraham) have Soveraign power over their children,
and servants. Againe, where God saith to Abraham, "In thee shall all
Nations of the earth be blessed: For I know thou wilt command thy
children, and thy house after thee to keep the way of the Lord, and to
observe Righteousnesse and Judgement," it is manifest, the obedience of
his Family, who had no Revelation, depended on their former obligation
to obey their Soveraign. At Mount Sinai Moses only went up to God; the
people were forbidden to approach on paine of death; yet were they bound
to obey all that Moses declared to them for Gods Law. Upon what ground,
but on this submission of their own, "Speak thou to us, and we will
heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye?" By which two
places it sufficiently appeareth, that in a Common-wealth, a subject
that has no certain and assured Revelation particularly to himself
concerning the Will of God, is to obey for such, the Command of
the Common-wealth: for if men were at liberty, to take for Gods
Commandements, their own dreams, and fancies, or the dreams and
fancies of private men; scarce two men would agree upon what is Gods
Commandement; and yet in respect of them, every man would despise the
Commandements of the Common-wealth. I conclude therefore, that in all
things not contrary to the Morall Law, (that is to say, to the Law of
Nature,) all Subjects are bound to obey that for divine Law, which is
declared to be so, by the Lawes of the Common-wealth. Which also is
evident to any mans reason; for whatsoever is not against the Law of
Nature, may be made Law in the name of them that have the Soveraign
power; and there is no reason men should be the lesse obliged by it,
when tis propounded in the name of God. Besides, there is no place in
the world where men are permitted to pretend other Commandements of God,
than are declared for such by the Common-wealth. Christian States punish
those that revolt from Christian Religion, and all other States, those
that set up any Religion by them forbidden. For in whatsoever is not
regulated by the Common-wealth, tis Equity (which is the Law of Nature,
and therefore an eternall Law of God) that every man equally enjoy his
liberty.



Another Division Of Lawes

There is also another distinction of Laws, into Fundamentall, and Not
Fundamentall: but I could never see in any Author, what a Fundamentall
Law signifieth. Neverthelesse one may very reasonably distinguish Laws
in that manner.



A Fundamentall Law What

For a Fundamentall Law in every Common-wealth is that, which being taken
away, the Common-wealth faileth, and is utterly dissolved; as a building
whose Foundation is destroyed. And therefore a Fundamentall Law is that,
by which Subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the
Soveraign, whether a Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, without which the
Common-wealth cannot stand, such as is the power of War and Peace, of
Judicature, of Election of Officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall
think necessary for the Publique good. Not Fundamentall is that
the abrogating whereof, draweth not with it the dissolution of the
Common-Wealth; such as are the Lawes Concerning Controversies between
subject and subject. Thus much of the Division of Lawes.



Difference Between Law And Right

I find the words Lex Civilis, and Jus Civile, that is to say, Law and
Right Civil, promiscuously used for the same thing, even in the most
learned Authors; which neverthelesse ought not to be so. For Right is
Liberty, namely that Liberty which the Civil Law leaves us: But Civill
Law is an Obligation; and takes from us the Liberty which the Law of
Nature gave us. Nature gave a Right to every man to secure himselfe
by his own strength, and to invade a suspected neighbour, by way of
prevention; but the Civill Law takes away that Liberty, in all cases
where the protection of the Lawe may be safely stayd for. Insomuch as
Lex and Jus, are as different as Obligation and Liberty.



And Between A Law And A Charter

Likewise Lawes and Charters are taken promiscuously for the same
thing. Yet Charters are Donations of the Soveraign; and not Lawes, but
exemptions from Law. The phrase of a Law is Jubeo, Injungo, I Command,
and Enjoyn: the phrase of a Charter is Dedi, Concessi, I Have Given, I
Have Granted: but what is given or granted, to a man, is not forced
upon him, by a Law. A Law may be made to bind All the Subjects of a
Common-wealth: a Liberty, or Charter is only to One man, or some One
part of the people. For to say all the people of a Common-wealth, have
Liberty in any case whatsoever; is to say, that in such case, there hath
been no Law made; or else having been made, is now abrogated.


CHAPTER XXVII. OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS


Sinne What

A Sinne, is not onely a Transgression of a Law, but also any Contempt of
the Legislator. For such Contempt, is a breach of all his Lawes at once.
And therefore may consist, not onely in the Commission of a Fact, or in
the Speaking of Words by the Lawes forbidden, or in the Omission of
what the Law commandeth, but also in the Intention, or purpose to
transgresse. For the purpose to breake the Law, is some degree of
Contempt of him, to whom it belongeth to see it executed. To be
delighted in the Imagination onely, of being possessed of another mans
goods, servants, or wife, without any intention to take them from him
by force, or fraud, is no breach of the Law, that sayth, "Thou shalt not
covet:" nor is the pleasure a man my have in imagining, or dreaming of
the death of him, from whose life he expecteth nothing but dammage, and
displeasure, a Sinne; but the resolving to put some Act in execution,
that tendeth thereto. For to be pleased in the fiction of that, which
would please a man if it were reall, is a Passion so adhaerent to the
Nature both of a man, and every other living creature, as to make it a
Sinne, were to make Sinne of being a man. The consideration of this,
has made me think them too severe, both to themselves, and others, that
maintain, that the First motions of the mind, (though checked with the
fear of God) be Sinnes. But I confesse it is safer to erre on that hand,
than on the other.



A Crime What

A Crime, is a sinne, consisting in the Committing (by Deed, or Word)
of that which the Law forbiddeth, or the Omission of what it hath
commanded. So that every Crime is a sinne; but not every sinne a Crime.
To intend to steale, or kill, is a sinne, though it never appeare in
Word, or Fact: for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to
his charge: but till it appear by some thing done, or said, by which
the intention may be Crime; which distinction the Greeks observed in
the word amartema, and egklema, or aitia; wherof the former, (which is
translated Sinne,) signifieth any swarving from the Law whatsoever; but
the two later, (which are translated Crime,) signifie that sinne onely,
whereof one man may accuse another. But of Intentions, which never
appear by any outward act, there is no place for humane accusation. In
like manner the Latines by Peccatum, which is Sinne, signifie all manner
of deviation from the Law; but by crimen, (which word they derive from
Cerno, which signifies to perceive,) they mean onely such sinnes, as my
be made appear before a Judge; and therfore are not meer Intentions.



Where No Civill Law Is, There Is No Crime

From this relation of Sinne to the Law, and of Crime to the Civill
Law, may be inferred, First, that where Law ceaseth, Sinne ceaseth.
But because the Law of Nature is eternall, Violation of Covenants,
Ingratitude, Arrogance, and all Facts contrary to any Morall vertue, can
never cease to be Sinne. Secondly, that the Civill Law ceasing, Crimes
cease: for there being no other Law remaining, but that of Nature, there
is no place for Accusation; every man being his own Judge, and accused
onely by his own Conscience, and cleared by the Uprightnesse of his own
Intention. When therefore his Intention is Right, his fact is no Sinne:
if otherwise, his fact is Sinne; but not Crime. Thirdly, That when the
Soveraign Power ceaseth, Crime also ceaseth: for where there is no such
Power, there is no protection to be had from the Law; and therefore
every one may protect himself by his own power: for no man in the
Institution of Soveraign Power can be supposed to give away the Right
of preserving his own body; for the safety whereof all Soveraignty was
ordained. But this is to be understood onely of those, that have not
themselves contributed to the taking away of the Power that protected
them: for that was a Crime from the beginning.



Ignorance Of The Law Of Nature Excuseth No Man

The source of every Crime, is some defect of the Understanding; or some
errour in Reasoning, or some sudden force of the Passions. Defect in
the Understanding, is Ignorance; in Reasoning, Erroneous Opinion. Again,
ignorance is of three sort; of the Law, and of the Soveraign, and of the
Penalty. Ignorance of the Law of Nature Excuseth no man; because every
man that hath attained to the use of Reason, is supposed to know, he
ought not to do to another, what he would not have done to himselfe.
Therefore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do any thing
contrary to that Law, it is a Crime. If a man come from the Indies
hither, and perswade men here to receive a new Religion, or teach them
any thing that tendeth to disobedience of the Lawes of this Country,
though he be never so well perswaded of the truth of what he teacheth,
he commits a Crime, and may be justly punished for the same, not onely
because his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he
would not approve in another, namely, that comming from hence, he should
endeavour to alter the Religion there. But ignorance of the Civill Law,
shall Excuse a man in a strange Country, till it be declared to him;
because, till then no Civill Law is binding.



Ignorance Of The Civill Law Excuseth Sometimes

In the like manner, if the Civill Law of a mans own Country, be not
so sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will; nor the Action
against the Law of Nature; the Ignorance is a good Excuse: In other
cases ignorance of the Civill Law, Excuseth not.



Ignorance Of The Soveraign Excuseth Not

Ignorance of the Soveraign Power, in the place of a mans ordinary
residence, Excuseth him not; because he ought to take notice of the
Power, by which he hath been protected there.



Ignorance Of The Penalty Excuseth Not

Ignorance of the Penalty, where the Law is declared, Excuseth no man:
For in breaking the Law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were
not a Law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not
what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth
all the known consequences of it; but Punishment is a known consequence
of the violation of the Lawes, in every Common-wealth; which punishment,
if it be determined already by the Law, he is subject to that; if not,
then is he subject to Arbitrary punishment. For it is reason, that he
which does Injury, without other limitation than that of his own Will,
should suffer punishment without other limitation, than that of his Will
whose Law is thereby violated.



Punishments Declared Before The Fact, Excuse From Greater Punishments

After It

But when a penalty, is either annexed to the Crime in the Law it selfe,
or hath been usually inflicted in the like cases; there the Delinquent
is Excused from a greater penalty. For the punishment foreknown, if not
great enough to deterre men from the action, is an invitement to it:
because when men compare the benefit of their Injustice, with the harm
of their punishment, by necessity of Nature they choose that which
appeareth best for themselves; and therefore when they are punished more
than the Law had formerly determined, or more than others were punished
for the same Crime; it the Law that tempted, and deceiveth them.



Nothing Can Be Made A Crime By A Law Made After The Fact

No Law, made after a Fact done, can make it a Crime: because if the
Fact be against the Law of Nature, the Law was before the Fact; and a
Positive Law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made; and therefore
cannot be Obligatory. But when the Law that forbiddeth a Fact, is made
before the Fact be done; yet he that doth the Fact, is lyable to the
Penalty ordained after, in case no lesser Penalty were made known
before, neither by Writing, nor by Example, for the reason immediatly
before alledged.



False Principles Of Right And Wrong Causes Of Crime

From defect in Reasoning, (that is to say, from Errour,) men are prone
to violate the Lawes, three wayes. First, by Presumption of false
Principles; as when men from having observed how in all places, and
in all ages, unjust Actions have been authorised, by the force, and
victories of those who have committed them; and that potent men,
breaking through the Cob-web Lawes of their Country, the weaker sort,
and those that have failed in their Enterprises, have been esteemed the
onely Criminals; have thereupon taken for Principles, and grounds of
their Reasoning, "That Justice is but a vain word: That whatsoever a man
can get by his own Industry, and hazard, is his own: That the Practice
of all Nations cannot be unjust: That examples of former times are good
Arguments of doing the like again;" and many more of that kind: Which
being granted, no Act in it selfe can be a Crime, but must be made so
(not by the Law, but) by the successe of them that commit it; and the
same Fact be vertuous, or vicious, as Fortune pleaseth; so that what
Marius makes a Crime, Sylla shall make meritorious, and Caesar (the same
Lawes standing) turn again into a Crime, to the perpetuall disturbance
of the Peace of the Common-wealth.



False Teachers Mis-interpreting The Law Of Nature Secondly, by false
Teachers, that either mis-interpret the Law of Nature, making it thereby
repugnant to the Law Civill; or by teaching for Lawes, such Doctrines of
their own, or Traditions of former times, as are inconsistent with the
duty of a Subject.



And False Inferences From True Principles, By Teachers

Thirdly, by Erroneous Inferences from True Principles; which happens
commonly to men that are hasty, and praecipitate in concluding, and
resolving what to do; such as are they, that have both a great opinion
of their own understanding, and believe that things of this nature
require not time and study, but onely common experience, and a good
naturall wit; whereof no man thinks himselfe unprovided: whereas the
knowledge, of Right and Wrong, which is no lesse difficult, there is no
man will pretend to, without great and long study. And of those defects
in Reasoning, there is none that can Excuse (though some of them may
Extenuate) a Crime, in any man, that pretendeth to the administration of
his own private businesse; much lesse in them that undertake a publique
charge; because they pretend to the Reason, upon the want whereof they
would ground their Excuse.



By Their Passions;

Of the Passions that most frequently are the causes of Crime, one,
is Vain-glory, or a foolish over-rating of their own worth; as if
difference of worth, were an effect of their wit, or riches, or bloud,
or some other naturall quality, not depending on the Will of those that
have the Soveraign Authority. From whence proceedeth a Presumption that
the punishments ordained by the Lawes, and extended generally to all
Subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with the same rigour they
are inflicted on poore, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under the
name of the Vulgar.



Presumption Of Riches

Therefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value themselves by the
greatnesse of their wealth, adventure on Crimes, upon hope of escaping
punishment, by corrupting publique Justice, or obtaining Pardon by Mony,
or other rewards.



And Friends

And that such as have multitude of Potent Kindred; and popular men, that
have gained reputation amongst the Multitude, take courage to violate
the Lawes, from a hope of oppressing the Power, to whom it belongeth to
put them in execution.



Wisedome

And that such as have a great, and false opinion of their own Wisedome,
take upon them to reprehend the actions, and call in question the
Authority of them that govern, and so to unsettle the Lawes with their
publique discourse, as that nothing shall be a Crime, but what their own
designes require should be so. It happeneth also to the same men, to be
prone to all such Crimes, as consist in Craft, and in deceiving of their
Neighbours; because they think their designes are too subtile to be
perceived. These I say are effects of a false presumption of their own
Wisdome. For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of
Common-wealth, (which can never happen without a Civill Warre,) very few
are left alive long enough, to see their new Designes established: so
that the benefit of their Crimes, redoundeth to Posterity, and such as
would least have wished it: which argues they were not as wise, as
they thought they were. And those that deceive upon hope of not being
observed, do commonly deceive themselves, (the darknesse in which they
believe they lye hidden, being nothing else but their own blindnesse;)
and are no wiser than Children, that think all hid, by hiding their own
eyes.

And generally all vain-glorious men, (unlesse they be withall timorous,)
are subject to Anger; as being more prone than others to interpret for
contempt, the ordinary liberty of conversation: And there are few Crimes
that may not be produced by Anger.



Hatred, Lust, Ambition, Covetousnesse, Causes Of Crime

As for the Passions, of Hate, Lust, Ambition, and Covetousnesse, what
Crimes they are apt to produce, is so obvious to every mans experience
and understanding, as there needeth nothing to be said of them, saving
that they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man, and
all other living creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindred,
but by extraordinary use of Reason, or a constant severity in punishing
them. For in those things men hate, they find a continuall, and
unavoydable molestation; whereby either a mans patience must be
everlasting, or he must be eased by removing the power of that which
molesteth him; The former is difficult; the later is many times
impossible, without some violation of the Law. Ambition, and
Covetousnesse are Passions also that are perpetually incumbent, and
pressing; whereas Reason is not perpetually present, to resist them:
and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects
proceed. And for Lust, what it wants in the lasting, it hath in the
vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easie,
or uncertain punishments.



Fear Sometimes Cause Of Crime, As When The Danger Is Neither Present,

Nor Corporeall

Of all Passions, that which enclineth men least to break the Lawes, is
Fear. Nay, (excepting some generous natures,) it is the onely thing,
(when there is apparence of profit, or pleasure by breaking the Lawes,)
that makes men keep them. And yet in many cases a Crime may be committed
through Feare.

For not every Fear justifies the Action it produceth, but the fear onely
of corporeall hurt, which we call Bodily Fear, and from which a man
cannot see how to be delivered, but by the action. A man is assaulted,
fears present death, from which he sees not how to escape, but by
wounding him that assaulteth him; If he wound him to death, this is no
Crime; because no man is supposed at the making of a Common-wealth, to
have abandoned the defence of his life, or limbes, where the Law cannot
arrive time enough to his assistance. But to kill a man, because from
his actions, or his threatnings, I may argue he will kill me when he
can, (seeing I have time, and means to demand protection, from the
Soveraign Power,) is a Crime. Again, a man receives words of disgrace,
or some little injuries (for which they that made the Lawes, had
assigned no punishment, nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use
of Reason, to take notice of,) and is afraid, unlesse he revenge it,
he shall fall into contempt, and consequently be obnoxious to the like
injuries from others; and to avoyd this, breaks the Law, and protects
himselfe for the future, by the terrour of his private revenge. This is
a Crime; For the hurt is not Corporeall, but Phantasticall, and (though
in this corner of the world, made sensible by a custome not many years
since begun, amongst young and vain men,) so light, as a gallant man,
and one that is assured of his own courage, cannot take notice of. Also
a man may stand in fear of Spirits, either through his own superstition,
or through too much credit given to other men, that tell him of strange
Dreams and visions; and thereby be made believe they will hurt him, for
doing, or omitting divers things, which neverthelesse, to do, or omit,
is contrary to the Lawes; And that which is so done, or omitted, is not
to be Excused by this fear; but is a Crime. For (as I have shewn before
in the second Chapter) Dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in
sleep, after the impressions our Senses had formerly received waking;
and when men are by any accident unassured they have slept, seem to be
reall Visions; and therefore he that presumes to break the Law upon his
own, or anothers Dream, or pretended Vision, or upon other Fancy of
the power of Invisible Spirits, than is permitted by the Common-wealth,
leaveth the Law of Nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the
imagery of his own, or another private mans brain, which he can never
know whether it signifieth any thing, or nothing, nor whether he that
tells his Dream, say true, or lye; which if every private man should
have leave to do, (as they must by the Law of Nature, if any one have
it) there could no Law be made to hold, and so all Common-wealth would
be dissolved.



Crimes Not Equall

From these different sources of Crimes, it appeares already, that all
Crimes are not (as the Stoicks of old time maintained) of the same
allay. There is place, not only for EXCUSE, by which that which seemed
a Crime, is proved to be none at all; but also for EXTENUATION, by which
the Crime, that seemed great, is made lesse. For though all Crimes doe
equally deserve the name of Injustice, as all deviation from a strait
line is equally crookednesse, which the Stoicks rightly observed; yet
it does not follow that all Crimes are equally unjust, no more than that
all crooked lines are equally crooked; which the Stoicks not observing,
held it as great a Crime, to kill a Hen, against the Law, as to kill
ones Father.



Totall Excuses

That which totally Excuseth a Fact, and takes away from it the nature of
a Crime, can be none but that, which at the same time, taketh away the
obligation of the Law. For the fact committed once against the Law,
if he that committed it be obliged to the Law, can be no other than a
Crime.

The want of means to know the Law, totally Excuseth: For the Law whereof
a man has no means to enforme himself, is not obligatory. But the want
of diligence to enquire, shall not be considered as a want of means; Nor
shall any man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the Government of
his own affairs, be supposed to want means to know the Lawes of Nature;
because they are known by the reason he pretends to: only Children, and
Madmen are Excused from offences against the Law Naturall.

Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy, (and he is then in
the power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is
so,) if it be without his own fault, the Obligation of the Law ceaseth;
because he must obey the enemy, or dye; and consequently such obedience
is no Crime: for no man is obliged (when the protection of the Law
faileth,) not to protect himself, by the best means he can.

If a man by the terrour of present death, be compelled to doe a fact
against the Law, he is totally Excused; because no Law can oblige a
man to abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a Law were
obligatory; yet a man would reason thus, "If I doe it not, I die
presently; if I doe it, I die afterwards; therefore by doing it, there
is time of life gained;" Nature therefore compells him to the fact.

When a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life,
and cannot preserve himselfe any other way, but by some fact against
the Law; as if in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth,
which he cannot obtaine for mony nor charity; or in defence of his life,
snatch away another mans Sword, he is totally Excused, for the reason
next before alledged.



Excuses Against The Author

Again, Facts done against the Law, by the authority of another, are
by that authority Excused against the Author; because no man ought to
accuse his own fact in another, that is but his instrument: but it
is not Excused against a third person thereby injured; because in the
violation of the law, bothe the Author, and Actor are Criminalls.
From hence it followeth that when that Man, or Assembly, that hath the
Soveraign Power, commandeth a man to do that which is contrary to a
former Law, the doing of it is totally Excused: For he ought not to
condemn it himselfe, because he is the Author; and what cannot justly
be condemned by the Soveraign, cannot justly be punished by any other.
Besides, when the Soveraign commandeth any thing to be done against
his own former Law, the Command, as to that particular fact, is an
abrogation of the Law.

If that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, disclaime
any Right essentiall to the Soveraignty, whereby there accrueth to the
Subject, any liberty inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, that is to
say, with the very being of a Common-wealth, if the Subject shall refuse
to obey the Command in any thing, contrary to the liberty granted, this
is neverthelesse a Sinne, and contrary to the duty of the Subject: for
he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with the Soveraignty,
because it was erected by his own consent, and for his own defence;
and that such liberty as is inconsistent with it, was granted through
ignorance of the evill consequence thereof. But if he not onely disobey,
but also resist a publique Minister in the execution of it, then it is
a Crime; because he might have been righted, (without any breach of the
Peace,) upon complaint.

The Degrees of Crime are taken on divers Scales, and measured, First, by
the malignity of the Source, or Cause: Secondly, by the contagion of the
Example: Thirdly, by the mischiefe of the Effect; and Fourthly, by the
concurrence of Times, Places, and Persons.



Presumption Of Power, Aggravateth

The same Fact done against the Law, if it proceed from Presumption of
strength, riches, or friends to resist those that are to execute the
Law, is a greater Crime, than if it proceed from hope of not being
discovered, or of escape by flight: For Presumption of impunity by
force, is a Root, from whence springeth, at all times, and upon all
temptations, a contempt of all Lawes; whereas in the later case, the
apprehension of danger, that makes a man fly, renders him more obedient
for the future. A Crime which we know to be so, is greater than the same
Crime proceeding from a false perswasion that it is lawfull: For he that
committeth it against his own conscience, presumeth on his force, or
other power, which encourages him to commit the same again: but he that
doth it by errour, after the errour shewn him, is conformable to the
Law.



Evill Teachers, Extenuate

Hee, whose errour proceeds from the authority of a Teacher, or an
Interpreter of the Law publiquely authorised, is not so faulty, as he
whose errour proceedeth from a peremptory pursute of his own principles,
and reasoning: For what is taught by one that teacheth by publique
Authority, the Common-wealth teacheth, and hath a resemblance of Law,
till the same Authority controuleth it; and in all Crimes that contain
not in them a denyall of the Soveraign Power, nor are against an evident
Law, Excuseth totally: whereas he that groundeth his actions, on his
private Judgement, ought according to the rectitude, or errour thereof,
to stand, or fall.



Examples Of Impunity, Extenuate

The same Fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, as
a greater Crime, than if there have been may precedent Examples of
impunity. For those Examples, are so many hopes of Impunity given by
the Soveraign himselfe: And because he which furnishes a man with such
a hope, and presumption of mercy, as encourageth him to offend, hath his
part in the offence; he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the
whole.



Praemeditation, Aggravateth

A Crime arising from a sudden Passion, is not so great, as when the same
ariseth from long meditation: For in the former case there is a place
for Extenuation, in the common infirmity of humane nature: but he that
doth it with praemeditation, has used circumspection, and cast his eye,
on the Law, on the punishment, and on the consequence thereof to humane
society; all which in committing the Crime, hee hath contemned, and
postposed to his own appetite. But there is no suddennesse of Passion
sufficient for a totall Excuse: For all the time between the first
knowing of the Law, and the Commission of the Fact, shall be taken for
a time of deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the Law, to
rectifie the irregularity of his Passions.

Where the Law is publiquely, and with assiduity, before all the people
read, and interpreted; a fact done against it, is a greater Crime,
than where men are left without such instruction, to enquire of it with
difficulty, uncertainty, and interruption of their Callings, and
be informed by private men: for in this case, part of the fault is
discharged upon common infirmity; but in the former there is apparent
negligence, which is not without some contempt of the Soveraign Power.



Tacite Approbation Of The Soveraign, Extenuates

Those facts which the Law expresly condemneth, but the Law-maker by
other manifest signes of his will tacitly approveth, are lesse Crimes,
than the same facts, condemned both by the Law, and Lawmaker. For
seeing the will of the Law-maker is a Law, there appear in this case two
contradictory Lawes; which would totally Excuse, if men were bound to
take notice of the Soveraigns approbation, by other arguments, than are
expressed by his command. But because there are punishments consequent,
not onely to the transgression of his Law, but also to the observing
of it, he is in part a cause of the transgression, and therefore cannot
reasonably impute the whole Crime to the Delinquent. For example, the
Law condemneth Duells; the punishment is made capitall: On the contrary
part, he that refuseth Duell, is subject to contempt and scorne, without
remedy; and sometimes by the Soveraign himselfe thought unworthy to
have any charge, or preferment in Warre: If thereupon he accept Duell,
considering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion
of them that have the Soveraign Power, he ought not in reason to be
rigorously punished; seeing part of the fault may be discharged on the
punisher; which I say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges,
or any other kind of disobedience; but a care in Governours, not
to countenance any thing obliquely, which directly they forbid. The
examples of Princes, to those that see them, are, and ever have been,
more potent to govern their actions, than the Lawes themselves. And
though it be our duty to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet
will that duty never be performed, till it please God to give men an
extraordinary, and supernaturall grace to follow that Precept.



Comparison Of Crimes From Their Effects

Again, if we compare Crimes by the mischiefe of their Effects, First,
the same fact, when it redounds to the dammage of many, is greater, than
when it redounds to the hurt of few. And therefore, when a fact hurteth,
not onely in the present, but also, (by example) in the future, it is a
greater Crime, than if it hurt onely in the present: for the former,
is a fertile Crime, and multiplyes to the hurt of many; the later is
barren. To maintain doctrines contrary to the Religion established in
the Common-wealth, is a greater fault, in an authorised Preacher, than
in a private person: So also is it, to live prophanely, incontinently,
or do any irreligious act whatsoever. Likewise in a Professor of the
Law, to maintain any point, on do any act, that tendeth to the weakning
of the Soveraign Power, as a greater Crime, than in another man: Also in
a man that hath such reputation for wisedome, as that his counsells are
followed, or his actions imitated by many, his fact against the Law, is
a greater Crime, than the same fact in another: For such men not onely
commit Crime, but teach it for Law to all other men. And generally all
Crimes are the greater, by the scandall they give; that is to say, by
becoming stumbling-blocks to the weak, that look not so much upon the
way they go in, as upon the light that other men carry before them.



Laesae Majestas

Also Facts of Hostility against the present state of the Common-wealth,
are greater Crimes, than the same acts done to private men; For
the dammage extends it selfe to all: Such are the betraying of the
strengths, or revealing of the secrets of the Common-wealth to an Enemy;
also all attempts upon the Representative of the Common-wealth, be it a
monarch, or an Assembly; and all endeavours by word, or deed to diminish
the Authority of the same, either in the present time, or in succession:
which Crimes the Latines understand by Crimina Laesae Majestatis, and
consist in designe, or act, contrary to a Fundamentall Law.



Bribery And False Testimony

Likewise those Crimes, which render Judgements of no effect, are greater
Crimes, than Injuries done to one, or a few persons; as to receive
mony to give False judgement, or testimony, is a greater Crime, than
otherwise to deceive a man of the like, or a greater summe; because not
onely he has wrong, that falls by such judgements; but all Judgements
are rendered uselesse, and occasion ministred to force, and private
revenges.



Depeculation

Also Robbery, and Depeculation of the Publique treasure, or Revenues,
is a greater Crime, than the robbing, or defrauding of a Private man;
because to robbe the publique, is to robbe many at once.



Counterfeiting Authority

Also the Counterfeit usurpation of publique Ministery, the
Counterfeiting of publique Seales, or publique Coine, than
counterfeiting of a private mans person, or his seale; because the fraud
thereof, extendeth to the dammage of many.



Crimes Against Private Men Compared

Of facts against the Law, done to private men, the greater Crime, is
that, where the dammage in the common opinion of men, is most sensible.
And therefore

To kill against the Law, is a greater Crime, that any other injury, life
preserved.

And to kill with Torment, greater, than simply to kill.

And Mutilation of a limbe, greater, than the spoyling a man of his
goods.

And the spoyling a man of his goods, by Terrour of death, or wounds,
than by clandestine surreption.

And by clandestine Surreption, than by consent fraudulently obtained.

And the violation of chastity by Force, greater, than by flattery.

And of a woman Married, than of a woman not married.

For all these things are commonly so valued; though some men are more,
and some lesse sensible of the same offence. But the Law regardeth not
the particular, but the generall inclination of mankind.

And therefore the offence men take, from contumely, in words, or
gesture, when they produce no other harme, than the present griefe of
him that is reproached, hath been neglected in the Lawes of the Greeks,
Romans, and other both antient, and moderne Common-wealths; supposing
the true cause of such griefe to consist, not in the contumely, (which
takes no hold upon men conscious of their own Vertue,) but in the
Pusillanimity of him that is offended by it.

Also a Crime against a private man, is much aggravated by the person,
time, and place. For to kill ones Parent, is a greater Crime, than to
kill another: for the Parent ought to have the honour of a Soveraign,
(though he have surrendred his Power to the Civill Law,) because he had
it originally by Nature. And to Robbe a poore man, is a greater Crime,
than to robbe a rich man; because 'tis to the poore a more sensible
dammage.

And a Crime committed in the Time, or Place appointed for Devotion, is
greater, than if committed at another time or place: for it proceeds
from a greater contempt of the Law.

Many other cases of Aggravation, and Extenuation might be added: but by
these I have set down, it is obvious to every man, to take the altitude
of any other Crime proposed.



Publique Crimes What

Lastly, because in almost all Crimes there is an Injury done, not onely
to some Private man, but also to the Common-wealth; the same Crime, when
the accusation is in the name of the Common-wealth, is called Publique
Crime; and when in the name of a Private man, a Private Crime; And the
Pleas according thereunto called Publique, Judicia Publica, Pleas of the
Crown; or Private Pleas. As in an Accusation of Murder, if the accuser
be a Private man, the plea is a Private plea; if the accuser be the
Soveraign, the plea is a Publique plea.


CHAPTER XXVIII. OF PUNISHMENTS, AND REWARDS



The Definition Of Punishment

"A PUNISHMENT, is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that
hath done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be
a Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of men may thereby
the better be disposed to obedience."



Right To Punish Whence Derived

Before I inferre any thing from this definition, there is a question to
be answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the Right, or
Authority of Punishing in any case, came in. For by that which has
been said before, no man is supposed bound by Covenant, not to resist
violence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right
to another to lay violent hands upon his person. In the making of a
Common-wealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another; but
not of defending himselfe. Also he obligeth himselfe, to assist him that
hath the Soveraignty, in the Punishing of another; but of himselfe
not. But to covenant to assist the Soveraign, in doing hurt to another,
unlesse he that so covenanteth have a right to doe it himselfe, is not
to give him a Right to Punish. It is manifest therefore that the Right
which the Common-wealth (that is, he, or they that represent it) hath to
Punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the Subjects.
But I have also shewed formerly, that before the Institution of
Common-wealth, every man had a right to every thing, and to do
whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing,
hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the
foundation of that right of Punishing, which is exercised in every
Common-wealth. For the Subjects did not give the Soveraign that right;
but onely in laying down theirs, strengthned him to use his own, as he
should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not
given, but left to him, and to him onely; and (excepting the limits set
him by naturall Law) as entire, as in the condition of meer Nature, and
of warre of every one against his neighbour.



Private Injuries, And Revenges No Punishments

From the definition of Punishment, I inferre, First, that neither
private revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be stiled
Punishment; because they proceed not from publique Authority.



Nor Denyall Of Preferment

Secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the publique
favour, is not a Punishment; because no new evill is thereby on any man
Inflicted; he is onely left in the estate he was in before.



Nor Pain Inflicted Without Publique Hearing

Thirdly, that the evill inflicted by publique Authority, without
precedent publique condemnation, is not to be stiled by the name of
Punishment; but of an hostile act; because the fact for which a man
is Punished, ought first to be Judged by publique Authority, to be a
transgression of the Law.



Nor Pain Inflicted By Usurped Power

Fourthly, that the evill inflicted by usurped power, and Judges
without Authority from the Soveraign, is not Punishment; but an act of
hostility; because the acts of power usurped, have not for Author, the
person condemned; and therefore are not acts of publique Authority.



Nor Pain Inflicted Without Respect To The Future Good

Fifthly, that all evill which is inflicted without intention, or
possibility of disposing the Delinquent, or (by his example) other men,
to obey the Lawes, is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; because
without such an end, no hurt done is contained under that name.



Naturall Evill Consequences, No Punishments

Sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by Nature, divers
hurtfull consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himselfe
slain, or wounded; or when he falleth into sicknesse by the doing of
some unlawfull act; such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the
author of Nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and therefore a
Punishment divine; yet it is not contaned in the name of Punishment in
respect of men, because it is not inflicted by the Authority of man.



Hurt Inflicted, If Lesse Than The Benefit Of Transgressing,

Is Not Punishment

Seventhly, If the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit, or
contentment that naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is
not within the definition; and is rather the Price, or Redemption, than
the Punishment of a Crime: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to
have for end, the disposing of men to obey the Law; which end (if it
be lesse that the benefit of the transgression) it attaineth not, but
worketh a contrary effect.



Where The Punishment Is Annexed To The Law, A Greater Hurt Is Not

Punishment, But Hostility

Eighthly, If a Punishment be determined and prescribed in the Law it
selfe, and after the crime committed, there be a greater Punishment
inflicted, the excesse is not Punishment, but an act of hostility. For
seeing the aym of Punishment is not a revenge, but terrour; and the
terrour of a great Punishment unknown, is taken away by the declaration
of a lesse, the unexpected addition is no part of the Punishment.
But where there is no Punishment at all determined by the Law, there
whatsoever is inflicted, hath the nature of Punishment. For he that
goes about the violation of a Law, wherein no penalty is determined,
expecteth an indeterminate, that is to say, an arbitrary Punishment.



Hurt Inflicted For A Fact Done Before The Law, No Punishment

Ninthly, Harme inflicted for a Fact done before there was a Law that
forbad it, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: For before the
Law, there is no transgression of the Law: But Punishment supposeth a
fact judged, to have been a transgression of the Law; Therefore
Harme inflicted before the Law made, is not Punishment, but an act of
Hostility.



The Representative Of The Common-wealth Unpunishable

Tenthly, Hurt inflicted on the Representative of the Common-wealth, is
not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: Because it is of the nature
of Punishment, to be inflicted by publique Authority, which is the
Authority only of the Representative it self.



Hurt To Revolted Subjects Is Done By Right Of War, Not

By Way Of Punishment

Lastly, Harme inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, fals not
under the name of Punishment: Because seeing they were either never
subject to the Law, and therefore cannot transgresse it; or having been
subject to it, and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny
they can transgresse it, all the Harmes that can be done them, must be
taken as acts of Hostility. But in declared Hostility, all infliction of
evill is lawfull. From whence it followeth, that if a subject shall
by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberatly deny the authority of
the Representative of the Common-wealth, (whatsoever penalty hath
been formerly ordained for Treason,) he may lawfully be made to suffer
whatsoever the Representative will: For in denying subjection, he denyes
such Punishment as by the Law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers
as an enemy of the Common-wealth; that is, according to the will of
the Representative. For the Punishments set down in the Law, are to
Subjects, not to Enemies; such as are they, that having been by their
own act Subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the Soveraign Power.

The first, and most generall distribution of Punishments, is into
Divine, and Humane. Of the former I shall have occasion, to speak, in a
more convenient place hereafter.

Humane, are those Punishments that be inflicted by the Commandement
of Man; and are either Corporall, or Pecuniary, or Ignominy, or
Imprisonment, or Exile, or mixt of these.



Punishments Corporall

Corporall Punishment is that, which is inflicted on the body directly,
and according to the intention of him that inflicteth it: such as are
stripes, or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body, as
were before lawfully enjoyed.



Capitall

And of these, some be Capitall, some Lesse than Capitall. Capitall, is
the Infliction of Death; and that either simply, or with torment. Lesse
than Capitall, are Stripes, Wounds, Chains, and any other corporall
Paine, not in its own nature mortall. For if upon the Infliction of
a Punishment death follow not in the Intention of the Inflicter, the
Punishment is not be bee esteemed Capitall, though the harme prove
mortall by an accident not to be foreseen; in which case death is not
inflicted, but hastened.

Pecuniary Punishment, is that which consisteth not only in the
deprivation of a Summe of Mony, but also of Lands, or any other goods
which are usually bought and sold for mony. And in case the Law, that
ordaineth such a punishment, be made with design to gather mony, from
such as shall transgresse the same, it is not properly a Punishment,
but the Price of priviledge, and exemption from the Law, which doth not
absolutely forbid the fact, but only to those that are not able to pay
the mony: except where the Law is Naturall, or part of Religion; for in
that case it is not an exemption from the Law, but a transgression of
it. As where a Law exacteth a Pecuniary mulct, of them that take the
name of God in vaine, the payment of the mulct, is not the price of a
dispensation to sweare, but the Punishment of the transgression of a Law
undispensable. In like manner if the Law impose a Summe of Mony to be
payd, to him that has been Injured; this is but a satisfaction for the
hurt done him; and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured,
not the crime of the offender.



Ignominy

Ignominy, is the infliction of such Evill, as is made Dishonorable;
or the deprivation of such Good, as is made Honourable by the
Common-wealth. For there be some things Honorable by Nature; as the
effects of Courage, Magnanimity, Strength, Wisdome, and other abilities
of body and mind: Others made Honorable by the Common-wealth; as Badges,
Titles, Offices, or any other singular marke of the Soveraigns favour.
The former, (though they may faile by nature, or accident,) cannot be
taken away by a Law; and therefore the losse of them is not Punishment.
But the later, may be taken away by the publique authority that made
them Honorable, and are properly Punishments: Such are degrading men
condemned, of their Badges, Titles, and Offices; or declaring them
uncapable of the like in time to come.



Imprisonment

Imprisonment, is when a man is by publique Authority deprived of
liberty; and may happen from two divers ends; whereof one is the safe
custody of a man accused; the other is the inflicting of paine on a man
condemned. The former is not Punishment; because no man is supposed
to be Punisht, before he be Judicially heard, and declared guilty.
And therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds, or
restraint, before his cause be heard, over and above that which is
necessary to assure his custody, is against the Law of Nature. But the
Later is Punishment, because Evill, and inflicted by publique Authority,
for somewhat that has by the same Authority been Judged a Transgression
of the Law. Under this word Imprisonment, I comprehend all restraint of
motion, caused by an externall obstacle, be it a House, which is called
by the generall name of a Prison; or an Iland, as when men are said to
be confined to it; or a place where men are set to worke, as in old time
men have been condemned to Quarries, and in these times to Gallies; or
be it a Chaine, or any other such impediment.



Exile

Exile, (Banishment) is when a man is for a crime, condemned to depart
out of the dominion of the Common-wealth, or out of a certaine part
thereof; and during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it:
and seemeth not in its own nature, without other circumstances, to be
a Punishment; but rather an escape, or a publique commandement to
avoid Punishment by flight. And Cicero sayes, there was never any such
Punishment ordained in the City of Rome; but cals it a refuge of men in
danger. For if a man banished, be neverthelesse permitted to enjoy
his Goods, and the Revenue of his Lands, the meer change of ayr is no
punishment; nor does it tend to that benefit of the Common-wealth, for
which all Punishments are ordained, (that is to say, to the forming of
mens wils to the observation of the Law;) but many times to the dammage
of the Common-wealth. For a Banished man, is a lawfull enemy of the
Common-wealth that banished him; as being no more a Member of the
same. But if he be withall deprived of his Lands, or Goods, then
the Punishment lyeth not in the Exile, but is to be reckoned amongst
Punishments Pecuniary.



The Punishment Of Innocent Subjects Is Contrary To The Law Of Nature

All Punishments of Innocent subjects, be they great or little, are
against the Law of Nature; For Punishment is only of Transgression of
the Law, and therefore there can be no Punishment of the Innocent. It
is therefore a violation, First, of that Law of Nature, which forbiddeth
all men, in their Revenges, to look at any thing but some future good:
For there can arrive no good to the Common-wealth, by Punishing the
Innocent. Secondly, of that, which forbiddeth Ingratitude: For seeing
all Soveraign Power, is originally given by the consent of every one of
the Subjects, to the end they should as long as they are obedient, be
protected thereby; the Punishment of the Innocent, is a rendring of
Evill for Good. And thirdly, of the Law that commandeth Equity; that
is to say, an equall distribution of Justice; which in Punishing the
Innocent is not observed.



But The Harme Done To Innocents In War, Not So

But the Infliction of what evill soever, on an Innocent man, that is not
a Subject, if it be for the benefit of the Common-wealth, and without
violation of any former Covenant, is no breach of the Law of Nature.
For all men that are not Subjects, are either Enemies, or else they have
ceased from being so, by some precedent covenants. But against Enemies,
whom the Common-wealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawfull by
the originall Right of Nature to make warre; wherein the Sword Judgeth
not, nor doth the Victor make distinction of Nocent and Innocent, as to
the time past; nor has other respect of mercy, than as it conduceth to
the good of his own People. And upon this ground it is, that also
in Subjects, who deliberatly deny the Authority of the Common-wealth
established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not onely to the
Fathers, but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being,
and consequently innocent of the fact, for which they are afflicted:
because the nature of this offence, consisteth in the renouncing of
subjection; which is a relapse into the condition of warre, commonly
called Rebellion; and they that so offend, suffer not as Subjects, but
as Enemies. For Rebellion, is but warre renewed.



Reward, Is Either Salary, Or Grace

REWARD, is either of Gift, or by Contract. When by Contract, it is
called Salary, and Wages; which is benefit due for service performed, or
promised. When of Gift, it is benefit proceeding from the Grace of them
that bestow it, to encourage, or enable men to do them service. And
therefore when the Soveraign of a Common-wealth appointeth a Salary
to any publique Office, he that receiveth it, is bound in Justice
to performe his office; otherwise, he is bound onely in honour, to
acknowledgement, and an endeavour of requitall. For though men have no
lawfull remedy, when they be commanded to quit their private businesse,
to serve the publique, without Reward, or Salary; yet they are not
bound thereto, by the Law of Nature, nor by the institution of the
Common-wealth, unlesse the service cannot otherwise be done; because it
is supposed the Soveraign may make use of all their means, insomuch as
the most common Souldier, may demand the wages of his warrefare, as a
debt.



Benefits Bestowed For Fear, Are Not Rewards

The benefits which a Soveraign bestoweth on a Subject, for fear of some
power, and ability he hath to do hurt to the Common-wealth, are not
properly Rewards; for they are not Salaryes; because there is in this
case no contract supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the
Common-wealth disservice: nor are they Graces; because they be extorted
by feare, which ought not to be incident to the Soveraign Power: but
are rather Sacrifices, which the Soveraign (considered in his naturall
person, and not in the person of the Common-wealth) makes, for the
appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himselfe; and
encourage not to obedience, but on the contrary, to the continuance, and
increasing of further extortion.



Salaries Certain And Casuall

And whereas some Salaries are certain, and proceed from the publique
Treasure; and others uncertain, and casuall, proceeding from the
execution of the Office for which the Salary is ordained; the later
is in some cases hurtfull to the Common-wealth; as in the case of
Judicature. For where the benefit of the Judges, and Ministers of a
Court of Justice, ariseth for the multitude of Causes that are brought
to their cognisance, there must needs follow two Inconveniences: One,
is the nourishing of sutes; for the more sutes, the greater benefit: and
another that depends on that, which is contention about Jurisdiction;
each Court drawing to it selfe, as many Causes as it can. But in
offices of Execution there are not those Inconveniences; because their
employment cannot be encreased by any endeavour of their own. And thus
much shall suffice for the nature of Punishment, and Reward; which are,
as it were, the Nerves and Tendons, that move the limbes and joynts of a
Common-wealth.

Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man, (whose Pride and other
Passions have compelled him to submit himselfe to Government;) together
with the great power of his Governour, whom I compared to Leviathan,
taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one and
fortieth of Job; where God having set forth the great power of
Leviathan, called him King of the Proud. "There is nothing," saith he,
"on earth, to be compared with him. He is made so as not be afraid. Hee
seeth every high thing below him; and is King of all the children of
pride." But because he is mortall, and subject to decay, as all other
Earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven, (though not
on earth) that he should stand in fear of, and whose Lawes he ought to
obey; I shall in the next following Chapters speak of his Diseases, and
the causes of his Mortality; and of what Lawes of Nature he is bound to
obey.


CHAPTER XXIX. OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN, OR TEND TO THE DISSOLUTION OF
A COMMON-WEALTH

Dissolution Of Common-wealths Proceedeth From Imperfect Institution

Though nothing can be immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had the
use of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured, at
least, from perishing by internall diseases. For by the nature of their
Institution, they are designed to live, as long as Man-kind, or as
the Lawes of Nature, or as Justice it selfe, which gives them life.
Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by externall violence, but
intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the Matter; but
as they are the Makers, and orderers of them. For men, as they become
at last weary of irregular justling, and hewing one another, and desire
with all their hearts, to conforme themselves into one firme and lasting
edifice; so for want, both of the art of making fit Laws, to square
their actions by, and also of humility, and patience, to suffer the rude
and combersome points of their present greatnesse to be taken off, they
cannot without the help of a very able Architect, be compiled, into any
other than a crasie building, such as hardly lasting out their own time,
must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity.

Amongst the Infirmities therefore of a Common-wealth, I will reckon in
the first place, those that arise from an Imperfect Institution,
and resemble the diseases of a naturall body, which proceed from a
Defectuous Procreation.



Want Of Absolute Power

Of which, this is one, "That a man to obtain a Kingdome, is sometimes
content with lesse Power, than to the Peace, and defence of the
Common-wealth is necessarily required." From whence it commeth to passe,
that when the exercise of the Power layd by, is for the publique safety
to be resumed, it hath the resemblance of as unjust act; which disposeth
great numbers of men (when occasion is presented) to rebell; In the
same manner as the bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents, are
subject either to untimely death, or to purge the ill quality, derived
from their vicious conception, by breaking out into biles and scabbs.
And when Kings deny themselves some such necessary Power, it is not
alwayes (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the
office they undertake; but many times out of a hope to recover the same
again at their pleasure: Wherein they reason not well; because such as
will hold them to their promises, shall be maintained against them by
forraign Common-wealths; who in order to the good of their own Subjects
let slip few occasions to Weaken the estate of their Neighbours. So was
Thomas Beckett Archbishop of Canterbury, supported against Henry
the Second, by the Pope; the subjection of Ecclesiastiques to the
Common-wealth, having been dispensed with by William the Conqueror at
his reception, when he took an Oath, not to infringe the liberty of the
Church. And so were the Barons, whose power was by William Rufus (to
have their help in transferring the Succession from his Elder brother,
to himselfe,) encreased to a degree, inconsistent with the Soveraign
Power, maintained in their Rebellion against King John, by the French.
Nor does this happen in Monarchy onely. For whereas the stile of the
antient Roman Common-wealth, was, The Senate, and People of Rome;
neither Senate, nor People pretended to the whole Power; which first
caused the seditions, of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius
Saturnius, and others; and afterwards the warres between the Senate and
the People, under Marius and Sylla; and again under Pompey and Caesar,
to the Extinction of their Democraty, and the setting up of Monarchy.

The people of Athens bound themselves but from one onely Action; which
was, that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the
warre for the Island of Salamis; And yet thereby, if Solon had not
caused to be given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit
of a mad-man, and in verse, propounded it to the People that flocked
about him, they had had an enemy perpetually in readinesse, even at the
gates of their Citie; such dammage, or shifts, are all Common-wealths
forced to, that have their Power never so little limited.



Private Judgement Of Good and Evill

In the second place, I observe the Diseases of a Common-wealth, that
proceed from the poyson of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, "That
every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions." This is true in
the condition of meer Nature, where there are no Civill Lawes; and also
under Civill Government, in such cases as are not determined by the
Law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of Good and Evill
actions, is the Civill Law; and the Judge the Legislator, who is alwayes
Representative of the Common-wealth. From this false doctrine, men are
disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the
Common-wealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their
private judgements they shall think fit. Whereby the Common-wealth is
distracted and Weakened.



Erroneous Conscience

Another doctrine repugnant to Civill Society, is, that "Whatsoever a
man does against his Conscience, is Sinne;" and it dependeth on the
presumption of making himself judge of Good and Evill. For a mans
Conscience, and his Judgement is the same thing; and as the Judgement,
so also the Conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is
subject to no Civill Law, sinneth in all he does against his Conscience,
because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is
not so with him that lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the
publique Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided.
Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which
are but private opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted,
and no man dare to obey the Soveraign Power, farther than it shall seem
good in his own eyes.



Pretence Of Inspiration

It hath been also commonly taught, "That Faith and Sanctity, are not to
be attained by Study and Reason, but by supernaturall Inspiration, or
Infusion," which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason
of his Faith; or why every Christian should not be also a Prophet; or
why any man should take the Law of his Country, rather than his own
Inspiration, for the rule of his action. And thus wee fall again into
the fault of taking upon us to Judge of Good and Evill; or to make
Judges of it, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally Inspired,
to the Dissolution of all Civill Government. Faith comes by hearing,
and hearing by those accidents, which guide us into the presence of them
that speak to us; which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty; and
yet are not supernaturall, but onely, for the great number of them that
concurre to every effect, unobservable. Faith, and Sanctity, are indeed
not very frequent; but yet they are not Miracles, but brought to passe
by education, discipline, correction, and other naturall wayes, by which
God worketh them in his elect, as such time as he thinketh fit. And
these three opinions, pernicious to Peace and Government, have in this
part of the world, proceeded chiefly from the tongues, and pens of
unlearned Divines; who joyning the words of Holy Scripture together,
otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men
think, that Sanctity and Naturall Reason, cannot stand together.



Subjecting The Soveraign Power To Civill Lawes

A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a Common-wealth, is this,
"That he that hath the Soveraign Power, is subject to the Civill Lawes."
It is true, that Soveraigns are all subjects to the Lawes of Nature;
because such lawes be Divine, and cannot by any man, or Common-wealth
be abrogated. But to those Lawes which the Soveraign himselfe, that is,
which the Common-wealth maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to
Lawes, is to be subject to the Common-wealth, that is to the Soveraign
Representative, that is to himselfe; which is not subjection, but
freedome from the Lawes. Which errour, because it setteth the Lawes
above the Soveraign, setteth also a Judge above him, and a Power to
punish him; which is to make a new Soveraign; and again for the same
reason a third, to punish the second; and so continually without end, to
the Confusion, and Dissolution of the Common-wealth.



Attributing Of Absolute Propriety To The Subjects

A Fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the Dissolution of a Common-wealth,
is, "That every private man has an absolute Propriety in his Goods;
such, as excludeth the Right of the Soveraign." Every man has indeed a
Propriety that excludes the Right of every other Subject: And he has it
onely from the Soveraign Power; without the protection whereof, every
other man should have equall Right to the same. But if the Right of the
Soveraign also be excluded, he cannot performe the office they have put
him into; which is, to defend them both from forraign enemies, and
from the injuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a
Common-wealth.

And if the Propriety of Subjects, exclude not the Right of the
Soveraign Representative to their Goods; much lesse to their offices
of Judicature, or Execution, in which they Represent the Soveraign
himselfe.



Dividing Of The Soveraign Power

There is a Sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence
of a Common-wealth; and 'tis this, "That the Soveraign Power may be
divided." For what is it to divide the Power of a Common-wealth, but
to Dissolve it; for Powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for
these doctrines, men are chiefly beholding to some of those, that making
profession of the Lawes, endeavour to make them depend upon their own
learning, and not upon the Legislative Power.



Imitation Of Neighbour Nations

And as False Doctrine, so also often-times the Example of different
Government in a neighbouring Nation, disposeth men to alteration of
the forme already setled. So the people of the Jewes were stirred up to
reject God, and to call upon the Prophet Samuel, for a King after
the manner of the Nations; So also the lesser Cities of Greece, were
continually disturbed, with seditions of the Aristocraticall, and
Democraticall factions; one part of almost every Common-wealth, desiring
to imitate the Lacedaemonians; the other, the Athenians. And I doubt
not, but many men, have been contented to see the late troubles in
England, out of an imitation of the Low Countries; supposing there
needed no more to grow rich, than to change, as they had done, the forme
of their Government. For the constitution of mans nature, is of it selfe
subject to desire novelty: When therefore they are provoked to the same,
by the neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is
almost impossible for them, not to be content with those that solicite
them to change; and love the first beginnings, though they be grieved
with the continuance of disorder; like hot blouds, that having gotten
the itch, tear themselves with their own nayles, till they can endure
the smart no longer.



Imitation Of The Greeks, And Romans

And as to Rebellion in particular against Monarchy; one of the most
frequent causes of it, is the Reading of the books of Policy, and
Histories of the antient Greeks, and Romans; from which, young men,
and all others that are unprovided of the Antidote of solid Reason,
receiving a strong, and delightfull impression, of the great exploits
of warre, atchieved by the Conductors of their Armies, receive withall
a pleasing Idea, of all they have done besides; and imagine their great
prosperity, not to have proceeded from the aemulation of particular men,
but from the vertue of their popular form of government: Not considering
the frequent Seditions, and Civill Warres, produced by the imperfection
of their Policy. From the reading, I say, of such books, men have
undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and Latine writers,
in their books, and discourses of Policy, make it lawfull, and laudable,
for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant. For
they say not Regicide, that is, killing of a King, but Tyrannicide, that
is, killing of a Tyrant is lawfull. From the same books, they that live
under a Monarch conceive an opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular
Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves.
I say, they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not
they that live under a Popular Government; for they find no such matter.
In summe, I cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudiciall to a
Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publikely read, without
present applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to
take away their Venime; Which Venime I will not doubt to compare to
the biting of a mad Dogge, which is a disease the Physicians call
Hydrophobia, or Fear Of Water. For as he that is so bitten, has a
continuall torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such
an estate, as if the poyson endeavoured to convert him into a Dogge:
So when a Monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those Democraticall
writers, that continually snarle at that estate; it wanteth nothing
more than a strong Monarch, which neverthelesse out of a certain
Tyrannophobia, or feare of being strongly governed, when they have him,
they abhorre.

As here have been Doctors, that hold there be three Soules in a man;
so there be also that think there may be more Soules, (that is, more
Soveraigns,) than one, in a Common-wealth; and set up a Supremacy
against the Soveraignty; Canons against Lawes; and a Ghostly Authority
against the Civill; working on mens minds, with words and distinctions,
that of themselves signifie nothing, but bewray (by their obscurity)
that there walketh (as some think invisibly) another Kingdome, as it
were a Kingdome of Fayries, in the dark. Now seeing it is manifest, that
the Civill Power, and the Power of the Common-wealth is the same
thing; and that Supremacy, and the Power of making Canons, and granting
Faculties, implyeth a Common-wealth; it followeth, that where one is
Soveraign, another Supreme; where one can make Lawes, and another
make Canons; there must needs be two Common-wealths, of one & the same
Subjects; which is a Kingdome divided in it selfe, and cannot stand. For
notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of Temporall, and Ghostly,
they are still two Kingdomes, and every Subject is subject to two
Masters. For seeing the Ghostly Power challengeth the Right to declare
what is Sinne it challengeth by consequence to declare what is Law,
(Sinne being nothing but the transgression of the Law;) and again, the
Civill Power challenging to declare what is Law, every Subject must
obey two Masters, who bothe will have their Commands be observed as Law;
which is impossible. Or, if it be but one Kingdome, either the Civill,
which is the Power of the Common-wealth, must be subordinate to the
Ghostly; or the Ghostly must be subordinate to the Temporall and then
there is no Supremacy but the Temporall. When therefore these two Powers
oppose one another, the Common-wealth cannot but be in great danger
of Civill warre, and Dissolution. For the Civill Authority being more
visible, and standing in the cleerer light of naturall reason cannot
choose but draw to it in all times a very considerable part of the
people: And the Spirituall, though it stand in the darknesse of Schoole
distinctions, and hard words; yet because the fear of Darknesse, and
Ghosts, is greater than other fears, cannot want a party sufficient to
Trouble, and sometimes to Destroy a Common-wealth. And this is a Disease
which not unfitly may be compared to the Epilepsie, or Falling-sicknesse
(which the Jewes took to be one kind of possession by Spirits) in the
Body Naturall. For as in this Disease, there is an unnaturall spirit,
or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots of the Nerves, and moving
them violently, taketh away the motion which naturally they should have
from the power of the Soule in the Brain, and thereby causeth violent,
and irregular motions (which men call Convulsions) in the parts;
insomuch as he that is seized therewith, falleth down sometimes into the
water, and sometimes into the fire, as a man deprived of his senses;
so also in the Body Politique, when the Spirituall power, moveth the
Members of a Common-wealth, by the terrour of punishments, and hope of
rewards (which are the Nerves of it,) otherwise than by the Civill Power
(which is the Soule of the Common-wealth) they ought to be moved; and by
strange, and hard words suffocates the people, and either Overwhelm
the Common-wealth with Oppression, or cast it into the Fire of a Civill
warre.



Mixt Government

Sometimes also in the meerly Civill government, there be more than
one Soule: As when the Power of levying mony, (which is the Nutritive
faculty,) has depended on a generall Assembly; the Power of conduct and
command, (which is the Motive Faculty,) on one man; and the Power of
making Lawes, (which is the Rationall faculty,) on the accidentall
consent, not onely of those two, but also of a third; This endangereth
the Common-wealth, somtimes for want of consent to good Lawes; but most
often for want of such Nourishment, as is necessary to Life, and Motion.
For although few perceive, that such government, is not government,
but division of the Common-wealth into three Factions, and call it
mixt Monarchy; yet the truth is, that it is not one independent
Common-wealth, but three independent Factions; nor one Representative
Person, but three. In the Kingdome of God, there may be three Persons
independent, without breach of unity in God that Reigneth; but where men
Reigne, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so. And
therefore if the King bear the person of the People, and the generall
Assembly bear also the person of the People, and another assembly bear
the person of a Part of the people, they are not one Person, nor one
Soveraign, but three Persons, and three Soveraigns.

To what Disease in the Naturall Body of man, I may exactly compare this
irregularity of a Common-wealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that
had another man growing out of his side, with an head, armes, breast,
and stomach, of his own: If he had had another man growing out of his
other side, the comparison might then have been exact.



Want Of Mony

Hitherto I have named such Diseases of a Common-wealth, as are of the
greatest, and most present danger. There be other, not so great; which
neverthelesse are not unfit to be observed. As first, the difficulty of
raising Mony, for the necessary uses of the Common-wealth; especially
in the approach of warre. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion, that
every Subject hath of a Propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of
the Soveraigns Right to the use of the same. From whence it commeth to
passe, that the Soveraign Power, which foreseeth the necessities and
dangers of the Common-wealth, (finding the passage of mony to the
publique Treasure obstructed, by the tenacity of the people,) whereas
it ought to extend it selfe, to encounter, and prevent such dangers in
their beginnings, contracteth it selfe as long as it can, and when it
cannot longer, struggles with the people by strategems of Law, to obtain
little summes, which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to
open the way for present supply, or Perish; and being put often to these
extremities, at last reduceth the people to their due temper; or else
the Common-wealth must perish. Insomuch as we may compare this Distemper
very aptly to an Ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or
by venomous matter obstructed; the Veins which by their naturall course
empty themselves into the Heart, are not (as they ought to be) supplyed
from the Arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction,
and trembling of the limbes; and afterwards a hot, and strong endeavour
of the Heart, to force a passage for the Bloud; and before it can do
that, contenteth it selfe with the small refreshments of such things as
coole of a time, till (if Nature be strong enough) it break at last
the contumacy of the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venome into
sweat; or (if Nature be too weak) the Patient dyeth.



Monopolies And Abuses Of Publicans

Again, there is sometimes in a Common-wealth, a Disease, which
resembleth the Pleurisie; and that is, when the Treasure of the
Common-wealth, flowing out of its due course, is gathered together in
too much abundance, in one, or a few private men, by Monopolies, or by
Farmes of the Publique Revenues; in the same manner as the Blood in a
Pleurisie, getting into the Membrane of the breast, breedeth there an
Inflammation, accompanied with a Fever, and painfull stitches.



Popular Men

Also, the Popularity of a potent Subject, (unlesse the Common-wealth
have very good caution of his fidelity,) is a dangerous Disease; because
the people (which should receive their motion from the Authority of the
Soveraign,) by the flattery, and by the reputation of an ambitious man,
are drawn away from their obedience to the Lawes, to follow a man, of
whose vertues, and designes they have no knowledge. And this is commonly
of more danger in a Popular Government, than in a Monarchy; as it may
easily be made believe, they are the People. By this means it was, that
Julius Caesar, who was set up by the People against the Senate, having
won to himselfe the affections of his Army, made himselfe Master, both
of Senate and People. And this proceeding of popular, and ambitious men,
is plain Rebellion; and may be resembled to the effects of Witchcraft.



Excessive Greatnesse Of A Town, Multitude Of Corporations

Another infirmity of a Common-wealth, is the immoderate greatnesse of a
Town, when it is able to furnish out of its own Circuit, the number, and
expence of a great Army: As also the great number of Corporations; which
are as it were many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater,
like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man.



Liberty Of Disputing Against Soveraign Power

To which may be added, the Liberty of Disputing against absolute Power,
by pretenders to Politicall Prudence; which though bred for the most
part in the Lees of the people; yet animated by False Doctrines, are
perpetually medling with the Fundamentall Lawes, to the molestation
of the Common-wealth; like the little Wormes, which Physicians call
Ascarides.

We may further adde, the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia, of enlarging
Dominion; with the incurable Wounds thereby many times received from
the enemy; And the Wens, of ununited conquests, which are many times a
burthen, and with lesse danger lost, than kept; As also the Lethargy of
Ease, and Consumption of Riot and Vain Expence.



Dissolution Of The Common-wealth

Lastly, when in a warre (forraign, or intestine,) the enemies got a
final Victory; so as (the forces of the Common-wealth keeping the field
no longer) there is no farther protection of Subjects in their loyalty;
then is the Common-wealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect
himselfe by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him.
For the Soveraign, is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the
Common-wealth; which expiring, the Members are governed by it no more,
than the Carcasse of a man, by his departed (though Immortal) Soule. For
though the Right of a Soveraign Monarch cannot be extinguished by the
act of another; yet the Obligation of the members may. For he that
wants protection, may seek it anywhere; and when he hath it, is obliged
(without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himselfe out of fear,)
to protect his Protection as long as he is able. But when the Power of
an Assembly is once suppressed, the Right of the same perisheth utterly;
because the Assembly it selfe is extinct; and consequently, there is no
possibility for the Soveraignty to re-enter.


CHAPTER XXX. OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVERAIGN REPRESENTATIVE



The Procuration Of The Good Of The People

The OFFICE of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,)
consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign
Power, namely the procuration of the Safety Of The People; to which he
is obliged by the Law of Nature, and to render an account thereof to
God, the Author of that Law, and to none but him. But by Safety here, is
not meant a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life,
which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the
Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe.



By Instruction & Lawes

And this is intended should be done, not by care applyed to
Individualls, further than their protection from injuries, when they
shall complain; but by a generall Providence, contained in publique
Instruction, both of Doctrine, and Example; and in the making, and
executing of good Lawes, to which individuall persons may apply their
own cases.



Against The Duty Of A Soveraign To Relinquish Any Essentiall Right

of Soveraignty Or Not To See The People Taught The Grounds Of Them

And because, if the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty (specified before
in the eighteenth Chapter) be taken away, the Common-wealth is thereby
dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a
warre with every other man, (which is the greatest evill that can happen
in this life;) it is the Office of the Soveraign, to maintain those
Rights entire; and consequently against his duty, First, to transferre
to another, or to lay from himselfe any of them. For he that deserteth
the Means, deserteth the Ends; and he deserteth the Means, that being
the Soveraign, acknowledgeth himselfe subject to the Civill Lawes; and
renounceth the Power of Supreme Judicature; or of making Warre, or
Peace by his own Authority; or of Judging of the Necessities of the
Common-wealth; or of levying Mony, and Souldiers, when, and as much as
in his own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making Officers,
and Ministers both of Warre, and Peace; or of appointing Teachers, and
examining what Doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the Defence,
Peace, and Good of the people. Secondly, it is against his duty, to let
the people be ignorant, or mis-in-formed of the grounds, and reasons
of those his essentiall Rights; because thereby men are easie to be
seduced, and drawn to resist him, when the Common-wealth shall require
their use and exercise.

And the grounds of these Rights, have the rather need to be diligently,
and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any Civill Law,
or terrour of legal punishment. For a Civill Law, that shall forbid
Rebellion, (and such is all resistance to the essentiall Rights of
Soveraignty,) is not (as a Civill Law) any obligation, but by vertue
onely of the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth the violation of Faith;
which naturall obligation if men know not, they cannot know the Right of
any Law the Soveraign maketh. And for the Punishment, they take it
but for an act of Hostility; which when they think they have strength
enough, they will endeavour by acts of Hostility, to avoyd.



Objection Of Those That Say There Are No Principles Of Reason For

Absolute Soveraignty

As I have heard some say, that Justice is but a word, without substance;
and that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himselfe,
(not onely in the condition of warre, but also in a Common-wealth,) is
his own, which I have already shewed to be false: So there be also
that maintain, that there are no grounds, nor Principles of Reason, to
sustain those essentiall Rights, which make Soveraignty absolute. For
if there were, they would have been found out in some place, or other;
whereas we see, there has not hitherto been any Common-wealth, where
those Rights have been acknowledged, or challenged. Wherein they argue
as ill, as if the Savage people of America, should deny there were any
grounds, or Principles of Reason, so to build a house, as to last as
long as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well built.
Time, and Industry, produce every day new knowledge. And as the art
of well building, is derived from Principles of Reason, observed by
industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and
the divers effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind
began (though poorly) to build: So, long time after men have begun to
constitute Common-wealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder,
there may, Principles of Reason be found out, by industrious meditation,
to make use of them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my
particular interest, at this day, very little. But supposing that
these of mine are not such Principles of Reason; yet I am sure they are
Principles from Authority of Scripture; as I shall make it appear, when
I shall come to speak of the Kingdome of God, (administred by Moses,)
over the Jewes, his peculiar people by Covenant.



Objection From The Incapacity Of The Vulgar

But they say again, that though the Principles be right, yet Common
people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them. I
should be glad, that the Rich, and Potent Subjects of a Kingdome, or
those that are accounted the most Learned, were no lesse incapable than
they. But all men know, that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine,
proceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter, as from the
interest of them that are to learn. Potent men, digest hardly any thing
that setteth up a Power to bridle their affections; and Learned men,
any thing that discovereth their errours, and thereby lesseneth their
Authority: whereas the Common-peoples minds, unlesse they be tainted
with dependance on the Potent, or scribbled over with the opinions
of their Doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by
Publique Authority shall be imprinted in them. Shall whole Nations be
brought to Acquiesce in the great Mysteries of Christian Religion, which
are above Reason; and millions of men be made believe, that the same
Body may be in innumerable places, at one and the same time, which
is against Reason; and shall not men be able, by their teaching, and
preaching, protected by the Law, to make that received, which is so
consonant to Reason, that any unprejudicated man, needs no more to learn
it, than to hear it? I conclude therefore, that in the instruction
of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall, and
Fundamentall Lawes) of Soveraignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a
Soveraign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault,
or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the
Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so to be
instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security,
against the danger that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall Person,
from Rebellion.



Subjects Are To Be Taught, Not To Affect Change Of Government

And (to descend to particulars) the People are to be taught, First, that
they ought not to be in love with any forme of Government they see
in their neighbour Nations, more than with their own, nor (whatsoever
present prosperity they behold in Nations that are otherwise governed
than they,) to desire change. For the prosperity of a People ruled by
an Aristocraticall, or Democraticall assembly, commeth not from
Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the Obedience, and Concord of
the Subjects; nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy, because one man
has the right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in
any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the Concord of the
People,) and they shall not onely not flourish, but in short time be
dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience, to doe no more than
reforme the Common-wealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like
the foolish daughters of Peleus (in the fable;) which desiring to renew
the youth of their decrepit Father, did by the Counsell of Medea, cut
him in pieces, and boyle him, together with strange herbs, but made not
of him a new man. This desire of change, is like the breach of the first
of Gods Commandements: For there God says, Non Habebis Deos Alienos;
Thou shalt not have the Gods of other Nations; and in another place
concerning Kings, that they are Gods.



Nor Adhere (Against The Soveraign) To Popular Men

Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led with
admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow Subjects, how
high soever he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the
Common-wealth; nor of any Assembly, (except the Soveraign Assembly,)
so as to deferre to them any obedience, or honour, appropriate to the
Soveraign onely, whom (in their particular stations) they represent; nor
to receive any influence from them, but such as is conveighed by them
from the Soveraign Authority. For that Soveraign, cannot be imagined to
love his People as he ought, that is not Jealous of them, but suffers
them by the flattery of Popular men, to be seduced from their loyalty,
as they have often been, not onely secretly, but openly, so as to
proclaime Marriage with them In Facie Ecclesiae by Preachers; and by
publishing the same in the open streets: which may fitly be compared to
the violation of the second of the ten Commandements.


Nor To Dispute The Soveraign Power

Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, how great
fault it is, to speak evill of the Soveraign Representative, (whether
One man, or an Assembly of men;) or to argue and dispute his Power, or
any way to use his Name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into
Contempt with his People, and their Obedience (in which the safety
of the Common-wealth consisteth) slackened. Which doctrine the third
Commandement by resemblance pointeth to.



And To Have Dayes Set Apart To Learn Their Duty

Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when 'tis taught,
remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the
Soveraign Power is placed, without setting a part from their ordinary
labour, some certain times, in which they may attend those that are
appointed to instruct them; It is necessary that some such times be
determined, wherein they may assemble together, and (after prayers and
praises given to God, the Soveraign of Soveraigns) hear those their
Duties told them, and the Positive Lawes, such as generally concern them
all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the Authority that maketh
them Lawes. To this end had the Jewes every seventh day, a Sabbath, in
which the Law was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof they
were put in mind, that their King was God; that having created the world
in six days, he rested the seventh day; and by their resting on it from
their labour, that that God was their King, which redeemed them from
their servile, and painfull labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after
they had rejoyced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawfull
recreation. So that the first Table of the Commandements, is spent all,
in setting down the summe of Gods absolute Power; not onely as God,
but as King by pact, (in peculiar) of the Jewes; and may therefore give
light, to those that have the Soveraign Power conferred on them by the
consent of men, to see what doctrine they Ought to teach their Subjects.



And To Honour Their Parents

And because the first instruction of Children, dependeth on the care
of their Parents; it is necessary that they should be obedient to them,
whilest they are under their tuition; and not onely so, but that also
afterwards (as gratitude requireth,) they acknowledge the benefit of
their education, by externall signes of honour. To which end they are
to be taught, that originally the Father of every man was also his
Soveraign Lord, with power over him of life and death; and that the
Fathers of families, when by instituting a Common-wealth, they resigned
that absolute Power, yet it was never intended, they should lose the
honour due unto them for their education. For to relinquish such right,
was not necessary to the Institution of Soveraign Power; nor would there
be any reason, why any man should desire to have children, or take the
care to nourish, and instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no
other benefit from them, than from other men. And this accordeth with
the fifth Commandement.



And To Avoyd Doing Of Injury:

Again, every Soveraign Ought to cause Justice to be taught, which
(consisting in taking from no man what is his) is as much as to say, to
cause men to be taught not to deprive their Neighbour, by violence,
or fraud, of any thing which by the Soveraign Authority is theirs. Of
things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own
life, & limbs; and in the next degree, (in most men,) those that
concern conjugall affection; and after them riches and means of living.
Therefore the People are to be taught, to abstain from violence to
one anothers person, by private revenges; from violation of conjugall
honour; and from forcibly rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one
anothers goods. For which purpose also it is necessary they be shewed
the evill consequences of false Judgement, by corruption either of
Judges or Witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away,
and Justice becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the
sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth Commandements.



And To Do All This Sincerely From The Heart

Lastly, they are to be taught, that not onely the unjust facts, but the
designes and intentions to do them, (though by accident hindred,) are
Injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in
the irregularity of the act. And this is the intention of the tenth
Commandement, and the summe of the Second Table; which is reduced all to
this one Commandement of mutuall Charity, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour
as thy selfe:" as the summe of the first Table is reduced to "the love
of God;" whom they had then newly received as their King.



The Use Of Universities

As for the Means, and Conduits, by which the people may receive this
Instruction, wee are to search, by what means so may Opinions,
contrary to the peace of Man-kind, upon weak and false Principles, have
neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them. I mean those, which I have
in the precedent Chapter specified: as That men shall Judge of what is
lawfull and unlawfull, not by the Law it selfe, but by their own
private Judgements; That Subjects sinne in obeying the Commands of the
Common-wealth, unlesse they themselves have first judged them to be
lawfull: That their Propriety in their riches is such, as to exclude the
Dominion, which the Common-wealth hath over the same: That it is lawfull
for Subjects to kill such, as they call Tyrants: That the Soveraign
Power may be divided, and the like; which come to be instilled into
the People by this means. They whom necessity, or covetousnesse keepeth
attent on their trades, and labour; and they, on the other side, whom
superfluity, or sloth carrieth after their sensuall pleasures, (which
two sorts of men take up the greatest part of Man-kind,) being diverted
from the deep meditation, which the learning of truth, not onely in the
matter of Naturall Justice, but also of all other Sciences necessarily
requireth, receive the Notions of their duty, chiefly from Divines
in the Pulpit, and partly from such of their Neighbours, or familiar
acquaintance, as having the Faculty of discoursing readily, and
plausibly, seem wiser and better learned in cases of Law, and
Conscience, than themselves. And the Divines, and such others as make
shew of Learning, derive their knowledge from the Universities, and from
the Schooles of Law, or from the Books, which by men eminent in
those Schooles, and Universities have been published. It is therefore
manifest, that the Instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the
right teaching of Youth in the Universities. But are not (may some men
say) the Universities of England learned enough already to do that? or
is it you will undertake to teach the Universities? Hard questions. Yet
to the first, I doubt not to answer; that till towards the later end of
Henry the Eighth, the Power of the Pope, was alwayes upheld against the
Power of the Common-wealth, principally by the Universities; and that
the doctrines maintained by so many Preachers, against the Soveraign
Power of the King, and by so many Lawyers, and others, that had their
education there, is a sufficient argument, that though the Universities
were not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not how to
plant the true. For in such a contradiction of Opinions, it is most
certain, that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and 'tis no
wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that subtile liquor, wherewith
they were first seasoned, against the Civill Authority. But to the later
question, it is not fit, nor needfull for me to say either I, or No: for
any man that sees what I am doing, may easily perceive what I think.

The safety of the People, requireth further, from him, or them that have
the Soveraign Power, that Justice be equally administred to all degrees
of People; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty, as poor and
obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the
great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they doe violence,
dishonour, or any Injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these,
does the like to one of them: For in this consisteth Equity; to which,
as being a Precept of the Law of Nature, a Soveraign is as much subject,
as any of the meanest of his People. All breaches of the Law, are
offences against the Common-wealth: but there be some, that are also
against private Persons. Those that concern the Common-wealth onely, may
without breach of Equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is
done against himselfe, according to his own discretion. But an offence
against a private man, cannot in Equity be pardoned, without the consent
of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.

The Inequality of Subjects, proceedeth from the Acts of Soveraign Power;
and therefore has no more place in the presence of the Soveraign; that
is to say, in a Court of Justice, then the Inequality between Kings,
and their Subjects, in the presence of the King of Kings. The honour of
great Persons, is to be valued for their beneficence, and the aydes
they give to men of inferiour rank, or not at all. And the violences,
oppressions, and injuries they do, are not extenuated, but aggravated by
the greatnesse of their persons; because they have least need to commit
them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great, proceed in
this manner. Impunity maketh Insolence; Insolence Hatred; and Hatred,
an Endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatnesse,
though with the ruine of the Common-wealth.



Equall Taxes

To Equall Justice, appertaineth also the Equall imposition of Taxes;
the equality whereof dependeth not on the Equality of riches, but on the
Equality of the debt, that every man oweth to the Common-wealth for his
defence. It is not enough, for a man to labour for the maintenance
of his life; but also to fight, (if need be,) for the securing of his
labour. They must either do as the Jewes did after their return from
captivity, in re-edifying the Temple, build with one hand, and hold the
Sword in the other; or else they must hire others to fight for them. For
the Impositions that are layd on the People by the Soveraign Power, are
nothing else but the Wages, due to them that hold the publique Sword,
to defend private men in the exercise of severall Trades, and Callings.
Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby, is the
enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor, and rich; the debt
which a poor man oweth them that defend his life, is the same which a
rich man oweth for the defence of his; saving that the rich, who have
the service of the poor, may be debtors not onely for their own persons,
but for many more. Which considered, the Equality of Imposition,
consisteth rather in the Equality of that which is consumed, than of the
riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there,
that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour,
consumeth little, should be more charged, then he that living idlely,
getteth little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no
more protection from the Common-wealth, then the other? But when the
Impositions, are layd upon those things which men consume, every man
payeth Equally for what he useth: Nor is the Common-wealth defrauded, by
the luxurious waste of private men.



Publique Charity

And whereas many men, by accident unevitable, become unable to maintain
themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the Charity
of private persons; but to be provided for, (as far-forth as the
necessities of Nature require,) by the Lawes of the Common-wealth. For
as it is Uncharitablenesse in any man, to neglect the impotent; so it
is in the Soveraign of a Common-wealth, to expose them to the hazard of
such uncertain Charity.



Prevention Of Idlenesse

But for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise: they are to
be forced to work; and to avoyd the excuse of not finding employment,
there ought to be such Lawes, as may encourage all manner of Arts; as
Navigation, Agriculture, Fishing, and all manner of Manifacture that
requires labour. The multitude of poor, and yet strong people still
encreasing, they are to be transplanted into Countries not sufficiently
inhabited: where neverthelesse, they are not to exterminate those they
find there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not range
a great deal of ground, to snatch what they find; but to court each
little Plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in due
season. And when all the world is overchargd with Inhabitants, then the
last remedy of all is Warre; which provideth for every man, by Victory,
or Death.



Good Lawes What

To the care of the Soveraign, belongeth the making of Good Lawes. But
what is a good Law? By a Good Law, I mean not a Just Law: for no Law can
be Unjust. The Law is made by the Soveraign Power, and all that is done
by such Power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people; and
that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in
the Lawes of a Common-wealth, as in the Lawes of Gaming: whatsoever
the Gamesters all agree on, is Injustice to none of them. A good Law
is that, which is Needfull, for the Good Of The People, and withall
Perspicuous.



Such As Are Necessary

For the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised) is not to bind
the People from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in
such a motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires,
rashnesse, or indiscretion, as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers,
but to keep them in the way. And therefore a Law that is not Needfull,
having not the true End of a Law, is not Good. A Law may be conceived to
be Good, when it is for the benefit of the Soveraign; though it be
not Necessary for the People; but it is not so. For the good of the
Soveraign and People, cannot be separated. It is a weak Soveraign, that
has weak Subjects; and a weak People, whose Soveraign wanteth Power to
rule them at his will. Unnecessary Lawes are not good Lawes; but trapps
for Mony: which where the right of Soveraign Power is acknowledged, are
superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, unsufficient to defend
the People.



Such As Are Perspicuous

The Perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the Law it
selfe, as in a Declaration of the Causes, and Motives, for which it was
made. That is it, that shewes us the meaning of the Legislator, and the
meaning of the Legislator known, the Law is more easily understood
by few, than many words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity;
and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the Law, is
multiplication of ambiguity: Besides it seems to imply, (by too much
diligence,) that whosoever can evade the words, is without the compasse
of the Law. And this is a cause of many unnecessary Processes. For when
I consider how short were the Lawes of antient times; and how they
grew by degrees still longer; me thinks I see a contention between the
Penners, and Pleaders of the Law; the former seeking to circumscribe
the later; and the later to evade their circumscriptions; and that the
Pleaders have got the Victory. It belongeth therefore to the Office of
a Legislator, (such as is in all Common-wealths the Supreme
Representative, be it one Man, or an Assembly,) to make the reason
Perspicuous, why the Law was made; and the Body of the Law it selfe, as
short, but in as proper, and significant termes, as may be.



Punishments

It belongeth also to the Office of the Soveraign, to make a right
application of Punishments, and Rewards. And seeing the end of punishing
is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of the
offender, or of others by his example; the severest Punishments are to
be inflicted for those Crimes, that are of most Danger to the
Publique; such as are those which proceed from malice to the Government
established; those that spring from contempt of Justice; those that
provoke Indignation in the Multitude; and those, which unpunished, seem
Authorised, as when they are committed by Sonnes, Servants, or Favorites
of men in Authority: For Indignation carrieth men, not onely against the
Actors, and Authors of Injustice; but against all Power that is likely
to protect them; as in the case of Tarquin; when for the Insolent act of
one of his Sonnes, he was driven out of Rome, and the Monarchy it selfe
dissolved. But Crimes of Infirmity; such as are those which proceed
from great provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance
whether the Fact be a great Crime, or not, there is place many times for
Lenity, without prejudice to the Common-wealth; and Lenity when there is
such place for it, is required by the Law of Nature. The Punishment of
the Leaders, and teachers in a Commotion; not the poore seduced People,
when they are punished, can profit the Common-wealth by their example.
To be severe to the People, is to punish that ignorance, which may in
great part be imputed to the Soveraign, whose fault it was, they were no
better instructed.



Rewards

In like manner it belongeth to the Office, and Duty of the Soveraign,
to apply his Rewards alwayes so, as there may arise from them benefit
to the Common-wealth: wherein consisteth their Use, and End; and is then
done, when they that have well served the Common-wealth, are with
as little expence of the Common Treasure, as is possible, so well
recompenced, as others thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same
as faithfully as they can, and to study the arts by which they may be
enabled to do it better. To buy with Mony, or Preferment, from a Popular
ambitious Subject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions
in the mindes of the People, has nothing of the nature of Reward; (which
is ordained not for disservice, but for service past;) nor a signe of
Gratitude, but of Fear: nor does it tend to the Benefit, but to the
Dammage of the Publique. It is a contention with Ambition, like that of
Hercules with the Monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every one
that was vanquished, there grew up three. For in like manner, when the
stubbornnesse of one Popular man, is overcome with Reward, there arise
many more (by the Example) that do the same Mischiefe, in hope of like
Benefit: and as all sorts of Manifacture, so also Malice encreaseth by
being vendible. And though sometimes a Civill warre, may be differred,
by such wayes as that, yet the danger growes still the greater, and the
Publique ruine more assured. It is therefore against the Duty of the
Soveraign, to whom the Publique Safety is committed, to Reward those
that aspire to greatnesse by disturbing the Peace of their Country, and
not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger,
than after a longer time with greater.



Counsellours

Another Businesse of the Soveraign, is to choose good Counsellours;
I mean such, whose advice he is to take in the Government of the
Common-wealth. For this word Counsell, Consilium, corrupted from
Considium, is a large signification, and comprehendeth all Assemblies
of men that sit together, not onely to deliberate what is to be done
hereafter, but also to judge of Facts past, and of Law for the present.
I take it here in the first sense onely: And in this sense, there is no
choyce of Counsell, neither in a Democracy, nor Aristocracy; because the
persons Counselling are members of the person Counselled. The choyce
of Counsellours therefore is to Monarchy; In which, the Soveraign that
endeavoureth not to make choyce of those, that in every kind are the
most able, dischargeth not his Office as he ought to do. The most able
Counsellours, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evill
Counsell, and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the Peace,
and Defence of the Common-wealth. It is a hard matter to know who
expecteth benefit from publique troubles; but the signes that guide to a
just suspicion, is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable,
or irremediable grievances, by men whose estates are not sufficient to
discharge their accustomed expences, and may easily be observed by any
one whom it concerns to know it. But to know, who has most knowledge of
the Publique affaires, is yet harder; and they that know them, need them
a great deale the lesse. For to know, who knowes the Rules almost of any
Art, is a great degree of the knowledge of the same Art; because no
man can be assured of the truth of anothers Rules, but he that is first
taught to understand them. But the best signes of Knowledge of any
Art, are, much conversing in it, and constant good effects of it. Good
Counsell comes not by Lot, nor by Inheritance; and therefore there is no
more reason to expect good Advice from the rich, or noble, in matter
of State, than in delineating the dimensions of a fortresse; unlesse we
shall think there needs no method in the study of the Politiques, (as
there does in the study of Geometry,) but onely to be lookers on; which
is not so. For the Politiques is the harder study of the two. Whereas
in these parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a Right of certain
persons, to have place in the highest Councell of State by Inheritance;
it is derived from the Conquests of the antient Germans; wherein many
absolute Lords joyning together to conquer other Nations, would not
enter in to the Confederacy, without such Priviledges, as might be
marks of difference in time following, between their Posterity, and the
posterity of their Subjects; which Priviledges being inconsistent with
the Soveraign Power, by the favour of the Soveraign, they may seem to
keep; but contending for them as their Right, they must needs by
degrees let them go, and have at last no further honour, than adhaereth
naturally to their abilities.

And how able soever be the Counsellours in any affaire, the benefit
of their Counsell is greater, when they give every one his Advice, and
reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an Assembly, by way of
Orations; and when they have praemeditated, than when they speak on the
sudden; both because they have more time, to survey the consequences
of action; and are lesse subject to be carried away to contradiction,
through Envy, Emulation, or other Passions arising from the difference
of opinion.

The best Counsell, in those things that concern not other Nations, but
onely the ease, and benefit the Subjects may enjoy, by Lawes that
look onely inward, is to be taken from the generall informations, and
complaints of the people of each Province, who are best acquainted
with their own wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in
derogation of the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty, to be diligently
taken notice of. For without those Essentiall Rights, (as I have often
before said,) the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist.



Commanders

A Commander of an Army in chiefe, if he be not Popular, shall not be
beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by his Army; and consequently
cannot performe that office with good successe. He must therefore be
Industrious, Valiant, Affable, Liberall and Fortunate, that he may gain
an opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his Souldiers. This is
Popularity, and breeds in the Souldiers both desire, and courage, to
recommend themselves to his favour; and protects the severity of
the Generall, in punishing (when need is) the Mutinous, or negligent
Souldiers. But this love of Souldiers, (if caution be not given of
the Commanders fidelity,) is a dangerous thing to Soveraign Power;
especially when it is in the hands of an Assembly not popular. It
belongeth therefore to the safety of the People, both that they be good
Conductors, and faithfull subjects, to whom the Soveraign Commits his
Armies.

But when the Soveraign himselfe is Popular, that is, reverenced and
beloved of his People, there is no danger at all from the Popularity of
a Subject. For Souldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with
their Captain; though they love him, against their Soveraign, when they
love not onely his Person, but also his Cause. And therefore those,
who by violence have at any time suppressed the Power of their Lawfull
Soveraign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have been
alwayes put to the trouble of contriving their Titles, to save the
People from the shame of receiving them. To have a known Right to
Soveraign Power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no
more, for his own part, to turn the hearts of his Subjects to him, but
that they see him able absolutely to govern his own Family: Nor, on the
part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their Armies. For the greatest
and most active part of Mankind, has never hetherto been well contented
with the present.

Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are
comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations,
I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and
the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Soveraign hath the same
Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man
can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body. And the same Law,
that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to
do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to
Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Soveraign Princes, and
Soveraign Assemblies; there being no Court of Naturall Justice, but
in the Conscience onely; where not Man, but God raigneth; whose Lawes,
(such of them as oblige all Mankind,) in respect of God, as he is the
Author of Nature, are Naturall; and in respect of the same God, as he is
King of Kings, are Lawes. But of the Kingdome of God, as King of Kings,
and as King also of a peculiar People, I shall speak in the rest of this
discourse.


CHAPTER XXXI. OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD BY NATURE



The Scope Of The Following Chapters

That the condition of meer Nature, that is to say, of absolute Liberty,
such as is theirs, that neither are Soveraigns, nor Subjects, is
Anarchy, and the condition of Warre: That the Praecepts, by which men
are guided to avoyd that condition, are the Lawes of Nature: That
a Common-wealth, without Soveraign Power, is but a word, without
substance, and cannot stand: That Subjects owe to Soveraigns, simple
Obedience, in all things, wherein their obedience is not repugnant
to the Lawes of God, I have sufficiently proved, in that which I have
already written. There wants onely, for the entire knowledge of Civill
duty, to know what are those Lawes of God. For without that, a man knows
not, when he is commanded any thing by the Civill Power, whether it be
contrary to the Law of God, or not: and so, either by too much civill
obedience, offends the Divine Majesty, or through feare of offending
God, transgresses the commandements of the Common-wealth. To avoyd both
these Rocks, it is necessary to know what are the Lawes Divine. And
seeing the knowledge of all Law, dependeth on the knowledge of the
Soveraign Power; I shall say something in that which followeth, of the
KINGDOME OF GOD.



Who Are Subjects In The Kingdome Of God

"God is King, let the Earth rejoice," saith the Psalmist. (Psal. 96. 1).
And again, "God is King though the Nations be angry; and he that sitteth
on the Cherubins, though the earth be moved." (Psal. 98. 1). Whether
men will or not, they must be subject alwayes to the Divine Power. By
denying the Existence, or Providence of God, men may shake off their
Ease, but not their Yoke. But to call this Power of God, which extendeth
it selfe not onely to Man, but also to Beasts, and Plants, and Bodies
inanimate, by the name of Kingdome, is but a metaphoricall use of
the word. For he onely is properly said to Raigne, that governs his
Subjects, by his Word, and by promise of Rewards to those that obey
it, and by threatning them with Punishment that obey it not. Subjects
therefore in the Kingdome of God, are not Bodies Inanimate, nor
creatures Irrationall; because they understand no Precepts as his: Nor
Atheists; nor they that believe not that God has any care of the actions
of mankind; because they acknowledge no Word for his, nor have hope of
his rewards, or fear of his threatnings. They therefore that believe
there is a God that governeth the world, and hath given Praecepts, and
propounded Rewards, and Punishments to Mankind, are Gods Subjects; all
the rest, are to be understood as Enemies.



A Threefold Word Of God, Reason, Revelation, Prophecy

To rule by Words, requires that such Words be manifestly made known;
for else they are no Lawes: For to the nature of Lawes belongeth a
sufficient, and clear Promulgation, such as may take away the excuse of
Ignorance; which in the Lawes of men is but of one onely kind, and that
is, Proclamation, or Promulgation by the voyce of man. But God
declareth his Lawes three wayes; by the Dictates of Naturall Reason, By
Revelation, and by the Voyce of some Man, to whom by the operation of
Miracles, he procureth credit with the rest. From hence there ariseth
a triple Word of God, Rational, Sensible, and Prophetique: to which
Correspondeth a triple Hearing; Right Reason, Sense Supernaturall, and
Faith. As for Sense Supernaturall, which consisteth in Revelation, or
Inspiration, there have not been any Universall Lawes so given, because
God speaketh not in that manner, but to particular persons, and to
divers men divers things.

A Twofold Kingdome Of God, Naturall And Prophetique From the difference
between the other two kinds of Gods Word, Rationall, and Prophetique,
there may be attributed to God, a two-fold Kingdome, Naturall, and
Prophetique: Naturall, wherein he governeth as many of Mankind as
acknowledge his Providence, by the naturall Dictates of Right Reason;
And Prophetique, wherein having chosen out one peculiar Nation (the
Jewes) for his Subjects, he governed them, and none but them, not onely
by naturall Reason, but by Positive Lawes, which he gave them by the
mouths of his holy Prophets. Of the Naturall Kingdome of God I intend to
speak in this Chapter.

The Right Of Gods Soveraignty Is Derived From His Omnipotence The Right
of Nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that
break his Lawes, is to be derived, not from his Creating them, as if
he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits; but from his
Irresistible Power. I have formerly shewn, how the Soveraign Right
ariseth from Pact: To shew how the same Right may arise from Nature,
requires no more, but to shew in what case it is never taken away.
Seeing all men by Nature had Right to All things, they had Right every
one to reigne over all the rest. But because this Right could not be
obtained by force, it concerned the safety of every one, laying by that
Right, to set up men (with Soveraign Authority) by common consent,
to rule and defend them: whereas if there had been any man of Power
Irresistible; there had been no reason, why he should not by that Power
have ruled, and defended both himselfe, and them, according to his own
discretion. To those therefore whose Power is irresistible, the dominion
of all men adhaereth naturally by their excellence of Power; and
consequently it is from that Power, that the Kingdome over men, and
the Right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth Naturally to God
Almighty; not as Creator, and Gracious; but as Omnipotent. And though
Punishment be due for Sinne onely, because by that word is understood
Affliction for Sinne; yet the Right of Afflicting, is not alwayes
derived from mens Sinne, but from Gods Power.



Sinne Not The Cause Of All Affliction

This question, "Why Evill men often Prosper, and Good men suffer
Adversity," has been much disputed by the Antient, and is the same
with this of ours, "By what Right God dispenseth the Prosperities and
Adversities of this life;" and is of that difficulty, as it hath shaken
the faith, not onely of the Vulgar, but of Philosophers, and which is
more, of the Saints, concerning the Divine Providence. "How Good," saith
David, "is the God of Israel to those that are Upright in Heart; and yet
my feet were almost gone, my treadings had well-nigh slipt; for I was
grieved at the Wicked, when I saw the Ungodly in such Prosperity."
And Job, how earnestly does he expostulate with God, for the many
Afflictions he suffered, notwithstanding his Righteousnesse? This
question in the case of Job, is decided by God himselfe, not by
arguments derived from Job's Sinne, but his own Power. For whereas the
friends of Job drew their arguments from his Affliction to his Sinne,
and he defended himselfe by the conscience of his Innocence, God
himselfe taketh up the matter, and having justified the Affliction by
arguments drawn from his Power, such as this "Where was thou when I
layd the foundations of the earth," and the like, both approved
Job's Innocence, and reproved the Erroneous doctrine of his friends.
Conformable to this doctrine is the sentence of our Saviour, concerning
the man that was born Blind, in these words, "Neither hath this man
sinned, nor his fathers; but that the works of God might be made
manifest in him." And though it be said "That Death entred into the
world by sinne," (by which is meant that if Adam had never sinned, he had
never dyed, that is, never suffered any separation of his soule from his
body,) it follows not thence, that God could not justly have Afflicted
him, though he had not Sinned, as well as he afflicteth other living
creatures, that cannot sinne.



Divine Lawes

Having spoken of the Right of Gods Soveraignty, as grounded onely on
Nature; we are to consider next, what are the Divine Lawes, or Dictates
of Naturall Reason; which Lawes concern either the naturall Duties of
one man to another, or the Honour naturally due to our Divine Soveraign.
The first are the same Lawes of Nature, of which I have spoken already
in the 14. and 15. Chapters of this Treatise; namely, Equity, Justice,
Mercy, Humility, and the rest of the Morall Vertues. It remaineth
therefore that we consider, what Praecepts are dictated to men, by their
Naturall Reason onely, without other word of God, touching the Honour
and Worship of the Divine Majesty.



Honour And Worship What

Honour consisteth in the inward thought, and opinion of the Power, and
Goodnesse of another: and therefore to Honour God, is to think as Highly
of his Power and Goodnesse, as is possible. And of that opinion, the
externall signes appearing in the Words, and Actions of men, are called
Worship; which is one part of that which the Latines understand by the
word Cultus: For Cultus signifieth properly, and constantly, that labour
which a man bestowes on any thing, with a purpose to make benefit by it.
Now those things whereof we make benefit, are either subject to us, and
the profit they yeeld, followeth the labour we bestow upon them, as a
naturall effect; or they are not subject to us, but answer our labour,
according to their own Wills. In the first sense the labour bestowed on
the Earth, is called Culture; and the education of Children a Culture of
their mindes. In the second sense, where mens wills are to be wrought to
our purpose, not by Force, but by Compleasance, it signifieth as much as
Courting, that is, a winning of favour by good offices; as by praises,
by acknowledging their Power, and by whatsoever is pleasing to them from
whom we look for any benefit. And this is properly Worship: in which
sense Publicola, is understood for a Worshipper of the People, and
Cultus Dei, for the Worship of God.



Severall Signes Of Honour

From internall Honour, consisting in the opinion of Power and Goodnesse,
arise three Passions; Love, which hath reference to Goodnesse; and Hope,
and Fear, that relate to Power: And three parts of externall worship;
Praise, Magnifying, and Blessing: The subject of Praise, being
Goodnesse; the subject of Magnifying, and Blessing, being Power, and the
effect thereof Felicity. Praise, and Magnifying are significant both by
Words, and Actions: By Words, when we say a man is Good, or Great:
By Actions, when we thank him for his Bounty, and obey his Power. The
opinion of the Happinesse of another, can onely be expressed by words.



Worship Naturall And Arbitrary

There be some signes of Honour, (both in Attributes and Actions,) that
be Naturally so; as amongst Attributes, Good, Just, Liberall, and the
like; and amongst Actions, Prayers, Thanks, and Obedience. Others are
so by Institution, or Custome of men; and in some times and places are
Honourable; in others Dishonourable; in others Indifferent: such as are
the Gestures in Salutation, Prayer, and Thanksgiving, in different
times and places, differently used. The former is Naturall; the later
Arbitrary Worship.



Worship Commanded And Free

And of Arbitrary Worship, there bee two differences: For sometimes it is
a Commanded, sometimes Voluntary Worship: Commanded, when it is such
as hee requireth, who is Worshipped: Free, when it is such as the
Worshipper thinks fit. When it is Commanded, not the words, or gestures,
but the obedience is the Worship. But when Free, the Worship consists
in the opinion of the beholders: for if to them the words, or actions by
which we intend honour, seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely; they
are not Worship; because a signe is not a signe to him that giveth it,
but to him to whom it is made; that is, to the spectator.



Worship Publique And Private

Again, there is a Publique, and a Private Worship. Publique, is the
Worship that a Common-wealth performeth, as one Person. Private, is that
which a Private person exhibiteth. Publique, in respect of the whole
Common-wealth, is Free; but in respect of Particular men it is not so.
Private, is in secret Free; but in the sight of the multitude, it is
never without some Restraint, either from the Lawes, or from the Opinion
of men; which is contrary to the nature of Liberty.



The End Of Worship

The End of Worship amongst men, is Power. For where a man seeth another
worshipped he supposeth him powerfull, and is the readier to obey him;
which makes his Power greater. But God has no Ends: the worship we do
him, proceeds from our duty, and is directed according to our capacity,
by those rules of Honour, that Reason dictateth to be done by the weak
to the more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of dammage, or in
thankfulnesse for good already received from them.



Attributes Of Divine Honour

That we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light of
Nature, I will begin with his Attributes. Where, First, it is manifest,
we ought to attribute to him Existence: For no man can have the will to
honour that, which he thinks not to have any Beeing.

Secondly, that those Philosophers, who sayd the World, or the Soule of
the World was God, spake unworthily of him; and denyed his Existence:
For by God, is understood the cause of the World; and to say the World
is God, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God.

Thirdly, to say the World was not Created, but Eternall, (seeing that
which is Eternall has no cause,) is to deny there is a God.

Fourthly, that they who attributing (as they think) Ease to God, take
from him the care of Mankind; take from him his Honour: for it takes
away mens love, and fear of him; which is the root of Honour.

Fifthly, in those things that signifie Greatnesse, and Power; to say he
is Finite, is not to Honour him: For it is not a signe of the Will to
Honour God, to attribute to him lesse than we can; and Finite, is lesse
than we can; because to Finite, it is easie to adde more.

Therefore to attribute Figure to him, is not Honour; for all Figure is
Finite:

Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an Idea of him, in our
mind: for whatsoever we conceive is Finite:

Not to attribute to him Parts, or Totality; which are the Attributes
onely of things Finite:

Nor to say he is this, or that Place: for whatsoever is in Place, is
bounded, and Finite:

Nor that he is Moved, or Resteth: for both these Attributes ascribe to
him Place:

Nor that there be more Gods than one; because it implies them all
Finite: for there cannot be more than one Infinite: Nor to ascribe to
him (unlesse Metaphorically, meaning not the Passion, but the Effect)
Passions that partake of Griefe; as Repentance, Anger, Mercy: or of
Want; as Appetite, Hope, Desire; or of any Passive faculty: For Passion,
is Power limited by somewhat else.

And therefore when we ascribe to God a Will, it is not to be understood,
as that of Man, for a Rationall Appetite; but as the Power, by which he
effecteth every thing.

Likewise when we attribute to him Sight, and other acts of Sense; as
also Knowledge, and Understanding; which in us is nothing else, but
a tumult of the mind, raised by externall things that presse the
organicall parts of mans body: For there is no such thing in God; and
being things that depend on naturall causes, cannot be attributed to
him.

Hee that will attribute to God, nothing but what is warranted by
naturall Reason, must either use such Negative Attributes, as Infinite,
Eternall, Incomprehensible; or Superlatives, as Most High, Most Great,
and the like; or Indefinite, as Good, Just, Holy, Creator; and in such
sense, as if he meant not to declare what he is, (for that were to
circumscribe him within the limits of our Fancy,) but how much wee
admire him, and how ready we would be to obey him; which is a signe of
Humility, and of a Will to honour him as much as we can: For there is
but one Name to signifie our Conception of his Nature, and that is, I
AM: and but one Name of his Relation to us, and that is God; in which is
contained Father, King, and Lord.



Actions That Are Signes Of Divine Honour

Concerning the actions of Divine Worship, it is a most generall Precept
of Reason, that they be signes of the Intention to Honour God; such as
are, First, Prayers: For not the Carvers, when they made Images, were
thought to make them Gods; but the People that Prayed to them.

Secondly, Thanksgiving; which differeth from Prayer in Divine Worship,
no otherwise, than that Prayers precede, and Thanks succeed the benefit;
the end both of the one, and the other, being to acknowledge God, for
Author of all benefits, as well past, as future.

Thirdly, Gifts; that is to say, Sacrifices, and Oblations, (if they be
of the best,) are signes of Honour: for they are Thanksgivings.

Fourthly, Not to swear by any but God, is naturally a signe of Honour:
for it is a confession that God onely knoweth the heart; and that no
mans wit, or strength can protect a man against Gods vengence on the
perjured.

Fifthly, it is a part of Rationall Worship, to speak Considerately
of God; for it argues a Fear of him, and Fear, is a confession of his
Power. Hence followeth, That the name of God is not to be used rashly,
and to no purpose; for that is as much, as in Vain: And it is to
no purpose; unlesse it be by way of Oath, and by order of the
Common-wealth, to make Judgements certain; or between Common-wealths,
to avoyd Warre. And that disputing of Gods nature is contrary to his
Honour: For it is supposed, that in this naturall Kingdome of God, there
is no other way to know any thing, but by naturall Reason; that is, from
the Principles of naturall Science; which are so farre from teaching us
any thing of Gods nature, as they cannot teach us our own nature, nor
the nature of the smallest creature living. And therefore, when men out
of the Principles of naturall Reason, dispute of the Attributes of God,
they but dishonour him: For in the Attributes which we give to God, we
are not to consider the signification of Philosophicall Truth; but the
signification of Pious Intention, to do him the greatest Honour we are
able. From the want of which consideration, have proceeded the volumes
of disputation about the Nature of God, that tend not to his Honour, but
to the honour of our own wits, and learning; and are nothing else but
inconsiderate, and vain abuses of his Sacred Name.

Sixthly, in Prayers, Thanksgivings, Offerings and Sacrifices, it is a
Dictate of naturall Reason, that they be every one in his kind the
best, and most significant of Honour. As for example, that Prayers, and
Thanksgiving, be made in Words and Phrases, not sudden, nor light, nor
Plebeian; but beautifull and well composed; For else we do not God
as much honour as we can. And therefore the Heathens did absurdly, to
worship Images for Gods: But their doing it in Verse, and with Musick,
both of Voyce, and Instruments, was reasonable. Also that the Beasts
they offered in sacrifice, and the Gifts they offered, and their actions
in Worshipping, were full of submission, and commemorative of benefits
received, was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention to
honour him.

Seventhly, Reason directeth not onely to worship God in Secret; but
also, and especially, in Publique, and in the sight of men: For without
that, (that which in honour is most acceptable) the procuring others to
honour him, is lost.

Lastly, Obedience to his Lawes (that is, in this case to the Lawes
of Nature,) is the greatest worship of all. For as Obedience is
more acceptable to God than sacrifice; so also to set light by his
Commandements, is the greatest of all contumelies. And these are the
Lawes of that Divine Worship, which naturall Reason dictateth to private
men.



Publique Worship Consisteth In Uniformity

But seeing a Common-wealth is but one Person, it ought also to exhibite
to God but one Worship; which then it doth, when it commandeth it to be
exhibited by Private men, Publiquely. And this is Publique Worship; the
property whereof, is to be Uniforme: For those actions that are done
differently, by different men, cannot be said to be a Publique Worship.
And therefore, where many sorts of Worship be allowed, proceeding from
the different Religions of Private men, it cannot be said there is any
Publique Worship, nor that the Common-wealth is of any Religion at all.



All Attributes Depend On The Lawes Civill

And because words (and consequently the Attributes of God) have their
signification by agreement, and constitution of men; those Attributes
are to be held significative of Honour, that men intend shall so be; and
whatsoever may be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no
Law but Reason, may be done by the will of the Common-wealth, by Lawes
Civill. And because a Common-wealth hath no Will, nor makes no Lawes,
but those that are made by the Will of him, or them that have the
Soveraign Power; it followeth, that those Attributes which the Soveraign
ordaineth, in the Worship of God, for signes of Honour, ought to be
taken and used for such, by private men in their publique Worship.



Not All Actions

But because not all Actions are signes by Constitution; but some are
Naturally signes of Honour, others of Contumely, these later (which are
those that men are ashamed to do in the sight of them they reverence)
cannot be made by humane power a part of Divine worship; nor the former
(such as are decent, modest, humble Behaviour) ever be separated from
it. But whereas there be an infinite number of Actions, and Gestures, of
an indifferent nature; such of them as the Common-wealth shall ordain to
be Publiquely and Universally in use, as signes of Honour, and part of
Gods Worship, are to be taken and used for such by the Subjects. And
that which is said in the Scripture, "It is better to obey God than
men," hath place in the kingdome of God by Pact, and not by Nature.



Naturall Punishments

Having thus briefly spoken of the Naturall Kingdome of God, and his
Naturall Lawes, I will adde onely to this Chapter a short declaration of
his Naturall Punishments. There is no action of man in this life, that
is not the beginning of so long a chayn of Consequences, as no humane
Providence, is high enough, to give a man a prospect to the end. And
in this Chayn, there are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing
events; in such manner, as he that will do any thing for his pleasure,
must engage himselfe to suffer all the pains annexed to it; and these
pains, are the Naturall Punishments of those actions, which are the
beginning of more Harme that Good. And hereby it comes to passe, that
Intemperance, is naturally punished with Diseases; Rashnesse, with
Mischances; Injustice, with the Violence of Enemies; Pride, with Ruine;
Cowardise, with Oppression; Negligent government of Princes, with
Rebellion; and Rebellion, with Slaughter. For seeing Punishments
are consequent to the breach of Lawes; Naturall Punishments must be
naturally consequent to the breach of the Lawes of Nature; and therfore
follow them as their naturall, not arbitrary effects.



The Conclusion Of The Second Part

And thus farre concerning the Constitution, Nature, and Right of
Soveraigns; and concerning the Duty of Subjects, derived from the
Principles of Naturall Reason. And now, considering how different
this Doctrine is, from the Practise of the greatest part of the world,
especially of these Western parts, that have received their Morall
learning from Rome, and Athens; and how much depth of Morall Philosophy
is required, in them that have the Administration of the Soveraign
Power; I am at the point of believing this my labour, as uselesse,
and the Common-wealth of Plato; For he also is of opinion that it is
impossible for the disorders of State, and change of Governments by
Civill Warre, ever to be taken away, till Soveraigns be Philosophers.
But when I consider again, that the Science of Naturall Justice, is the
onely Science necessary for Soveraigns, and their principall Ministers;
and that they need not be charged with the Sciences Mathematicall, (as
by Plato they are,) further, than by good Lawes to encourage men to
the study of them; and that neither Plato, nor any other Philosopher
hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently, or probably proved all
the Theoremes of Morall doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how
to govern, and how to obey; I recover some hope, that one time or other,
this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a Soveraign, who will
consider it himselfe, (for it is short, and I think clear,) without the
help of any interested, or envious Interpreter; and by the exercise of
entire Soveraignty, in protecting the Publique teaching of it, convert
this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice.




PART III. OF A CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH



CHAPTER XXXII. OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN POLITIQUES

The Word Of God Delivered By Prophets Is The Main Principle

Of Christian Politiques

I have derived the Rights of Soveraigne Power, and the duty of Subjects
hitherto, from the Principles of Nature onely; such as Experience has
found true, or Consent (concerning the use of words) has made so; that
is to say, from the nature of Men, known to us by Experience, and
from Definitions (of such words as are Essentiall to all Politicall
reasoning) universally agreed on. But in that I am next to handle, which
is the Nature and Rights of a CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH, whereof there
dependeth much upon Supernaturall Revelations of the Will of God; the
ground of my Discourse must be, not only the Naturall Word of God, but
also the Propheticall.

Neverthelesse, we are not to renounce our Senses, and Experience; nor
(that which is the undoubted Word of God) our naturall Reason. For they
are the talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the
coming again of our blessed Saviour; and therefore not to be folded up
in the Napkin of an Implicate Faith, but employed in the purchase of
Justice, Peace, and true Religion, For though there be many things in
Gods Word above Reason; that is to say, which cannot by naturall reason
be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing contrary
to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskilfull
Interpretation, or erroneous Ratiocination.

Therefore, when any thing therein written is too hard for our
examination, wee are bidden to captivate our understanding to the Words;
and not to labour in sifting out a Philosophicall truth by Logick, of
such mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of
naturall science. For it is with the mysteries of our Religion, as with
wholsome pills for the sick, which swallowed whole, have the vertue to
cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect.



What It Is To Captivate The Understanding

But by the Captivity of our Understanding, is not meant a Submission of
the Intellectual faculty, to the Opinion of any other man; but of
the Will to Obedience, where obedience is due. For Sense, Memory,
Understanding, Reason, and Opinion are not in our power to change; but
alwaies, and necessarily such, as the things we see, hear, and consider
suggest unto us; and therefore are not effects of our Will, but our Will
of them. We then Captivate our Understanding and Reason, when we forbear
contradiction; when we so speak, as (by lawfull Authority) we are
commanded; and when we live accordingly; which in sum, is Trust, and
Faith reposed in him that speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any
Notion at all from the words spoken.



How God Speaketh To Men

When God speaketh to man, it must be either immediately; or by mediation
of another man, to whom he had formerly spoken by himself immediately.
How God speaketh to a man immediately, may be understood by those well
enough, to whom he hath so spoken; but how the same should be understood
by another, is hard, if not impossible to know. For if a man pretend to
me, that God hath spoken to him supernaturally, and immediately, and I
make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce,
to oblige me to beleeve it. It is true, that if he be my Soveraign,
he may oblige me to obedience, so, as not by act or word to declare I
beleeve him not; but not to think any otherwise then my reason perswades
me. But if one that hath not such authority over me, shall pretend the
same, there is nothing that exacteth either beleefe, or obedience.

For to say that God hath spoken to him in the Holy Scripture, is not
to say God hath spoken to him immediately, but by mediation of the
Prophets, or of the Apostles, or of the Church, in such manner as he
speaks to all other Christian men. To say he hath spoken to him in a
Dream, is no more than to say he dreamed that God spake to him; which is
not of force to win beleef from any man, that knows dreams are for
the most part naturall, and may proceed from former thoughts; and such
dreams as that, from selfe conceit, and foolish arrogance, and false
opinion of a mans own godlinesse, or other vertue, by which he thinks he
hath merited the favour of extraordinary Revelation. To say he hath
seen a Vision, or heard a Voice, is to say, that he hath dreamed between
sleeping and waking: for in such manner a man doth many times naturally
take his dream for a vision, as not having well observed his own
slumbering. To say he speaks by supernaturall Inspiration, is to say he
finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for
which he can alledge no naturall and sufficient reason. So that
though God Almighty can speak to a man, by Dreams, Visions, Voice, and
Inspiration; yet he obliges no man to beleeve he hath so done to him
that pretends it; who (being a man), may erre, and (which is more) may
lie.



By What Marks Prophets Are Known

How then can he, to whom God hath never revealed his Wil immediately
(saving by the way of natural reason) know when he is to obey, or not
to obey his Word, delivered by him, that sayes he is a Prophet? (1 Kings
22) Of 400 Prophets, of whom the K. of Israel asked counsel, concerning
the warre he made against Ramoth Gilead, only Micaiah was a true one.(1
Kings 13) The Prophet that was sent to prophecy against the Altar set up
by Jeroboam, though a true Prophet, and that by two miracles done in
his presence appears to be a Prophet sent from God, was yet deceived by
another old Prophet, that perswaded him as from the mouth of God, to eat
and drink with him. If one Prophet deceive another, what certainty is
there of knowing the will of God, by other way than that of Reason? To
which I answer out of the Holy Scripture, that there be two marks, by
which together, not asunder, a true Prophet is to be known. One is the
doing of miracles; the other is the not teaching any other Religion than
that which is already established. Asunder (I say) neither of these is
sufficient. (Deut. 13 v. 1,2,3,4,5 ) "If a Prophet rise amongst you, or
a Dreamer of dreams, and shall pretend the doing of a miracle, and the
miracle come to passe; if he say, Let us follow strange Gods, which thou
hast not known, thou shalt not hearken to him, &c. But that Prophet and
Dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he hath spoken to you
to Revolt from the Lord your God." In which words two things are to
be observed, First, that God wil not have miracles alone serve for
arguments, to approve the Prophets calling; but (as it is in the third
verse) for an experiment of the constancy of our adherence to himself.
For the works of the Egyptian Sorcerers, though not so great as those
of Moses, yet were great miracles. Secondly, that how great soever the
miracle be, yet if it tend to stir up revolt against the King, or him
that governeth by the Kings authority, he that doth such miracle, is
not to be considered otherwise than as sent to make triall of their
allegiance. For these words, "revolt from the Lord your God," are in
this place equivalent to "revolt from your King." For they had made God
their King by pact at the foot of Mount Sinai; who ruled them by Moses
only; for he only spake with God, and from time to time declared Gods
Commandements to the people. In like manner, after our Saviour Christ
had made his Disciples acknowledge him for the Messiah, (that is to say,
for Gods anointed, whom the nation of the Jews daily expected for their
King, but refused when he came,) he omitted not to advertise them of the
danger of miracles. "There shall arise," (saith he) "false Christs, and
false Prophets, and shall doe great wonders and miracles, even to the
seducing (if it were possible) of the very Elect." (Mat. 24. 24) By
which it appears, that false Prophets may have the power of miracles;
yet are wee not to take their doctrin for Gods Word. St. Paul says
further to the Galatians, that "if himself, or an Angell from heaven
preach another Gospel to them, than he had preached, let him be
accursed." (Gal. 1. 8) That Gospel was, that Christ was King; so that
all preaching against the power of the King received, in consequence
to these words, is by St. Paul accursed. For his speech is addressed to
those, who by his preaching had already received Jesus for the Christ,
that is to say, for King of the Jews.



The Marks Of A Prophet In The Old Law, Miracles, And Doctrine

Conformable To The Law

And as Miracles, without preaching that Doctrine which God hath
established; so preaching the true Doctrine, without the doing of
Miracles, is an unsufficient argument of immediate Revelation. For if
a man that teacheth not false Doctrine, should pretend to bee a Prophet
without shewing any Miracle, he is never the more to bee regarded for
his pretence, as is evident by Deut. 18. v. 21, 22. "If thou say in
thy heart, How shall we know that the Word (of the Prophet) is not that
which the Lord hath spoken. When the Prophet shall have spoken in the
name of the Lord, that which shall not come to passe, that's the word
which the Lord hath not spoken, but the Prophet has spoken it out of
the pride of his own heart, fear him not." But a man may here again ask,
When the Prophet hath foretold a thing, how shal we know whether it will
come to passe or not? For he may foretel it as a thing to arrive after
a certain long time, longer then the time of mans life; or indefinitely,
that it will come to passe one time or other: in which case this mark
of a Prophet is unusefull; and therefore the miracles that oblige us to
beleeve a Prophet, ought to be confirmed by an immediate, or a not
long deferr'd event. So that it is manifest, that the teaching of
the Religion which God hath established, and the showing of a present
Miracle, joined together, were the only marks whereby the Scripture
would have a true Prophet, that is to say immediate Revelation to be
acknowledged; neither of them being singly sufficient to oblige any
other man to regard what he saith.



Miracles Ceasing, Prophets Cease, The Scripture Supplies Their Place

Seeing therefore Miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to
acknowledge the pretended Revelations, or Inspirations of any private
man; nor obligation to give ear to any Doctrine, farther than it is
conformable to the Holy Scriptures, which since the time of our Saviour,
supply the want of all other Prophecy; and from which, by wise and
careful ratiocination, all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge
of our duty both to God and man, without Enthusiasme, or supernaturall
Inspiration, may easily be deduced. And this Scripture is it, out of
which I am to take the Principles of my Discourse, concerning the
Rights of those that are the Supream Govenors on earth, of Christian
Common-wealths; and of the duty of Christian Subjects towards their
Soveraigns. And to that end, I shall speak in the next Chapter, or the
Books, Writers, Scope and Authority of the Bible.


CHAPTER XXXIII. OF THE NUMBER, ANTIQUITY, SCOPE, AUTHORITY,

AND INTERPRETERS OF THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURES



Of The Books Of Holy Scripture

By the Books of Holy SCRIPTURE, are understood those, which ought to be
the Canon, that is to say, the Rules of Christian life. And because all
Rules of life, which men are in conscience bound to observe, are Laws;
the question of the Scripture, is the question of what is Law throughout
all Christendome, both Naturall, and Civill. For though it be not
determined in Scripture, what Laws every Christian King shall constitute
in his own Dominions; yet it is determined what laws he shall not
constitute. Seeing therefore I have already proved, that Soveraigns
in their own Dominions are the sole Legislators; those Books only are
Canonicall, that is, Law, in every nation, which are established for
such by the Soveraign Authority. It is true, that God is the Soveraign
of all Soveraigns; and therefore, when he speaks to any Subject, he
ought to be obeyed, whatsoever any earthly Potentate command to the
contrary. But the question is not of obedience to God, but of When,
and What God hath said; which to Subjects that have no supernaturall
revelation, cannot be known, but by that naturall reason, which guided
them, for the obtaining of Peace and Justice, to obey the authority
of their severall Common-wealths; that is to say, of their lawfull
Soveraigns. According to this obligation, I can acknowledge no other
Books of the Old Testament, to be Holy Scripture, but those which have
been commanded to be acknowledged for such, by the Authority of the
Church of England. What Books these are, is sufficiently known, without
a Catalogue of them here; and they are the same that are acknowledged
by St. Jerome, who holdeth the rest, namely, the Wisdome of Solomon,
Ecclesiasticus, Judith, Tobias, the first and second of Maccabees,
(though he had seen the first in Hebrew) and the third and fourth of
Esdras, for Apocrypha. Of the Canonicall, Josephus a learned Jew, that
wrote in the time of the Emperor Domitian, reckoneth Twenty Two, making
the number agree with the Hebrew Alphabet. St. Jerome does the same,
though they reckon them in different manner. For Josephus numbers Five
Books of Moses, Thirteen of Prophets, that writ the History of their own
times (which how it agrees with the Prophets writings contained in the
Bible wee shall see hereafter), and Four of Hymnes and Morall Precepts.
But St. Jerome reckons Five Books of Moses, Eight of Prophets, and Nine
of other Holy writ, which he calls of Hagiographa. The Septuagint, who
were 70. learned men of the Jews, sent for by Ptolemy King of Egypt, to
translate the Jewish Law, out of the Hebrew into the Greek, have left us
no other for holy Scripture in the Greek tongue, but the same that are
received in the Church of England.

As for the Books of the New Testament, they are equally acknowledged for
Canon by all Christian Churches, and by all sects of Christians, that
admit any Books at all for Canonicall.



Their Antiquity

Who were the originall writers of the severall Books of Holy Scripture,
has not been made evident by any sufficient testimony of other History,
(which is the only proof of matter of fact); nor can be by any arguments
of naturall Reason; for Reason serves only to convince the truth (not
of fact, but) of consequence. The light therefore that must guide us in
this question, must be that which is held out unto us from the Bookes
themselves: And this light, though it show us not the writer of every
book, yet it is not unusefull to give us knowledge of the time, wherein
they were written.



The Pentateuch Not Written By Moses

And first, for the Pentateuch, it is not argument enough that they were
written by Moses, because they are called the five Books of Moses; no
more than these titles, The Book of Joshua, the Book of Judges, The Book
of Ruth, and the Books of the Kings, are arguments sufficient to prove,
that they were written by Joshua, by the Judges, by Ruth, and by the
Kings. For in titles of Books, the subject is marked, as often as the
writer. The History Of Livy, denotes the Writer; but the History Of
Scanderbeg, is denominated from the subject. We read in the last Chapter
of Deuteronomie, Ver. 6. concerning the sepulcher of Moses, "that no man
knoweth of his sepulcher to this day," that is, to the day wherein those
words were written. It is therefore manifest, that those words were
written after his interrement. For it were a strange interpretation, to
say Moses spake of his own sepulcher (though by Prophecy), that it was
not found to that day, wherein he was yet living. But it may perhaps
be alledged, that the last Chapter only, not the whole Pentateuch, was
written by some other man, but the rest not: Let us therefore consider
that which we find in the Book of Genesis, Chap. 12. Ver. 6 "And Abraham
passed through the land to the place of Sichem, unto the plain of Moreh,
and the Canaanite was then in the land;" which must needs bee the
words of one that wrote when the Canaanite was not in the land; and
consequently, not of Moses, who dyed before he came into it. Likewise
Numbers 21. Ver. 14. the Writer citeth another more ancient Book,
Entituled, The Book of the Warres of the Lord, wherein were registred
the Acts of Moses, at the Red-sea, and at the brook of Arnon. It is
therefore sufficiently evident, that the five Books of Moses were
written after his time, though how long after it be not so manifest.

But though Moses did not compile those Books entirely, and in the form
we have them; yet he wrote all that which hee is there said to have
written: as for example, the Volume of the Law, which is contained, as
it seemeth in the 11 of Deuteronomie, and the following Chapters to the
27. which was also commanded to be written on stones, in their entry
into the land of Canaan. (Deut. 31. 9) And this did Moses himself
write, and deliver to the Priests and Elders of Israel, to be read
every seventh year to all Israel, at their assembling in the feast of
Tabernacles. And this is that Law which God commanded, that their Kings
(when they should have established that form of Government) should take
a copy of from the Priests and Levites to lay in the side of the Arke;
(Deut. 31. 26) and the same which having been lost, was long time after
found again by Hilkiah, and sent to King Josias, who causing it to be
read to the People, renewed the Covenant between God and them. (2 King.
22. 8 & 23. 1,2,3)



The Book of Joshua Written After His Time

That the Book of Joshua was also written long after the time of Joshua,
may be gathered out of many places of the Book it self. Joshua had
set up twelve stones in the middest of Jordan, for a monument of their
passage; (Josh 4. 9) of which the Writer saith thus, "They are there
unto this day;" (Josh 5. 9) for "unto this day", is a phrase that
signifieth a time past, beyond the memory of man. In like manner, upon
the saying of the Lord, that he had rolled off from the people the
Reproach of Egypt, the Writer saith, "The place is called Gilgal unto
this day;" which to have said in the time of Joshua had been improper.
So also the name of the Valley of Achor, from the trouble that Achan
raised in the Camp, (Josh. 7. 26) the Writer saith, "remaineth unto
this day;" which must needs bee therefore long after the time of Joshua.
Arguments of this kind there be many other; as Josh. 8. 29. 13. 13. 14.
14. 15. 63.



The Booke Of Judges And Ruth Written Long After The Captivity

The same is manifest by like arguments of the Book of Judges, chap. 1.
21,26 6.24 10.4 15.19 17.6 and Ruth 1. 1. but especially Judg. 18. 30.
where it is said, that Jonathan "and his sonnes were Priests to the
Tribe of Dan, untill the day of the captivity of the land."



The Like Of The Bookes Of Samuel

That the Books of Samuel were also written after his own time, there
are the like arguments, 1 Sam. 5.5. 7.13,15. 27.6. & 30.25. where, after
David had adjudged equall part of the spoiles, to them that guarded
the Ammunition, with them that fought, the Writer saith, "He made it a
Statute and an Ordinance to Israel to this day." (2. Sam. 6.4.) Again,
when David (displeased, that the Lord had slain Uzzah, for putting out
his hand to sustain the Ark,) called the place Perez-Uzzah, the Writer
saith, it is called so "to this day": the time therefore of the writing
of that Book, must be long after the time of the fact; that is, long
after the time of David.



The Books Of The Kings, And The Chronicles

As for the two Books of the Kings, and the two books of the Chronicles,
besides the places which mention such monuments, as the Writer saith,
remained till his own days; such as are 1 Kings 9.13. 9.21. 10. 12.
12.19. 2 Kings 2.22. 8.22. 10.27. 14.7. 16.6. 17.23. 17.34. 17.41. 1
Chron. 4.41. 5.26. It is argument sufficient they were written after the
captivity in Babylon, that the History of them is continued till that
time. For the Facts Registred are alwaies more ancient than such Books
as make mention of, and quote the Register; as these Books doe in divers
places, referring the Reader to the Chronicles of the Kings of Juda,
to the Chronicles of the Kings of Israel, to the Books of the Prophet
Samuel, or the Prophet Nathan, of the Prophet Ahijah; to the Vision of
Jehdo, to the Books of the Prophet Serveiah, and of the Prophet Addo.



Ezra And Nehemiah

The Books of Esdras and Nehemiah were written certainly after their
return from captivity; because their return, the re-edification of
the walls and houses of Jerusalem, the renovation of the Covenant, and
ordination of their policy are therein contained.



Esther

The History of Queen Esther is of the time of the Captivity; and
therefore the Writer must have been of the same time, or after it.



Job

The Book of Job hath no mark in it of the time wherein it was written:
and though it appear sufficiently (Exekiel 14.14, and James 5.11.)
that he was no fained person; yet the Book it self seemeth not to be
a History, but a Treatise concerning a question in ancient time much
disputed, "why wicked men have often prospered in this world, and good
men have been afflicted;" and it is the most probably, because from the
beginning, to the third verse of the third chapter, where the complaint
of Job beginneth, the Hebrew is (as St. Jerome testifies) in prose; and
from thence to the sixt verse of the last chapter in Hexameter Verses;
and the rest of that chapter again in prose. So that the dispute is all
in verse; and the prose is added, but as a Preface in the beginning, and
an Epilogue in the end. But Verse is no usuall stile of such, as either
are themselves in great pain, as Job; or of such as come to comfort
them, as his friends; but in Philosophy, especially morall Philosophy,
in ancient time frequent.



The Psalter

The Psalmes were written the most part by David, for the use of the
Quire. To these are added some songs of Moses, and other holy men; and
some of them after the return from the Captivity; as the 137. and the
126. whereby it is manifest that the Psalter was compiled, and put into
the form it now hath, after the return of the Jews from Babylon.



The Proverbs

The Proverbs, being a Collection of wise and godly Sayings, partly of
Solomon, partly of Agur the son of Jakeh; and partly of the Mother
of King Lemuel, cannot probably be thought to have been collected by
Solomon, rather then by Agur, or the Mother of Lemues; and that, though
the sentences be theirs, yet the collection or compiling them into this
one Book, was the work of some other godly man, that lived after them
all.



Ecclesiastes And The Canticles

The Books of Ecclesiastes and the Canticles have nothing that was not
Solomons, except it be the Titles, or Inscriptions. For "The Words of
the Preacher, the Son of David, King in Jerusalem;" and, "the Song of
Songs, which is Solomon's," seem to have been made for distinctions
sake, then, when the Books of Scripture were gathered into one body of
the Law; to the end, that not the Doctrine only, but the Authors also
might be extant.



The Prophets

Of the Prophets, the most ancient, are Sophoniah, Jonas, Amos, Hosea,
Isaiah and Michaiah, who lived in the time of Amaziah, and Azariah,
otherwise Ozias, Kings of Judah. But the Book of Jonas is not properly
a Register of his Prophecy, (for that is contained in these few words,
"Fourty dayes and Ninivy shall be destroyed,") but a History or Narration
of his frowardenesse and disputing Gods commandements; so that there is
small probability he should be the Author, seeing he is the subject of
it. But the Book of Amos is his Prophecy.

Jeremiah, Abdias, Nahum, and Habakkuk prophecyed in the time of Josiah.

Ezekiel, Daniel, Aggeus, and Zacharias, in the Captivity.

When Joel and Malachi prophecyed, is not evident by their Writings. But
considering the Inscriptions, or Titles of their Books, it is manifest
enough, that the whole Scripture of the Old Testament, was set forth in
the form we have it, after the return of the Jews from their Captivity
in Babylon, and before the time of Ptolemaeus Philadelphus, that caused
it to bee translated into Greek by seventy men, which were sent him
out of Judea for that purpose. And if the Books of Apocrypha (which
are recommended to us by the Church, though not for Canonicall, yet for
profitable Books for our instruction) may in this point be credited, the
Scripture was set forth in the form wee have it in, by Esdras; as may
appear by that which he himself saith, in the second book, chapt. 14.
verse 21, 22, &c. where speaking to God, he saith thus, "Thy law is
burnt; therefore no man knoweth the things which thou has done, or the
works that are to begin. But if I have found Grace before thee, send
down the holy Spirit into me, and I shall write all that hath been done
in the world, since the beginning, which were written in thy Law, that
men may find thy path, and that they which will live in the later days,
may live." And verse 45. "And it came to passe when the forty dayes were
fulfilled, that the Highest spake, saying, 'The first that thou hast
written, publish openly, that the worthy and unworthy may read it; but
keep the seventy last, that thou mayst deliver them onely to such as
be wise among the people.'" And thus much concerning the time of the
writing of the Bookes of the Old Testament.



The New Testament

The Writers of the New Testament lived all in lesse then an age after
Christs Ascension, and had all of them seen our Saviour, or been his
Disciples, except St. Paul, and St. Luke; and consequently whatsoever
was written by them, is as ancient as the time of the Apostles. But
the time wherein the Books of the New Testament were received, and
acknowledged by the Church to be of their writing, is not altogether so
ancient. For, as the Bookes of the Old Testament are derived to us, from
no higher time then that of Esdras, who by the direction of Gods Spirit
retrived them, when they were lost: Those of the New Testament, of which
the copies were not many, nor could easily be all in any one private
mans hand, cannot bee derived from a higher time, that that wherein the
Governours of the Church collected, approved, and recommended them to
us, as the writings of those Apostles and Disciples; under whose names
they go. The first enumeration of all the Bookes, both of the Old,
and New Testament, is in the Canons of the Apostles, supposed to be
collected by Clement the first (after St. Peter) Bishop of Rome. But
because that is but supposed, and by many questioned, the Councell of
Laodicea is the first we know, that recommended the Bible to the then
Christian Churches, for the Writings of the Prophets and Apostles: and
this Councell was held in the 364. yeer after Christ. At which time,
though ambition had so far prevailed on the great Doctors of the Church,
as no more to esteem Emperours, though Christian, for the Shepherds of
the people, but for Sheep; and Emperours not Christian, for Wolves; and
endeavoured to passe their Doctrine, not for Counsell, and Information,
as Preachers; but for Laws, as absolute Governours; and thought such
frauds as tended to make the people the more obedient to Christian
Doctrine, to be pious; yet I am perswaded they did not therefore
falsifie the Scriptures, though the copies of the Books of the New
Testament, were in the hands only of the Ecclesiasticks; because if they
had had an intention so to doe, they would surely have made them more
favorable to their power over Christian Princes, and Civill Soveraignty,
than they are. I see not therefore any reason to doubt, but that the
Old, and New Testament, as we have them now, are the true Registers of
those things, which were done and said by the Prophets, and Apostles.
And so perhaps are some of those Books which are called Apocrypha, if
left out of the Canon, not for inconformity of Doctrine with the
rest, but only because they are not found in the Hebrew. For after the
conquest of Asia by Alexander the Great, there were few learned Jews,
that were not perfect in the Greek tongue. For the seventy Interpreters
that converted the Bible into Greek, were all of them Hebrews; and we
have extant the works of Philo and Josephus both Jews, written by them
eloquently in Greek. But it is not the Writer, but the authority of the
Church, that maketh a Book Canonicall.



Their Scope

And although these Books were written by divers men, yet it is manifest
the Writers were all indued with one and the same Spirit, in that they
conspire to one and the same end, which is the setting forth of the
Rights of the Kingdome of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. For
the Book of Genesis, deriveth the Genealogy of Gods people, from the
creation of the World, to the going into Egypt: the other four Books of
Moses, contain the Election of God for their King, and the Laws which
hee prescribed for their Government: The Books of Joshua, Judges, Ruth,
and Samuel, to the time of Saul, describe the acts of Gods people,
till the time they cast off Gods yoke, and called for a King, after the
manner of their neighbour nations; The rest of the History of the
Old Testament, derives the succession of the line of David, to the
Captivity, out of which line was to spring the restorer of the Kingdome
of God, even our blessed Saviour God the Son, whose coming was foretold
in the Bookes of the Prophets, after whom the Evangelists writt his
life, and actions, and his claim to the Kingdome, whilst he lived one
earth: and lastly, the Acts, and Epistles of the Apostles, declare the
coming of God, the Holy Ghost, and the Authority he left with them, and
their successors, for the direction of the Jews, and for the invitation
of the Gentiles. In summe, the Histories and the Prophecies of the old
Testament, and the Gospels, and Epistles of the New Testament, have had
one and the same scope, to convert men to the obedience of God; 1. in
Moses, and the Priests; 2. in the man Christ; and 3. in the Apostles and
the successors to Apostolicall power. For these three at several times
did represent the person of God: Moses, and his successors the High
Priests, and Kings of Judah, in the Old Testament: Christ himself, in
the time he lived on earth: and the Apostles, and their successors, from
the day of Pentecost (when the Holy Ghost descended on them) to this
day.



The Question Of The Authority Of The Scriptures Stated.

It is a question much disputed between the divers sects of Christian
Religion, From Whence The Scriptures Derive Their Authority; which
question is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, How Wee Know
Them To Be The Word Of God, or, Why We Beleeve Them To Be So: and the
difficulty of resolving it, ariseth chiefly from the impropernesse of
the words wherein the question it self is couched. For it is beleeved
on all hands, that the first and originall Author of them is God; and
consequently the question disputed, is not that. Again, it is manifest,
that none can know they are Gods Word, (though all true Christians
beleeve it,) but those to whom God himself hath revealed it
supernaturally; and therefore the question is not rightly moved, of our
Knowledge of it. Lastly, when the question is propounded of our Beleefe;
because some are moved to beleeve for one, and others for other reasons,
there can be rendred no one generall answer for them all. The question
truly stated is, By What Authority They Are Made Law.



Their Authority And Interpretation

As far as they differ not from the Laws of Nature, there is no doubt,
but they are the Law of God, and carry their Authority with them,
legible to all men that have the use of naturall reason: but this is
no other Authority, then that of all other Morall Doctrine consonant to
Reason; the Dictates whereof are Laws, not Made, but Eternall.

If they be made Law by God himselfe, they are of the nature of written
Law, which are Laws to them only to whom God hath so sufficiently
published them, as no man can excuse himself, by saying, he know not
they were his.

He therefore, to whom God hath not supernaturally revealed, that they
are his, nor that those that published them, were sent by him, is not
obliged to obey them, by any Authority, but his, whose Commands have
already the force of Laws; that is to say, by any other Authority, then
that of the Common-wealth, residing in the Soveraign, who only has the
Legislative power. Again, if it be not the Legislative Authority of
the Common-wealth, that giveth them the force of Laws, it must bee
some other Authority derived from God, either private, or publique:
if private, it obliges onely him, to whom in particular God hath been
pleased to reveale it. For if every man should be obliged, to take for
Gods Law, what particular men, on pretence of private Inspiration, or
Revelation, should obtrude upon him, (in such a number of men, that out
of pride, and ignorance, take their own Dreams, and extravagant Fancies,
and Madnesse, for testimonies of Gods Spirit; or out of ambition,
pretend to such Divine testimonies, falsely, and contrary to their
own consciences,) it were impossible that any Divine Law should be
acknowledged. If publique, it is the Authority of the Common-wealth, or
of the Church. But the Church, if it be one person, is the same thing
with a Common-wealth of Christians; called a Common-wealth, because it
consisteth of men united in one person, their Soveraign; and a Church,
because it consisteth in Christian men, united in one Christian
Soveraign. But if the Church be not one person, then it hath no
authority at all; it can neither command, nor doe any action at all; nor
is capable of having any power, or right to any thing; nor has any Will,
Reason, nor Voice; for all these qualities are personall. Now if the
whole number of Christians be not contained in one Common-wealth, they
are not one person; nor is there an Universall Church that hath any
authority over them; and therefore the Scriptures are not made Laws,
by the Universall Church: or if it bee one Common-wealth, then all
Christian Monarchs, and States are private persons, and subject to
bee judged, deposed, and punished by an Universall Soveraigne of all
Christendome. So that the question of the Authority of the Scriptures is
reduced to this, "Whether Christian Kings, and the Soveraigne Assemblies
in Christian Common-wealths, be absolute in their own Territories,
immediately under God; or subject to one Vicar of Christ, constituted
over the Universall Church; to bee judged, condemned, deposed, and put
to death, as hee shall think expedient, or necessary for the common
good."

Which question cannot bee resolved, without a more particular
consideration of the Kingdome of God; from whence also, wee are to judge
of the Authority of Interpreting the Scripture. For, whosoever hath a
lawfull power over any Writing, to make it Law, hath the power also to
approve, or disapprove the interpretation of the same.


CHAPTER XXXIV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF SPIRIT, ANGEL, AND INSPIRATION IN
THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE



Body And Spirit How Taken In The Scripture

Seeing the foundation of all true Ratiocination, is the constant
Signification of words; which in the Doctrine following, dependeth not
(as in naturall science) on the Will of the Writer, nor (as in common
conversation) on vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in the
Scripture; It is necessary, before I proceed any further, to determine,
out of the Bible, the meaning of such words, as by their ambiguity, may
render what I am to inferre upon them, obscure, or disputable. I will
begin with the words BODY, and SPIRIT, which in the language of the
Schools are termed, Substances, Corporeall, and Incorporeall.

The Word Body, in the most generall acceptation, signifieth that
which filleth, or occupyeth some certain room, or imagined place; and
dependeth not on the imagination, but is a reall part of that we call
the Universe. For the Universe, being the Aggregate of all Bodies, there
is no reall part thereof that is not also Body; nor any thing properly
a Body, that is not also part of (that Aggregate of all Bodies) the
Universe. The same also, because Bodies are subject to change, that is
to say, to variety of apparence to the sense of living creatures, is
called Substance, that is to say, Subject, to various accidents, as
sometimes to be Moved, sometimes to stand Still; and to seem to our
senses sometimes Hot, sometimes Cold, sometimes of one Colour, Smel,
Tast, or Sound, somtimes of another. And this diversity of Seeming,
(produced by the diversity of the operation of bodies, on the organs
of our sense) we attribute to alterations of the Bodies that operate, &
call them Accidents of those Bodies. And according to this acceptation
of the word, Substance and Body, signifie the same thing; and therefore
Substance Incorporeall are words, which when they are joined together,
destroy one another, as if a man should say, an Incorporeall Body.

But in the sense of common people, not all the Universe is called Body,
but only such parts thereof as they can discern by the sense of Feeling,
to resist their force, or by the sense of their Eyes, to hinder them
from a farther prospect. Therefore in the common language of men, Aire,
and Aeriall Substances, use not to be taken for Bodies, but (as often
as men are sensible of their effects) are called Wind, or Breath, or
(because the some are called in the Latine Spiritus) Spirits; as when
they call that aeriall substance, which in the body of any living
creature, gives it life and motion, Vitall and Animall Spirits. But for
those Idols of the brain, which represent Bodies to us, where they
are not, as in a Looking-glasse, in a Dream, or to a Distempered brain
waking, they are (as the Apostle saith generally of all Idols) nothing;
Nothing at all, I say, there where they seem to bee; and in the brain
it self, nothing but tumult, proceeding either from the action of the
objects, or from the disorderly agitation of the Organs of our Sense.
And men, that are otherwise imployed, then to search into their causes,
know not of themselves, what to call them; and may therefore easily be
perswaded, by those whose knowledge they much reverence, some to
call them Bodies, and think them made of aire compacted by a power
supernaturall, because the sight judges them corporeall; and some to
call them Spirits, because the sense of Touch discerneth nothing in the
place where they appear, to resist their fingers: So that the proper
signification of Spirit in common speech, is either a subtile, fluid,
and invisible Body, or a Ghost, or other Idol or Phantasme of the
Imagination. But for metaphoricall significations, there be many: for
sometimes it is taken for Disposition or Inclination of the mind; as
when for the disposition to controwl the sayings of other men, we say,
A Spirit Contradiction; For A Disposition to Uncleannesse, An Unclean
Spirit; for Perversenesse, A Froward Spirit; for Sullennesse, A Dumb
Spirit, and for Inclination To Godlinesse, And Gods Service, the Spirit
of God: sometimes for any eminent ability, or extraordinary passion,
or disease of the mind, as when Great Wisdome is called the Spirit Of
Wisdome; and Mad Men are said to be Possessed With A Spirit.

Other signification of Spirit I find no where any; and where none
of these can satisfie the sense of that word in Scripture, the place
falleth not under humane Understanding; and our Faith therein consisteth
not in our Opinion, but in our Submission; as in all places where God
is said to be a Spirit; or where by the Spirit of God, is meant God
himselfe. For the nature of God is incomprehensible; that is to say, we
understand nothing of What He Is, but only That He Is; and therefore the
Attributes we give him, are not to tell one another, What He Is, Nor
to signifie our opinion of his Nature, but our desire to honor him with
such names as we conceive most honorable amongst our selves.



Spirit Of God Taken In The Scripture Sometimes For A Wind, Or Breath

Gen. 1. 2. "The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the Waters." Here
if by the Spirit of God be meant God himself, then is Motion attributed
to God, and consequently Place, which are intelligible only of Bodies,
and not of substances incorporeall; and so the place is above our
understanding, that can conceive nothing moved that changes not place,
or that has not dimension; and whatsoever has dimension, is Body. But
the meaning of those words is best understood by the like place, Gen.
8. 1. Where when the earth was covered with Waters, as in the beginning,
God intending to abate them, and again to discover the dry land, useth
like words, "I will bring my Spirit upon the Earth, and the waters shall
be diminished:" in which place by Spirit is understood a Wind, (that is
an Aire or Spirit Moved,) which might be called (as in the former place)
the Spirit of God, because it was Gods Work.



Secondly, For Extraordinary Gifts Of The Understanding

Gen. 41. 38. Pharaoh calleth the Wisdome of Joseph, the Spirit of God.
For Joseph having advised him to look out a wise and discreet man, and
to set him over the land of Egypt, he saith thus, "Can we find such a
man as this is, in whom is the Spirit of God?" and Exod. 28.3. "Thou
shalt speak (saith God) to all that are wise hearted, whom I have filled
with the Spirit of Wisdome, to make Aaron Garments, to consecrate him."
Where extraordinary Understanding, though but in making Garments, as
being the Gift of God, is called the Spirit of God. The same is found
again, Exod. 31.3,4,5,6. and 35.31. And Isaiah 11.2,3. where the Prophet
speaking of the Messiah, saith, "The Spirit of the Lord shall abide upon
him, the Spirit of wisdome and understanding, the Spirit of counsell,
and fortitude; and the Spirit of the fear of the Lord." Where manifestly
is meant, not so many Ghosts, but so many eminent Graces that God would
give him.



Thirdly, For Extraordinary Affections

In the Book of Judges, an extraordinary Zeal, and Courage in the
defence of Gods people, is called the Spirit of God; as when it excited
Othoniel, Gideon, Jeptha, and Samson to deliver them from servitude,
Judg. 3.10. 6.34. 11.29. 13.25. 14.6,19. And of Saul, upon the newes of
the insolence of the Ammonites towards the men of Jabeth Gilead, it is
said (1 Sam.11.6.) that "The Spirit of God came upon Saul, and his Anger
(or, as it is in the Latine, His Fury) was kindled greatly." Where it is
not probable was meant a Ghost, but an extraordinary Zeal to punish the
cruelty of the Ammonites. In like manner by the Spirit of God, that came
upon Saul, when hee was amongst the Prophets that praised God in Songs,
and Musick (1 Sam.19.20.) is to be understood, not a Ghost, but an
unexpected and sudden Zeal to join with them in their devotions.



Fourthly, For The Gift Of Prediction By Dreams And Visions

The false Prophet Zedekiah, saith to Micaiah (1 Kings 22.24.) "Which way
went the Spirit of the Lord from me to speak to thee?" Which cannot be
understood of a Ghost; for Micaiah declared before the Kings of Israel
and Judah, the event of the battle, as from a Vision, and not as from a
Spirit, speaking in him.

In the same manner it appeareth, in the Books of the Prophets, that
though they spake by the Spirit of God, that is to say, by a speciall
grace of Prediction; yet their knowledge of the future, was not by a
Ghost within them, but by some supernaturall Dream or Vision.



Fiftly, For Life

Gen. 2.7. It is said, "God made man of the dust of the Earth, and
breathed into his nostrills (spiraculum vitae) the breath of life, and
man was made a living soul." There the Breath of Life inspired by God,
signifies no more, but that God gave him life; And (Job 27.3.) "as long
as the Spirit of God is in my nostrils;" is no more then to say, "as
long as I live." So in Ezek. 1.20. "the Spirit of life was in the
wheels," is equivalent to, "the wheels were alive." And (Ezek. 2.30.)
"the spirit entred into me, and set me on my feet," that is, "I
recovered my vitall strength;" not that any Ghost, or incorporeal
substance entred into, and possessed his body.



Sixtly, For A Subordination To Authority

In the 11 chap. of Numbers. verse 17. "I will take (saith God) of the
Spirit, which is upon thee, and will put it upon them, and they shall
bear the burthen of the people with thee;" that is, upon the seventy
Elders: whereupon two of the seventy are said to prophecy in the campe;
of whom some complained, and Joshua desired Moses to forbid them; which
Moses would not doe. Whereby it appears; that Joshua knew not they had
received authority so to do, and prophecyed according to the mind of
Moses, that is to say, by a Spirit, or Authority subordinate to his own.

In the like sense we read (Deut. 34.9.) that "Joshua was full of the
Spirit of wisdome," because Moses had laid his hands upon him: that is,
because he was Ordained by Moses, to prosecute the work hee had himselfe
begun, (namely, the bringing of Gods people into the promised land), but
prevented by death, could not finish.

In the like sense it is said, (Rom. 8.9.) "If any man have not the
Spirit of Christ, he is none of his:" not meaning thereby the Ghost of
Christ, but a Submission to his Doctrine. As also (1 John 4.2.) "Hereby
you shall know the Spirit of God; Every Spirit that confesseth that
Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God;" by which is meant the
Spirit of unfained Christianity, or Submission to that main Article of
Christian faith, that Jesus is the Christ; which cannot be interpreted
of a Ghost.

Likewise these words (Luke 4.1.) "And Jesus full of the Holy Ghost"
(that is, as it is exprest, Mat. 4.1. and Mar. 1.12. "of the Holy
Spirit",) may be understood, for Zeal to doe the work for which hee was
sent by God the Father: but to interpret it of a Ghost, is to say, that
God himselfe (for so our Saviour was,) was filled with God; which is
very unproper, and unsignificant. How we came to translate Spirits, by
the word Ghosts, which signifieth nothing, neither in heaven, nor earth,
but the Imaginary inhabitants of mans brain, I examine not: but this I
say, the word Spirit in the text signifieth no such thing; but either
properly a reall Substance, or Metaphorically, some extraordinary
Ability of Affection of the Mind, or of the Body.



Seventhly, For Aeriall Bodies

The Disciples of Christ, seeing him walking upon the sea, (Mat. 14.26.
and Marke 6.49.) supposed him to be a Spirit, meaning thereby an Aeriall
Body, and not a Phantasme: for it is said, they all saw him; which
cannot be understood of the delusions of the brain, (which are not
common to many at once, as visible Bodies are; but singular, because of
the differences of Fancies), but of Bodies only. In like manner, where
he was taken for a Spirit, by the same Apostles (Luke 24.3,7.): So also
(Acts 12.15) when St. Peter was delivered out of Prison, it would not
be beleeved; but when the Maid said he was at the dore, they said it
was his Angel; by which must be meant a corporeall substance, or we must
say, the Disciples themselves did follow the common opinion of both Jews
and Gentiles, that some such apparitions were not Imaginary, but Reall;
and such as needed not the fancy of man for their Existence: These the
Jews called Spirits, and Angels, Good or Bad; as the Greeks called the
same by the name of Daemons. And some such apparitions may be reall, and
substantiall; that is to say, subtile Bodies, which God can form by
the same power, by which he formed all things, and make use of, as of
Ministers, and Messengers (that is to say, Angels) to declare his
will, and execute the same when he pleaseth, in extraordinary and
supernaturall manner. But when hee hath so formed them they are
Substances, endued with dimensions, and take up roome, and can be moved
from place to place, which is peculiar to Bodies; and therefore are not
Ghosts Incorporeall, that is to say, Ghosts that are in No Place;
that is to say, that are No Where; that is to say, that seeming to be
Somewhat, are Nothing. But if corporeall be taken in the most vulgar
manner, for such Substances as are perceptible by our externall Senses;
then is Substance Incorporeall, a thing not Imaginary, but Reall;
namely, a thin Substance Invisible, but that hath the same dimensions
that are in grosser Bodies.



Angel What

By the name of ANGEL, is signified generally, a Messenger; and most
often, a Messenger of God: And by a Messenger of God, is signified, any
thing that makes known his extraordinary Presence; that is to say, the
extraordinary manifestation of his power, especially by a Dream, or
Vision.

Concerning the creation of Angels, there is nothing delivered in the
Scriptures. That they are Spirits, is often repeated: but by the name of
Spirit, is signified both in Scripture, and vulgarly, both amongst Jews,
and Gentiles, sometimes thin Bodies; as the Aire, the Wind, the Spirits
Vitall, and Animall, of living creatures; and sometimes the Images
that rise in the fancy in Dreams, and Visions; which are not reall
Substances, but accidents of the brain; yet when God raiseth them
supernaturally, to signifie his Will, they are not unproperly termed
Gods Messengers, that is to say, his Angels.

And as the Gentiles did vulgarly conceive the Imagery of the brain, for
things really subsistent without them, and not dependent on the fancy;
and out of them framed their opinions of Daemons, Good and Evill; which
because they seemed to subsist really, they called Substances; and
because they could not feel them with their hands, Incorporeall: so also
the Jews upon the same ground, without any thing in the Old Testament
that constrained them thereunto, had generally an opinion, (except the
sect of the Sadduces,) that those apparitions (which it pleased God
sometimes to produce in the fancie of men, for his own service, and
therefore called them his Angels) were substances, not dependent on the
fancy, but permanent creatures of God; whereof those which they thought
were good to them, they esteemed the Angels of God, and those they
thought would hurt them, they called Evill Angels, or Evill Spirits;
such as was the Spirit of Python, and the Spirits of Mad-men, of
Lunatiques, and Epileptiques: For they esteemed such as were troubled
with such diseases, Daemoniaques.

But if we consider the places of the Old Testament where Angels are
mentioned, we shall find, that in most of them, there can nothing else
be understood by the word Angel, but some image raised (supernaturally)
in the fancy, to signifie the presence of God in the execution of some
supernaturall work; and therefore in the rest, where their nature is not
exprest, it may be understood in the same manner.

For we read Gen. 16. that the same apparition is called, not onely an
Angel, but God; where that which (verse 7.) is called the Angel of
the Lord, in the tenth verse, saith to Agar, "I will multiply thy seed
exceedingly;" that is, speaketh in the person of God. Neither was this
apparition a Fancy figured, but a Voice. By which it is manifest,
that Angel signifieth there, nothing but God himself, that caused Agar
supernaturally to apprehend a voice supernaturall, testifying Gods
speciall presence there. Why therefore may not the Angels that appeared
to Lot, and are called Gen. 19.13. Men; and to whom, though they were
but two, Lot speaketh (ver. 18.) as but one, and that one, as God, (for
the words are, "Lot said unto them, Oh not so my Lord") be understood of
images of men, supernaturally formed in the Fancy; as well as before by
Angel was understood a fancyed Voice? When the Angel called to Abraham
out of heaven, to stay his hand (Gen. 22.11.) from slaying Isaac, there
was no Apparition, but a Voice; which neverthelesse was called properly
enough a Messenger, or Angel of God, because it declared Gods will
supernaturally, and saves the labour of supposing any permanent Ghosts.
The Angels which Jacob saw on the Ladder of Heaven (Gen. 28.12.) were
a Vision of his sleep; therefore onely Fancy, and a Dream; yet being
supernaturall, and signs of Gods Speciall presence, those apparitions
are not improperly called Angels. The same is to be understood
(Gen.31.11.) where Jacob saith thus, "The Angel of the Lord appeared to
mee in my sleep." For an apparition made to a man in his sleep, is
that which all men call a Dreame, whether such Dreame be naturall, or
supernaturall: and that which there Jacob calleth an Angel, was God
himselfe; for the same Angel saith (verse 13.) "I am the God of Bethel."

Also (Exod.14.9.) the Angel that went before the Army of Israel to the
Red Sea, and then came behind it, is (verse 19.) the Lord himself; and
he appeared not in the form of a beautifull man, but in form (by day)
of a Pillar Of Cloud and (by night) in form of a Pillar Of Fire; and yet
this Pillar was all the apparition, and Angel promised to Moses (Exod.
14.9.) for the Armies guide: For this cloudy pillar, is said, to have
descended, and stood at the dore of the Tabernacle, and to have talked
with Moses.

There you see Motion, and Speech, which are commonly attributed to
Angels, attributed to a Cloud, because the Cloud served as a sign of
Gods presence; and was no lesse an Angel, then if it had had the form of
a Man, or Child of never so great beauty; or Wings, as usually they are
painted, for the false instruction of common people. For it is not the
shape; but their use, that makes them Angels. But their use is to be
significations of Gods presence in supernaturall operations; As when
Moses (Exod. 33.14.) had desired God to goe along with the Campe, (as
he had done alwaies before the making of the Golden Calfe,) God did not
answer, "I will goe," nor "I will send an Angel in my stead;" but thus,
"my presence shall goe with thee."

To mention all the places of the Old Testament where the name of Angel
is found, would be too long. Therefore to comprehend them all at once,
I say, there is no text in that part of the Old Testament, which the
Church of England holdeth for Canonicall, from which we can conclude,
there is, or hath been created, any permanent thing (understood by the
name of Spirit or Angel,) that hath not quantity; and that may not be,
by the understanding divided; that is to say, considered by parts; so
as one part may bee in one place, and the next part in the next place
to it; and, in summe, which is not (taking Body for that, which is some
what, or some where) Corporeall; but in every place, the sense will bear
the interpretation of Angel, for Messenger; as John Baptist is called
an Angel, and Christ the Angel of the Covenant; and as (according to the
same Analogy) the Dove, and the Fiery Tongues, in that they were signes
of Gods speciall presence, might also be called Angels. Though we find
in Daniel two names of Angels, Gabriel, and Michael; yet is cleer out of
the text it selfe, (Dan. 12.1) that by Michael is meant Christ, not as
an Angel, but as a Prince: and that Gabriel (as the like apparitions
made to other holy men in their sleep) was nothing but a supernaturall
phantasme, by which it seemed to Daniel, in his dream, that two Saints
being in talke, one of them said to the other, "Gabriel, let us make
this man understand his Vision:" For God needeth not, to distinguish
his Celestiall servants by names, which are usefull onely to the short
memories of Mortalls. Nor in the New Testament is there any place, out
of which it can be proved, that Angels (except when they are put for
such men, as God hath made the Messengers, and Ministers of his word,
or works) are things permanent, and withall incorporeall. That they
are permanent, may bee gathered from the words of our Saviour himselfe,
(Mat. 25.41.) where he saith, it shall be said to the wicked in the last
day, "Go ye cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his
Angels:" which place is manifest for the permanence of Evill Angels,
(unlesse wee might think the name of Devill and his Angels may be
understood of the Churches Adversaries and their Ministers;) but then
it is repugnant to their Immateriality; because Everlasting fire is no
punishment to impatible substances, such as are all things Incorporeall.
Angels therefore are not thence proved to be Incorporeall. In like
manner where St. Paul sayes (1 Cor. 6.3.) "Knew ye not that wee shall
judge the Angels?" And (2 Pet. 2.4.) "For if God spared not the Angels
that sinned, but cast them down into Hell." And (Jude 1,6.) "And the
Angels that kept not their first estate, but left their owne habitation,
hee hath reserved in everlasting chaines under darknesse unto the
Judgement of the last day;" though it prove the Permanence of Angelicall
nature, it confirmeth also their Materiality. And (Mat. 22.30.) In the
resurrection men doe neither marry, nor give in marriage, but are as
the Angels of God in heaven:" but in the resurrection men shall be
Permanent, and not Incorporeall; so therefore also are the Angels.

There be divers other places out of which may be drawn the like
conclusion. To men that understand the signification of these words,
Substance, and Incorporeall; as Incorporeall is taken not for subtile
body, but for Not Body, they imply a contradiction: insomuch as to say,
an Angel, or Spirit is (in that sense) an Incorporeall Substance, is
to say in effect, there is no Angel nor Spirit at all. Considering
therefore the signification of the word Angel in the Old Testament, and
the nature of Dreams and Visions that happen to men by the ordinary way
of Nature; I was enclined to this opinion, that Angels were nothing
but supernaturall apparitions of the Fancy, raised by the speciall
and extraordinary operation of God, thereby to make his presence and
commandements known to mankind, and chiefly to his own people. But the
many places of the New Testament, and our Saviours own words, and in
such texts, wherein is no suspicion of corruption of the Scripture, have
extorted from my feeble Reason, an acknowledgement, and beleef, that
there be also Angels substantiall, and permanent. But to beleeve they be
in no place, that is to say, no where, that is to say, nothing, as they
(though indirectly) say, that will have them Incorporeall, cannot by
Scripture bee evinced.



Inspiration What

On the signification of the word Spirit, dependeth that of the word
INSPIRATION; which must either be taken properly; and then it is nothing
but the blowing into a man some thin and subtile aire, or wind, in such
manner as a man filleth a bladder with his breath; or if Spirits be not
corporeal, but have their existence only in the fancy, it is nothing but
the blowing in of a Phantasme; which is improper to say, and impossible;
for Phantasmes are not, but only seem to be somewhat. That word
therefore is used in the Scripture metaphorically onely: As (Gen. 2.7.)
where it is said, that God Inspired into man the breath of life, no more
is meant, then that God gave unto him vitall motion. For we are not to
think that God made first a living breath, and then blew it into Adam
after he was made, whether that breath were reall, or seeming; but only
as it is (Acts 17.25.) "that he gave him life and breath;" that is,
made him a living creature. And where it is said (2 Tim. 3.16.) "all
Scripture is given by Inspiration from God," speaking there of the
Scripture of the Old Testament, it is an easie metaphor, to signifie,
that God enclined the spirit or mind of those Writers, to write that
which should be usefull, in teaching, reproving, correcting, and
instructing men in the way of righteous living. But where St. Peter (2
Pet. 1.21.) saith, that "Prophecy came not in old time by the will
of man, but the holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy
Spirit," by the Holy Spirit, is meant the voice of God in a Dream, or
Vision supernaturall, which is not Inspiration; Nor when our Saviour
breathing on his Disciples, said, "Receive the Holy Spirit," was that
Breath the Spirit, but a sign of the spirituall graces he gave unto
them. And though it be said of many, and of our Saviour himself, that he
was full of the Holy Spirit; yet that Fulnesse is not to be understood
for Infusion of the substance of God, but for accumulation of his gifts,
such as are the gift of sanctity of life, of tongues, and the like,
whether attained supernaturally, or by study and industry; for in all
cases they are the gifts of God. So likewise where God sayes (Joel
2.28.) "I will powre out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your Sons and
your Daughters shall prophecy, your Old men shall dream Dreams, and your
Young men shall see Visions," wee are not to understand it in the
proper sense, as if his Spirit were like water, subject to effusion, or
infusion; but as if God had promised to give them Propheticall Dreams,
and Visions. For the proper use of the word Infused, in speaking of
the graces of God, is an abuse of it; for those graces are Vertues, not
Bodies to be carryed hither and thither, and to be powred into men, as
into barrels.

In the same manner, to take Inspiration in the proper sense, or to
say that Good Spirits entred into men to make them prophecy, or Evill
Spirits into those that became Phrenetique, Lunatique, or Epileptique,
is not to take the word in the sense of the Scripture; for the Spirit
there is taken for the power of God, working by causes to us unknown. As
also (Acts 2.2.) the wind, that is there said to fill the house wherein
the Apostles were assembled on the day of Pentecost, is not to be
understood for the Holy Spirit, which is the Deity it self; but for an
Externall sign of Gods speciall working on their hearts, to effect in
them the internall graces, and holy vertues hee thought requisite for
the performance of their Apostleship.


CHAPTER XXXV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF KINGDOME OF GOD, OF
HOLY, SACRED, AND SACRAMENT



Kingdom Of God Taken By Divines Metaphorically But In The Scriptures

Properly

The Kingdome of God in the Writings of Divines, and specially in
Sermons, and Treatises of Devotion, is taken most commonly for Eternall
Felicity, after this life, in the Highest Heaven, which they also call
the Kingdome of Glory; and sometimes for (the earnest of that felicity)
Sanctification, which they terme the Kingdome of Grace, but never
for the Monarchy, that is to say, the Soveraign Power of God over
any Subjects acquired by their own consent, which is the proper
signification of Kingdome.

To the contrary, I find the KINGDOME OF GOD, to signifie in most places
of Scripture, a Kingdome Properly So Named, constituted by the Votes
of the People of Israel in peculiar manner; wherein they chose God
for their King by Covenant made with him, upon Gods promising them the
possession of the land of Canaan; and but seldom metaphorically;
and then it is taken for Dominion Over Sinne; (and only in the New
Testament;) because such a Dominion as that, every Subject shall have in
the Kingdome of God, and without prejudice to the Soveraign.

From the very Creation, God not only reigned over all men Naturally by
his might; but also had Peculiar Subjects, whom he commanded by a Voice,
as one man speaketh to another. In which manner he Reigned over Adam,
and gave him commandement to abstaine from the tree of cognizance of
Good and Evill; which when he obeyed not, but tasting thereof, took upon
him to be as God, judging between Good and Evill, not by his Creators
commandement, but by his own sense, his punishment was a privation of
the estate of Eternall life, wherein God had at first created him: And
afterwards God punished his posterity, for their vices, all but eight
persons, with an universall deluge; And in these eight did consist the
then Kingdome Of God.



The Originall Of The Kingdome Of God

After this, it pleased God to speak to Abraham, and (Gen. 17.7,8.) to
make a Covenant with him in these words, "I will establish my Covenant
between me, and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations,
for an everlasting Covenant, to be a God to thee, and to thy seed after
thee; And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land
wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting
possession." And for a memoriall, and a token of this Covenant, he
ordaineth (verse 11.) the Sacrament of Circumcision. This is it which is
called the Old Covenant, or Testament; and containeth a Contract between
God and Abraham; by which Abraham obligeth himself, and his posterity,
in a peculiar manner to be subject to Gods positive Law; for to the Law
Morall he was obliged before, as by an Oath of Allegiance. And though
the name of King be not yet given to God, nor of Kingdome to Abraham and
his seed; yet the thing is the same; namely, an Institution by pact,
of Gods peculiar Soveraignty over the seed of Abraham; which in the
renewing of the same Covenant by Moses, at Mount Sinai, is expressely
called a peculiar Kingdome of God over the Jews: and it is of Abraham
(not of Moses) St. Paul saith (Rom. 4.11.) that he is the "Father of the
Faithfull," that is, of those that are loyall, and doe not violate their
Allegiance sworn to God, then by Circumcision, and afterwards in the New
Covenant by Baptisme.



That The Kingdome Of God Is Properly His Civill Soveraignty Over

A Peculiar People By Pact

This Covenant, at the Foot of Mount Sinai, was renewed by Moses (Exod.
19.5.) where the Lord commandeth Moses to speak to the people in this
manner, "If you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my Covenant, then
yee shall be a peculiar people to me, for all the Earth is mine; and
yee shall be unto me a Sacerdotall Kingdome, and an holy Nation." For a
"Peculiar people" the vulgar Latine hath, Peculium De Cunctis Populis:
the English translation made in the beginning of the Reign of King
James, hath, a "Peculiar treasure unto me above all Nations;" and the
Geneva French, "the most precious Jewel of all Nations." But the truest
Translation is the first, because it is confirmed by St. Paul himself
(Tit. 2.14.) where he saith, alluding to that place, that our blessed
Saviour "gave himself for us, that he might purifie us to himself, a
peculiar (that is, an extraordinary) people:" for the word is in the
Greek periousios, which is opposed commonly to the word epiousios: and
as this signifieth Ordinary, Quotidian, or (as in the Lords Prayer) Of
Daily Use; so the other signifieth that which is Overplus, and Stored
Up, and Enjoyed In A Speciall Manner; which the Latines call Peculium;
and this meaning of the place is confirmed by the reason God rendereth
of it, which followeth immediately, in that he addeth, "For all the
Earth is mine," as if he should say, "All the Nations of the world are
mine;" but it is not so that you are mine, but in a Speciall Manner: For
they are all mine, by reason of my Power; but you shall be mine, by your
own Consent, and Covenant; which is an addition to his ordinary title,
to all nations.

The same is again confirmed in expresse words in the same Text, "Yee
shall be to me a Sacerdotall Kingdome, and an holy Nation." The Vulgar
Latine hath it, Regnum Sacerdotale, to which agreeth the Translation of
that place (1 Pet. 2.9.) Sacerdotium Regale, A Regal Priesthood; as also
the Institution it self, by which no man might enter into the Sanctum
Sanctorum, that is to say, no man might enquire Gods will immediately of
God himselfe, but onely the High Priest. The English Translation before
mentioned, following that of Geneva, has, "a Kingdome of Priests;" which
is either meant of the succession of one High Priest after another, or
else it accordeth not with St. Peter, nor with the exercise of the High
Priesthood; For there was never any but the High Priest onely, that was
to informe the People of Gods Will; nor any Convocation of Priests ever
allowed to enter into the Sanctum Sanctorum.

Again, the title of a Holy Nation confirmes the same: For Holy
signifies, that which is Gods by speciall, not by generall Right. All
the Earth (as is said in the text) is Gods; but all the Earth is
not called Holy, but that onely which is set apart for his especiall
service, as was the Nation of the Jews. It is therefore manifest enough
by this one place, that by the Kingdome of God, is properly meant a
Common-wealth, instituted (by the consent of those which were to be
subject thereto) for their Civill Government, and the regulating of
their behaviour, not onely towards God their King, but also towards one
another in point of justice, and towards other Nations both in peace and
warre; which properly was a Kingdome, wherein God was King, and the
High priest was to be (after the death of Moses) his sole Viceroy, or
Lieutenant.

But there be many other places that clearly prove the same. As first (1
Sam. 8.7.) when the Elders of Israel (grieved with the corruption of
the Sons of Samuel) demanded a King, Samuel displeased therewith, prayed
unto the Lord; and the Lord answering said unto him, "Hearken unto the
voice of the People, for they have not rejected thee, but they have
rejected me, that I should not reign over them." Out of which it is
evident, that God himself was then their King; and Samuel did not
command the people, but only delivered to them that which God from time
to time appointed him.

Again, (1 Sam. 12.12.) where Samuel saith to the People, "When yee saw
that Nahash King of the Children of Ammon came against you, ye said unto
me, Nay, but a King shall reign over us, when the Lord your God was your
King:" It is manifest that God was their King, and governed the Civill
State of their Common-wealth.

And after the Israelites had rejected God, the Prophets did foretell his
restitution; as (Isaiah 24.23.) "Then the Moon shall be confounded, and
the Sun ashamed when the Lord of Hosts shall reign in Mount Zion, and
in Jerusalem;" where he speaketh expressely of his Reign in Zion, and
Jerusalem; that is, on Earth. And (Micah 4.7.) "And the Lord shall
reign over them in Mount Zion:" This Mount Zion is in Jerusalem upon the
Earth. And (Ezek. 20.33.) "As I live, saith the Lord God, surely with a
mighty hand, and a stretched out arme, and with fury powred out, I wil
rule over you; and (verse 37.) I will cause you to passe under the rod,
and I will bring you into the bond of the Covenant;" that is, I will
reign over you, and make you to stand to that Covenant which you made
with me by Moses, and brake in your rebellion against me in the days of
Samuel, and in your election of another King.

And in the New testament, the Angel Gabriel saith of our Saviour (Luke
1.32,33) "He shall be great, and be called the Son of the Most High,
and the Lord shall give him the throne of his Father David; and he shall
reign over the house of Jacob for ever; and of his Kingdome there shall
be no end." This is also a Kingdome upon Earth; for the claim whereof,
as an enemy to Caesar, he was put to death; the title of his crosse,
was, Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews; hee was crowned in scorn with
a crown of Thornes; and for the proclaiming of him, it is said of
the Disciples (Acts 17.7.) "That they did all of them contrary to
the decrees of Caesar, saying there was another King, one Jesus. The
Kingdome therefore of God, is a reall, not a metaphoricall Kingdome; and
so taken, not onely in the Old Testament, but the New; when we say, "For
thine is the Kingdome, the Power, and Glory," it is to be understood of
Gods Kingdome, by force of our Covenant, not by the Right of Gods Power;
for such a Kingdome God alwaies hath; so that it were superfluous to
say in our prayer, "Thy Kingdome come," unlesse it be meant of the
Restauration of that Kingdome of God by Christ, which by revolt of the
Israelites had been interrupted in the election of Saul. Nor had it been
proper to say, "The Kingdome of Heaven is at hand," or to pray, "Thy
Kingdome come," if it had still continued.

There be so many other places that confirm this interpretation, that it
were a wonder there is no greater notice taken of it, but that it gives
too much light to Christian Kings to see their right of Ecclesiastical
Government. This they have observed, that in stead of a Sacerdotall
Kingdome, translate, a Kingdome of Priests: for they may as well
translate a Royall Priesthood, (as it is in St. Peter) into a Priesthood
of Kings. And whereas, for a Peculiar People, they put a Pretious Jewel,
or Treasure, a man might as well call the speciall Regiment, or Company
of a Generall, the Generalls pretious Jewel, or his Treasure.

In short, the Kingdome of God is a Civill Kingdome; which consisted,
first in the obligation of the people of Israel to those Laws, which
Moses should bring unto them from Mount Sinai; and which afterwards the
High Priest of the time being, should deliver to them from before the
Cherubins in the Sanctum Sanctorum; and which kingdome having been cast
off, in the election of Saul, the Prophets foretold, should be restored
by Christ; and the Restauration whereof we daily pray for, when we
say in the Lords Prayer, "Thy Kingdome come;" and the Right whereof we
acknowledge, when we adde, "For thine is the Kingdome, the Power, and
Glory, for ever and ever, Amen;" and the Proclaiming whereof, was
the Preaching of the Apostles; and to which men are prepared, by the
Teachers of the Gospel; to embrace which Gospel, (that is to say, to
promise obedience to Gods government) is, to bee in the Kingdome of
Grace, because God hath gratis given to such the power to bee the
subjects (that is, Children) of God hereafter, when Christ shall come
in Majesty to judge the world, and actually to govern his owne people,
which is called the Kingdome of Glory. If the Kingdome of God (called
also the Kingdome of Heaven, from the gloriousnesse, and admirable
height of that throne) were not a Kingdome which God by his Lieutenant,
or Vicars, who deliver his Commandements to the people, did exercise on
Earth; there would not have been so much contention, and warre, about
who it is, by whom God speaketh to us; neither would many Priests have
troubled themselves with Spirituall Jurisdiction, nor any King have
denied it them.

Out of this literall interpretation of the Kingdome of God, ariseth also
the true interpretation of the word HOLY. For it is a word, which in
Gods Kingdome answereth to that, which men in their Kingdomes use to
call Publique, or the Kings.

The King of any Countrey is the Publique Person, or Representative of
all his own Subjects. And God the King of Israel was the Holy One of
Israel. The Nation which is subject to one earthly Soveraign, is the
Nation of that Soveraign, that is, of the Publique Person. So the Jews,
who were Gods Nation, were called (Exod. 19.6.) "a Holy Nation." For by
Holy, is alwaies understood, either God himselfe, or that which is Gods
in propriety; as by Publique is alwaies meant, either the Person of the
Common-wealth it self, or something that is so the Common-wealths, as no
private person can claim any propriety therein.

Therefore the Sabbath (Gods day) is a Holy Day; the Temple, (Gods house)
a Holy House; Sacrifices, Tithes, and Offerings (Gods tribute) Holy
Duties; Priests, Prophets, and anointed Kings, under Christ (Gods
ministers) Holy Men; The Coelestiall ministring Spirits (Gods
Messengers) Holy Angels; and the like: and wheresoever the word Holy is
taken properly, there is still something signified of Propriety, gotten
by consent. In saying "Hallowed be thy name," we do but pray to God for
grace to keep the first Commandement, of "having no other Gods but
Him." Mankind is Gods Nation in propriety: but the Jews only were a Holy
Nation. Why, but because they became his Propriety by covenant.



Sacred What

And the word Profane, is usually taken in the Scripture for the same
with Common; and consequently their contraries, Holy, and Proper, in the
Kingdome of God must be the same also. But figuratively, those men also
are called Holy, that led such godly lives, as if they had forsaken all
worldly designes, and wholly devoted, and given themselves to God.
In the proper sense, that which is made Holy by Gods appropriating or
separating it to his own use, is said to be Sanctified by God, as the
Seventh day in the fourth Commandement; and as the Elect in the New
Testament were said to bee Sanctified, when they were endued with the
Spirit of godlinesse. And that which is made Holy by the dedication of
men, and given to God, so as to be used onely in his publique service,
is called also SACRED, and said to be consecrated, as Temples, and other
Houses of Publique Prayer, and their Utensils, Priests, and Ministers,
Victimes, Offerings, and the externall matter of Sacraments.



Degrees of Sanctity

Of Holinesse there be degrees: for of those things that are set apart
for the service of God, there may bee some set apart again, for a neerer
and more especial service. The whole Nation of the Israelites were a
people Holy to God; yet the tribe of Levi was amongst the Israelites a
Holy tribe; and amongst the Levites, the Priests were yet more Holy; and
amongst the Priests, the High Priest was the most Holy. So the Land
of Judea was the Holy Land; but the Holy City wherein God was to be
worshipped, was more Holy; and again, the Temples more Holy than the
City; and the Sanctum Sanctorum more Holy than the rest of the Temple.



Sacrament

A SACRAMENT, is a separation of some visible thing from common use;
and a consecration of it to Gods service, for a sign, either of our
admission into the Kingdome of God, to be of the number of his peculiar
people, or for a Commemoration of the same. In the Old Testament, the
sign of Admission was Circumcision; in the New Testament, Baptisme. The
Commemoration of it in the Old Testament, was the Eating (at a certain
time, which was Anniversary) of the Paschall Lamb; by which they were
put in mind of the night wherein they were delivered out of their
bondage in Egypt; and in the New Testament, the celebrating of the
Lords Supper; by which, we are put in mind, of our deliverance from
the bondage of sin, by our Blessed Saviours death upon the crosse. The
Sacraments of Admission, are but once to be used, because there needs
but one Admission; but because we have need of being often put in
mind of our deliverance, and of our Allegeance, The Sacraments of
Commemoration have need to be reiterated. And these are the principall
Sacraments, and as it were the solemne oathes we make of our
Alleageance. There be also other Consecrations, that may be called
Sacraments, as the word implyeth onely Consecration to Gods service; but
as it implies an oath, or promise of Alleageance to God, there were no
other in the Old Testament, but Circumcision, and the Passover; nor
are there any other in the New Testament, but Baptisme, and the Lords
Supper.


CHAPTER XXXVI. OF THE WORD OF GOD, AND OF PROPHETS



Word What

When there is mention of the Word of God, or of Man, it doth not
signifie a part of Speech, such as Grammarians call a Nown, or a Verb,
or any simple voice, without a contexture with other words to make it
significative; but a perfect Speech or Discourse, whereby the speaker
Affirmeth, Denieth, Commandeth, Promiseth, Threateneth, Wisheth, or
Interrogateth. In which sense it is not Vocabulum, that signifies a
Word; but Sermo, (in Greek Logos) that is some Speech, Discourse, or
Saying.



The Words Spoken By God And Concerning God, Both Are Called Gods Word

In Scripture

Again, if we say the Word of God, or of Man, it may bee understood
sometimes of the Speaker, (as the words that God hath spoken, or that
a Man hath spoken): In which sense, when we say, the Gospel of St.
Matthew, we understand St. Matthew to be the Writer of it: and sometimes
of the Subject: In which sense, when we read in the Bible, "The words
of the days of the Kings of Israel, or Judah," 'tis meant, that the acts
that were done in those days, were the Subject of those Words; And in
the Greek, which (in the Scripture) retaineth many Hebraismes, by the
Word of God is oftentimes meant, not that which is spoken by God, but
concerning God, and his government; that is to say, the Doctrine of
Religion: Insomuch, as it is all one, to say Logos Theou, and Theologia;
which is, that Doctrine which wee usually call Divinity, as is manifest
by the places following (Acts 13.46.) "Then Paul and Barnabas waxed
bold, and said, It was necessary that the Word of God should first
have been spoken to you, but seeing you put it from you, and judge your
selves unworthy of everlasting life, loe, we turn to the Gentiles."
That which is here called the Word of god, was the Doctrine of Christian
Religion; as it appears evidently by that which goes before. And (Acts
5.20.) where it is said to the Apostles by an Angel, "Go stand and speak
in the Temple, all the Words of this life;" by the Words of this life,
is meant, the Doctrine of the Gospel; as is evident by what they did in
the Temple, and is expressed in the last verse of the same Chap. "Daily
in the Temple, and in every house they ceased not to teach and preach
Christ Jesus:" In which place it is manifest, that Jesus Christ was the
subject of this Word of Life; or (which is all one) the subject of the
Words of this Life Eternall, that our saviour offered them. So (Acts
15.7.) the Word of God, is called the Word of the Gospel, because it
containeth the Doctrine of the Kingdome of Christ; and the same Word
(Rom. 10.8,9.) is called the Word of Faith; that is, as is there
expressed, the Doctrine of Christ come, and raised from the dead. Also
(Mat. 13. 19.) "When any one heareth the Word of the Kingdome;" that is,
the Doctrine of the Kingdome taught by Christ. Again, the same Word, is
said (Acts 12. 24.) "to grow and to be multiplied;" which to understand
of the Evangelicall Doctrine is easie, but of the Voice, or Speech
of God, hard and strange. In the same sense the Doctrine of Devils,
signifieth not the Words of any Devill, but the Doctrine of Heathen men
concerning Daemons, and those Phantasms which they worshipped as Gods.
(1 Tim. 4.1.)

Considering these two significations of the WORD OF GOD, as it is taken
in Scripture, it is manifest in this later sense (where it is taken for
the Doctrine of the Christian Religion,) that the whole scripture is the
Word of God: but in the former sense not so. For example, though these
words, "I am the Lord thy God, &c." to the end of the Ten Commandements,
were spoken by God to Moses; yet the Preface, "God spake these words
and said," is to be understood for the Words of him that wrote the holy
History. The Word of God, as it is taken for that which he hath spoken,
is understood sometimes Properly, sometimes Metaphorically. Properly,
as the words, he hath spoken to his Prophets; Metaphorically, for his
Wisdome, Power, and eternall Decree, in making the world; in which
sense, those Fiats, "Let there be light," "Let there be a firmament,"
"Let us make man," &c. (Gen. 1.) are the Word of God. And in the same
sense it is said (John 1.3.) "All things were made by it, and without it
was nothing made that was made; And (Heb. 1.3.) "He upholdeth all things
by the word of his Power;" that is, by the Power of his Word; that is,
by his Power; and (Heb. 11.3.) "The worlds were framed by the Word
of God;" and many other places to the same sense: As also amongst the
Latines, the name of Fate, which signifieth properly The Word Spoken, is
taken in the same sense.



Secondly, For The Effect Of His Word

Secondly, for the effect of his Word; that is to say, for the thing it
self, which by his Word is Affirmed, Commanded, Threatned, or Promised;
as (Psalm 105.19.) where Joseph is said to have been kept in prison,
"till his Word was come;" that is, till that was come to passe which
he had (Gen. 40.13.) foretold to Pharaohs Butler, concerning his being
restored to his office: for there by His Word Was Come, is meant, the
thing it self was come to passe. So also (1 King. 18.36.) Elijah saith
to God, "I have done all these thy Words," in stead of "I have done all
these things at thy Word," or commandement: and (Jer. 17.15.) "Where is
the Word of the Lord," is put for, "Where is the Evill he threatened:"
And (Ezek. 12.28.) "There shall none of my Words be prolonged any
more:" by "Words" are understood those Things, which God promised to his
people. And in the New Testament (Mat. 24.35.) "heaven and earth shal
pass away, but my Words shall not pass away;" that is, there is nothing
that I have promised or foretold, that shall not come to passe. And in
this sense it is, that St. John the Evangelist, and, I think, St. John
onely calleth our Saviour himself as in the flesh "the Word of God
(as Joh. 1.14.) the Word was made Flesh;" that is to say, the Word, or
Promise that Christ should come into the world, "who in the beginning
was with God;" that is to say, it was in the purpose of God the Father,
to send God the Son into the world, to enlighten men in the way of
Eternall life, but it was not till then put in execution, and actually
incarnate; So that our Saviour is there called "the Word," not because
he was the promise, but the thing promised. They that taking occasion
from this place, doe commonly call him the Verbe of God, do but render
the text more obscure. They might as well term him the Nown of God:
for as by Nown, so also by Verbe, men understand nothing but a part
of speech, a voice, a sound, that neither affirms, nor denies, nor
commands, nor promiseth, nor is any substance corporeall, or spirituall;
and therefore it cannot be said to bee either God, or Man; whereas our
Saviour is both. And this Word which St. John in his Gospel saith was
with God, is (in his 1 Epistle, verse 1.) called "the Word of Life;" and
(verse 2.) "The eternall life, which was with the Father:" so that he
can be in no other sense called the Word, then in that, wherein he is
called Eternall life; that is, "he that hath procured us Eternall life,"
by his comming in the flesh. So also (Apocalypse 19.13.) the Apostle
speaking of Christ, clothed in a garment dipt in bloud, saith; his name
is "the Word of God;" which is to be understood, as if he had said his
name had been, "He that was come according to the purpose of God from
the beginning, and according to his Word and promises delivered by the
Prophets." So that there is nothing here of the Incarnation of a Word,
but of the Incarnation of God the Son, therefore called the Word,
because his Incarnation was the Performance of the Promise; In like
manner as the Holy Ghost is called The Promise. (Acts 1.4. Luke 24.49.)



Thirdly, For The Words Of Reason And Equity

There are also places of the Scripture, where, by the Word of God, is
signified such Words as are consonant to reason, and equity, though
spoken sometimes neither by prophet, nor by a holy man. For Pharaoh
Necho was an Idolator; yet his Words to the good King Josiah, in which
he advised him by Messengers, not to oppose him in his march against
Carchemish, are said to have proceeded from the mouth of God; and that
Josiah not hearkning to them, was slain in the battle; as is to be read
2 Chron. 35. vers. 21,22,23. It is true, that as the same History is
related in the first book of Esdras, not Pharaoh, but Jeremiah spake
these words to Josiah, from the mouth of the Lord. But wee are to
give credit to the Canonicall Scripture, whatsoever be written in the
Apocrypha.

The Word of God, is then also to be taken for the Dictates of reason,
and equity, when the same is said in the Scriptures to bee written in
mans heart; as Psalm 36.31. Jerem. 31.33. Deut.30.11, 14. and many other
like places.



Divers Acceptions Of The Word Prophet

The name of PROPHET, signifieth in Scripture sometimes Prolocutor; that
is, he that speaketh from God to Man, or from man to God: And sometimes
Praedictor, or a foreteller of things to come; And sometimes one that
speaketh incoherently, as men that are distracted. It is most frequently
used in the sense of speaking from God to the People. So Moses, Samuel,
Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others were Prophets. And in this sense
the High Priest was a Prophet, for he only went into the Sanctum
Sanctorum, to enquire of God; and was to declare his answer to the
people. And therefore when Caiphas said, it was expedient that one man
should die for the people, St. John saith (chap. 11.51.) that "He spake
not this of himselfe, but being High Priest that year, he prophesied
that one man should dye for the nation." Also they that in Christian
Congregations taught the people, (1 Cor. 14.3.) are said to Prophecy. In
the like sense it is, that God saith to Moses (Exod. 4.16.) concerning
Aaron, "He shall be thy Spokes-man to the People; and he shall be to
thee a mouth, and thou shalt be to him in stead of God;" that which here
is Spokesman, is (chap.7.1.) interpreted Prophet; "See (saith God)
I have made thee a God to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy Brother shall be thy
Prophet." In the sense of speaking from man to God, Abraham is called
a Prophet (Genes. 20.7.) where God in a Dream speaketh to Abimelech
in this manner, "Now therefore restore the man his wife, for he is a
Prophet, and shall pray for thee;" whereby may be also gathered,
that the name of Prophet may be given, not unproperly to them that
in Christian Churches, have a Calling to say publique prayers for the
Congregation. In the same sense, the Prophets that came down from the
High place (or Hill of God) with a Psaltery, and a Tabret, and a Pipe,
and a Harp (1 Sam. 10.5,6.) and (vers. 10.) Saul amongst them, are said
to Prophecy, in that they praised God, in that manner publiquely. In the
like sense, is Miriam (Exod. 15.20.) called a Prophetesse. So is it
also to be taken (1 Cor. 11.4,5.) where St. Paul saith, "Every man that
prayeth or prophecyeth with his head covered, &c. and every woman that
prayeth or prophecyeth with her head uncovered: For Prophecy in that
place, signifieth no more, but praising God in Psalmes, and Holy Songs;
which women might doe in the Church, though it were not lawfull for them
to speak to the Congregation. And in this signification it is, that the
Poets of the Heathen, that composed Hymnes and other sorts of Poems in
the honor of their Gods, were called Vates (Prophets) as is well enough
known by all that are versed in the Books of the Gentiles, and as
is evident (Tit. 1.12.) where St. Paul saith of the Cretians, that a
Prophet of their owne said, they were Liars; not that St. Paul held
their Poets for Prophets, but acknowledgeth that the word Prophet was
commonly used to signifie them that celebrated the honour of God in
Verse



Praediction Of Future Contingents, Not Alwaies Prophecy

When by Prophecy is meant Praediction, or foretelling of future
Contingents; not only they were Prophets, who were Gods Spokesmen, and
foretold those things to others, which God had foretold to them; but
also all those Imposters, that pretend by the helpe of familiar spirits,
or by superstitious divination of events past, from false causes, to
foretell the like events in time to come: of which (as I have declared
already in the 12. chapter of this Discourse) there be many kinds, who
gain in the opinion of the common sort of men, a greater reputation
of Prophecy, by one casuall event that may bee but wrested to their
purpose, than can be lost again by never so many failings. Prophecy is
not an art, nor (when it is taken for Praediction) a constant Vocation;
but an extraordinary, and temporary Employment from God, most often of
Good men, but sometimes also of the Wicked. The woman of Endor, who
is said to have had a familiar spirit, and thereby to have raised a
Phantasme of Samuel, and foretold Saul his death, was not therefore a
Prophetesse; for neither had she any science, whereby she could raise
such a Phantasme; nor does it appear that God commanded the raising of
it; but onely guided that Imposture to be a means of Sauls terror and
discouragement; and by consequent, of the discomfiture, by which he
fell. And for Incoherent Speech, it was amongst the Gentiles taken for
one sort of Prophecy, because the Prophets of their Oracles, intoxicated
with a spirit, or vapour from the cave of the Pythian Oracle at Delphi,
were for the time really mad, and spake like mad-men; of whose loose
words a sense might be made to fit any event, in such sort, as all
bodies are said to be made of Materia prima. In the Scripture I find
it also so taken (1 Sam. 18. 10.) in these words, "And the Evill spirit
came upon Saul, and he Prophecyed in the midst of the house."



The Manner How God Hath Spoken To The Prophets

And although there be so many significations in Scripture of the word
Prophet; yet is that the most frequent, in which it is taken for him,
to whom God speaketh immediately, that which the Prophet is to say from
him, to some other man, or to the people. And hereupon a question may
be asked, in what manner God speaketh to such a Prophet. Can it (may some
say) be properly said, that God hath voice and language, when it cannot
be properly said, he hath a tongue, or other organs, as a man? The
Prophet David argueth thus, "Shall he that made the eye, not see? or he
that made the ear, not hear?" But this may be spoken, not (as usually) to
signifie Gods nature, but to signifie our intention to honor him. For
to See, and Hear, are Honorable Attributes, and may be given to God, to
declare (as far as our capacity can conceive) his Almighty power. But
if it were to be taken in the strict, and proper sense, one might argue
from his making of all parts of mans body, that he had also the same use
of them which we have; which would be many of them so uncomely, as it
would be the greatest contumely in the world to ascribe them to him.
Therefore we are to interpret Gods speaking to men immediately, for that
way (whatsoever it be), by which God makes them understand his will: And
the wayes whereby he doth this, are many; and to be sought onely in the
Holy Scripture: where though many times it be said, that God spake to
this, and that person, without declaring in what manner; yet there be
again many places, that deliver also the signes by which they were
to acknowledge his presence, and commandement; and by these may be
understood, how he spake to many of the rest.



To The Extraordinary Prophets Of The Old Testament He Spake

By Dreams, Or Visions

In what manner God spake to Adam, and Eve, and Cain, and Noah, is not
expressed; nor how he spake to Abraham, till such time as he came out of
his own countrey to Sichem in the land of Canaan; and then (Gen. 12.7.)
God is said to have Appeared to him. So there is one way, whereby God
made his presence manifest; that is, by an Apparition, or Vision. And
again, (Gen. 15.1.) The Word of the Lord came to Abraham in a Vision;
that is to say, somewhat, as a sign of Gods presence, appeared as Gods
Messenger, to speak to him. Again, the Lord appeared to Abraham (Gen.
18. 1.) by an apparition of three Angels; and to Abimelech (Gen. 20. 3.)
in a dream: To Lot (Gen. 19. 1.) by an apparition of Two Angels: And
to Hagar (Gen. 21. 17.) by the apparition of one Angel: And to Abraham
again (Gen. 22. 11.) by the apparition of a voice from heaven: And (Gen.
26. 24.) to Isaac in the night; (that is, in his sleep, or by dream):
And to Jacob (Gen. 18. 12.) in a dream; that is to say (as are the words
of the text) "Jacob dreamed that he saw a ladder, &c." And (Gen. 32. 1.)
in a Vision of Angels: And to Moses (Exod. 3.2.) in the apparition of a
flame of fire out of the midst of a bush: And after the time of Moses,
(where the manner how God spake immediately to man in the Old Testament,
is expressed) hee spake alwaies by a Vision, or by a Dream; as to
Gideon, Samuel, Eliah, Elisha, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and the rest of the
Prophets; and often in the New Testament, as to Joseph, to St. Peter, to
St. Paul, and to St. John the Evangelist in the Apocalypse.

Onely to Moses hee spake in a more extraordinary manner in Mount Sinai,
and in the Tabernacle; and to the High Priest in the Tabernacle, and in
the Sanctum Sanctorum of the Temple. But Moses, and after him the
High Priests were Prophets of a more eminent place, and degree in
Gods favour; And God himself in express words declareth, that to other
Prophets hee spake in Dreams and Visions, but to his servant Moses, in
such manner as a man speaketh to his friend. The words are these (Numb.
12. 6,7,8.) "If there be a Prophet among you, I the Lord will make my
self known to him in a Vision, and will speak unto him in a Dream. My
servant Moses is not so, who is faithfull in all my house; with him I
will speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, not in dark speeches; and
the similitude of the Lord shall he behold." And (Exod. 33. 11.) "The
Lord spake to Moses face to face, as a man speaketh to his friend."
And yet this speaking of God to Moses, was by mediation of an Angel, or
Angels, as appears expressely, Acts 7. ver. 35. and 53. and Gal. 3. 19.
and was therefore a Vision, though a more cleer Vision than was given to
other Prophets. And conformable hereunto, where God saith (Deut. 13. 1.)
"If there arise amongst you a Prophet, or Dreamer of Dreams," the later
word is but the interpretation of the former. And (Joel 2. 28.) "Your
sons and your daughters shall Prophecy; your old men shall dream Dreams,
and your young men shall see Visions:" where again, the word Prophecy is
expounded by Dream, and Vision. And in the same manner it was, that God
spake to Solomon, promising him Wisdome, Riches, and Honor; for the text
saith, (1 Kings 3. 15.) "And Solomon awoak, and behold it was a Dream:"
So that generally the Prophets extraordinary in the old Testament took
notice of the Word of God no otherwise, than from their Dreams, or
Visions, that is to say, from the imaginations which they had in their
sleep, or in an Extasie; which imaginations in every true Prophet were
supernaturall; but in false Prophets were either naturall, or feigned.

The same Prophets were neverthelesse said to speak by the Spirit; as
(Zach. 7. 12.) where the Prophet speaking of the Jewes, saith, "They
made their hearths hard as Adamant, lest they should hear the law, and
the words which the Lord of Hosts hath sent in his Spirit by the former
Prophets." By which it is manifest, that speaking by the Spirit, or
Inspiration, was not a particular manner of Gods speaking, different
from Vision, when they that were said to speak by the Spirit, were
extraordinary Prophets, such as for every new message, were to have a
particular Commission, or (which is all one) a new Dream, or Vision.

To Prophets Of Perpetuall Calling, And Supreme, God Spake In The
Old Testament From The Mercy Seat, In A Manner Not Expressed In The
Scripture. Of Prophets, that were so by a perpetuall Calling in the Old
Testament, some were Supreme, and some Subordinate: Supreme were first
Moses; and after him the High Priest, every one for his time, as long
as the Priesthood was Royall; and after the people of the Jews, had
rejected God, that he should no more reign over them, those Kings which
submitted themselves to Gods government, were also his chief Prophets;
and the High Priests office became Ministeriall. And when God was to be
consulted, they put on the holy vestments, and enquired of the Lord,
as the King commanded them, and were deprived of their office, when
the King thought fit. For King Saul (1 Sam. 13. 9.) commanded the burnt
offering to be brought, and (1 Sam. 14. 18.) he commands the Priest to
bring the Ark neer him; and (ver. 19.) again to let it alone, because he
saw an advantage upon his enemies. And in the same chapter Saul asketh
counsell of God. In like manner King David, after his being anointed,
though before he had possession of the Kingdome, is said to "enquire
of the Lord" (1 Sam. 23. 2.) whether he should fight against the
Philistines at Keilah; and (verse 10.) David commandeth the Priest to
bring him the Ephod, to enquire whether he should stay in Keilah,
or not. And King Solomon (1 Kings 2. 27.) took the Priesthood from
Abiathar, and gave it (verse 35.) to Zadoc. Therefore Moses, and
the High Priests, and the pious Kings, who enquired of God on all
extraordinary occasions, how they were to carry themselves, or what
event they were to have, were all Soveraign Prophets. But in what manner
God spake unto them, is not manifest. To say that when Moses went up to
God in Mount Sinai, it was a Dream, or Vision, such as other Prophets
had, is contrary to that distinction which God made between Moses, and
other Prophets, Numb. 12. 6,7,8. To say God spake or appeared as he
is in his own nature, is to deny his Infinitenesse, Invisibility,
Incomprehensibility. To say he spake by Inspiration, or Infusion of the
Holy Spirit, as the Holy Spirit signifieth the Deity, is to make Moses
equall with Christ, in whom onely the Godhead (as St. Paul speaketh Col.
2.9.) dwelleth bodily. And lastly, to say he spake by the Holy Spirit,
as it signifieth the graces, or gifts of the Holy Spirit, is to
attribute nothing to him supernaturall. For God disposeth men to Piety,
Justice, Mercy, Truth, Faith, and all manner of Vertue, both Morall,
and Intellectuall, by doctrine, example, and by severall occasions,
naturall, and ordinary.

And as these ways cannot be applyed to God, in his speaking to Moses, at
Mount Sinai; so also, they cannot be applyed to him, in his speaking
to the High Priests, from the Mercy-Seat. Therefore in what manner God
spake to those Soveraign Prophets of the Old Testament, whose office
it was to enquire of him, is not intelligible. In the time of the New
Testament, there was no Soveraign Prophet, but our Saviour; who was both
God that spake, and the Prophet to whom he spake.

To Prophets Of Perpetuall Calling, But Subordinate, God Spake By The
Spirit. To subordinate Prophets of perpetuall Calling, I find not any
place that proveth God spake to them supernaturally; but onely in
such manner, as naturally he inclineth men to Piety, to Beleef, to
Righteousnesse, and to other vertues all other Christian Men. Which
way, though it consist in Constitution, Instruction, Education, and the
occasions and invitements men have to Christian vertues; yet it is truly
attributed to the operation of the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit
(which we in our language call the Holy Ghost): For there is no good
inclination, that is not of the operation of God. But these operations
are not alwaies supernaturall. When therefore a Prophet is said to speak
in the Spirit, or by the Spirit of God, we are to understand no more,
but that he speaks according to Gods will, declared by the supreme
Prophet. For the most common acceptation of the word Spirit, is in the
signification of a mans intention, mind, or disposition.

In the time of Moses, there were seventy men besides himself, that
Prophecyed in the Campe of the Israelites. In what manner God spake to
them, is declared in the 11 of Numbers, verse 25. "The Lord came down in
a cloud, and spake unto Moses, and took of the Spirit that was upon him,
and gave it to the seventy Elders. And it came to passe, when the Spirit
rested upon them, they Prophecyed, and did not cease," By which it is
manifest, first, that their Prophecying to the people, was subservient,
and subordinate to the Prophecying of Moses; for that God took of the
Spirit of Moses, to put upon them; so that they Prophecyed as Moses
would have them: otherwise they had not been suffered to Prophecy at
all. For there was (verse 27.) a complaint made against them to Moses;
and Joshua would have Moses to have forbidden them; which he did not,
but said to Joshua, Bee not jealous in my behalf. Secondly, that
the Spirit of God in that place, signifieth nothing but the Mind and
Disposition to obey, and assist Moses in the administration of the
Government. For if it were meant they had the substantial Spirit of God;
that is, the Divine nature, inspired into them, then they had it in no
lesse manner than Christ himself, in whom onely the Spirit of God dwelt
bodily. It is meant therefore of the Gift and Grace of God, that guided
them to co-operate with Moses; from whom their Spirit was derived. And
it appeareth (verse 16.) that, they were such as Moses himself should
appoint for Elders and Officers of the People: For the words are,
"Gather unto me seventy men, whom thou knowest to be Elders and
Officers of the people:" where, "thou knowest," is the same with "thou
appointest," or "hast appointed to be such." For we are told
before (Exod. 18.) that Moses following the counsell of Jethro his
Father-in-law, did appoint Judges, and Officers over the people, such as
feared God; and of these, were those Seventy, whom God by putting upon
them Moses spirit, inclined to aid Moses in the Administration of the
Kingdome: and in this sense the Spirit of God is said (1 Sam. 16. 13,
14.) presently upon the anointing of David, to have come upon David, and
left Saul; God giving his graces to him he chose to govern his people,
and taking them away from him, he rejected. So that by the Spirit is
meant Inclination to Gods service; and not any supernaturall Revelation.



God Sometimes Also Spake By Lots

God spake also many times by the event of Lots; which were ordered by
such as he had put in Authority over his people. So wee read that God
manifested by the Lots which Saul caused to be drawn (1 Sam. 14. 43.)
the fault that Jonathan had committed, in eating a honey-comb, contrary
to the oath taken by the people. And (Josh. 18. 10.) God divided the
land of Canaan amongst the Israelite, by the "lots that Joshua did cast
before the Lord in Shiloh." In the same manner it seemeth to be, that
God discovered (Joshua 7.16., &c.) the crime of Achan. And these are the
wayes whereby God declared his Will in the Old Testament.

All which ways he used also in the New Testament. To the Virgin Mary, by
a Vision of an Angel: To Joseph in a Dream: again to Paul in the way
to Damascus in a Vision of our Saviour: and to Peter in the Vision of
a sheet let down from heaven, with divers sorts of flesh, of clean and
unclean, beasts; and in prison, by Vision of an Angel: And to all the
Apostles, and Writers of the New Testament, by the graces of his Spirit;
and to the Apostles again (at the choosing of Matthias in the place of
Judas Iscariot) by lot.



Every Man Ought To Examine The Probability Of A Pretended Prophets

Calling

Seeing then all Prophecy supposeth Vision, or Dream, (which two, when
they be naturall, are the same,) or some especiall gift of God, so
rarely observed in mankind, as to be admired where observed; and seeing
as well such gifts, as the most extraordinary Dreams, and Visions, may
proceed from God, not onely by his supernaturall, and immediate, but
also by his naturall operation, and by mediation of second causes;
there is need of Reason and Judgement to discern between naturall, and
supernaturall Gifts, and between naturall, and supernaturall Visions, or
Dreams. And consequently men had need to be very circumspect, and wary,
in obeying the voice of man, that pretending himself to be a Prophet,
requires us to obey God in that way, which he in Gods name telleth us to
be the way to happinesse. For he that pretends to teach men the way of
so great felicity, pretends to govern them; that is to say, to rule, and
reign over them; which is a thing, that all men naturally desire, and
is therefore worthy to be suspected of Ambition and Imposture; and
consequently, ought to be examined, and tryed by every man, before hee
yeeld them obedience; unlesse he have yeelded it them already, in
the institution of a Common-wealth; as when the Prophet is the Civill
Soveraign, or by the Civil Soveraign Authorized. And if this examination
of Prophets, and Spirits, were not allowed to every one of the people,
it had been to no purpose, to set out the marks, by which every man
might be able, to distinguish between those, whom they ought, and those
whom they ought not to follow. Seeing therefore such marks are set out
(Deut. 13. 1,&c.) to know a Prophet by; and (1 John 4.1.&C) to know a
Spirit by: and seeing there is so much Prophecying in the Old Testament;
and so much Preaching in the New Testament against Prophets; and so much
greater a number ordinarily of false Prophets, then of true; every
one is to beware of obeying their directions, at their own perill. And
first, that there were many more false than true Prophets, appears by
this, that when Ahab (1 Kings 12.) consulted four hundred Prophets, they
were all false Imposters, but onely one Michaiah. And a little before
the time of the Captivity, the Prophets were generally lyars. "The
Prophets" (saith the Lord by Jerem. cha. 14. verse 14.) "prophecy Lies
in my name. I sent them not, neither have I commanded them, nor spake
unto them, they prophecy to you a false Vision, a thing of naught; and
the deceit of their heart." In so much as God commanded the People by
the mouth of the Prophet Jeremiah (chap. 23. 16.) not to obey them.
"Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, hearken not unto the words of the
Prophets, that prophecy to you. They make you vain, they speak a Vision
of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord."



All Prophecy But Of The Soveraign Prophet Is To Be Examined

By Every Subject

Seeing then there was in the time of the Old Testament, such quarrells
amongst the Visionary Prophets, one contesting with another, and asking
When departed the Spirit from me, to go to thee? as between Michaiah,
and the rest of the four hundred; and such giving of the Lye to one
another, (as in Jerem. 14.14.) and such controversies in the New
Testament at this day, amongst the Spirituall Prophets: Every man then
was, and now is bound to make use of his Naturall Reason, to apply to
all Prophecy those Rules which God hath given us, to discern the
true from the false. Of which rules, in the Old Testament, one was,
conformable doctrine to that which Moses the Soveraign Prophet had
taught them; and the other the miraculous power of foretelling what God
would bring to passe, as I have already shown out of Deut. 13. 1. &c.
and in the New Testament there was but one onely mark; and that was the
preaching of this Doctrine, That Jesus Is The Christ, that is, the
King of the Jews, promised in the Old Testament. Whosoever denyed that
Article, he was a false Prophet, whatsoever miracles he might seem to
work; and he that taught it was a true Prophet. For St. John (1 Epist,
4. 2, &c) speaking expressely of the means to examine Spirits, whether
they be of God, or not; after he hath told them that there would arise
false Prophets, saith thus, "Hereby know ye the Spirit of God. Every
Spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of
God;" that is, is approved and allowed as a Prophet of God: not that
he is a godly man, or one of the Elect, for this, that he confesseth,
professeth, or preacheth Jesus to be the Christ; but for that he is a
Prophet avowed. For God sometimes speaketh by Prophets, whose persons he
hath not accepted; as he did by Baalam; and as he foretold Saul of his
death, by the Witch of Endor. Again in the next verse, "Every Spirit
that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh, is not
of Christ. And this is the Spirit of Antichrist." So that the rule is
perfect on both sides; that he is a true Prophet, which preacheth the
Messiah already come, in the person of Jesus; and he a false one that
denyeth him come, and looketh for him in some future Imposter, that
shall take upon him that honour falsely, whom the Apostle there properly
calleth Antichrist. Every man therefore ought to consider who is the
Soveraign Prophet; that is to say, who it is, that is Gods Viceregent
on earth; and hath next under God, the Authority of Governing Christian
men; and to observe for a Rule, that Doctrine, which in the name of
God, hee commanded to bee taught; and thereby to examine and try out
the truth of those Doctrines, which pretended Prophets with miracles, or
without, shall at any time advance: and if they find it contrary to that
Rule, to doe as they did, that came to Moses, and complained that there
were some that Prophecyed in the Campe, whose Authority so to doe they
doubted of; and leave to the Soveraign, as they did to Moses to uphold,
or to forbid them, as hee should see cause; and if hee disavow them,
then no more to obey their voice; or if he approve them, then to obey
them, as men to whom God hath given a part of the Spirit of their
Soveraigne. For when Christian men, take not their Christian Soveraign,
for Gods Prophet; they must either take their owne Dreams, for the
prophecy they mean to bee governed by, and the tumour of their own
hearts for the Spirit of God; or they must suffer themselves to bee lead
by some strange Prince; or by some of their fellow subjects, that can
bewitch them, by slander of the government, into rebellion, without
other miracle to confirm their calling, then sometimes an extraordinary
successe, and Impunity; and by this means destroying all laws, both
divine, and humane, reduce all Order, Government, and Society, to the
first Chaos of Violence, and Civill warre.


CHAPTER XXXVII. OF MIRACLES, AND THEIR USE



A Miracle Is A Work That Causeth Admiration

By Miracles are signified the Admirable works of God: & therefore they
are also called Wonders. And because they are for the most part, done,
for a signification of his commandement, in such occasions, as
without them, men are apt to doubt, (following their private naturall
reasoning,) what he hath commanded, and what not, they are commonly in
Holy Scripture, called Signes, in the same sense, as they are called by
the Latines, Ostenta, and Portenta, from shewing, and fore-signifying
that, which the Almighty is about to bring to passe.



And Must Therefore Be Rare, Whereof There Is No Naturall Cause Known

To understand therefore what is a Miracle, we must first understand what
works they are, which men wonder at, and call Admirable. And there be
but two things which make men wonder at any event: The one is, if it
be strange, that is to say, such, as the like of it hath never, or very
rarely been produced: The other is, if when it is produced, we cannot
imagine it to have been done by naturall means, but onely by the
immediate hand of God. But when wee see some possible, naturall cause of
it, how rarely soever the like has been done; or if the like have been
often done, how impossible soever it be to imagine a naturall means
thereof, we no more wonder, nor esteem it for a Miracle.

Therefore, if a Horse, or Cow should speak, it were a Miracle; because
both the thing is strange, & the Naturall cause difficult to imagin: So
also were it, to see a strange deviation of nature, in the production
of some new shape of a living creature. But when a man, or other Animal,
engenders his like, though we know no more how this is done, than the
other; yet because 'tis usuall, it is no Miracle. In like manner, if a
man be metamorphosed into a stone, or into a pillar, it is a Miracle;
because strange: but if a peece of wood be so changed; because we see it
often, it is no Miracle: and yet we know no more, by what operation of
God, the one is brought to passe, than the other.

The first Rainbow that was seen in the world, was a Miracle, because the
first; and consequently strange; and served for a sign from God, placed
in heaven, to assure his people, there should be no more an universall
destruction of the world by Water. But at this day, because they
are frequent, they are not Miracles, neither to them that know their
naturall causes, nor to them who know them not. Again, there be many
rare works produced by the Art of man: yet when we know they are done;
because thereby wee know also the means how they are done, we count them
not for Miracles, because not wrought by the immediate hand of God, but
by mediation of humane Industry.



That Which Seemeth A Miracle To One Man, May Seem Otherwise To Another

Furthermore, seeing Admiration and Wonder, is consequent to the
knowledge and experience, wherewith men are endued, some more, some
lesse; it followeth, that the same thing, may be a Miracle to one, and
not to another. And thence it is, that ignorant, and superstitious men
make great Wonders of those works, which other men, knowing to proceed
from Nature, (which is not the immediate, but the ordinary work of God,)
admire not at all: As when Ecclipses of the Sun and Moon have been taken
for supernaturall works, by the common people; when neverthelesse, there
were others, could from their naturall causes, have foretold the very
hour they should arrive: Or, as when a man, by confederacy, and secret
intelligence, getting knowledge of the private actions of an ignorant,
unwary man, thereby tells him, what he has done in former time; it seems
to him a Miraculous thing; but amongst wise, and cautelous men, such
Miracles as those, cannot easily be done.



The End Of Miracles

Again, it belongeth to the nature of a Miracle, that it be wrought for
the procuring of credit to Gods Messengers, Ministers, and Prophets,
that thereby men may know, they are called, sent, and employed by God,
and thereby be the better inclined to obey them. And therefore, though
the creation of the world, and after that the destruction of all living
creatures in the universall deluge, were admirable works; yet because
they were not done to procure credit to any Prophet, or other Minister
of God, they use not to be called Miracles. For how admirable soever any
work be, the Admiration consisteth not in that it could be done, because
men naturally beleeve the Almighty can doe all things, but because he
does it at the Prayer, or Word of a man. But the works of God in Egypt,
by the hand of Moses, were properly Miracles; because they were done
with intention to make the people of Israel beleeve, that Moses came
unto them, not out of any design of his owne interest, but as sent from
God. Therefore after God had commanded him to deliver the Israelites
from the Egyptian bondage, when he said (Exod 4.1. &c.) "They will not
beleeve me, but will say, the Lord hath not appeared unto me," God gave
him power, to turn the Rod he had in his hand into a Serpent, and again
to return it into a Rod; and by putting his hand into his bosome, to
make it leprous; and again by pulling it out to make it whole, to make
the Children of Israel beleeve (as it is verse 5.) that the God of their
Fathers had appeared unto him; And if that were not enough, he gave
him power to turn their waters into bloud. And when hee had done these
Miracles before the people, it is said (verse 41.) that "they beleeved
him." Neverthelesse, for fear of Pharaoh, they durst not yet obey him.
Therefore the other works which were done to plague Pharaoh and the
Egyptians, tended all to make the Israelites beleeve in Moses, and were
properly Miracles. In like manner if we consider all the Miracles
done by the hand of Moses, and all the rest of the Prophets, till the
Captivity; and those of our Saviour, and his Apostles afterward; we
shall find, their end was alwaies to beget, or confirm beleefe, that
they came not of their own motion, but were sent by God. Wee may further
observe in Scripture, that the end of Miracles, was to beget beleef,
not universally in all men, elect, and reprobate; but in the elect
only; that is to say, is such as God had determined should become his
Subjects. For those miraculous plagues of Egypt, had not for end, the
conversion of Pharaoh; For God had told Moses before, that he would
harden the heart of Pharaoh, that he should not let the people goe: And
when he let them goe at last, not the Miracles perswaded him, but the
plagues forced him to it. So also of our Saviour, it is written, (Mat.
13. 58.) that he wrought not many Miracles in his own countrey, because
of their unbeleef; and (in Marke 6.5.) in stead of, "he wrought not
many," it is, "he could work none." It was not because he wanted power;
which to say, were blasphemy against God; nor that the end of Miracles
was not to convert incredulous men to Christ; for the end of all the
Miracles of Moses, of Prophets, of our Saviour, and of his Apostles
was to adde men to the Church; but it was, because the end of their
Miracles, was to adde to the Church (not all men, but) such as should
be saved; that is to say, such as God had elected. Seeing therefore
our Saviour sent from his Father, hee could not use his power in the
conversion of those, whom his Father had rejected. They that expounding
this place of St. Marke, say, that his word, "Hee could not," is put
for, "He would not," do it without example in the Greek tongue, (where
Would Not, is put sometimes for Could Not, in things inanimate, that
have no will; but Could Not, for Would Not, never,) and thereby lay
a stumbling block before weak Christians; as if Christ could doe no
Miracles, but amongst the credulous.



The Definition Of A Miracle

From that which I have here set down, of the nature, and use of a
Miracle, we may define it thus, "A MIRACLE, is a work of God, (besides
his operation by the way of Nature, ordained in the Creation,) done
for the making manifest to his elect, the mission of an extraordinary
Minister for their salvation."

And from this definition, we may inferre; First, that in all Miracles,
the work done, is not the effect of any vertue in the Prophet; because
it is the effect of the immediate hand of God; that is to say God hath
done it, without using the Prophet therein, as a subordinate cause.

Secondly, that no Devil, Angel, or other created Spirit, can do a
Miracle. For it must either be by vertue of some naturall science, or
by Incantation, that is, vertue of words. For if the Inchanters do it
by their own power independent, there is some power that proceedeth not
from God; which all men deny: and if they doe it by power given them,
then is the work not from the immediate hand of God, but naturall, and
consequently no Miracle.

There be some texts of Scripture, that seem to attribute the power of
working wonders (equall to some of those immediate Miracles, wrought
by God himself,) to certain Arts of Magick, and Incantation. As for
example, when we read that after the Rod of Moses being cast on the
ground became a Serpent, (Exod. 7. 11.) "the Magicians of Egypt did the
like by their Enchantments;" and that after Moses had turned the waters
of the Egyptian Streams, Rivers, Ponds, and Pooles of water into blood,
(Exod. 7. 22.) "the Magicians of Egypt did so likewise, with their
Enchantments;" and that after Moses had by the power of God brought
frogs upon the land, (Exod. 8. 7.) "the Magicians also did so with their
Enchantments, and brought up frogs upon the land of Egypt;" will not a
man be apt to attribute Miracles to Enchantments; that is to say, to the
efficacy of the sound of Words; and think the same very well proved out
of this, and other such places? and yet there is no place of Scripture,
that telleth us what on Enchantment is. If therefore Enchantment be not,
as many think it, a working of strange effects by spells, and words;
but Imposture, and delusion, wrought by ordinary means; and so far
from supernaturall, as the Impostors need not the study so much as of
naturall causes, but the ordinary ignorance, stupidity, and superstition
of mankind, to doe them; those texts that seem to countenance the power
of Magick, Witchcraft, and Enchantment, must needs have another sense,
than at first sight they seem to bear.



That Men Are Apt To Be Deceived By False Miracles

For it is evident enough, that Words have no effect, but on those
that understand them; and then they have no other, but to signifie the
intentions, or passions of them that speak; and thereby produce, hope,
fear, or other passions, or conceptions in the hearer. Therefore when a
Rod seemeth a Serpent, or the Water Bloud, or any other Miracle seemeth
done by Enchantment; if it be not to the edification of Gods people,
not the Rod, nor the Water, nor any other thing is enchanted; that is
to say, wrought upon by the Words, but the Spectator. So that all the
Miracle consisteth in this, that the Enchanter has deceived a man; which
is no Miracle, but a very easie matter to doe.

For such is the ignorance, and aptitude to error generally of all men,
but especially of them that have not much knowledge of naturall causes,
and of the nature, and interests of men; as by innumerable and easie
tricks to be abused. What opinion of miraculous power, before it was
known there was a Science of the course of the Stars, might a man have
gained, that should have told the people, This hour, or day the Sun
should be darkned? A juggler by the handling of his goblets, and other
trinkets, if it were not now ordinarily practised, would be thought
to do his wonders by the power at least of the Devil. A man that hath
practised to speak by drawing in of his breath, (which kind of men in
antient time were called Ventriloqui,) and so make the weaknesse of
his voice seem to proceed, not from the weak impulsion of the organs
of Speech, but from distance of place, is able to make very many men
beleeve it is a voice from Heaven, whatsoever he please to tell them.
And for a crafty man, that hath enquired into the secrets, and familiar
confessions that one man ordinarily maketh to another of his actions and
adventures past, to tell them him again is no hard matter; and yet there
be many, that by such means as that, obtain the reputation of being
Conjurers. But it is too long a businesse, to reckon up the severall
sorts of those men, which the Greeks called Thaumaturgi, that is to say,
workers of things wonderfull; and yet these do all they do, by their
own single dexterity. But if we looke upon the Impostures wrought by
Confederacy, there is nothing how impossible soever to be done, that is
impossible to bee beleeved. For two men conspiring, one to seem lame,
the other to cure him with a charme, will deceive many: but many
conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the rest
to bear witnesse; will deceive many more.



Cautions Against The Imposture Of Miracles

In this aptitude of mankind, to give too hasty beleefe to pretended
Miracles, there can be no better, nor I think any other caution, than
that which God hath prescribed, first by Moses, (as I have said before
in the precedent chapter,) in the beginning of the 13. and end of the
18. of Deuteronomy; That wee take not any for Prophets, that teach any
other Religion, then that which Gods Lieutenant, (which at that time was
Moses,) hath established; nor any, (though he teach the same Religion,)
whose Praediction we doe not see come to passe. Moses therefore in his
time, and Aaron, and his successors in their times, and the Soveraign
Governour of Gods people, next under God himself, that is to say, the
Head of the Church in all times, are to be consulted, what doctrine
he hath established, before wee give credit to a pretended Miracle, or
Prophet. And when that is done, the thing they pretend to be a Miracle,
we must both see it done, and use all means possible to consider,
whether it be really done; and not onely so, but whether it be such, as
no man can do the like by his naturall power, but that it requires the
immediate hand of God. And in this also we must have recourse to Gods
Lieutenant; to whom in all doubtfull cases, wee have submitted our
private judgments. For Example; if a man pretend, that after certain
words spoken over a peece of bread, that presently God hath made it not
bread, but a God, or a man, or both, and neverthelesse it looketh still
as like bread as ever it did; there is no reason for any man to think
it really done; nor consequently to fear him, till he enquire of God,
by his Vicar, or Lieutenant, whether it be done, or not. If he say not,
then followeth that which Moses saith, (Deut. 18. 22.) "he hath spoken
it presumptuously, thou shalt not fear him." If he say 'tis done, then
he is not to contradict it. So also if wee see not, but onely hear tell
of a Miracle, we are to consult the Lawful Church; that is to say, the
lawful Head thereof, how far we are to give credit to the relators of
it. And this is chiefly the case of men, that in these days live under
Christian Soveraigns. For in these times, I do not know one man, that
ever saw any such wondrous work, done by the charm, or at the word,
or prayer of a man, that a man endued but with a mediocrity of reason,
would think supernaturall: and the question is no more, whether what wee
see done, be a Miracle; whether the Miracle we hear, or read of, were
a reall work, and not the Act of a tongue, or pen; but in plain terms,
whether the report be true, or a lye. In which question we are not every
one, to make our own private Reason, or Conscience, but the Publique
Reason, that is, the reason of Gods Supreme Lieutenant, Judge; and
indeed we have made him Judge already, if wee have given him a Soveraign
power, to doe all that is necessary for our peace and defence. A private
man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,) to beleeve,
or not beleeve in his heart, those acts that have been given out for
Miracles, according as he shall see, what benefit can accrew by
mens belief, to those that pretend, or countenance them, and thereby
conjecture, whether they be Miracles, or Lies. But when it comes
to confession of that faith, the Private Reason must submit to the
Publique; that is to say, to Gods Lieutenant. But who is this Lieutenant
of God, and Head of the Church, shall be considered in its proper place
thereafter.


CHAPTER XXXVIII. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF ETERNALL LIFE,

HELL, SALVATION, THE WORLD TO COME, AND REDEMPTION

The maintenance of Civill Society, depending on Justice; and Justice on
the power of Life and Death, and other lesse Rewards and Punishments,
residing in them that have the Soveraignty of the Common-wealth; It
is impossible a Common-wealth should stand, where any other than the
Soveraign, hath a power of giving greater rewards than Life; and of
inflicting greater punishments than Death. Now seeing Eternall Life is
a greater reward, than the Life Present; and Eternall Torment a greater
punishment than the Death of Nature; It is a thing worthy to be well
considered, of all men that desire (by obeying Authority) to avoid
the calamities of Confusion, and Civill war, what is meant in Holy
Scripture, by Life Eternall, and Torment Eternall; and for what
offences, against whom committed, men are to be Eternally Tormented; and
for what actions, they are to obtain Eternall Life.



Place Of Adams Eternity If He Had Not Sinned, The Terrestrial Paradise

And first we find, that Adam was created in such a condition of life,
as had he not broken the commandement of God, he had enjoyed it in the
Paradise of Eden Everlastingly. For there was the Tree of Life; whereof
he was so long allowed to eat, as he should forbear to eat of the tree
of Knowledge of Good an Evill; which was not allowed him. And therefore
as soon as he had eaten of it, God thrust him out of Paradise, "lest he
should put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and live
for ever." (Gen. 3. 22.) By which it seemeth to me, (with submission
neverthelesse both in this, and in all questions, whereof the
determination dependeth on the Scriptures, to the interpretation of the
Bible authorized by the Common-wealth, whose Subject I am,) that Adam if
he had not sinned, had had an Eternall Life on Earth: and that Mortality
entred upon himself, and his posterity, by his first Sin. Not that
actuall Death then entred; for Adam then could never have had children;
whereas he lived long after, and saw a numerous posterity ere he dyed.
But where it is said, "In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt
surely die," it must needs bee meant of his Mortality, and certitude
of death. Seeing then Eternall life was lost by Adams forfeiture, in
committing sin, he that should cancell that forfeiture was to recover
thereby, that Life again. Now Jesus Christ hath satisfied for the sins
of all that beleeve in him; and therefore recovered to all beleevers,
that ETERNALL LIFE, which was lost by the sin of Adam. And in this sense
it is, that the comparison of St. Paul holdeth (Rom. 5.18, 19.) "As by
the offence of one, Judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even
so by the righteousnesse of one, the free gift came upon all men
to Justification of Life." Which is again (1 Cor. 15.21,22) more
perspicuously delivered in these words, "For since by man came death, by
man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even
so in Christ shall all be made alive."



Texts Concerning The Place Of Life Eternall For Beleevers

Concerning the place wherein men shall enjoy that Eternall Life, which
Christ hath obtained for them, the texts next before alledged seem to
make it on Earth. For if as in Adam, all die, that is, have forfeited
Paradise, and Eternall Life on Earth; even so in Christ all shall be
made alive; then all men shall be made to live on Earth; for else
the comparison were not proper. Hereunto seemeth to agree that of the
Psalmist, (Psal. 133.3.) "Upon Zion God commanded the blessing, even
Life for evermore;" for Zion, is in Jerusalem, upon Earth: as also that
of S. Joh. (Rev. 2.7.) "To him that overcommeth I will give to eat of
the tree of life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of God." This
was the tree of Adams Eternall life; but his life was to have been on
Earth. The same seemeth to be confirmed again by St. Joh. (Rev. 21.2.)
where he saith, "I John saw the Holy City, New Jerusalem, coming down
from God out of heaven, prepared as a Bride adorned for her husband:"
and again v. 10. to the same effect: As if he should say, the new
Jerusalem, the Paradise of God, at the coming again of Christ, should
come down to Gods people from Heaven, and not they goe up to it from
Earth. And this differs nothing from that, which the two men in white
clothing (that is, the two Angels) said to the Apostles, that were
looking upon Christ ascending (Acts 1.11.) "This same Jesus, who is
taken up from you into Heaven, shall so come, as you have seen him go up
into Heaven." Which soundeth as if they had said, he should come down
to govern them under his Father, Eternally here; and not take them up
to govern them in Heaven; and is conformable to the Restauration of the
Kingdom of God, instituted under Moses; which was a Political government
of the Jews on Earth. Again, that saying of our Saviour (Mat. 22.30.)
"that in the Resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage,
but are as the Angels of God in heaven," is a description of an Eternall
Life, resembling that which we lost in Adam in the point of Marriage.
For seeing Adam, and Eve, if they had not sinned, had lived on Earth
Eternally, in their individuall persons; it is manifest, they should
not continually have procreated their kind. For if Immortals should have
generated, as Mankind doth now; the Earth in a small time, would not
have been able to afford them a place to stand on. The Jews that asked
our Saviour the question, whose wife the woman that had married many
brothers, should be, in the resurrection, knew not what were the
consequences of Immortality; that there shal be no Generation, and
consequently no marriage, no more than there is Marriage, or generation
among the Angels. The comparison between that Eternall life which Adam
lost, and our Saviour by his Victory over death hath recovered; holdeth
also in this, that as Adam lost Eternall Life by his sin, and yet lived
after it for a time; so the faithful Christian hath recovered Eternal
Life by Christs passion, though he die a natural death, and remaine dead
for a time; namely, till the Resurrection. For as Death is reckoned from
the Condemnation of Adam, not from the Execution; so life is reckoned
from the Absolution, not from the Resurrection of them that are elected
in Christ.



Ascension Into Heaven

That the place wherein men are to live Eternally, after the
Resurrection, is the Heavens, meaning by Heaven, those parts of the
world, which are the most remote from Earth, as where the stars are,
or above the stars, in another Higher Heaven, called Caelum Empyreum,
(whereof there is no mention in Scripture, nor ground in Reason) is not
easily to be drawn from any text that I can find. By the Kingdome of
Heaven, is meant the Kingdome of the King that dwelleth in Heaven; and
his Kingdome was the people of Israel, whom he ruled by the Prophets
his Lieutenants, first Moses, and after him Eleazar, and the Soveraign
Priests, till in the days of Samuel they rebelled, and would have a
mortall man for their King, after the manner of other Nations. And
when our Saviour Christ, by the preaching of his Ministers, shall have
perswaded the Jews to return, and called the Gentiles to his obedience,
then shall there be a new Kingdome of Heaven, because our King shall
then be God, whose Throne is Heaven; without any necessity evident in
the Scripture, that man shall ascend to his happinesse any higher than
Gods Footstool the Earth. On the contrary, we find written (Joh. 3.13.)
that "no man hath ascended into Heaven, but he that came down from
Heaven, even the Son of man, that is in Heaven." Where I observe by the
way, that these words are not, as those which go immediately before, the
words of our Saviour, but of St. John himself; for Christ was then not
in Heaven, but upon the Earth. The like is said of David (Acts 2.34.)
where St. Peter, to prove the Ascension of Christ, using the words of
the Psalmist, (Psal. 16.10.) "Thou wilt not leave my soule in Hell, nor
suffer thine Holy one to see corruption," saith, they were spoken (not
of David, but) of Christ; and to prove it, addeth this Reason, "For
David is not ascended into Heaven." But to this a man may easily answer,
and say, that though their bodies were not to ascend till the generall
day of Judgment, yet their souls were in Heaven as soon as they were
departed from their bodies; which also seemeth to be confirmed by the
words of our Saviour (Luke 20.37,38.) who proving the Resurrection out
of the word of Moses, saith thus, "That the dead are raised, even Moses
shewed, at the bush, when he calleth the Lord, the God of Abraham, and
the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the Dead,
but of the Living; for they all live to him." But if these words be to
be understood only of the Immortality of the Soul, they prove not at all
that which our Saviour intended to prove, which was the Resurrection
of the Body, that is to say, the Immortality of the Man. Therefore our
Saviour meaneth, that those Patriarchs were Immortall; not by a property
consequent to the essence, and nature of mankind, but by the will of
God, that was pleased of his mere grace, to bestow Eternall Life upon
the faithfull. And though at that time the Patriarchs and many other
faithfull men were Dead, yet as it is in the text, they Lived To God;
that is, they were written in the Book of Life with them that were
absolved of their sinnes, and ordained to Life eternall at the
Resurrection. That the Soul of man is in its own nature Eternall, and
a living Creature independent on the Body; or that any meer man is
Immortall, otherwise than by the Resurrection in the last day, (except
Enos and Elias,) is a doctrine not apparent in Scripture. The whole 14.
Chapter of Job, which is the speech not of his friends, but of himselfe,
is a complaint of this Mortality of Nature; and yet no contradiction of
the Immortality at the Resurrection. "There is hope of a tree," (saith
hee verse 7.) "if it be cast down, Though the root thereof wax old, and
the stock thereof die in the ground, yet when it scenteth the water
it will bud, and bring forth boughes like a Plant. But man dyeth, and
wasteth away, yea, man giveth up the Ghost, and where is he?" and (verse
12.) "man lyeth down, and riseth not, till the heavens be no more." But
when is it, that the heavens shall be no more? St. Peter tells us, that
it is at the generall Resurrection. For in his 2. Epistle, 3. Chapter,
and 7. verse, he saith, that "the Heavens and the Earth that are now,
are reserved unto fire against the day of Judgment, and perdition of
ungodly men," and (verse 12.) "looking for, and hasting to the comming
of God, wherein the Heavens shall be on fire, and shall be dissolved,
and the Elements shall melt with fervent heat. Neverthelesse, we
according to the promise look for new Heavens, and a new Earth, wherein
dwelleth righteousnesse." Therefore where Job saith, man riseth not till
the Heavens be no more; it is all one, as if he had said, the Immortall
Life (and Soule and Life in the Scripture, do usually signifie the same
thing) beginneth not in man, till the Resurrection, and day of Judgment;
and hath for cause, not his specificall nature, and generation; but the
Promise. For St. Peter saies not, "Wee look for new heavens, and a new
earth, (from Nature) but from Promise."

Lastly, seeing it hath been already proved out of divers evident places
of Scripture, in the 35. chapter of this book, that the Kingdom of God
is a Civil Common-wealth, where God himself is Soveraign, by vertue
first of the Old, and since of the New Covenant, wherein he reigneth by
his Vicar, or Lieutenant; the same places do therefore also prove, that
after the comming again of our Saviour in his Majesty, and glory, to
reign actually, and Eternally; the Kingdom of God is to be on Earth. But
because this doctrine (though proved out of places of Scripture not few,
nor obscure) will appear to most men a novelty; I doe but propound
it; maintaining nothing in this, or any other paradox of Religion;
but attending the end of that dispute of the sword, concerning the
Authority, (not yet amongst my Countrey-men decided,) by which all sorts
of doctrine are to bee approved, or rejected; and whose commands, both
in speech, and writing, (whatsoever be the opinions of private men) must
by all men, that mean to be protected by their Laws, be obeyed. For
the points of doctrine concerning the Kingdome (of) God, have so great
influence on the Kingdome of Man, as not to be determined, but by them,
that under God have the Soveraign Power.



The Place After Judgment, Of Those Who Were Never In The Kingdome

Of God, Or Having Been In, Are Cast Out

As the Kingdome of God, and Eternall Life, so also Gods Enemies, and
their Torments after Judgment, appear by the Scripture, to have their
place on Earth. The name of the place, where all men remain till the
Resurrection, that were either buryed, or swallowed up of the Earth, is
usually called in Scripture, by words that signifie Under Ground; which
the Latines read generally Infernus, and Inferni, and the Greeks Hades;
that is to say, a place where men cannot see; and containeth as well the
Grave, as any other deeper place. But for the place of the damned after
the Resurrection, it is not determined, neither in the Old, nor New
Testament, by any note of situation; but onely by the company: as that
it shall bee, where such wicked men were, as God in former times in
extraordinary, and miraculous manner, had destroyed from off the face of
the Earth: As for Example, that they are in Inferno, in Tartarus, or in
the bottomelesse pit; because Corah, Dathan, and Abirom, were swallowed
up alive into the earth. Not that the Writers of the Scripture would
have us beleeve, there could be in the globe of the Earth, which is
not only finite, but also (compared to the height of the Stars) of no
considerable magnitude, a pit without a bottome; that is, a hole of
infinite depth, such as the Greeks in their Daemonologie (that is to
say, in their doctrine concerning Daemons,) and after them, the Romans
called Tartarus; of which Virgill sayes,

Bis patet in praeceps, tantem tenditque sub umbras,
Quantus ad aethereum coeli suspectus Olympum:

for that is a thing the proportion of Earth to Heaven cannot bear: but
that wee should beleeve them there, indefinitely, where those men are,
on whom God inflicted that Exemplary punnishment.



The Congregation Of Giants

Again, because those mighty men of the Earth, that lived in the time
of Noah, before the floud, (which the Greeks called Heroes, and the
Scripture Giants, and both say, were begotten, by copulation of the
children of God, with the children of men,) were for their wicked life
destroyed by the generall deluge; the place of the Damned, is therefore
also sometimes marked out, by the company of those deceased Giants; as
Proverbs 21.16. "The man that wandreth out of the way of understanding,
shall remain in the congregation of the Giants," and Job 26.5. "Behold
the Giants groan under water, and they that dwell with them." Here
the place of the Damned, is under the water. And Isaiah 14.9. "Hell is
troubled how to meet thee," (that is, the King of Babylon) "and will
displace the Giants for thee:" and here again the place of the Damned,
(if the sense be literall,) is to be under water.



Lake Of Fire

Thirdly, because the Cities of Sodom, and Gomorrah, by the extraordinary
wrath of God, were consumed for their wickednesse with Fire and
Brimstone, and together with them the countrey about made a stinking
bituminous Lake; the place of the Damned is sometimes expressed by
Fire, and a Fiery Lake: as in the Apocalypse ch.21.8. "But the timorous,
incredulous, and abominable, and Murderers, and Whoremongers, and
Sorcerers, and Idolators, and all Lyars, shall have their part in the
Lake that burneth with Fire, and Brimstone; which is the second Death."
So that it is manifest, that Hell Fire, which is here expressed by
Metaphor, from the reall Fire of Sodome, signifieth not any certain
kind, or place of Torment; but is to be taken indefinitely, for
Destruction, as it is in the 20. Chapter, at the 14. verse; where it is
said, that "Death and Hell were cast into the Lake of Fire;" that is
to say, were abolished, and destroyed; as if after the day of Judgment,
there shall be no more Dying, nor no more going into Hell; that is, no
more going to Hades (from which word perhaps our word Hell is derived,)
which is the same with no more Dying.



Utter Darknesse

Fourthly, from the Plague of Darknesse inflicted on the Egyptians, of
which it is written (Exod. 10.23.) "They saw not one another, neither
rose any man from his place for three days; but all the Children of
Israel had light in their dwellings;" the place of the wicked after
Judgment, is called Utter Darknesse, or (as it is in the originall)
Darknesse Without. And so it is expressed (Mat. 22.13.) where the King
commandeth his Servants, "to bind hand and foot the man that had not
on his Wedding garment, and to cast him out," Eis To Skotos To Exoteron,
Externall Darknesse, or Darknesse Without: which though translated Utter
Darknesse, does not signifie How Great, but Where that darknesse is to
be; namely, Without The Habitation of Gods Elect.



Gehenna, And Tophet

Lastly, whereas there was a place neer Jerusalem, called the Valley of
the Children of Hinnon; in a part whereof, called Tophet, the Jews had
committed most grievous Idolatry, sacrificing their children to the
Idol Moloch; and wherein also God had afflicted his enemies with most
grievous punishments; and wherein Josias had burnt the Priests of Moloch
upon their own Altars, as appeareth at large in the 2 of Kings chap. 23.
the place served afterwards, to receive the filth, and garbage which was
carried thither, out of the City; and there used to be fires made, from
time to time, to purifie the aire, and take away the stench of Carrion.
From this abominable place, the Jews used ever after to call the place
of the Damned, by the name of Gehenna, or Valley of Hinnon. And this
Gehenna, is that word, which is usually now translated HELL; and
from the fires from time to time there burning, we have the notion of
Everlasting, and Unquenchable Fire.



Of The Literall Sense Of The Scripture Concerning Hell

Seeing now there is none, that so interprets the Scripture, as that
after the day of Judgment, the wicked are all Eternally to be punished
in the Valley of Hinnon; or that they shall so rise again, as to be ever
after under ground, or under water; or that after the Resurrection, they
shall no more see one another; nor stir from one place to another; it
followeth, me thinks, very necessarily, that that which is thus said
concerning Hell Fire, is spoken metaphorically; and that therefore there
is a proper sense to bee enquired after, (for of all Metaphors there is
some reall ground, that may be expressed in proper words) both of the
Place of Hell, and the nature of Hellish Torment, and Tormenters.



Satan, Devill, Not Proper Names, But Appellatives

And first for the Tormenters, wee have their nature, and properties,
exactly and properly delivered by the names of, The Enemy, or Satan;
The Accuser, or Diabolus; The Destroyer, or Abbadon. Which significant
names, Satan, Devill, Abbadon, set not forth to us any Individuall
person, as proper names use to doe; but onely an office, or quality;
and are therefore Appellatives; which ought not to have been left
untranslated, as they are, in the Latine, and Modern Bibles; because
thereby they seem to be the proper names of Daemons; and men are the
more easily seduced to beleeve the doctrine of Devills; which at that
time was the Religion of the Gentiles, and contrary to that of Moses,
and of Christ.

And because by the Enemy, the Accuser, and Destroyer, is meant, the
Enemy of them that shall be in the Kingdome of God; therefore if the
Kingdome of God after the Resurrection, bee upon the Earth, (as in the
former Chapter I have shewn by Scripture it seems to be,) The Enemy,
and his Kingdome must be on Earth also. For so also was it, in the time
before the Jews had deposed God. For Gods Kingdome was in Palestine;
and the Nations round about, were the Kingdomes of the Enemy; and
consequently by Satan, is meant any Earthly Enemy of the Church.



Torments Of Hell

The Torments of Hell, are expressed sometimes, by "weeping, and gnashing
of teeth," as Mat. 8.12. Sometimes, by "the worm of Conscience;" as
Isa.66.24. and Mark 9.44, 46, 48; sometimes, by Fire, as in the place
now quoted, "where the worm dyeth not, and the fire is not quenched,"
and many places beside: sometimes by "Shame, and contempt," as Dan.
12.2. "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the Earth, shall
awake; some to Everlasting life; and some to shame, and everlasting
contempt." All which places design metaphorically a grief, and
discontent of mind, from the sight of that Eternall felicity in others,
which they themselves through their own incredulity, and disobedience
have lost. And because such felicity in others, is not sensible but by
comparison with their own actuall miseries; it followeth that they are
to suffer such bodily paines, and calamities, as are incident to those,
who not onely live under evill and cruell Governours, but have also for
Enemy, the Eternall King of the Saints, God Almighty. And amongst these
bodily paines, is to be reckoned also to every one of the wicked a
second Death. For though the Scripture bee clear for an universall
Resurrection; yet wee do not read, that to any of the Reprobate is
promised an Eternall life. For whereas St. Paul (1 Cor. 15.42, 43.) to
the question concerning what bodies men shall rise with again, saith,
that "the body is sown in corruption, and is raised in incorruption; It
is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weaknesse, it
is raised in power;" Glory and Power cannot be applyed to the bodies of
the wicked: Nor can the name of Second Death, bee applyed to those
that can never die but once: And although in Metaphoricall speech, a
Calamitous life Everlasting, may bee called an Everlasting Death yet it
cannot well be understood of a Second Death. The fire prepared for the
wicked, is an Everlasting Fire: that is to say, the estate wherein
no man can be without torture, both of body and mind, after the
Resurrection, shall endure for ever; and in that sense the Fire shall
be unquenchable, and the torments Everlasting: but it cannot thence be
inferred, that hee who shall be cast into that fire, or be tormented
with those torments, shall endure, and resist them so, as to be
eternally burnt, and tortured, and yet never be destroyed, nor die. And
though there be many places that affirm Everlasting Fire, and Torments
(into which men may be cast successively one after another for ever;)
yet I find none that affirm there shall bee an Eternall Life therein of
any individuall person; but on the contrary, an Everlasting Death, which
is the Second Death: (Apoc. 20. 13,14.) "For after Death, and the Grave
shall have delivered up the dead which were in them, and every man be
judged according to his works; Death and the Grave shall also be cast
into the Lake of Fire. This is the Second Death." Whereby it is
evident, that there is to bee a Second Death of every one that shall bee
condemned at the day of Judgement, after which hee shall die no more.



The Joyes Of Life Eternall, And Salvation The Same Thing,

Salvation From Sin, And From Misery, All One

The joyes of Life Eternall, are in Scripture comprehended all under the
name of SALVATION, or Being Saved. To be saved, is to be secured, either
respectively, against speciall Evills, or absolutely against all Evill,
comprehending Want, Sicknesse, and Death it self. And because man
was created in a condition Immortall, not subject to corruption, and
consequently to nothing that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature;
and fell from that happinesse by the sin of Adam; it followeth, that
to be Saved From Sin, is to be saved from all the Evill, and Calamities
that Sinne hath brought upon us. And therefore in the Holy Scripture,
Remission of Sinne, and Salvation from Death and Misery, is the same
thing, as it appears by the words of our Saviour, who having cured a man
sick of the Palsey, by saying, (Mat. 9.2.) "Son be of good cheer, thy
Sins be forgiven thee;" and knowing that the Scribes took for blasphemy,
that a man should pretend to forgive Sins, asked them (v.5.) "whether
it were easier to say, Thy Sinnes be forgiven thee, or, Arise and walk;"
signifying thereby, that it was all one, as to the saving of the sick,
to say, "Thy Sins are forgiven," and "Arise and walk;" and that he used
that form of speech, onely to shew he had power to forgive Sins. And
it is besides evident in reason, that since Death and Misery, were the
punishments of Sin, the discharge of Sinne, must also be a discharge
of Death and Misery; that is to say, Salvation absolute, such as the
faithfull are to enjoy after the day of Judgment, by the power, and
favour of Jesus Christ, who for that cause is called our SAVIOUR.

Concerning Particular Salvations, such as are understood, 1 Sam. 14.39.
"as the Lord liveth that saveth Israel," that is, from their temporary
enemies, and 2 Sam. 22.4. "Thou art my Saviour, thou savest me from
violence;" and 2 Kings 13.5. "God gave the Israelites a Saviour, and
so they were delivered from the hand of the Assyrians," and the like,
I need say nothing; there being neither difficulty, nor interest, to
corrupt the interpretation of texts of that kind.



The Place Of Eternall Salvation

But concerning the Generall Salvation, because it must be in the
Kingdome of Heaven, there is great difficulty concerning the Place.
On one side, by Kingdome (which is an estate ordained by men for their
perpetuall security against enemies, and want) it seemeth that this
Salvation should be on Earth. For by Salvation is set forth unto us,
a glorious Reign of our King, by Conquest; not a safety by Escape:
and therefore there where we look for Salvation, we must look also
for Triumph; and before Triumph, for Victory; and before Victory, for
Battell; which cannot well be supposed, shall be in Heaven. But how good
soever this reason may be, I will not trust to it, without very evident
places of Scripture. The state of Salvation is described at large,
Isaiah, 33. ver. 20,21,22,23,24.

"Look upon Zion, the City of our solemnities, thine eyes shall see
Jerusalem a quiet habitation, a tabernacle that shall not be taken down;
not one of the stakes thereof shall ever be removed, neither shall any
of the cords thereof be broken.

But there the glorious Lord will be unto us a place of broad rivers, and
streams; wherein shall goe no Gally with oares; neither shall gallant
ship passe thereby.

For the Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our Lawgiver, the Lord is our
King, he will save us.

Thy tacklings are loosed; they could not well strengthen their mast;
they could not spread the sail: then is the prey of a great spoil
divided; the lame take the prey.

And the Inhabitant shall not say, I am sicke; the people that shall
dwell therein shall be forgiven their Iniquity."

In which words wee have the place from whence Salvation is to proceed,
"Jerusalem, a quiet habitation;" the Eternity of it, "a tabernacle that
shall not be taken down," &c. The Saviour of it, "the Lord, their Judge,
their Lawgiver, their King, he will save us;" the Salvation, "the Lord
shall be to them as a broad mote of swift waters," &c. the condition of
their Enemies, "their tacklings are loose, their masts weake, the
lame shal take the spoil of them." The condition of the Saved,
"The Inhabitants shall not say, I am sick:" And lastly, all this is
comprehended in Forgivenesse of sin, "The people that dwell therein
shall be forgiven their iniquity." By which it is evident, that
Salvation shall be on Earth, then, when God shall reign, (at the coming
again of Christ) in Jerusalem; and from Jerusalem shall proceed the
Salvation of the Gentiles that shall be received into Gods Kingdome; as
is also more expressely declared by the same Prophet, Chap. 66.20, 21.
"And they," (that is, the Gentiles who had any Jew in bondage) "shall
bring all your brethren, for an offering to the Lord, out of all
nations, upon horses, and in charets, and in litters, and upon mules,
and upon swift beasts, to my holy mountain, Jerusalem, saith the Lord,
as the Children of Israel bring an offering in a clean vessell into
the House of the Lord. And I will also take of them for Priests and for
Levites, saith the Lord:" Whereby it is manifest, that the chief seat of
Gods Kingdome (which is the Place, from whence the Salvation of us that
were Gentiles, shall proceed) shall be Jerusalem; And the same is also
confirmed by our Saviour, in his discourse with the woman of Samaria,
concerning the place of Gods worship; to whom he saith, John 4.22. that
the Samaritans worshipped they know not what, but the Jews worship what
they knew, "For Salvation is of the Jews (Ex Judais, that is, begins at
the Jews): as if he should say, you worship God, but know not by whom
he wil save you, as we doe, that know it shall be one of the tribe
of Judah, a Jew, not a Samaritan. And therefore also the woman not
impertinently answered him again, "We know the Messias shall come." So
that which our saviour saith, "Salvation is from the Jews," is the
same that Paul sayes (Rom. 1.16,17.) "The Gospel is the power of God to
Salvation to every one that beleeveth; To the Jew first, and also to the
Greek. For therein is the righteousnesse of God revealed from faith to
faith;" from the faith of the Jew, to the faith of the Gentile. In
the like sense the Prophet Joel describing the day of Judgment, (chap.
2.30,31.) that God would "shew wonders in heaven, and in earth, bloud,
and fire, and pillars of smoak. The Sun should be turned to darknesse,
and the Moon into bloud, before the great and terrible day of the Lord
come," he addeth verse 32. "and it shall come to passe, that whosoever
shall call upon the name of the Lord, shall be saved. For in Mount Zion,
and in Jerusalem shall be Salvation." And Obadiah verse 17 saith
the same, "Upon Mount Zion shall be Deliverance; and there shall be
holinesse, and the house of Jacob shall possesse their possessions,"
that is, the possessions of the Heathen, which possessions he expresseth
more particularly in the following verses, by the Mount of Esau, the
Land of the Philistines, the Fields of Ephraim, of Samaria, Gilead, and
the Cities of the South, and concludes with these words, "the Kingdom
shall be the Lords." All these places are for Salvation, and the
Kingdome of God (after the day of Judgement) upon Earth. On the other
side, I have not found any text that can probably be drawn, to prove
any Ascension of the Saints into Heaven; that is to say, into any Coelum
Empyreum, or other aetheriall Region; saving that it is called the
Kingdome of Heaven; which name it may have, because God, that was King
of the Jews, governed them by his commands, sent to Moses by Angels from
Heaven, to reduce them to their obedience; and shall send him thence
again, to rule both them, and all other faithfull men, from the day of
Judgment, Everlastingly: or from that, that the Throne of this our Great
King is in Heaven; whereas the Earth is but his Footstoole. But that the
Subjects of God should have any place as high as his throne, or higher
than his Footstoole, it seemeth not sutable to the dignity of a King,
nor can I find any evident text for it in holy Scripture.

From this that hath been said of the Kingdom of God, and of Salvation,
it is not hard to interpret, what is meant by the WORLD TO COME. There
are three worlds mentioned in Scripture, the Old World, the Present
World, and the World to Come. Of the first, St. Peter speaks, (2 Pet.
2.5.) "If God spared not the Old World, but saved Noah the eighth
person, a Preacher of righteousnesse, bringing the flood upon the world
of the ungodly," &c. So the First World, was from Adam to the generall
Flood. Of the present World, our Saviour speaks (John 18.36.) "My
Kingdome is not of this World." For he came onely to teach men the way
of Salvation, and to renew the Kingdome of his Father, by his doctrine.
Of the World to come, St. Peter speaks, (2 Pet. 3. 13.) "Neverthelesse
we according to his promise look for new Heavens, and a new Earth." This
is that WORLD, wherein Christ coming down from Heaven, in the clouds,
with great power, and glory, shall send his Angels, and shall gather
together his elect, from the four winds, and from the uttermost parts
of the Earth, and thence forth reign over them, (under his Father)
Everlastingly.



Redemption

Salvation of a sinner, supposeth a precedent REDEMPTION; for he that is
once guilty of Sin, is obnoxious to the Penalty of the same; and must
pay (or some other for him) such Ransome, as he that is offended, and
has him in his power, shall require. And seeing the person offended, is
Almighty God, in whose power are all things; such Ransome is to be paid
before Salvation can be acquired, as God hath been pleased to require.
By this Ransome, is not intended a satisfaction for Sin, equivalent to
the Offence, which no sinner for himselfe, nor righteous man can ever be
able to make for another; The dammage a man does to another, he may make
amends for by restitution, or recompence, but sin cannot be taken
away by recompence; for that were to make the liberty to sin, a thing
vendible. But sins may bee pardoned to the repentant, either Gratis, or
upon such penalty, as God is pleased to accept. That which God usually
accepted in the Old Testament, was some Sacrifice, or Oblation. To
forgive sin is not an act of Injustice, though the punishment have
been threatned. Even amongst men, though the promise of Good, bind the
promiser; yet threats, that is to say, promises, of Evill, bind them
not; much lesse shall they bind God, who is infinitely more mercifull
then men. Our Saviour Christ therefore to Redeem us, did not in that
sense satisfie for the Sins of men, as that his Death, of its own
vertue, could make it unjust in God to punish sinners with Eternall
death; but did make that Sacrifice, and Oblation of himself, at his
first coming, which God was pleased to require, for the Salvation at his
second coming, of such as in the mean time should repent, and beleeve in
him. And though this act of our Redemption, be not alwaies in Scripture
called a Sacrifice, and Oblation, but sometimes a Price, yet by Price
we are not to understand any thing, by the value whereof, he could claim
right to a pardon for us, from his offended Father, but that Price which
God the Father was pleased in mercy to demand.


CHAPTER XXXIX. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF THE WORD CHURCH



Church The Lords House

The word Church, (Ecclesia) signifieth in the Books of Holy Scripture
divers things. Sometimes (though not often) it is taken for Gods House,
that is to say, for a Temple, wherein Christians assemble to perform
holy duties publiquely; as, 1 Cor. 14. ver. 34. "Let your women keep
silence in the Churches:" but this is Metaphorically put, for the
Congregation there assembled; and hath been since used for the
Edifice it self, to distinguish between the Temples of Christians, and
Idolaters. The Temple of Jerusalem was Gods House, and the House of
Prayer; and so is any Edifice dedicated by Christians to the worship of
Christ, Christs House: and therefore the Greek Fathers call it Kuriake,
The Lords House; and thence, in our language it came to be called Kyrke,
and Church.



Ecclesia Properly What

Church (when not taken for a House) signifieth the same that Ecclesia
signified in the Grecian Common-wealths; that is to say, a Congregation,
or an Assembly of Citizens, called forth, to hear the Magistrate speak
unto them; and which in the Common-wealth of Rome was called Concio, as
he that spake was called Ecclesiastes, and Concionator. And when they
were called forth by lawfull Authority, (Acts 19.39.) it was Ecclesia
Legitima, a Lawfull Church, Ennomos Ecclesia. But when they were excited
by tumultuous, and seditious clamor, then it was a confused Church,
Ecclesia Sugkechumene.

It is taken also sometimes for the men that have right to be of the
Congregation, though not actually assembled; that is to say, for the
whole multitude of Christian men, how far soever they be dispersed: as
(Act. 8.3.) where it is said, that "Saul made havock of the Church:" And
in this sense is Christ said to be Head of the Church. And sometimes for
a certain part of Christians, as (Col. 4.15.) "Salute the Church that is
in his house." Sometimes also for the Elect onely; as (Ephes. 5.27.) "A
Glorious Church, without spot, or wrinkle, holy, and without blemish;"
which is meant of the Church Triumphant, or, Church To Come. Sometimes,
for a Congregation assembled, of professors of Christianity, whether
their profession be true, or counterfeit, as it is understood, Mat.
18.17. where it is said, "Tell it to the Church, and if hee neglect to
hear the Church, let him be to thee as a Gentile, or Publican."



In What Sense The Church Is One Person Church Defined

And in this last sense only it is that the Church can be taken for one
Person; that is to say, that it can be said to have power to will, to
pronounce, to command, to be obeyed, to make laws, or to doe any other
action whatsoever; For without authority from a lawfull Congregation,
whatsoever act be done in a concourse of people, it is the particular
act of every one of those that were present, and gave their aid to the
performance of it; and not the act of them all in grosse, as of one
body; much lesse that act of them that were absent, or that being
present, were not willing it should be done. According to this sense, I
define a CHURCH to be, "A company of men professing Christian Religion,
united in the person of one Soveraign; at whose command they ought to
assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble." And
because in all Common-wealths, that Assembly, which is without warrant
from the Civil Soveraign, is unlawful; that Church also, which is
assembled in any Common-wealth, that hath forbidden them to assemble, is
an unlawfull Assembly.



A Christian Common-wealth, And A Church All One

It followeth also, that there is on Earth, no such universall Church as
all Christians are bound to obey; because there is no power on Earth, to
which all other Common-wealths are subject: There are Christians, in
the Dominions of severall Princes and States; but every one of them
is subject to that Common-wealth, whereof he is himself a member; and
consequently, cannot be subject to the commands of any other Person.
And therefore a Church, such as one as is capable to Command, to Judge,
Absolve, Condemn, or do any other act, is the same thing with a Civil
Common-wealth, consisting of Christian men; and is called a Civill
State, for that the subjects of it are Men; and a Church, for that the
subjects thereof are Christians. Temporall and Spirituall Government,
are but two words brought into the world, to make men see double, and
mistake their Lawfull Soveraign. It is true, that the bodies of the
faithfull, after the Resurrection shall be not onely Spirituall, but
Eternall; but in this life they are grosse, and corruptible. There
is therefore no other Government in this life, neither of State, nor
Religion, but Temporall; nor teaching of any doctrine, lawfull to any
Subject, which the Governour both of the State, and of the Religion,
forbiddeth to be taught: And that Governor must be one; or else there
must needs follow Faction, and Civil war in the Common-wealth, between
the Church and State; between Spiritualists, and Temporalists; between
the Sword Of Justice, and the Shield Of Faith; and (which is more) in
every Christian mans own brest, between the Christian, and the Man.
The Doctors of the Church, are called Pastors; so also are Civill
Soveraignes: But if Pastors be not subordinate one to another, so
as that there may bee one chief Pastor, men will be taught contrary
Doctrines, whereof both may be, and one must be false. Who that one
chief Pastor is, according to the law of Nature, hath been already
shewn; namely, that it is the Civill Soveraign; And to whom the
Scripture hath assigned that Office, we shall see in the Chapters
following.


CHAPTER XL

OF THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD, IN ABRAHAM, MOSES, HIGH PRIESTS,

AND THE KINGS OF JUDAH



The Soveraign Rights Of Abraham

The Father of the Faithfull, and first in the Kingdome of God by
Covenant, was Abraham. For with him was the Covenant first made; wherein
he obliged himself, and his seed after him, to acknowledge and obey the
commands of God; not onely such, as he could take notice of, (as Morall
Laws,) by the light of Nature; but also such, as God should in speciall
manner deliver to him by Dreams and Visions. For as to the Morall law,
they were already obliged, and needed not have been contracted withall,
by promise of the Land of Canaan. Nor was there any Contract, that could
adde to, or strengthen the Obligation, by which both they, and all
men else were bound naturally to obey God Almighty: And therefore the
Covenant which Abraham made with God, was to take for the Commandement
of God, that which in the name of God was commanded him, in a Dream, or
Vision, and to deliver it to his family, and cause them to observe the
same.



Abraham Had The Sole Power Of Ordering The Religion Of His Own People

In this Contract of God with Abraham, wee may observe three points of
important consequence in the government of Gods people. First, that at
the making of this Covenant, God spake onely to Abraham; and therefore
contracted not with any of his family, or seed, otherwise then as their
wills (which make the essence of all Covenants) were before the Contract
involved in the will of Abraham; who was therefore supposed to have had
a lawfull power, to make them perform all that he covenanted for them.
According whereunto (Gen 18.18, 19.) God saith, "All the Nations of the
Earth shall be blessed in him, For I know him that he will command his
children and his houshold after him, and they shall keep the way of the
Lord." From whence may be concluded this first point, that they to
whom God hath not spoken immediately, are to receive the positive
commandements of God, from their Soveraign; as the family and seed of
Abraham did from Abraham their Father, and Lord, and Civill Soveraign.
And Consequently in every Common-wealth, they who have no supernaturall
Revelation to the contrary, ought to obey the laws of their own
Soveraign, in the externall acts and profession of Religion. As for the
inward Thought, and beleef of men, which humane Governours can take no
notice of, (for God onely knoweth the heart) they are not voluntary, nor
the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will, and of the power of
God; and consequently fall not under obligation.



No Pretence Of Private Spirit Against The Religion Of Abraham

From whence proceedeth another point, that it was not unlawfull for
Abraham, when any of his Subjects should pretend Private Vision, or
Spirit, or other Revelation from God, for the countenancing of any
doctrine which Abraham should forbid, or when they followed, or adhered
to any such pretender, to punish them; and consequently that it is
lawfull now for the Soveraign to punish any man that shall oppose his
Private Spirit against the Laws: For hee hath the same place in the
Common-wealth, that Abraham had in his own Family.



Abraham Sole Judge, And Interpreter Of What God Spake

There ariseth also from the same, a third point; that as none but
Abraham in his family, so none but the Soveraign in a Christian
Common-wealth, can take notice what is, or what is not the Word of God.
For God spake onely to Abraham; and it was he onely, that was able
to know what God said, and to interpret the same to his family: And
therefore also, they that have the place of Abraham in a Common-wealth,
are the onely Interpreters of what God hath spoken.



The Authority Of Moses Whereon Grounded

The same Covenant was renewed with Isaac; and afterwards with Jacob; but
afterwards no more, till the Israelites were freed from the Egyptians,
and arrived at the Foot of Mount Sinai: and then it was renewed by Moses
(as I have said before, chap. 35.) in such manner, as they became from
that time forward the Peculiar Kingdome of God; whose Lieutenant was
Moses, for his owne time; and the succession to that office was setled
upon Aaron, and his heirs after him, to bee to God a Sacerdotall
Kingdome for ever.

By this constitution, a Kingdome is acquired to God. But seeing Moses
had no authority to govern the Israelites, as a successor to the right
of Abraham, because he could not claim it by inheritance; it appeareth
not as yet, that the people were obliged to take him for Gods
Lieutenant, longer than they beleeved that God spake unto him. And
therefore his authority (notwithstanding the Covenant they made with
God) depended yet merely upon the opinion they had of his Sanctity,
and of the reality of his Conferences with God, and the verity of his
Miracles; which opinion coming to change, they were no more obliged to
take any thing for the law of God, which he propounded to them in Gods
name. We are therefore to consider, what other ground there was, of
their obligation to obey him. For it could not be the commandement of
God that could oblige them; because God spake not to them immediately,
but by the mediation of Moses Himself; And our Saviour saith of himself,
(John 5. 31.) "If I bear witnesse of my self, my witnesse is not true,"
much lesse if Moses bear witnesse of himselfe, (especially in a claim of
Kingly power over Gods people) ought his testimony to be received. His
authority therefore, as the authority of all other Princes, must be
grounded on the Consent of the People, and their Promise to obey him.
And so it was: for "the people" (Exod. 20.18.) "when they saw the
Thunderings, and the Lightnings, and the noyse of the Trumpet, and the
mountaine smoaking, removed, and stood a far off. And they said unto
Moses, speak thou with us, and we will hear, but let not God speak with
us lest we die." Here was their promise of obedience; and by this it was
they obliged themselves to obey whatsoever he should deliver unto them
for the Commandement of God.



Moses Was (Under God) Soveraign Of The Jews, All His Own Time,

Though Aaron Had The Priesthood

And notwithstanding the Covenant constituted a Sacerdotall Kingdome,
that is to say, a Kingdome hereditary to Aaron; yet that is to be
understood of the succession, after Moses should bee dead. For
whosoever ordereth, and establisheth the Policy, as first founder of
a Common-wealth (be it Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy) must needs
have Soveraign Power over the people all the while he is doing of it.
And that Moses had that power all his own time, is evidently affirmed in
the Scripture. First, in the text last before cited, because the people
promised obedience, not to Aaron but to him. Secondly, (Exod. 24.1, 2.)
"And God said unto Moses, Come up unto the Lord, thou, and Aaron, Nadab
and Abihu, and seventy of the Elders of Israel. And Moses alone shall
come neer the Lord, but they shall not come nigh, neither shall the
people goe up with him." By which it is plain, that Moses who was alone
called up to God, (and not Aaron, nor the other Priests, nor the Seventy
Elders, nor the People who were forbidden to come up) was alone he, that
represented to the Israelites the Person of God; that is to say, was
their sole Soveraign under God. And though afterwards it be said (verse
9.) "Then went up Moses, and Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu, and seventy of the
Elders of Israel, and they saw the God of Israel, and there was under
his feet, as it were a paved work of a saphire stone," &c. yet this was
not till after Moses had been with God before, and had brought to
the people the words which God had said to him. He onely went for the
businesse of the people; the others, as the Nobles of his retinue, were
admitted for honour to that speciall grace, which was not allowed to
the people; which was, (as in the verse after appeareth) to see God and
live. "God laid not his hand upon them, they saw God and did eat and
drink" (that is, did live), but did not carry any commandement from
him to the people. Again, it is every where said, "The Lord spake unto
Moses," as in all other occasions of Government; so also in the ordering
of the Ceremonies of Religion, contained in the 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
and 31 Chapters of Exodus, and throughout Leviticus: to Aaron seldome.
The Calfe that Aaron made, Moses threw into the fire. Lastly, the
question of the Authority of Aaron, by occasion of his and Miriams
mutiny against Moses, was (Numbers 12.) judged by God himself for Moses.
So also in the question between Moses, and the People, when Corah,
Dathan, and Abiram, and two hundred and fifty Princes of the Assembly
"gathered themselves together" (Numbers 16. 3) "against Moses, and
against Aaron, and said unto them, 'Ye take too much upon you, seeing
all the congregation are Holy, every one of them, and the Lord is
amongst them, why lift you up your selves above the congregation of the
Lord?'" God caused the Earth to swallow Corah, Dathan, and Abiram with
their wives and children alive, and consumed those two hundred and fifty
Princes with fire. Therefore neither Aaron, nor the People, nor any
Aristocracy of the chief Princes of the People, but Moses alone had next
under God the Soveraignty over the Israelites: And that not onely in
causes of Civill Policy, but also of Religion; For Moses onely spake
with God, and therefore onely could tell the People, what it was that
God required at their hands. No man upon pain of death might be so
presumptuous as to approach the Mountain where God talked with Moses.
"Thou shalt set bounds" (saith the Lord, Exod 19. 12.) "to the people
round about, and say, Take heed to your selves that you goe not up into
the Mount, or touch the border of it; whosoever toucheth the Mount shall
surely be put to death." and again (verse 21.) "Get down, charge the
people, lest they break through unto the Lord to gaze." Out of which we
may conclude, that whosoever in a Christian Common-wealth holdeth the
place of Moses, is the sole Messenger of God, and Interpreter of
his Commandements. And according hereunto, no man ought in the
interpretation of the Scripture to proceed further then the bounds which
are set by their severall Soveraigns. For the Scriptures since God now
speaketh in them, are the Mount Sinai; the bounds whereof are the Laws
of them that represent Gods Person on Earth. To look upon them and
therein to behold the wondrous works of God, and learn to fear him is
allowed; but to interpret them; that is, to pry into what God saith to
him whom he appointeth to govern under him, and make themselves Judges
whether he govern as God commandeth him, or not, is to transgresse the
bounds God hath set us, and to gaze upon God irreverently.



All Spirits Were Subordinate To The Spirit Of Moses

There was no Prophet in the time of Moses, nor pretender to the Spirit
of God, but such as Moses had approved, and Authorized. For there were
in his time but Seventy men, that are said to Prophecy by the Spirit of
God, and these were of all Moses his election; concerning whom God saith
to Moses (Numb. 11.16.) "Gather to mee Seventy of the Elders of Israel,
whom thou knowest to be the Elders of the People." To these God imparted
his Spirit; but it was not a different Spirit from that of Moses; for
it is said (verse 25.) "God came down in a cloud, and took of the Spirit
that was upon Moses, and gave it to the Seventy Elders." But as I have
shewn before (chap. 36.) by Spirit, is understood the Mind; so that the
sense of the place is no other than this, that God endued them with
a mind conformable, and subordinate to that of Moses, that they might
Prophecy, that is to say, speak to the people in Gods name, in such
manner, as to set forward (as Ministers of Moses, and by his authority)
such doctrine as was agreeable to Moses his doctrine. For they were but
Ministers; and when two of them Prophecyed in the Camp, it was thought
a new and unlawfull thing; and as it is in the 27. and 28. verses of
the same Chapter, they were accused of it, and Joshua advised Moses to
forbid them, as not knowing that it was by Moses his Spirit that they
Prophecyed. By which it is manifest, that no Subject ought to pretend to
Prophecy, or to the Spirit, in opposition to the doctrine established by
him, whom God hath set in the place of Moses.



After Moses The Soveraignty Was In The High Priest

Aaron being dead, and after him also Moses, the Kingdome, as being a
Sacerdotall Kingdome, descended by vertue of the Covenant, to Aarons
Son, Eleazar the High Priest: And God declared him (next under himself)
for Soveraign, at the same time that he appointed Joshua for the
Generall of their Army. For thus God saith expressely (Numb. 27.21.)
concerning Joshua; "He shall stand before Eleazar the Priest, who shall
ask counsell for him, before the Lord, at his word shall they goe out,
and at his word they shall come in, both he, and all the Children of
Israel with him:" Therefore the Supreme Power of making War and Peace,
was in the Priest. The Supreme Power of Judicature belonged also to
the High Priest: For the Book of the Law was in their keeping; and the
Priests and Levites onely were the subordinate Judges in causes Civill,
as appears in Deut. 17.8, 9, 10. And for the manner of Gods worship,
there was never doubt made, but that the High Priest till the time
of Saul, had the Supreme Authority. Therefore the Civill and
Ecclesiasticall Power were both joined together in one and the same
person, the High Priest; and ought to bee so, in whosoever governeth by
Divine Right; that is, by Authority immediate from God.



Of The Soveraign Power Between The Time Of Joshua And Of Saul

After the death of Joshua, till the time of Saul, the time between is
noted frequently in the Book of Judges, "that there was in those dayes
no King in Israel;" and sometimes with this addition, that "every
man did that which was right in his own eyes." By which is to bee
understood, that where it is said, "there was no King," is meant, "there
was no Soveraign Power" in Israel. And so it was, if we consider the
Act, and Exercise of such power. For after the death of Joshua, &
Eleazar, "there arose another generation" (Judges 2.10.) "that knew not
the Lord, nor the works which he had done for Israel, but did evill in
the sight of the Lord, and served Baalim." And the Jews had that quality
which St. Paul noteth, "to look for a sign," not onely before they would
submit themselves to the government of Moses, but also after they had
obliged themselves by their submission. Whereas Signs, and Miracles had
for End to procure Faith, not to keep men from violating it, when they
have once given it; for to that men are obliged by the law of Nature.
But if we consider not the Exercise, but the Right of governing, the
Soveraign power was still in the High Priest. Therefore whatsoever
obedience was yeelded to any of the Judges, (who were men chosen by God
extraordinarily, to save his rebellious subjects out of the hands of
the enemy,) it cannot bee drawn into argument against the Right the High
Priest had to the Soveraign Power, in all matters, both of Policy and
Religion. And neither the Judges, nor Samuel himselfe had an ordinary,
but extraordinary calling to the Government; and were obeyed by the
Israelites, not out of duty, but out of reverence to their favour
with God, appearing in their wisdome, courage, or felicity. Hitherto
therefore the Right of Regulating both the Policy, and the Religion,
were inseparable.



Of The Rights Of The Kings Of Israel

To the Judges, succeeded Kings; And whereas before, all authority, both
in Religion, and Policy, was in the High Priest; so now it was all in
the King. For the Soveraignty over the people, which was before, not
onely by vertue of the Divine Power, but also by a particular pact of
the Israelites in God, and next under him, in the High Priest, as his
Viceregent on earth, was cast off by the People, with the consent of God
himselfe. For when they said to Samuel (1 Sam. 8.5.) "make us a King to
judge us, like all the Nations," they signified that they would no
more bee governed by the commands that should bee laid upon them by the
Priest, in the name of God; but by one that should command them in the
same manner that all other nations were commanded; and consequently in
deposing the High Priest of Royall authority, they deposed that peculiar
Government of God. And yet God consented to it, saying to Samuel (verse
7.) "Hearken unto the voice of the People, in all that they shall say
unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected mee,
that I should not reign over them." Having therefore rejected God, in
whose Right the Priests governed, there was no authority left to the
Priests, but such as the King was pleased to allow them; which was
more, or lesse, according as the Kings were good, or evill. And for the
Government of Civill affaires, it is manifest, it was all in the hands
of the King. For in the same Chapter, verse 20. They say they will be
like all the Nations; that their King shall be their Judge, and goe
before them, and fight their battells; that is, he shall have the
whole authority, both in Peace and War. In which is contained also the
ordering of Religion; for there was no other Word of God in that time,
by which to regulate Religion, but the Law of Moses, which was their
Civill Law. Besides, we read (1 Kings 2.27.) that Solomon "thrust out
Abiathar from being Priest before the Lord:" He had therefore authority
over the High Priest, as over any other Subject; which is a great
mark of Supremacy in Religion. And we read also (1 Kings 8.) that hee
dedicated the Temple; that he blessed the People; and that he himselfe
in person made that excellent prayer, used in the Consecrations of all
Churches, and houses of Prayer; which is another great mark of Supremacy
in Religion. Again, we read (2 Kings 22.) that when there was question
concerning the Book of the Law found in the Temple, the same was not
decided by the High Priest, but Josiah sent both him, and others to
enquire concerning it, of Hulda, the Prophetesse; which is another mark
of the Supremacy in Religion. Lastly, wee read (1 Chro. 26.30.) that
David made Hashabiah and his brethren, Hebronites, Officers of Israel
among them Westward, "in all businesse of the Lord, and in the service
of the King." Likewise (verse 32.) that hee made other Hebronites,
"rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites, and the halfe tribe of
Manasseh" (these were the rest of Israel that dwelt beyond Jordan) "for
every matter pertaining to God, and affairs of the King." Is not this
full Power, both Temporall and Spirituall, as they call it, that would
divide it? To conclude; from the first institution of Gods Kingdome, to
the Captivity, the Supremacy of Religion, was in the same hand with that
of the Civill Soveraignty; and the Priests office after the election of
Saul, was not Magisteriall, but Ministeriall.



The Practice Of Supremacy In Religion, Was Not In The Time Of The Kings,

According To The Right Thereof

Notwithstanding the government both in Policy and Religion, were joined,
first in the High Priests, and afterwards in the Kings, so far forth as
concerned the Right; yet it appeareth by the same Holy History, that the
people understood it not; but there being amongst them a great part, and
probably the greatest part, that no longer than they saw great miracles,
or (which is equivalent to a miracle) great abilities, or great felicity
in the enterprises of their Governours, gave sufficient credit, either
to the fame of Moses, or to the Colloquies between God and the Priests;
they took occasion as oft as their Governours displeased them, by
blaming sometimes the Policy, sometimes the Religion, to change the
Government, or revolt from their Obedience at their pleasure: And from
thence proceeded from time to time the civill troubles, divisions, and
calamities of the Nation. As for example, after the death of Eleazar and
Joshua, the next generation which had not seen the wonders of God, but
were left to their own weak reason, not knowing themselves obliged
by the Covenant of a Sacerdotall Kingdome, regarded no more the
Commandement of the Priest, nor any law of Moses, but did every man that
which was right in his own eyes; and obeyed in Civill affairs, such
men, as from time to time they thought able to deliver them from the
neighbour Nations that oppressed them; and consulted not with God (as
they ought to doe,) but with such men, or women, as they guessed to bee
Prophets by their Praedictions of things to come; and thought they had
an Idol in their Chappel, yet if they had a Levite for their Chaplain,
they made account they worshipped the God of Israel.

And afterwards when they demanded a King, after the manner of the
nations; yet it was not with a design to depart from the worship of God
their King; but despairing of the justice of the sons of Samuel, they
would have a King to judg them in Civill actions; but not that they
would allow their King to change the Religion which they thought was
recommended to them by Moses. So that they alwaies kept in store a
pretext, either of Justice, or Religion, to discharge themselves of
their obedience, whensoever they had hope to prevaile. Samuel was
displeased with the people, for that they desired a King, (for God was
their King already, and Samuel had but an authority under him); yet did
Samuel, when Saul observed not his counsell, in destroying Agag as God
had commanded, anoint another King, namely David, to take the succession
from his heirs. Rehoboam was no Idolater; but when the people thought
him an Oppressor; that Civil pretence carried from him ten Tribes to
Jeroboam an Idolater. And generally through the whole History of the
Kings, as well of Judah, as of Israel, there were Prophets that alwaies
controlled the Kings, for transgressing the Religion; and sometimes also
for Errours of State; (2 Chro. 19. 2.) as Jehosaphat was reproved by
the Prophet Jehu, for aiding the King of Israel against the Syrians;
and Hezekiah, by Isaiah, for shewing his treasures to the Ambassadors of
Babylon. By all which it appeareth, that though the power both of State
and Religion were in the Kings; yet none of them were uncontrolled
in the use of it, but such as were gracious for their own naturall
abilities, or felicities. So that from the practise of those times,
there can no argument be drawn, that the right of Supremacy in Religion
was not in the Kings, unlesse we place it in the Prophets; and conclude,
that because Hezekiah praying to the Lord before the Cherubins, was not
answered from thence, nor then, but afterwards by the Prophet Isaiah,
therefore Isaiah was supreme Head of the Church; or because Josiah
consulted Hulda the Prophetesse, concerning the Book of the Law, that
therefore neither he, nor the High Priest, but Hulda the Prophetesse had
the Supreme authority in matter of Religion; which I thinke is not the
opinion of any Doctor.



After The Captivity The Jews Had No Setled Common-wealth

During the Captivity, the Jews had no Common-wealth at all

And after their return, though they renewed their Covenant with God, yet
there was no promise made of obedience, neither to Esdras, nor to any
other; And presently after they became subjects to the Greeks (from
whose Customes, and Daemonology, and from the doctrine of the Cabalists,
their Religion became much corrupted): In such sort as nothing can be
gathered from their confusion, both in State and Religion, concerning
the Supremacy in either. And therefore so far forth as concerneth the
Old Testament, we may conclude, that whosoever had the Soveraignty
of the Common-wealth amongst the Jews, the same had also the Supreme
Authority in matter of Gods externall worship; and represented Gods
Person; that is the person of God the Father; though he were not called
by the name of Father, till such time as he sent into the world his Son
Jesus Christ, to redeem mankind from their sins, and bring them into his
Everlasting Kingdome, to be saved for evermore. Of which we are to speak
in the Chapter following.


CHAPTER XLI. OF THE OFFICE OF OUR BLESSED SAVIOUR



Three Parts Of The Office Of Christ

We find in Holy Scripture three parts of the Office of the Messiah: the
first of a Redeemer, or Saviour: The second of a Pastor, Counsellour,
or Teacher, that is, of a Prophet sent from God, to convert such as God
hath elected to Salvation; The third of a King, and Eternall King, but
under his Father, as Moses and the High Priests were in their severall
times. And to these three parts are corespondent three times. For our
Redemption he wrought at his first coming, by the Sacrifice, wherein
he offered up himself for our sinnes upon the Crosse: our conversion
he wrought partly then in his own Person; and partly worketh now by his
Ministers; and will continue to work till his coming again. And after
his coming again, shall begin that his glorious Reign over his elect,
which is to last eternally.



His Office As A Redeemer

To the Office of a Redeemer, that is, of one that payeth the Ransome of
Sin, (which Ransome is Death,) it appertaineth, that he was Sacrificed,
and thereby bare upon his own head, and carryed away from us our
iniquities, in such sort as God had required. Not that the death of one
man, though without sinne, can satisfie for the offences of all men,
in the rigour of Justice, but in the Mercy of God, that ordained such
Sacrifices for sin, as he was pleased in his mercy to accept. In the old
Law (as we may read, Leviticus the 16.) the Lord required, that there
should every year once, bee made an Atonement for the Sins of all
Israel, both Priests, and others; for the doing whereof, Aaron alone was
to sacrifice for himself and the Priests a young Bullock; and for the
rest of the people, he was to receive from them two young Goates, of
which he was to Sacrifice one; but as for the other, which was the Scape
Goat, he was to lay his hands on the head thereof, and by a confession
of the iniquities of the people, to lay them all on that head, and then
by some opportune man, to cause the Goat to be led into the wildernesse,
and there to Escape, and carry away with him the iniquities of the
people. As the Sacrifice of the one Goat was a sufficient (because an
acceptable) price for the Ransome of all Israel; so the death of the
Messiah, is a sufficient price, for the Sins of all mankind, because
there was no more required. Our Saviour Christs sufferings seem to be
here figured, as cleerly, as in the oblation of Isaac, or in any other
type of him in the Old Testament: He was both the sacrificed Goat, and
the Scape Goat; "Hee was oppressed, and he was afflicted (Isa. 53.7.);
he opened not his mouth; he brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a
sheep is dumbe before the shearer, so opened he not his mouth:" Here he
is the Sacrificed Goat. "He hath born our Griefs, (ver.4.) and carried
our sorrows;" And again, (ver. 6.) "the Lord hath laid upon him the
iniquities of us all:" And so he is the Scape Goat. "He was cut off from
the land of the living (ver. 8.) for the transgression of my People:"
There again he is the Sacrificed Goat. And again (ver. 11.) "he shall
bear their sins:" Hee is the Scape Goat. Thus is the Lamb of God
equivalent to both those Goates; sacrificed, in that he dyed; and
escaping, in his Resurrection; being raised opportunely by his Father,
and removed from the habitation of men in his Ascension.



Christs Kingdome Not Of This World

For as much therefore, as he that Redeemeth, hath no title to the Thing
Redeemed, before the Redemption, and Ransome paid; and this Ransome was
the Death of the Redeemer; it is manifest, that our Saviour (as man) was
not King of those that he Redeemed, before hee suffered death; that is,
during that time hee conversed bodily on the Earth. I say, he was not
then King in present, by vertue of the Pact, which the faithfull make
with him in Baptisme; Neverthelesse, by the renewing of their Pact with
God in Baptisme, they were obliged to obey him for King, (under his
Father) whensoever he should be pleased to take the Kingdome upon him.
According whereunto, our Saviour himself expressely saith, (John 18.36.)
"My Kingdome is not of this world." Now seeing the Scripture maketh
mention but of two worlds; this that is now, and shall remain to the day
of Judgment, (which is therefore also called, The Last Day;) and that
which shall bee a new Heaven, and a new Earth; the Kingdome of Christ
is not to begin till the general Resurrection. And that is it which our
Saviour saith, (Mat. 16.27.) "The Son of man shall come in the glory
of his Father, with his Angels; and then he shall reward every man
according to his works." To reward every man according to his works, is
to execute the Office of a King; and this is not to be till he come in
the glory of his Father, with his Angells. When our Saviour saith,
(Mat. 23.2.) "The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses seat; All therefore
whatsoever they bid you doe, that observe and doe;" hee declareth
plainly, that hee ascribeth Kingly Power, for that time, not to
himselfe, but to them. And so hee hath also, where he saith, (Luke
12.14.) "Who made mee a Judge, or Divider over you?" And (John 12.47.)
"I came not to judge the world, but to save the world." And yet our
Saviour came into this world that hee might bee a King, and a Judge in
the world to come: For hee was the Messiah, that is, the Christ, that
is, the Anointed Priest, and the Soveraign Prophet of God; that is to
say, he was to have all the power that was in Moses the Prophet, in the
High Priests that succeeded Moses, and in the Kings that succeeded the
Priests. And St. John saies expressely (chap. 5. ver. 22.) "The Father
judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the Son." And this is
not repugnant to that other place, "I came not to judge the world:" for
this is spoken of the world present, the other of the world to come; as
also where it is said, that at the second coming of Christ, (Mat. 19.
28.) "Yee that have followed me in the Regeneration, when the Son of
man shall sit in the throne of his Glory, yee shall also sit on twelve
thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel."



The End Of Christs Comming Was To Renew The Covenant Of The Kingdome

Of God, And To Perswade The Elect To Imbrace It, Which Was The Second

Part Of His Office

If then Christ while hee was on Earth, had no Kingdome in this World,
to what end was his first coming? It was to restore unto God, by a new
Covenant, the Kingdome, which being his by the Old Covenant, had been
cut off by the rebellion of the Israelites in the election of Saul.
Which to doe, he was to preach unto them, that he was the Messiah, that
is, the King promised to them by the Prophets; and to offer himselfe in
sacrifice for the sinnes of them that should by faith submit themselves
thereto; and in case the nation generally should refuse him, to call
to his obedience such as should beleeve in him amongst the Gentiles. So
that there are two parts of our Saviours Office during his aboad upon
the Earth; One to Proclaim himself the Christ; and another by Teaching,
and by working of Miracles, to perswade, and prepare men to live so, as
to be worthy of the Immortality Beleevers were to enjoy, at such time as
he should come in majesty, to take possession of his Fathers Kingdome.
And therefore it is, that the time of his preaching, is often by himself
called the Regeneration; which is not properly a Kingdome, and thereby
a warrant to deny obedience to the Magistrates that then were, (for
hee commanded to obey those that sate then in Moses chaire, and to pay
tribute to Caesar;) but onely an earnest of the Kingdome of God that was
to come, to those to whom God had given the grace to be his disciples,
and to beleeve in him; For which cause the Godly are said to bee already
in the Kingdome of Grace, as naturalized in that heavenly Kingdome.



The Preaching Of Christ Not Contrary To The Then Law Of The Jews,

Nor Of Caesar

Hitherto therefore there is nothing done, or taught by Christ, that
tendeth to the diminution of the Civill Right of the Jewes, or of
Caesar. For as touching the Common-wealth which then was amongst
the Jews, both they that bare rule amongst them, that they that were
governed, did all expect the Messiah, and Kingdome of God; which they
could not have done if their Laws had forbidden him (when he came) to
manifest, and declare himself. Seeing therefore he did nothing, but by
Preaching, and Miracles go about to prove himselfe to be that Messiah,
hee did therein nothing against their laws. The Kingdome hee claimed was
to bee in another world; He taught all men to obey in the mean time them
that sate in Moses seat: he allowed them to give Caesar his tribute, and
refused to take upon himselfe to be a Judg. How then could his words,
or actions bee seditious, or tend to the overthrow of their then Civill
Government? But God having determined his sacrifice, for the reduction
of his elect to their former covenanted obedience, for the means,
whereby he would bring the same to effect, made use of their malice,
and ingratitude. Nor was it contrary to the laws of Caesar. For though
Pilate himself (to gratifie the Jews) delivered him to be crucified; yet
before he did so, he pronounced openly, that he found no fault in him:
And put for title of his condemnation, not as the Jews required, "that
he pretended to be King;" but simply, "That hee was King of the Jews;"
and notwithstanding their clamour, refused to alter it; saying, "What I
have written, I have written."



The Third Part Of His Office Was To Be King (Under His Father)

Of The Elect

As for the third part of his Office, which was to be King, I have
already shewn that his Kingdome was not to begin till the Resurrection.
But then he shall be King, not onely as God, in which sense he is
King already, and ever shall be, of all the Earth, in vertue of his
omnipotence; but also peculiarly of his own Elect, by vertue of the
pact they make with him in their Baptisme. And therefore it is, that
our Saviour saith (Mat. 19.28.) that his Apostles should sit upon twelve
thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel, "When the Son of man shall
sit in the throne of his glory;" whereby he signified that he should
reign then in his humane nature; and (Mat. 16.27.) "The Son of man shall
come in the glory of his Father, with his Angels, and then he shall
reward every man according to his works." The same we may read, Marke
13..26. and 14.26. and more expressely for the time, Luke 22.29, 30. "I
appoint unto you a Kingdome, as my Father hath appointed to mee, that
you may eat and drink at my table in my Kingdome, and sit on thrones
judging the twelve tribes of Israel." By which it is manifest that the
Kingdome of Christ appointed to him by his Father, is not to be before
the Son of Man shall come in Glory, and make his Apostles Judges of
the twelve tribes of Israel. But a man may here ask, seeing there is
no marriage in the Kingdome of Heaven, whether men shall then eat, and
drink; what eating therefore is meant in this place? This is expounded
by our Saviour (John 6.27.) where he saith, "Labour not for the meat
which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting
life, which the Son of man shall give you." So that by eating at Christs
table, is meant the eating of the Tree of Life; that is to say, the
enjoying of Immortality, in the Kingdome of the Son of Man. By which
places, and many more, it is evident, that our Saviours Kingdome is to
bee exercised by him in his humane nature.



Christs Authority In The Kingdome Of God Subordinate To His Father

Again, he is to be King then, no otherwise than as subordinate, or
Viceregent of God the Father, as Moses was in the wildernesse; and as
the High Priests were before the reign of Saul; and as the Kings were
after it. For it is one of the Prophecies concerning Christ, that he
should be like (in Office) to Moses; "I will raise them up a Prophet
(saith the Lord, Deut. 18.18.) from amongst their Brethren like unto
thee, and will put my words into his mouth," and this similitude with
Moses, is also apparent in the actions of our Saviour himself, whilest
he was conversant on Earth. For as Moses chose twelve Princes of the
tribes, to govern under him; so did our Saviour choose twelve Apostles,
who shall sit on twelve thrones, and judge the twelve tribes of Israel;
And as Moses authorized Seventy Elders, to receive the Spirit of God,
and to Prophecy to the people, that is, (as I have said before,) to
speak unto them in the name of God; so our Saviour also ordained seventy
Disciples, to preach his Kingdome, and Salvation to all Nations. And as
when a complaint was made to Moses, against those of the Seventy that
prophecyed in the camp of Israel, he justified them in it, as being
subservient therein to his government; so also our Saviour, when St.
John complained to him of a certain man that cast out Devills in his
name, justified him therein, saying, (Luke 9.50.) "Forbid him not, for
hee that is not against us, is on our part."

Again, our Saviour resembled Moses in the institution of Sacraments,
both of Admission into the Kingdome of God, and of Commemoration of his
deliverance of his Elect from their miserable condition. As the Children
of Israel had for Sacrament of their Reception into the Kingdome of God,
before the time of Moses, the rite of Circumcision, which rite having
been omitted in the Wildernesse, was again restored as soon as they came
into the land of Promise; so also the Jews, before the coming of our
Saviour, had a rite of Baptizing, that is, of washing with water all
those that being Gentiles, embraced the God of Israel. This rite St.
John the Baptist used in the reception of all them that gave their names
to the Christ, whom hee preached to bee already come into the world; and
our Saviour instituted the same for a Sacrament to be taken by all that
beleeved in him. From what cause the rite of Baptisme first proceeded,
is not expressed formally in the Scripture; but it may be probably
thought to be an imitation of the law of Moses, concerning Leprousie;
wherein the Leprous man was commanded to be kept out of the campe of
Israel for a certain time; after which time being judged by the Priest
to be clean, hee was admitted into the campe after a solemne Washing.
And this may therefore bee a type of the Washing in Baptisme; wherein
such men as are cleansed of the Leprousie of Sin by Faith, are received
into the Church with the solemnity of Baptisme. There is another
conjecture drawn from the Ceremonies of the Gentiles, in a certain case
that rarely happens; and that is, when a man that was thought dead,
chanced to recover, other men made scruple to converse with him, as they
would doe to converse with a Ghost, unlesse hee were received again into
the number of men, by Washing, as Children new born were washed from
the uncleannesse of their nativity, which was a kind of new birth. This
ceremony of the Greeks, in the time that Judaea was under the Dominion
of Alexander, and the Greeks his successors, may probably enough have
crept into the Religion of the Jews. But seeing it is not likely our
Saviour would countenance a Heathen rite, it is most likely it proceeded
from the Legall Ceremony of Washing after Leprosie. And for the other
Sacraments, of eating the Paschall Lambe, it is manifestly imitated in
the Sacrament of the Lords Supper; in which the Breaking of the Bread,
and the pouring out of the Wine, do keep in memory our deliverance from
the Misery of Sin, by Christs Passion, as the eating of the Paschall
Lambe, kept in memory the deliverance of the Jewes out of the Bondage of
Egypt. Seeing therefore the authority of Moses was but subordinate, and
hee but a Lieutenant to God; it followeth, that Christ, whose authority,
as man, was to bee like that of Moses, was no more but subordinate to
the authority of his Father. The same is more expressely signified, by
that that hee teacheth us to pray, "Our Father, Let thy Kingdome come;"
and, "For thine is the Kingdome, the power and the Glory;" and by that
it is said, that "Hee shall come in the Glory of his Father;" and by
that which St. Paul saith, (1 Cor. 15.24.) "then commeth the end, when
hee shall have delivered up the Kingdome to God, even the Father;" and
by many other most expresse places.



One And The Same God Is The Person Represented By Moses, And By Christ

Our Saviour therefore, both in Teaching, and Reigning, representeth (as
Moses Did) the Person of God; which God from that time forward, but
not before, is called the Father; and being still one and the same
substance, is one Person as represented by Moses, and another Person as
represented by his Sonne the Christ. For Person being a relative to a
Representer, it is consequent to plurality of Representers, that there
bee a plurality of Persons, though of one and the same Substance.


CHAPTER XLII. OF POWER ECCLESIASTICALL

For the understanding of POWER ECCLESIASTICALL, what, and in whom it is,
we are to distinguish the time from the Ascension of our Saviour, into
two parts; one before the Conversion of Kings, and men endued with
Soveraign Civill Power; the other after their Conversion. For it was
long after the Ascension, before any King, or Civill Soveraign embraced,
and publiquely allowed the teaching of Christian Religion.



Of The Holy Spirit That Fel On The Apostles

And for the time between, it is manifest, that the Power
Ecclesiasticall, was in the Apostles; and after them in such as were by
them ordained to Preach the Gospell, and to convert men to Christianity,
and to direct them that were converted in the way of Salvation; and
after these the Power was delivered again to others by these ordained,
and this was done by Imposition of hands upon such as were ordained; by
which was signified the giving of the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of God, to
those whom they ordained Ministers of God, to advance his Kingdome.
So that Imposition of hands, was nothing else but the Seal of their
Commission to Preach Christ, and teach his Doctrine; and the giving of
the Holy Ghost by that ceremony of Imposition of hands, was an imitation
of that which Moses did. For Moses used the same ceremony to his
Minister Joshua, as wee read Deuteronomy 34. ver. 9. "And Joshua the son
of Nun was full of the Spirit of Wisdome; for Moses had laid his
hands upon him." Our Saviour therefore between his Resurrection, and
Ascension, gave his Spirit to the Apostles; first, by "Breathing on
them, and saying," (John 20.22.) "Receive yee the Holy Spirit;" and after
his Ascension (Acts 2.2, 3.) by sending down upon them, a "mighty wind,
and Cloven tongues of fire;" and not by Imposition of hands; as neither
did God lay his hands on Moses; and his Apostles afterward, transmitted
the same Spirit by Imposition of hands, as Moses did to Joshua. So that
it is manifest hereby, in whom the Power Ecclesiasticall continually
remained, in those first times, where there was not any Christian
Common-wealth; namely, in them that received the same from the Apostles,
by successive laying on of hands.



Of The Trinity

Here wee have the Person of God born now the third time. For as Moses,
and the High Priests, were Gods Representative in the Old Testament;
and our Saviour himselfe as Man, during his abode on earth: So the Holy
Ghost, that is to say, the Apostles, and their successors, in the Office
of Preaching, and Teaching, that had received the Holy Spirit, have
Represented him ever since. But a Person, (as I have shewn before,
[chapt. 16.].) is he that is Represented, as often as hee is
Represented; and therefore God, who has been Represented (that is,
Personated) thrice, may properly enough be said to be three Persons;
though neither the word Person, nor Trinity be ascribed to him in the
Bible. St. John indeed (1 Epist. 5.7.) saith, "There be three that bear
witnesse in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these
Three are One:" But this disagreeth not, but accordeth fitly with three
Persons in the proper signification of Persons; which is, that which is
Represented by another. For so God the Father, as Represented by Moses,
is one Person; and as Represented by his Sonne, another Person, and as
Represented by the Apostles, and by the Doctors that taught by authority
from them derived, is a third Person; and yet every Person here, is
the Person of one and the same God. But a man may here ask, what it was
whereof these three bare witnesse. St. John therefore tells us (verse
11.) that they bear witnesse, that "God hath given us eternall life
in his Son." Again, if it should be asked, wherein that testimony
appeareth, the Answer is easie; for he hath testified the same by the
miracles he wrought, first by Moses; secondly, by his Son himself; and
lastly by his Apostles, that had received the Holy Spirit; all which
in their times Represented the Person of God; and either prophecyed, or
preached Jesus Christ. And as for the Apostles, it was the character
of the Apostleship, in the twelve first and great Apostles, to bear
Witnesse of his Resurrection; as appeareth expressely (Acts 1. ver.
21,22.) where St Peter, when a new Apostle was to be chosen in the place
of Judas Iscariot, useth these words, "Of these men which have companied
with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us,
beginning at the Baptisme of John, unto that same day that hee was
taken up from us, must one bee ordained to be a Witnesse with us of his
Resurrection:" which words interpret the Bearing of Witnesse, mentioned
by St. John. There is in the same place mentioned another Trinity of
Witnesses in Earth. For (ver. 8.) he saith, "there are three that bear
Witnesse in Earth, the Spirit, and the Water, and the Bloud; and these
three agree in one:" that is to say, the graces of Gods Spirit, and the
two Sacraments, Baptisme, and the Lords Supper, which all agree in one
Testimony, to assure the consciences of beleevers, of eternall life; of
which Testimony he saith (verse 10.) "He that beleeveth on the Son of
man hath the Witnesse in himselfe." In this Trinity on Earth the Unity
is not of the thing; for the Spirit, the Water, and the Bloud, are not
the same substance, though they give the same testimony: But in the
Trinity of Heaven, the Persons are the persons of one and the same God,
though Represented in three different times and occasions. To conclude,
the doctrine of the Trinity, as far as can be gathered directly from
the Scripture, is in substance this; that God who is alwaies One and the
same, was the Person Represented by Moses; the Person Represented by
his Son Incarnate; and the Person Represented by the Apostles. As
Represented by the Apostles, the Holy Spirit by which they spake, is
God; As Represented by his Son (that was God and Man), the Son is that
God; As represented by Moses, and the High Priests, the Father, that is
to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that God: From whence
we may gather the reason why those names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in
the signification of the Godhead, are never used in the Old Testament:
For they are Persons, that is, they have their names from Representing;
which could not be, till divers men had Represented Gods Person in
ruling, or in directing under him.

Thus wee see how the Power Ecclesiasticall was left by our Saviour
to the Apostles; and how they were (to the end they might the better
exercise that Power,) endued with the Holy Spirit, which is therefore
called sometime in the New Testament Paracletus which signifieth an
Assister, or one called to for helpe, though it bee commonly translated
a Comforter. Let us now consider the Power it selfe, what it was, and
over whom.



The Power Ecclesiasticall Is But The Power To Teach

Cardinall Bellarmine in his third generall Controversie, hath handled a
great many questions concerning the Ecclesiasticall Power of the Pope
of Rome; and begins with this, Whether it ought to be Monarchicall,
Aristocraticall, or Democraticall. All which sorts of Power, are
Soveraign, and Coercive. If now it should appear, that there is no
Coercive Power left them by our Saviour; but onely a Power to proclaim
the Kingdom of Christ, and to perswade men to submit themselves
thereunto; and by precepts and good counsell, to teach them that have
submitted, what they are to do, that they may be received into the
Kingdom of God when it comes; and that the Apostles, and other Ministers
of the Gospel, are our Schoolemasters, and not our Commanders, and their
Precepts not Laws, but wholesome Counsells then were all that dispute in
vain.



An Argument Thereof, The Power Of Christ Himself

I have shewn already (in the last Chapter,) that the Kingdome of Christ
is not of this world: therefore neither can his Ministers (unlesse they
be Kings,) require obedience in his name. For if the Supreme King, have
not his Regall Power in this world; by what authority can obedience be
required to his Officers? As my Father sent me, (so saith our Saviour)
I send you. But our Saviour was sent to perswade the Jews to return to,
and to invite the Gentiles, to receive the Kingdome of his Father, and
not to reign in Majesty, no not, as his Fathers Lieutenant, till the day
of Judgment.



From The Name Of Regeneration

The time between the Ascension, and the generall Resurrection, is
called, not a Reigning, but a Regeneration; that is, a Preparation
of men for the second and glorious coming of Christ, at the day of
Judgment; as appeareth by the words of our Saviour, Mat. 19.28. "You
that have followed me in the Regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit
in the throne of his glory, you shall also sit upon twelve Thrones;" And
of St. Paul (Ephes. 6.15.) "Having your feet shod with the Preparation
of the Gospell of Peace."



From The Comparison Of It, With Fishing, Leaven, Seed

And is compared by our Saviour, to Fishing; that is, to winning men
to obedience, not by Coercion, and Punishing; but by Perswasion: and
therefore he said not to his Apostles, hee would make them so many
Nimrods, Hunters Of Men; But Fishers Of Men. It is compared also to
Leaven; to Sowing of Seed, and to the Multiplication of a grain of
Mustard-seed; by all which Compulsion is excluded; and consequently
there can in that time be no actual Reigning. The work of Christs
Ministers, is Evangelization; that is, a Proclamation of Christ, and
a preparation for his second comming; as the Evangelization of John
Baptist, was a preparation to his first coming.



From The Nature Of Faith:

Again, the Office of Christs Ministers in this world, is to make men
Beleeve, and have Faith in Christ: But Faith hath no relation to, nor
dependence at all upon Compulsion, or Commandement; but onely upon
certainty, or probability of Arguments drawn from Reason, or from
something men beleeve already. Therefore the Ministers of Christ in this
world, have no Power by that title, to Punish any man for not Beleeving,
or for Contradicting what they say; they have I say no Power by that
title of Christs Ministers, to Punish such: but if they have Soveraign
Civill Power, by politick institution, then they may indeed lawfully
Punish any Contradiction to their laws whatsoever: And St. Paul, of
himselfe and other then Preachers of the Gospell saith in expresse
words, (2 Cor. 1.24.) "Wee have no Dominion over your Faith, but are
Helpers of your Joy."



From The Authority Christ Hath Left To Civill Princes

Another Argument, that the Ministers of Christ in this present world
have no right of Commanding, may be drawn from the lawfull Authority
which Christ hath left to all Princes, as well Christians, as Infidels.
St. Paul saith (Col. 3.20.) "Children obey your Parents in all things;
for this is well pleasing to the Lord." And ver. 22. "Servants obey in
all things your Masters according to the flesh, not with eye-service, as
men-pleasers, but in singlenesse of heart, as fearing the Lord;" This is
spoken to them whose Masters were Infidells; and yet they are bidden
to obey them In All Things. And again, concerning obedience to Princes.
(Rom. 13. the first 6. verses) exhorting to "be subject to the Higher
Powers," he saith, "that all Power is ordained of God;" and "that we
ought to be subject to them, not onely for" fear of incurring their
"wrath, but also for conscience sake." And St. Peter, (1 Epist. chap. 2e
ver. 13, 14, 15.) "Submit your selves to every Ordinance of Man, for the
Lords sake, whether it bee to the King, as Supreme, or unto Governours,
as to them that be sent by him for the punishment of evill doers, and
for the praise of them that doe well; for so is the will of God."
And again St. Paul (Tit. 3.1.) "Put men in mind to be subject to
Principalities, and Powers, and to obey Magistrates." These Princes, and
Powers, whereof St. Peter, and St. Paul here speak, were all Infidels;
much more therefore we are to obey those Christians, whom God hath
ordained to have Soveraign Power over us. How then can wee be obliged
to doe any thing contrary to the Command of the King, or other Soveraign
Representant of the Common-wealth, whereof we are members, and by whom
we look to be protected? It is therefore manifest, that Christ hath not
left to his Ministers in this world, unlesse they be also endued with
Civill Authority, any authority to Command other men.



What Christians May Do To Avoid Persecution

But what (may some object) if a King, or a Senate, or other Soveraign
Person forbid us to beleeve in Christ? To this I answer, that such
forbidding is of no effect, because Beleef, and Unbeleef never follow
mens Commands. Faith is a gift of God, which Man can neither give, nor
take away by promise of rewards, or menaces of torture. And if it be
further asked, What if wee bee commanded by our lawfull Prince, to say
with our tongue, wee beleeve not; must we obey such command? Profession
with the tongue is but an externall thing, and no more then any other
gesture whereby we signifie our obedience; and wherein a Christian,
holding firmely in his heart the Faith of Christ, hath the same liberty
which the Prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman the Syrian. Naaman was
converted in his heart to the God of Israel; For hee saith (2 Kings
5.17.) "Thy servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering, nor
sacrifice unto other Gods but unto the Lord. In this thing the Lord
pardon thy servant, that when my Master goeth into the house of Rimmon
to worship there, and he leaneth on my hand, and I bow my selfe in the
house of Rimmon; when I bow my selfe in the house of Rimmon, the Lord
pardon thy servant in this thing." This the Prophet approved, and bid
him "Goe in peace." Here Naaman beleeved in his heart; but by bowing
before the Idol Rimmon, he denyed the true God in effect, as much as
if he had done it with his lips. But then what shall we answer to our
Saviours saying, "Whosoever denyeth me before men, I will deny him
before my Father which is in Heaven?" This we may say, that whatsoever
a Subject, as Naaman was, is compelled to in obedience to his Soveraign,
and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the laws of
his country, that action is not his, but his Soveraigns; nor is it he
that in this case denyeth Christ before men, but his Governour, and the
law of his countrey. If any man shall accuse this doctrine, as repugnant
to true, and unfeigned Christianity; I ask him, in case there should be
a subject in any Christian Common-wealth, that should be inwardly in his
heart of the Mahometan Religion, whether if his Soveraign Command him to
bee present at the divine service of the Christian Church, and that on
pain of death, he think that Mamometan obliged in conscience to suffer
death for that cause, rather than to obey that command of his lawful
Prince. If he say, he ought rather to suffer death, then he authorizeth
all private men, to disobey their Princes, in maintenance of their
Religion, true, or false; if he say, he ought to bee obedient, then he
alloweth to himself, that which hee denyeth to another, contrary to the
words of our Saviour, "Whatsoever you would that men should doe unto
you, that doe yee unto them;" and contrary to the Law of Nature, (which
is the indubitable everlasting Law of God) "Do not to another, that
which thou wouldest not he should doe unto thee."



Of Martyrs

But what then shall we say of all those Martyrs we read of in the
History of the Church, that they have needlessely cast away their lives?
For answer hereunto, we are to distinguish the persons that have been
for that cause put to death; whereof some have received a Calling to
preach, and professe the Kingdome of Christ openly; others have had no
such Calling, nor more has been required of them than their owne faith.
The former sort, if they have been put to death, for bearing witnesse to
this point, that Jesus Christ is risen from the dead, were true Martyrs;
For a Martyr is, (to give the true definition of the word) a Witnesse of
the Resurrection of Jesus the Messiah; which none can be but those
that conversed with him on earth, and saw him after he was risen: For a
Witnesse must have seen what he testifieth, or else his testimony is not
good. And that none but such, can properly be called Martyrs of Christ,
is manifest out of the words of St. Peter, Act. 1.21, 22. "Wherefore of
these men which have companyed with us all the time that the Lord Jesus
went in and out amongst us, beginning from the Baptisme of John unto
that same day hee was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a
Martyr (that is a Witnesse) with us of his Resurrection:" Where we
may observe, that he which is to bee a Witnesse of the truth of
the Resurrection of Christ, that is to say, of the truth of this
fundamentall article of Christian Religion, that Jesus was the Christ,
must be some Disciple that conversed with him, and saw him before, and
after his Resurrection; and consequently must be one of his originall
Disciples: whereas they which were not so, can Witnesse no more, but
that their antecessors said it, and are therefore but Witnesses of
other mens testimony; and are but second Martyrs, or Martyrs of Christs
Witnesses.

He, that to maintain every doctrine which he himself draweth out of
the History of our Saviours life, and of the Acts, or Epistles of the
Apostles; or which he beleeveth upon the authority of a private man,
wil oppose the Laws and Authority of the Civill State, is very far from
being a Martyr of Christ, or a Martyr of his Martyrs. 'Tis one Article
onely, which to die for, meriteth so honorable a name; and that Article
is this, that Jesus Is The Christ; that is to say, He that hath redeemed
us, and shall come again to give us salvation, and eternall life in his
glorious Kingdome. To die for every tenet that serveth the ambition,
or profit of the Clergy, is not required; nor is it the Death of the
Witnesse, but the Testimony it self that makes the Martyr: for the word
signifieth nothing else, but the man that beareth Witnesse, whether he
be put to death for his testimony, or not.

Also he that is not sent to preach this fundamentall article, but taketh
it upon him of his private authority, though he be a Witnesse, and
consequently a Martyr, either primary of Christ, or secondary of his
Apostles, Disciples, or their Successors; yet is he not obliged to
suffer death for that cause; because being not called thereto, tis
not required at his hands; nor ought hee to complain, if he loseth
the reward he expecteth from those that never set him on work. None
therefore can be a Martyr, neither of the first, nor second degree, that
have not a warrant to preach Christ come in the flesh; that is to say,
none, but such as are sent to the conversion of Infidels. For no man
is a Witnesse to him that already beleeveth, and therefore needs no
Witnesse; but to them that deny, or doubt, or have not heard it. Christ
sent his Apostles, and his Seventy Disciples, with authority to preach;
he sent not all that beleeved: And he sent them to unbeleevers; "I send
you (saith he) as sheep amongst wolves;" not as sheep to other sheep.



Argument From The Points Of Their Commission

Lastly the points of their Commission, as they are expressely set down
in the Gospel, contain none of them any authority over the Congregation.



To Preach

We have first (Mat. 10.) that the twelve Apostles were sent "to the
lost sheep of the house of Israel," and commanded to Preach, "that the
Kingdome of God was at hand." Now Preaching in the originall, is that
act, which a Crier, Herald, or other Officer useth to doe publiquely in
Proclaiming of a King. But a Crier hath not right to Command any man.
And (Luke 10.2.) the seventy Disciples are sent out, "as Labourers,
not as Lords of the Harvest;" and are bidden (verse 9.) to say, "The
Kingdome of God is come nigh unto you;" and by Kingdome here is meant,
not the Kingdome of Grace, but the Kingdome of Glory; for they are
bidden to denounce it (ver. 11.) to those Cities which shall not receive
them, as a threatning, that it shall be more tolerable in that day for
Sodome, than for such a City. And (Mat. 20.28.) our Saviour telleth his
Disciples, that sought Priority of place, their Office was to minister,
even as the Son of man came, not to be ministred unto, but to minister.
Preachers therefore have not Magisteriall, but Ministeriall power: "Bee
not called Masters, (saith our Saviour, Mat. 23.10) for one is your
Master, even Christ."



And Teach

Another point of their Commission, is, to Teach All Nations; as it is in
Mat. 28.19. or as in St. Mark 16.15 "Goe into all the world, and Preach
the Gospel to every creature." Teaching therefore, and Preaching is the
same thing. For they that Proclaim the comming of a King, must withall
make known by what right he commeth, if they mean men shall submit
themselves unto him: As St. Paul did to the Jews of Thessalonica,
when "three Sabbath days he reasoned with them out of the Scriptures,
opening, and alledging that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen
again from the dead, and that this Jesus is Christ." But to teach out
of the Old Testament that Jesus was Christ, (that is to say, King,)
and risen from the dead, is not to say, that men are bound after they
beleeve it, to obey those that tell them so, against the laws, and
commands of their Soveraigns; but that they shall doe wisely, to expect
the coming of Christ hereafter, in Patience, and Faith, with Obedience
to their present Magistrates.



To Baptize;

Another point of their Commission, is to Baptize, "in the name of
the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." What is Baptisme?
Dipping into water. But what is it to Dip a man into the water in the
name of any thing? The meaning of these words of Baptisme is this. He
that is Baptized, is Dipped or Washed, as a sign of becomming a new man,
and a loyall subject to that God, whose Person was represented in old
time by Moses, and the High Priests, when he reigned over the Jews; and
to Jesus Christ, his Sonne, God, and Man, that hath redeemed us, and
shall in his humane nature Represent his Fathers Person in his eternall
Kingdome after the Resurrection; and to acknowledge the Doctrine of the
Apostles, who assisted by the Spirit of the Father, and of the Son, were
left for guides to bring us into that Kingdome, to be the onely, and
assured way thereunto. This, being our promise in Baptisme; and the
Authority of Earthly Soveraigns being not to be put down till the day of
Judgment; (for that is expressely affirmed by S. Paul 1 Cor. 15. 22, 23,
24. where he saith, "As in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be
made alive. But every man in his owne order, Christ the first fruits,
afterward they that are Christs, at his comming; Then Commeth the end,
when he shall have delivered up the Kingdome of God, even the Father,
when he shall have put down all Rule, and all Authority and Power")
it is manifest, that we do not in Baptisme constitute over us another
authority, by which our externall actions are to be governed in this
life; but promise to take the doctrine of the Apostles for our direction
in the way to life eternall.



And To Forgive, And Retain Sinnes

The Power of Remission, And Retention Of Sinnes, called also the Power
of Loosing, and Binding, and sometimes the Keyes Of The Kingdome Of
Heaven, is a consequence of the Authority to Baptize, or refuse to
Baptize. For Baptisme is the Sacrament of Allegeance, of them that are
to be received into the Kingdome of God; that is to say, into Eternall
life; that is to say, to Remission of Sin: For as Eternall life was lost
by the Committing, so it is recovered by the Remitting of mens Sins. The
end of Baptisme is Remission of Sins: and therefore St. Peter, when they
that were converted by his Sermon on the day of Pentecost, asked what
they were to doe, advised them to "repent, and be Baptized in the name
of Jesus, for the Remission of Sins." And therefore seeing to Baptize
is to declare the Reception of men into Gods Kingdome; and to refuse to
Baptize is to declare their Exclusion; it followeth, that the Power
to declare them Cast out, or Retained in it, was given to the same
Apostles, and their Substitutes, and Successors. And therefore after our
Saviour had breathed upon them, saying, (John 20.22.) "Receive the Holy
Ghost," hee addeth in the next verse, "Whose soever Sins ye Remit,
they are Remitted unto them; and whose soever Sins ye Retain, they are
Retained." By which words, is not granted an Authority to Forgive, or
Retain Sins, simply and absolutely, as God Forgiveth or Retaineth them,
who knoweth the Heart of man, and truth of his Penitence and Conversion;
but conditionally, to the Penitent: And this Forgivenesse, or
Absolution, in case the absolved have but a feigned Repentance, is
thereby without other act, or sentence of the Absolvent, made void,
and hath no effect at all to Salvation, but on the contrary, to the
Aggravation of his Sin. Therefore the Apostles, and their Successors,
are to follow but the outward marks of Repentance; which appearing, they
have no Authority to deny Absolution; and if they appeare not, they have
no authority to Absolve. The same also is to be observed in Baptisme:
for to a converted Jew, or Gentile, the Apostles had not the Power to
deny Baptisme; nor to grant it to the Un-penitent. But seeing no man is
able to discern the truth of another mans Repentance, further than by
externall marks, taken from his words, and actions, which are subject to
hypocrisie; another question will arise, Who it is that is constituted
Judge of those marks. And this question is decided by our Saviour
himself; (Mat. 18. 15, 16, 17.) "If thy Brother (saith he) shall
trespasse against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee, and him
alone; if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy Brother. But if he
will not hear thee, then take with thee one, or two more. And if he
shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church, let him be unto
thee as an Heathen man, and a Publican." By which it is manifest, that
the Judgment concerning the truth of Repentance, belonged not to any one
Man, but to the Church, that is, to the Assembly of the Faithfull, or
to them that have authority to bee their Representant. But besides the
Judgment, there is necessary also the pronouncing of Sentence: And
this belonged alwaies to the Apostle, or some Pastor of the Church,
as Prolocutor; and of this our Saviour speaketh in the 18 verse,
"Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and
whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven." And
comformable hereunto was the practise of St. Paul (1 Cor. 5.3, 4, & 5.)
where he saith, "For I verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit,
have determined already, as though I were present, concerning him that
hath so done this deed; In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ when ye
are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus
Christ, To deliver such a one to Satan;" that is to say, to cast him
out of the Church, as a man whose Sins are not Forgiven. Paul here
pronounceth the Sentence; but the Assembly was first to hear the Cause,
(for St. Paul was absent;) and by consequence to condemn him. But in
the same chapter (ver. 11, 12.) the Judgment in such a case is more
expressely attributed to the Assembly: "But now I have written unto
you, not to keep company, if any man that is called a Brother be a
Fornicator, &c. with such a one no not to eat. For what have I to do to
judg them that are without? Do not ye judg them that are within?"
The Sentence therefore by which a man was put out of the Church, was
pronounced by the Apostle, or Pastor; but the Judgment concerning the
merit of the cause, was in the Church; that is to say, (as the times
were before the conversion of Kings, and men that had Soveraign
Authority in the Common-wealth,) the Assembly of the Christians dwelling
in the same City; as in Corinth, in the Assembly of the Christians of
Corinth.



Of Excommunication

This part of the Power of the Keyes, by which men were thrust out from
the Kingdome of God, is that which is called Excommunication; and to
excommunicate, is in the Originall, Aposunagogon Poiein, To Cast Out Of
The Synagogue; that is, out of the place of Divine service; a word drawn
from the custom of the Jews, to cast out of their Synagogues, such as
they thought in manners, or doctrine, contagious, as Lepers were by the
Law of Moses separated from the congregation of Israel, till such time
as they should be by the Priest pronounced clean.



The Use Of Excommunication Without Civill Power.

The Use and Effect of Excommunication, whilest it was not yet
strengthened with the Civill Power, was no more, than that they, who
were not Excommunicate, were to avoid the company of them that were.
It was not enough to repute them as Heathen, that never had been
Christians; for with such they might eate, and drink; which with
Excommunicate persons they might not do; as appeareth by the words of
St. Paul, (1 Cor. 5. ver. 9, 10, &c.) where he telleth them, he had
formerly forbidden them to "company with Fornicators;" but (because that
could not bee without going out of the world,) he restraineth it to such
Fornicators, and otherwise vicious persons, as were of the brethren;
"with such a one" (he saith) they ought not to keep company, "no, not to
eat." And this is no more than our Saviour saith (Mat. 18.17.) "Let
him be to thee as a Heathen, and as a Publican." For Publicans (which
signifieth Farmers, and Receivers of the revenue of the Common-wealth)
were so hated, and detested by the Jews that were to pay for it, as
that Publican and Sinner were taken amongst them for the same thing:
Insomuch, as when our Saviour accepted the invitation of Zacchaeus a
Publican; though it were to Convert him, yet it was objected to him as
a Crime. And therefore, when our Saviour, to Heathen, added Publican, he
did forbid them to eat with a man Excommunicate.

As for keeping them out of their Synagogues, or places of Assembly, they
had no Power to do it, but that of the owner of the place, whether he
were Christian, or Heathen. And because all places are by right, in the
Dominion of the Common-wealth; as well hee that was Excommunicated, as
hee that never was Baptized, might enter into them by Commission from
the Civill Magistrate; as Paul before his conversion entred into their
Synagogues at Damascus, (Acts 9.2.) to apprehend Christians, men and
women, and to carry them bound to Jerusalem, by Commission from the High
Priest.



Of No Effect Upon An Apostate

By which it appears, that upon a Christian, that should become an
Apostate, in a place where the Civill Power did persecute, or not assist
the Church, the effect of Excommunication had nothing in it, neither of
dammage in this world, nor of terrour: Not of terrour, because of their
unbeleef; nor of dammage, because they returned thereby into the favour
of the world; and in the world to come, were to be in no worse estate,
then they which never had beleeved. The dammage redounded rather to the
Church, by provocation of them they cast out, to a freer execution of
their malice.



But Upon The Faithfull Only

Excommunication therefore had its effect onely upon those, that beleeved
that Jesus Christ was to come again in Glory, to reign over, and to
judge both the quick, and the dead, and should therefore refuse entrance
into his Kingdom, to those whose Sins were Retained; that is, to those
that were Excommunicated by the Church. And thence it is that St. Paul
calleth Excommunication, a delivery of the Excommunicate person to
Satan. For without the Kingdom of Christ, all other Kingdomes after
Judgment, are comprehended in the Kingdome of Satan. This is it that the
faithfull stood in fear of, as long as they stood Excommunicate, that is
to say, in an estate wherein their sins were not Forgiven. Whereby wee
may understand, that Excommunication in the time that Christian Religion
was not authorized by the Civill Power, was used onely for a correction
of manners, not of errours in opinion: for it is a punishment, whereof
none could be sensible but such as beleeved, and expected the coming
again of our Saviour to judge the world; and they who so beleeved,
needed no other opinion, but onely uprightnesse of life, to be saved.



For What Fault Lyeth Excommunication

There Lyeth Excommunication for Injustice; as (Mat. 18.) If thy Brother
offend thee, tell it him privately; then with Witnesses; lastly, tell
the Church; and then if he obey not, "Let him be to thee as an Heathen
man, and a Publican." And there lyeth Excommunication for a Scandalous
Life, as (1 Cor. 5. 11.) "If any man that is called a Brother, be
a Fornicator, or Covetous, or an Idolater, or a Drunkard, or an
Extortioner, with such a one yee are not to eat." But to Excommunicate a
man that held this foundation, that Jesus Was The Christ, for difference
of opinion in other points, by which that Foundation was not destroyed,
there appeareth no authority in the Scripture, nor example in the
Apostles. There is indeed in St. Paul (Titus 3.10.) a text that seemeth
to be to the contrary. "A man that is an Haeretique, after the first
and second admonition, reject." For an Haeretique, is he, that being a
member of the Church, teacheth neverthelesse some private opinion, which
the Church has forbidden: and such a one, S. Paul adviseth Titus, after
the first, and second admonition, to Reject. But to Reject (in this
place) is not to Excommunicate the Man; But to Give Over Admonishing
Him, To Let Him Alone, To Set By Disputing With Him, as one that is to
be convinced onely by himselfe. The same Apostle saith (2 Tim. 2.23.)
"Foolish and unlearned questions avoid;" The word Avoid in this place,
and Reject in the former, is the same in the Originall, paraitou: but
Foolish questions may bee set by without Excommunication. And again,
(Tit. 3.93) "Avoid Foolish questions," where the Originall, periistaso,
(set them by) is equivalent to the former word Reject. There is no
other place that can so much as colourably be drawn, to countenance
the Casting out of the Church faithfull men, such as beleeved the
foundation, onely for a singular superstructure of their own, proceeding
perhaps from a good & pious conscience. But on the contrary, all such
places as command avoiding such disputes, are written for a Lesson to
Pastors, (such as Timothy and Titus were) not to make new Articles of
Faith, by determining every small controversie, which oblige men to a
needlesse burthen of Conscience, or provoke them to break the union of
the Church. Which Lesson the Apostles themselves observed well. S. Peter
and S. Paul, though their controversie were great, (as we may read
in Gal. 2.11.) yet they did not cast one another out of the Church.
Neverthelesse, during the Apostles time, there were other Pastors that
observed it not; As Diotrephes (3 John 9. &c.) who cast out of the
Church, such as S. John himself thought fit to be received into it, out
of a pride he took in Praeeminence; so early it was, that Vainglory, and
Ambition had found entrance into the Church of Christ.



Of Persons Liable To Excommunication

That a man be liable to Excommunication, there be many conditions
requisite; as First, that he be a member of some Commonalty, that is to
say, of some lawfull Assembly, that is to say, of some Christian
Church, that hath power to judge of the cause for which hee is to
bee Excommunicated. For where there is no community, there can bee no
Excommunication; nor where there is no power to Judge, can there bee any
power to give Sentence. From hence it followeth, that one Church cannot
be Excommunicated by another: For either they have equall power
to Excommunicate each other, in which case Excommunication is not
Discipline, nor an act of Authority, but Schisme, and Dissolution of
charity; or one is so subordinate to the other, as that they both
have but one voice, and then they be but one Church; and the part
Excommunicated, is no more a Church, but a dissolute number of
individuall persons.

And because the sentence of Excommunication, importeth an advice, not to
keep company, nor so much as to eat with him that is Excommunicate, if
a Soveraign Prince, or Assembly bee Excommunicate, the sentence is of no
effect. For all Subjects are bound to be in the company and presence of
their own Soveraign (when he requireth it) by the law of Nature; nor
can they lawfully either expell him from any place of his own Dominion,
whether profane or holy; nor go out of his Dominion, without his leave;
much lesse (if he call them to that honour,) refuse to eat with him. And
as to other Princes and States, because they are not parts of one and
the same congregation, they need not any other sentence to keep
them from keeping company with the State Excommunicate: for the
very Institution, as it uniteth many men into one Community; so it
dissociateth one Community from another: so that Excommunication is
not needfull for keeping Kings and States asunder; nor has any further
effect then is in the nature of Policy it selfe; unlesse it be to
instigate Princes to warre upon one another.

Nor is the Excommunication of a Christian Subject, that obeyeth the laws
of his own Soveraign, whether Christian, or Heathen, of any effect. For
if he beleeve that "Jesus is the Christ, he hath the Spirit of God" (1
Joh. 4.1.) "and God dwelleth in him, and he in God," (1 Joh. 4.15.) But
hee that hath the Spirit of God; hee that dwelleth in God; hee in
whom God dwelleth, can receive no harm by the Excommunication of men.
Therefore, he that beleeveth Jesus to be the Christ, is free from all
the dangers threatned to persons Excommunicate. He that beleeveth it
not, is no Christian. Therefore a true and unfeigned Christian is not
liable to Excommunication; Nor he also that is a professed Christian,
till his Hypocrisy appear in his Manners, that is, till his behaviour
bee contrary to the law of his Soveraign, which is the rule of Manners,
and which Christ and his Apostles have commanded us to be subject to.
For the Church cannot judge of Manners but by externall Actions, which
Actions can never bee unlawfull, but when they are against the Law of
the Common-wealth.

If a mans Father, or Mother, or Master bee Excommunicate, yet are not
the Children forbidden to keep them Company, nor to Eat with them; for
that were (for the most part) to oblige them not to eat at all, for want
of means to get food; and to authorise them to disobey their Parents,
and Masters, contrary to the Precept of the Apostles.

In summe, the Power of Excommunication cannot be extended further than
to the end for which the Apostles and Pastors of the Church have
their Commission from our Saviour; which is not to rule by Command and
Coaction, but by Teaching and Direction of men in the way of Salvation
in the world to come. And as a Master in any Science, may abandon his
Scholar, when hee obstinately neglecteth the practise of his rules; but
not accuse him of Injustice, because he was never bound to obey him:
so a Teacher of Christian doctrine may abandon his Disciples that
obstinately continue in an unchristian life; but he cannot say, they doe
him wrong, because they are not obliged to obey him: For to a Teacher
that shall so complain, may be applyed the Answer of God to Samuel in
the like place, (1 Sam. 8.) "They have not rejected thee, but mee."
Excommunication therefore when it wanteth the assistance of the Civill
Power, as it doth, when a Christian State, or Prince is Excommunicate
by a forain Authority, is without effect; and consequently ought to
be without terrour. The name of Fulmen Excommunicationis (that is, the
Thunderbolt Of Excommunication) proceeded from an imagination of the
Bishop of Rome, which first used it, that he was King of Kings, as the
Heathen made Jupiter King of the Gods; and assigned him in their Poems,
and Pictures, a Thunderbolt, wherewith to subdue, and punish the Giants,
that should dare to deny his power: Which imagination was grounded on
two errours; one, that the Kingdome of Christ is of this world, contrary
to our Saviours owne words, "My Kingdome is not of this world;" the
other, that hee is Christs Vicar, not onely over his owne Subjects,
but over all the Christians of the World; whereof there is no ground in
Scripture, and the contrary shall bee proved in its due place.



Of The Interpreter Of The Scriptures Before Civill Soveraigns

Became Christians

St. Paul coming to Thessalonica, where was a Synagogue of the Jews,
(Acts 17.2, 3.) "As his manner was, went in unto them, and three Sabbath
dayes reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, Opening and alledging,
that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again from the dead; and
that this Jesus whom he preached was the Christ." The Scriptures here
mentioned were the Scriptures of the Jews, that is, the Old Testament.
The men, to whom he was to prove that Jesus was the Christ, and risen
again from the dead, were also Jews, and did beleeve already, that
they were the Word of God. Hereupon (as it is verse 4.) some of them
beleeved, and (as it is in the 5. ver.) some beleeved not. What was
the reason, when they all beleeved the Scripture, that they did not
all beleeve alike; but that some approved, others disapproved the
Interpretation of St. Paul that cited them; and every one Interpreted
them to himself? It was this; S. Paul came to them without any Legall
Commission, and in the manner of one that would not Command, but
Perswade; which he must needs do, either by Miracles, as Moses did
to the Israelites in Egypt, that they might see his Authority in Gods
works; or by Reasoning from the already received Scripture, that
they might see the truth of his doctrine in Gods Word. But whosoever
perswadeth by reasoning from principles written, maketh him to whom hee
speaketh Judge, both of the meaning of those principles, and also of the
force of his inferences upon them. If these Jews of Thessalonica were
not, who else was the Judge of what S. Paul alledged out of Scripture?
If S. Paul, what needed he to quote any places to prove his doctrine? It
had been enough to have said, I find it so in Scripture, that is to
say, in your Laws, of which I am Interpreter, as sent by Christ. The
Interpreter therefore of the Scripture, to whose Interpretation the
Jews of Thessalonica were bound to stand, could be none: every one might
beleeve, or not beleeve, according as the Allegations seemed to himselfe
to be agreeable, or not agreeable to the meaning of the places alledged.
And generally in all cases of the world, hee that pretendeth any proofe,
maketh Judge of his proofe him to whom he addresseth his speech. And as
to the case of the Jews in particular, they were bound by expresse words
(Deut. 17.) to receive the determination of all hard questions, from
the Priests and Judges of Israel for the time being. But this is to bee
understood of the Jews that were yet unconverted.

For the Conversion of the Gentiles, there was no use of alledging the
Scriptures, which they beleeved not. The Apostles therefore laboured by
Reason to confute their Idolatry; and that done, to perswade them to the
faith of Christ, by their testimony of his Life, and Resurrection. So
that there could not yet bee any controversie concerning the authority
to Interpret Scripture; seeing no man was obliged during his infidelity,
to follow any mans Interpretation of any Scripture, except his
Soveraigns Interpretation of the Laws of his countrey.

Let us now consider the Conversion it self, and see what there was
therein, that could be cause of such an obligation. Men were converted
to no other thing then to the Beleef of that which the Apostles
preached: And the Apostles preached nothing, but that Jesus was the
Christ, that is to say, the King that was to save them, and reign over
them eternally in the world to come; and consequently that hee was not
dead, but risen again from the dead, and gone up into Heaven, and should
come again one day to judg the world, (which also should rise again to
be judged,) and reward every man according to his works. None of them
preached that himselfe, or any other Apostle was such an Interpreter
of the Scripture, as all that became Christians, ought to take their
Interpretation for Law. For to Interpret the Laws, is part of the
Administration of a present Kingdome; which the Apostles had not. The